Com. v. Plowden, T. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TYSHAWN PLOWDEN,
Appellee No. 143 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order January 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0002528-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2016
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”),
appeals from the January 6, 2015 order granting Tyshawn Plowden’s
(“Plowden”) Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motion to dismiss and dismissing the charges
against Plowden with prejudice. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history, as follows:
The parties have stipulated, in accordance with the record, that
the Rule 600 time limits expired on December 27, 2014. A
review of the record reveals that on June 9, 2014, defendant
filed a Petition for Nominal Bail Pursuant to Rule 600, and
therein alleged that the 180-day time period for bringing him to
trial expired on June 9, 2014. On June 19, 2014, the Honorable
Gerard Long of this [c]ourt granted defendant’s Petition and set
bond at $1.00. On July 11, 2014, defendant was released from
the Cambria County Prison and was extradited to the State of
New York, following an extradition hearing on July 3, 2014.
At the January 5, 2015 hearing [on the Rule 600 motion],
the Commonwealth offered a written log and oral testimony from
Detective Lia DeMarco relative to the Commonwealth’s efforts to
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secure defendant from the State of New York from July 2014 to
present. See 1/5/15 Com. Exhibit A. At [the] hearing, Detective
DeMarco testified, in response to questioning by the Court, that
when the Cambria County Prison, in July 2014, inquired with the
Commonwealth as to whether defendant could be extradited to
the State of New York, the Commonwealth did not object to the
extradition. N.T. 1/5/15 at p. 24. The Detective also admitted
that prior to [Plowden’s] release from the Cambria County
Prison, no one scrutinized the charges . . . pending in Cambria
County. N.T. 1/5/15 at p. 24. However, she further testified that
since this case, the Commonwealth’s protocol has changed. N.T.
1/5/15 at pp. 24-25. Additionally, counsel for the
Commonwealth freely admitted that the Commonwealth should
have known that there were charges pending against defendant,
should have more closely taken action prior to his release to the
State of New York, and are now attempting to rectify the errors.
N.T. 1/5/15 at pp. 29-30.
Testimony was also presented at the January 5, 2015
hearing that the Commonwealth started proceeding pursuant to
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) on September
24, 2014. N.T. 1/5/15 at p. 40. However formal written demand
was not filed until October 9, 2014. Id. Thereafter, on
December 12, 2014, as a “backup” plan, the Commonwealth also
began proceedings pursuant to the Uniform Extradition Act, as
Detective DeMarco learned from the State of New York that she
needed to obtain a governor’s warrant from Harrisburg. N.T.
1/5/15 at pp. 41-42.
On December 4, 2014, the last scheduled Jury Selection
date prior to the Rule 600 run date of December 27, 2014, the
Court specially set another Jury Selection date of December 16,
2014 to accommodate the Rule 600 time frame. However,
defendant was not present on either December 4th or December
16th, given that he was incarcerated in New York. In fact, as of
the January 5, 2015 hearing date, the defendant had still not
been returned to Cambria County, but his trial date was set for
January 8, 2015, and the Cambria County Sheriff’s Office had
made arrangements to transport defendant from upstate New
York to Cambria County on January 7, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/15, at 3–4. Based upon these facts, the trial court
granted Plowden’s Rule 600 motion and dismissed the criminal charges
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pending against him with prejudice. The trial court also denied as moot
Plowden’s objection to the court conducting the January 5, 2015 hearing in
his absence. Trial Court Order, 1/6/15, at unnumbered 2.
The Commonwealth raises a single issue for our consideration on
appeal:
Whether the trial court erred when it granted [Plowden’s] motion
to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure
600(D)(1) when the Commonwealth clearly exercised due
diligence in timely prosecuting [Plowden].
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.1
In evaluating a Rule 600 issue:
our standard of review of a trial court’s decision is whether the
trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires
action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances
judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if
in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or
the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence
or the record, discretion is abused.
The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on
the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the
findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court
is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600].
Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the
protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right
to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those
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1
Plowden did not file an appellate brief in this matter.
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contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule
[600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from
good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the
Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of
the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy
trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a
manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime.
In considering [these] matters . . . courts must carefully factor
into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the
individual accused, but the collective right of the community to
vigorous law enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 283–284 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super.
2007) (en banc)).
In pertinent part, Rule 600 provides as follows:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
* * *
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed
against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from
the date on which the complaint is filed.
* * *
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from
the computation.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of delay caused
by the defendant shall be excluded from the computation of the
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length of time of any pretrial incarceration. Any other periods of
delay shall be included in the computation.
