Deivert, M. v. Pittsburgh Chauffeur ( 2018 )


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  • J-A06042-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    MATTHEW T. DEIVERT                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    PITTSBURGH CHAUFFEUR, LLC.            :
    :
    Appellant          :   No. 1314 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 1, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
    No(s): GD No 15-019904
    BEFORE:    BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:           FILED: April 2, 2018
    The learned Majority found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
    admission of testimony by the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Gregory Habib.       I,
    however, question how Dr. Habib’s opinion translated to legal causation based
    on accepted scientific methodology. Finding inadequate support in the law
    and the record at hand for the admission of Dr. Habib’s testimony, I
    respectfully dissent.
    Pa.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony on scientific
    knowledge, which includes medical knowledge, and provides as follows:
    A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
    experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
    opinion or otherwise if:
    (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A06042-18
    (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
    to determine a fact in issue; and
    (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
    field.
    Pa.R.E. 702. Rule 702 embodies the Frye test, derived from Frye v. United
    States, 
    293 F. 1013
    (D.C. Cir. 1923), and adopted in Pennsylvania in
    Commonwealth v. Topa, 
    369 A.2d 1277
    (Pa. 1977). “Frye only applies to
    determine if the relevant scientific community has generally accepted the
    principles and methodology the scientist employs. . . .” Grady v. Frito-Lay,
    Inc., 
    839 A.2d 1038
    , 1043–1044 (Pa. 2003). The Frye test does not require
    proof “that the scientific community has also generally accepted the expert’s
    conclusion.” 
    Id. at 1045.
    In light of Frye, “expert testimony must be based
    on more than mere personal belief and must be supported by reference to
    facts, testimony or empirical data.” Snizavich v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
    83 A.3d 191
    , 195 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    I take issue in this case with the methodology Dr. Habib employed to
    reach his causation conclusion.   This Court has addressed the meaning of
    “methodology” as follows:
    As The Supreme Court observed in [Daubert v. Merrell Dow
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    (1993)], “‘Scientific
    methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing
    them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is
    what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.’”
    
    Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593
    , . . . quoting Green, Expert Witnesses
    and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The
    Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L.Rev.
    643, 645 (1992). Stated differently, the scientific method is “a
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    method of research in which a problem is identified, relevant data
    are gathered, a hypothesis is formulated from these data, and the
    hypothesis is empirically tested.”        Webster’s Encyclopedic
    Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (“Webster’s”)
    1279 (1989). Within the meaning of the definition of the scientific
    method, “empirical” means “provable or verifiable by experience
    or experiment.” 
    Id. [at] 468.
    Key aspects of the scientific method
    include the ability to test or verify a scientific experiment by a
    parallel experiment or other standard of comparison (control) and
    to replicate the experiment to expose or reduce error. 
    Id. [at] 318–319,
    1217.
    Trach v. Fellin, 
    817 A.2d 1102
    , 1113 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).
    Dr. Habib used the methodology of extrapolation. “Extrapolation is not
    science: in fact, it is a logical method used to estimate the value of a variable
    outside its tabulated or observed range” or “to infer (that which is not known)
    from that which is known.”       
    Trach, 817 A.2d at 1114
    (citation omitted).
    Extrapolation has gained general acceptance in the scientific community under
    certain limited circumstances:    “[W]hen the medical inquiry is new or the
    opportunities to examine a specific cause and effect relationship are limited;
    when the number of cases limits study of the disease; or . . . when ethical
    considerations prevent exposing individuals to a toxic substance for research
    purposes.” 
    Id. at 1116
    (citation omitted).
    Dr. Habib, an orthopedic surgeon, did not treat the plaintiff and did not
    reference any literature or cases of burns arising from this specific type of
    situation. In fact, he repeatedly characterized the plaintiff’s burn as a “unique
    situation.” Dr. Habib’s Deposition, 5/3/17, at 19, 27, 32, 44, 47, 48, 50, 60.
