Com. v. Matthews, P. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S09006-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    PAUL MICHAEL MATTHEWS
    Appellant               No. 1102 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order May 29, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002452-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                           FILED MARCH 11, 2016
    Appellant, Paul Michael Matthews, appeals from the order entered May
    29, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, which denied his
    Post Conviction Relief Act1 petition. Additionally, Matthews’s court-appointed
    counsel, John M. Hamme, Esquire, has filed an application to withdraw as
    counsel. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order and grant
    Attorney Hamme’s application to withdraw as counsel.
    Following a November 8, 2013 bench trial, the trial court found
    Matthews guilty of robbery, simple assault, and retail theft. 2 On January 8,
    2014, the court sentenced Matthews to a term of ten to twenty years
    imprisonment. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541, et seq.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1); 2701(a)(3); and 3929(a)(1), respectively..
    J-S09006-16
    Commonwealth v. Matthews, 
    116 A.3d 679
    (Pa. Super., filed Dec. 4,
    2014) (unpublished memorandum).
    Matthews filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court
    subsequently appointed PCRA counsel and held a hearing on the petition.
    Following the hearing, the PCRA court granted Matthews’ petition in part and
    modified   the   original   sentence   imposed   to   eight   to   twenty   years’
    imprisonment. The PCRA court denied the remaining claims. This timely
    appeal followed.
    We will first address counsel’s motion to withdraw. Pennsylvania law
    requires counsel seeking to withdraw from representing a petitioner under
    the PCRA to file a ‘no-merit’ letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
    
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (1988) (en banc). See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d 940
    , 947
    (Pa. Super. 2003).
    Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
    proceed ... under [Turner and Finley and] ... must review the
    case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-
    merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court,
    detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the
    case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to have reviewed,
    explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting
    permission to withdraw.
    Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no
    merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw;
    and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed
    pro se or by new counsel.
    ***
    -2-
    J-S09006-16
    [W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that ...
    satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court—trial
    court or this Court—must then conduct its own review of the
    merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
    claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
    withdraw and deny relief.
    Commonwealth v. Doty, 
    48 A.3d 451
    , 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
    omitted).
    Here,     counsel    has     complied     with   the   foregoing   procedural
    requirements.3 Accordingly, we will proceed to examine whether any of the
    issues counsel raises on appeal are of merit.
    I.      Whether the court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA
    petition when the Commonwealth violated the agreement
    made with Appellant at his preliminary hearing?
    II.     Whether the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA
    petition when Appellant did not knowingly or voluntarily
    waive his right to a jury trial in favor of a stipulated bench
    trial?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
    review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
    supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
    Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “[Our] scope of
    ____________________________________________
    3
    We note that although counsel incorrectly submitted his Turner/Finley
    letter as a brief pursuant to the requirements of Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), the procedure to withdraw from a direct appeal imposes
    stricter requirements than those imposed in a Turner/Finley withdrawal.
    See Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 
    866 A.2d 1109
    , 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super.
    2004).
    -3-
    J-S09006-16
    review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
    record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
    PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 
    36 A.3d 121
    , 131 (Pa.
    2012) (citation omitted).
    In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
    arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
    These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
    The issues Matthews raises in his PCRA petition could have been raised
    on direct appeal. Section 9544(b) of the PCRA states that, “[f]or purposes of
    this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but
    failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a
    prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). Matthews
    could have raised his current allegations—that the Commonwealth violated
    the preliminary hearing agreement and that his waiver of a jury trial was
    involuntary—at trial or on direct appeal. He did not. Therefore, we are
    constrained to find that these issues are waived.4 See id.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Notably, Matthews does not attribute his allegations of error to the
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel, nor does the record support such an
    assertion. Although the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion examined these
    claims as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, Matthews did not
    raise these issues in that light in his PCRA petition filed March 2, 2015. It is
    well settled that the “[f]ailure to state … a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA]
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-S09006-16
    We have conducted an independent review of the record and found no
    other issues of merit. Based on the foregoing, we agree with counsel’s
    conclusion that Matthews’ appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
    order of the PCRA court dismissing in part Matthews’s petition for post-
    conviction relief and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.
    Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel is granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/11/2016
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    petition shall preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any
    proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B).
    -5-