(D) Remedies
(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the
time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial,
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented,
may file a written motion requesting that the charges be
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney
for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall
conduct a hearing on the motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (A)(2)(a), (C)(1) and (2), and (D)(1).
This Court has outlined the requirements for the calculation of the
relevant Rule 600 time period in the following manner:
The first step in determining whether a technical violation of Rule
600 has occurred is to calculate the “mechanical run date.”
Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must
commence under Rule 600. Id. It is calculated by ascertaining
the number of days in which the Commonwealth must
commence trial under Rule 600 and counting from the date on
which the criminal complaint was filed. Id. The mechanical run
date can be modified or extended by adding any periods of time
in which the defendant causes delay. Id. Once the mechanical
run date is modified accordingly, it then becomes an “adjusted
run date.” Id.Rule 600 takes into account both “excludable time” and
“excusable delay.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234,
1241 (Pa. Super. 2004). “Excludable time” is defined in Rule
600(C) as the period of time between the filing of the written
complaint and the defendant’s arrest, provided that the
defendant could not be apprehended because his whereabouts
[were] unknown and could not be determined by due diligence;
any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule
600; and/or such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings
as results from: (a) the unavailability of the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney; and/or (b) any continuance granted at the
request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney. Id. (citing
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)). The “due diligence” required under Rule
600(C)(1) pertains to the Commonwealth’s efforts to apprehend
the defendant. Id. at 1241 n.10. The other aspects of Rule
600(C) defining “excludable time” do not require a showing of
due diligence by the Commonwealth. Id. “Excusable delay” is
not expressly defined in Rule 600, but the legal construct takes
into account delays which occur as a result of circumstances
beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due
diligence. See id. at 1241-42 (explaining manner in which
excludable time, excusable delay and due diligence are to be
determined); see also DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 431 (discussing
excludable time and excusable delay).
Commonwealth v. Murray, 879 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal
citations modified).
With regard to the due diligence analysis in the case sub judice, the
trial court concluded the following:
[I]t is clear that once defendant was granted nominal bond on
June 19, 2014, the Commonwealth was on notice that Rule 600
would again be violated in 180 days, absent any proper defense
continuances. The record also reveals that, despite having
knowledge of New York’s extradition proceedings, at no time did
the Commonwealth request a stay from extradition. In fact, the
Commonwealth waited until October 9, 2014 to file any formal
written documents to initiate defendant’s return. Again, as of
January 5, 2015, the Commonwealth still had not transported
defendant for trial.
Accordingly, we find that the Commonwealth did not act
with due diligence in procuring defendant’s person for trial, and
that the circumstances occasioning the delay in trial were not
beyond the Commonwealth’s control. Consistent with the
aforesaid, and in consideration of the entire record, the appeal
should be dismissed.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/15, at 4–5.
The Commonwealth’s position on appeal is that the trial court’s
decision to grant Plowden’s Rule 600 motion was reasoned primarily by the
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trial court’s disapproval of the Commonwealth’s initial failure to contest
Plowden’s extradition to New York in July of 2014. Despite acknowledging
certain of its missteps regarding Plowden’s extradition to New York and the
delay in initiating detainer proceedings, the Commonwealth asserts that it
should have been accorded at least twelve more days of excusable delay
relative to its diligent efforts to transport Plowden from New York for trial.
The Commonwealth also argues that Plowden’s objection to the extradition
proceedings constitutes excludable time which should have factored into the
trial court’s Rule 600 calculation.
Our review of the certified record and the transcript from the Rule 600
hearing reveals that Detective Lia DeMarco, of the Cambria County District
Attorney’s Office, who was responsible for extradition requests, detailed her
efforts to secure Plowden’s return from New York. N.T., 1/5/15, at 10, 14–
28; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit A, 1/6/15, at unnumbered 1–3.
Detective DeMarco acknowledged that the Commonwealth was not aware of
criminal charges pending in Cambria County against Plowden and did not
object to Plowden’s extradition to New York in July of 2014. N.T., 1/5/15, at
10, 13. Detective DeMarco then recounted that beginning in October of
2014, she prepared and transmitted the necessary paperwork to New York
to commence proceedings under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9101, et seq. (“IAD”). Id. at 40. However, according to the
detective, rather than conducting an IAD hearing, the New York authorities
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instead held an extradition hearing. On December 11, 2014, Plowden
refused to waive extradition. Id. at 20–21. The next day, on instruction
from the state of New York, Detective DeMarco initiated proceedings under
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9121, et seq. (“UCEA”),
which necessitated procuring a governor’s warrant from the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.2 Id. at 41. On December 12, 2014, Detective DeMarco
forwarded the request for the governor’s warrant to the appropriate office in
Harrisburg. Id. At this point, Detective DeMarco’s narration of the ensuing
procedures became rather vague.3 What we glean from the remainder of
Detective DeMarco’s testimony is that, despite the commencement of the
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2
Section 9123 of the UCEA provides:
§ 9123. Duty of Governor with respect to fugitives from
justice
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all
acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of
the Governor of this Commonwealth to have arrested and
delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the
United States any person charged in that state with treason,
felony or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in
this Commonwealth.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9123. The New York UCEA statute mimics this language. See
McKinney’s CPL § 570.06
3
The imprecise nature of Detective DeMarco’s recollection is understandable
because she was on maternity leave from her position beginning on
December 19, 2014, and was apparently reconstructing the events occurring
after that date by reference to receipts. N.T., 1/5/15, at 19, 42.
