United States v. Adjei ( 1998 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4520
SAMUEL ADJEI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(CR-97-204)
Submitted: February 27, 1998
Decided: March 18, 1998
Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
John Clifton Rand, LAW OFFICES OF J. C. RAND, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Patricia
S. Rim, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Adjei appeals from the district court order affirming his
conviction by a magistrate judge for possession of marijuana, in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1994). We affirm.
In October 1996, Park Police Officer Franz Ferstl noticed Adjei sit-
ting in a parked car in the Roach's Run turn-off on the George Wash-
ington Parkway in Arlington, Virginia. Ferstl checked the vehicle
because it was in a known narcotics area but did not see any suspi-
cious activity. Ferstl did notice, however, that the registration and
inspection stickers on the vehicle were expired. Ferstl approached the
vehicle and requested Adjei's license and registration. During this
time, Ferstl noticed that Adjei was aggressively chewing on some-
thing. Ferstl asked Adjei to step out from the vehicle and then asked
him what he had in his mouth. Adjei removed a large pink object
from his mouth, stated that it was bubble gum, and threw it aside onto
the pavement. Ferstl picked up the object and noticed that it was actu-
ally a pink piece of paper that contained marijuana. Ferstl then
arrested Adjei.
Adjei moved to suppress all evidence, and the magistrate judge
denied the motion. Adjei subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of
marijuana. Adjei then appealed the magistrate judge's denial of the
motion to suppress, and the district court affirmed. Adjei timely
appealed. On appeal, Adjei asserts that the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the encounter between Adjei and Ferstl
constituted custodial interrogation without Miranda* warnings.
A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the pro-
cedural safeguards prescribed by Miranda. See Stansbury v.
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*Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). For purposes of
Miranda, custodial interrogation is defined as"questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984). A person is
"in custody" if he "has been formally arrested or if he is questioned
under circumstances in which his freedom of action is curtailed `of
the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" United States v. Leshuk,
65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at
322).
In Berkemer, the Supreme Court noted that a traffic stop "signifi-
cantly curtails the `freedom of action' of the driver and the passen-
gers." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436. However, the Court went on to hold
that persons temporarily detained pursuant to ordinary traffic stops
are not `in custody' for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 440-41.
In the case at bar, we find that the facts and circumstances would
not have led a reasonable person to believe that the detention was not
temporary and that he would not be free to leave. See Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 437-42. Ferstl held Adjei's license and registration while writ-
ing a citation for a traffic violation and did not retain the license and
registration for any other purpose. Further, Ferstl asked Adjei one
question and did not force Adjei to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Adjei freely responded to the question by toss-
ing the object in his mouth onto the roadway. This was a voluntary
act and not an act indicative of interrogation. Because we find that
Adjei was not in custody for purposes of Miranda , we need not con-
sider the Government's contention that Adjei abandoned the mari-
juana.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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