Haygood v. ACM Medical Laboratory, Inc. , 642 F. App'x 27 ( 2016 )


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  • 15-2029
    Haygood v. ACM Medical Laboratory, Inc.,
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
    filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
    document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
    electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
    must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
    At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
    Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
    the 14th day of March, two thousand sixteen.
    Present:       ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    Chief Judge,
    AMALYA L. KEARSE,
    Circuit Judge,
    GREGORY H. WOODS,
    District Judge.*
    HAROLD L. HAYGOOD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    -v-                                  No. 15-2029
    ACM MEDICAL LABORATORY, INC.,
    and DAWN CRUZ, Homebound Services
    Supervisor, individually,
    Defendants-Appellees.**
    For Plaintiff-Appellant:                            Ryan C. Woodworth, Rochester, NY.
    *
    The Honorable Gregory H. Woods, of the United States District Court for the Southern District
    of New York, sitting by designation.
    **
    The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to conform to the above.
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    For Defendants-Appellees:                             Daniel J. Moore, Harris Beach PLLC,
    Pittsford, NY.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
    (Telesca, S.J.).
    ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Harold Haygood alleges that he was subject to racial discrimination, a hostile work
    environment, and unlawful retaliation by his supervisor, Dawn Cruz, during the two years he was
    employed by ACM Medical Laboratory, Inc. (“ACM”). Haygood, acting pro se, filed two
    substantially identical charges of discrimination on the same date, one with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and one with the New York State Division of
    Human Rights (the “Division”). The EEOC did not find any violations of anti-discrimination
    laws and sent Haygood a dismissal notice on January 30, 2014. The Division, which held a fact-
    finding conference to investigate the allegations, also dismissed Haygood’s complaint. Haygood
    appealed the Division’s determination to the EEOC, which issued a second dismissal notice on
    May 20. Both EEOC dismissal notices informed Haygood that he had 90 days to file suit or his
    right to sue based on those claims would be lost.
    On August 13, 2014, Haygood filed a complaint against ACM and Cruz, alleging
    violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State
    Human Rights Law. His complaint was filed within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s second
    dismissal notice, but more than 90 days after he received the first. The defendants jointly moved
    to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Western District of
    New York (Telesca, S.J.) granted the motion and dismissed all of Haygood’s claims. It
    determined that Haygood’s Title VII claims were untimely and denied him equitable tolling. The
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    court also concluded that Haygood’s § 1981 claims were collaterally estopped because he had a
    full and fair opportunity to litigate before the Division. Haygood now appeals on both grounds.
    We find that the district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, as
    Haygood’s complaint was filed well after the expiration of the 90-day deadline from his first
    dismissal notice. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    determining that Haygood had not met the “extraordinary” burden to invoke equitable tolling.
    See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
    544 U.S. 408
    , 418 (2005) (“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears
    the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
    (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”). As a unanimous Supreme Court
    recently “reaffirm[ed],” “the second prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the
    circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond its control.”
    Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. U.S., 
    136 S. Ct. 750
    , 756 (2016); see also Nat’l R.R.
    Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    , 113 (2002) (tolling should be “applied sparingly”).
    Although there is no indication here that Haygood sought two dismissal notices in a
    deliberate attempt to get around the statutory time limits, see, e.g., Soso Liang Lo v. Pan
    American World Airways, Inc., 
    787 F.2d 827
    (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam), the deadline stated in
    the first notice was controlling. Because Haygood’s filing was indisputably untimely and he has
    not shown any “extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling, we affirm the district
    court’s judgment dismissing the Title VII claims.
    We have examined the remainder of Haygood’s arguments and find them to be without
    merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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