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UCEA proceedings, Plowden was eventually transported to Cambria County
under the auspices of the IAD. Id. at 42. To effectuate the transfer,
Detective DeMarco “overnighted” the IAD forms on December 22, 2014, to
the Pennsylvania IAD Administrator, who, in turn, submitted the forms to
the state of New York on December 29, 2014. Id. at 42–43. Detective
DeMarco could not pinpoint the date that Plowden was available to be picked
up from New York custody, only that it was sometime after December 19,
2014. Id. at 54. In any event, the Cambria County Sheriff’s Office made
arrangements to transport Plowden from New York on January 7, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/15, at 4.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the Commonwealth argued
generally it was entitled to twelve days of excusable delay because “certain
things happened here that were beyond our control even though we
attempted and tried to get [Plowden] back.” N.T., 1/5/15, at 60. The
Commonwealth admitted that it should “probably have acted sooner than
October [of 2014],” id. at 61, but urged that New York’s failure to
expeditiously hold an IAD hearing, in addition to that jurisdiction’s decision
to instead hold an extradition hearing, resulted in “additional delay that
[was] out of our hands.” Id. at 63.
Our case law requires the Commonwealth to act diligently to bring a
case to trial and to present evidence supporting its diligence at the Rule 600
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hearing. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780 (Pa.
Super. 2013):
[A] Rule 600 motion shall be denied if the Commonwealth acted
with due diligence in attempting to try the defendant timely and
the circumstances occasioning the delay were beyond the
Commonwealth’s control. Commonwealth v. Riley, 19 A.3d
1146, 1148–1149 (Pa. Super. 2011); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G).
Thus, if the Commonwealth acted with due diligence and the
delay in question was beyond the Commonwealth’s control, the
delay is excusable. Riley, 19 A.3d at 1148–1149.
Id. at 786. See also Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102 (if defendant’s trial takes
place outside of the adjusted run date, pursuant to Rule 600(G), it must
then be determined whether the delay occurred despite the Commonwealth’s
due diligence); Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa. Super.
2013) (Rule 600 provides for dismissal of charges in cases in where the
defendant has not been brought to trial within the term of the adjusted run
date, after subtracting all excludable time and excusable delay that occurs
as a result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and
despite its due diligence). Conversely, if the Commonwealth was not
attentive to the progression of the case, any ensuing delay will not be
excluded. Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. Super.
2014) (Rule 600 violation occurred when Commonwealth failed to exercise
due diligence to try the appellant within 365 days of filing of the criminal
complaint).
The Commonwealth’s broad assertion that it diligently pursued
Plowden’s return from New York does not warrant relief as it has not
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satisfactorily identified twelve days of excusable delay. The Commonwealth
has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it
exercised due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial. Commonwealth v.
Bradford, 146 A.3d 693, 701 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). The due
diligence inquiry is fact-specific, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 702.
Even cognizant of the oft-referenced phrase that the Commonwealth
need not demonstrate “perfect vigilance and punctilious care,”
Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010), we cannot
conclude that the Commonwealth herein put forth a reasonable effort to
demonstrate entitlement to additional credit for excusable delay. The only
specific cited by the Commonwealth to support its claim of improper Rule
600 calculation is that “[Plowden] failed to waive extradition on December
11, 2014 necessitating further work for the Commonwealth. This garners
the Commonwealth the requisite excusable delay and excludable time.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 11 (record reference omitted). The
Commonwealth, however, makes no attempt to detail further the number of
days that should have been excludable due to Plowden’s failure to waive
extradition or describe the extra work necessitated by Plowden’s actions
which might be considered as excusable delay. Therefore, the
Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of proof that it acted with due
diligence to bring Plowden to trial within the time dictates of Rule 600.
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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
P.J.E. Ford Elliott joins the memorandum.
Judge Ott files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/8/2016
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