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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-15558
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cr-00154-SLB-SGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FREDERICK LAMAR BURNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(January 11, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Frederick Lamar Burnett appeals his convictions and 48-month sentence for
three counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Burnett contends the
district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony about his consultations
with prior legal counsel, in violation of the rules of evidence and his constitutional
right to present a complete defense. He further contends that, because the excluded
testimony would have been probative of his intent to defraud the Government, its
exclusion was not harmless. Burnett also contends the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a 48-month sentence, which he asserts is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable, because the district court erroneously calculated the
loss amount attributable to his fraud under the Guidelines. After review, we
affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Exclusion 1
“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986) (quotation omitted). Thus, a court may not exclude evidence that is crucial,
relevant, and necessary to establish a valid defense. United States v. Todd,
108
F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997). A criminal defendant must nevertheless
1
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Watkins,
880 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). “This standard grants the court substantial
leeway; reversal is appropriate only when the law, facts, or procedure was incorrectly applied or
when there is an otherwise clear error in judgment.”
Id.
2
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“comply with the procedural and evidentiary rules designed to facilitate a search
for the truth.” United States v. Frazier,
387 F.3d 1244, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). “[T]he Constitution leaves to the judges who must make these decisions
wide latitude to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant or
poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.”
Crane,
476 U.S. at 689–90 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Kimberly Ford’s
testimony. Burnett could not establish good-faith reliance on the advice of his
counsel because he did not “fully disclose[] to his attorney all material facts that
[we]re relevant to the advice for which he consulted the attorney.” See United
States v. Hill,
643 F.3d 807, 851 (11th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, the legal advice Burnett sought to admit was given in the limited
context of responding to a competitor’s bid challenge on only one of the three
contracts at issue. Its relevance beyond that context was, at best, marginal.
Indeed, Ford did not recall Burnett receiving any advice concerning the Berry
Amendment or its applicability. And Ford stated Burnett told his counsel he would
utilize only “very small” or “minute” foreign components when fulfilling the
backpack contract. Ford concluded that, had Burnett disclosed the true nature of
his plan to import substantial portions of the backpacks from China, his counsel
likely would have provided different advice.
3
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In any event, the thrust of what Ford remembered about the advice of
Burnett’s counsel—that Burnett could comply with the Buy American Act even if
he imported some of his components from China—was admitted through other
evidence. Thus, Ford’s testimony was largely cumulative. Given the marginal
relevance of Ford’s testimony on the issue of Burnett’s understanding of his
broader contractual obligations (particularly under the Berry Amendment), the
district court was within its discretion to determine that the probative value of
Ford’s testimony was outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury as to the scope
and legal effect of the advice Burnett received from his former counsel.
B. Sentencing 2
We need not determine whether the government-benefits rule should have
applied in this case. Nor must we determine the amount of loss properly attributed
to Burnett’s fraud. The district court stated that even “if [it] accepted the
defendant’s argument that the loss calculation should be zero, with the resulting
guideline range of four to ten months, the Court would have either varied or
upwardly departed to the sentence imposed.” USDC Doc. 101 at 37. And we have
held that an error in calculating a Guidelines range is harmless if: (1) the district
court stated it would impose the same sentence even if it decided the Guidelines
issue in the defendant’s favor; and (2) under the corrected Guidelines range, “the
2
We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Thompson,
702 F.3d 604, 606–07 (11th Cir. 2012).
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final sentence resulting from consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would still be
reasonable.” United States v. Keene,
470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006).
“Our review for reasonableness is deferential, and the party challenging the
sentence has the burden of establishing unreasonableness. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[t]he weight to be accorded any
given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district
court.”
Id. We will not “remand for resentencing if we are [not] left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
Id.
The district court in this case concluded a 48-month sentence was necessary
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide a just
punishment for Burnett’s crime, and deter similar conduct. It also was influenced
by its determination that Burnett perjured himself during the trial. In the end, its
sentence was far below the statutory maximum. See United States v. Stanley,
739
F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A sentence imposed well below the statutory
maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.”). And there is nothing
to suggest the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors in its
analysis, which it specifically stated would not change even if it were to consider
the lower Guidelines range advocated by Burnett. Under the circumstances, “we
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are [not] left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
clear error of judgment” in arriving at a 48-month sentence, which was within “the
range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” See
Clay, 483
F.3d at 743.
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Ford’s testimony
or imposing a 48-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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