    In extrapolating that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the same
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    biomechanics as a bed sore or a friction burn, Dr. Habib failed, however, to
    divulge the underlying scientific foundation for his opinion.       Contrary to
    established scientific methodology, Dr. Habib did not “assemble all of the
    information,” “perform a weight of the evidence evaluation,” and decide,
    “based on the most credible work, what story is being told” as to the creation
    of a full-thickness friction burn from a twenty-minute ride in a cramped
    limousine.   See Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 
    44 A.3d 27
    , 38 (Pa. 2012)
    (illustrating how medical expert’s extrapolated conclusion that any inhalation
    of asbestos fiber was substantial factor in causing mesothelioma was not
    based on accepted scientific method).       See also Checchio v. Frankford
    Hospital–Torresdale Division, 
    717 A.2d 1058
    (Pa. Super. 1998) (affirming
    inadmissibility of experts’ testimony that was based “entirely on [their] own
    observations and experience in the field without any reference to outside
    sources on which [they] might predicate [their] findings”); Snizavich, 
    83 A.3d 191
    (rejecting expert’s testimony because it failed to demonstrate “any
    scientific basis, other than his own subjective beliefs”). Cf. Harris v. NGK
    North American, Inc., 
    19 A.3d 1053
    (Pa. Super. 2011) (reversing exclusion
    of expert’s testimony that referenced outside data that supported the causal
    relationship he asserted).
    Indeed, I see no indication in Dr. Habib’s report of the scientific method:
    Dr. Habib did not provide any description of a complete review of the wound
    care, friction burn, or dermatology literature that exists. He did not discuss
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    J-A06042-18
    whether the literature was adequate or not.           He did not summarize that
    literature. In fact, Dr. Habib made no mention, let alone synthesis, of the
    literature.    Additionally, Dr. Habib did not discuss the strengths and
    weaknesses of various studies or case reports related to wound care, friction
    burns, or dermatologic reactions that he relied upon. In fact, Dr. Habib did
    not rely on any studies or case reports.1          Dr. Habib provided no specific
    information regarding how much pressure, heat, and time are required to
    cause a full-thickness wound; how the patient’s age and health affect the
    formation of a full-thickness wound; how environmental, genetic, and/or pre-
    existing conditions affect the formation of a full-thickness wound. In short,
    Dr. Habib offered no science in support of his conclusion that a twenty-minute
    ride in a cramped limousine caused a full-thickness wound.
    What I do see is an opinion based “on subjective assessments of both
    cause and effect.” 
    Checchio, 717 A.2d at 1062
    . Dr. Habib jumped from a
    general hypothesis, i.e., pressure and heat can cause sores, to a specific
    conclusion, i.e., the plaintiff’s twenty-minute ride in a cramped limousine
    caused a full-thickness wound.            This approach disregards the generally
    accepted methodology for looking at causation in that Dr. Habib’s opinion was
    ____________________________________________
    1  Cf. 
    Trach, 817 A.2d at 1119
    (affirming admission of medical testimony as
    to causation where expert reviewed patient’s medical records and medical
    literature and extrapolated from the documented adverse effects of Doxepin
    in recommended doses, which effects were derived from clinical trials and
    clinical experience with Doxepin at therapeutic levels, to conclude that
    patient’s injuries resulted from a massive overdose of Doxepin).
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    J-A06042-18
    not based upon extrapolating from a sound scientific principle logically applied
    in a manner that can be affirmatively articulated, referenced, reviewed,
    tested, and empirically verified.    
    Betz, 44 A.3d at 39
    (citing trial court
    opinion). Rather, his testimony strikes me as the “best estimate,” the “gut
    instinct,” or the “educated guess” of an orthopedic surgeon in the context of
    a unique fact pattern. 
    Id. This Court
    has opined, “[T]he breadth and character of an expert’s
    extrapolations are relevant to the scientific acceptance of his methodology.
    The alternative is to permit experts to evade a reasoned Frye inquiry merely
    by making references to accepted methods in the abstract.” 
    Betz, 44 A.3d at 58
    . Dr. Habib’s methodology is based on the use of abstract assertions about
    the formation of bedsores or friction burns to reach a specific conclusion about
    the plaintiff’s injury. At a minimum, the trial court should have conducted a
    Frye hearing. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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