Union Planters Bank, National Association v. Neal Doniphan Rogers, Jr. ( 2003 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CA-02221-SCT
UNION PLANTERS BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
v.
NEAL DONIPHAN ROGERS, JR.,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
HELEN ROGERS, DECEASED,
a/k/a HELEN K. ROGERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/04/2003
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES J. SWAYZE, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: NATHAN P. ADAMS, JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 04/28/2005
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
WALLER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Mississippi – the interpretation of
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-4-406 (Rev. 2002), which imposes duties on banks and their customers
insofar as forgeries are concerned. The case arises from a series of forgeries made by one
person on four checking accounts maintained by Helen Rogers at the Union Planters Bank. We
find that the circuit judge erred in denying Union Planters’ motion for JNOV because, under
§ 75-4-406, Rogers failed to inspect her bank statements in a timely manner and because
Rogers produced no evidence that Union Planters had failed to exercise ordinary care or that
Union Planters acted with bad faith in paying the checks.
FACTS
¶2. Neal D. and Helen K. Rogers 1 maintained four checking accounts with the Union
Planters Bank in Greenville, Washington County, Mississippi. Each of these four accounts had
originally been opened at banks (the Sunburst Bank, the Magnolia Federal Savings Bank; and
the Washington Federal Savings Bank) which later merged with Union Planters. The Rogers
were both in their eighties when the events which gave rise to this lawsuit took place. After
Neal became bedridden, Helen hired Jackie Reese to help her take care of Neal and to do
chores and errands.
¶3. In September of 2000, Reese began writing checks on the Rogerses’ four accounts and
forged Helen’s name on the signature line. Some of the checks were made out to “cash,” some
to “Helen K. Rogers,” and some to “Jackie Reese.” The following chart summarizes the
forgeries to each account:2
1
Neal Rogers died prior to the institution of this lawsuit. Helen Rogers died after
Union Planters filed this appeal. We have substituted Helen’s estate as appellee.
2
Detailed lists of the forged checks are found as attachments to the complaint and will
not be reproduced in this opinion.
2
ACCOUNT NUMBER AMOUNT
NUMBER BEGINNING ENDING OF CHECKS OF CHECKS
54282309 11/27/2000 6/18/2001 46 $16,635.00
0039289441 9/27/2000 1/25/2001 10 $2,701.00
6100110922 11/29/2000 8/13/2001 29 $9,297.00
6404000343 11/20/2000 8/16/2001 83 $29,765.00
TOTAL 168 $58,398.00
¶4. Neal died in late May of 2001. Shortly thereafter, the Rogerses’ son, Neal, Jr., began
helping Helen with financial matters. Together they discovered that many bank statements
were missing and that there was not as much money in the accounts as they had thought.3 In
June of 2001, they contacted Union Planters and asked for copies of the missing bank
statements. In September of 2001, Helen was advised by Union Planters to contact the police
due to forgeries made on her accounts. More specific dates and facts leading up to the
discovery of the forgeries are not found in the record.
¶5. Subsequently, criminal charges were brought against Reese. 4 In the meantime, Helen
filed suit against Union Planters, alleging conversion (unlawful payment of forged checks) and
negligence. After a trial, the jury awarded Helen $29,595 in damages, and the circuit court
entered judgment accordingly. From this judgment, Union Planters appeals.
3
For instance, Helen thought one account balance should have been around $17,000.00,
when it was in fact around $800.00.
4
The record does not reveal the disposition of the criminal proceedings against Reese.
3
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT JUDGE ERRED IN
DENYING UNION PLANTERS’ MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION.
¶6. After its acquisition of the Sunburst Bank, the Magnolia Federal Savings Bank and the
Washington Federal Savings Bank, Union Planters sent many mailings to its customers
outlining the duties and responsibilities of the bank to the customers and of the customers to
the bank. Contained in one of the mail-outs was an arbitration clause which included the
following language:
BY SIGNING A SIGNATURE CARD AND USING YOUR
ACCOUNT YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. BY SIGNING YOUR
SIGNATURE CARD YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE
READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE WAIVER OF YOUR RIGHT
TO A JURY TRIAL OR TRIAL BY A JUDGE IN A PUBLIC
COURT.
The circuit judge ruled that the arbitration clause was not enforceable because, even though
Rogers had signed signature cards with the individual banks prior to merger, she had never
signed a signature card for Union Planters containing an arbitration clause.
¶7. Union Planters argues that whether Rogers signed a Union Planters signature card is
immaterial because many of the mail-outs had the following or similar language: “Your
continued use of the Account evidences your agreement to any amendment.” Since Rogers
continued to use her accounts, it contends, she agreed to the amendment which added the
arbitration clause. Union Planters also cites to Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, 113
4
F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000), aff’d, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001), which dealt with
almost identical facts. There, United States District Judge Walter Gex held as follows:
When the plaintiffs signed their initial signature cards
[from a bank before it merged with Union Planters], they agreed
that the terms and conditions of their deposit accounts could
change in the future upon sufficient notice. It is undisputed that
the plaintiffs were given notice in March of 1998 that their
accounts were being revised to include an arbitration clause. It is
further undisputed that the plaintiffs continued to use their
accounts after the effective date of the arbitration clause. . . .
***
The cover letter accompanying the “revised Deposit
Account Agreement” explicitly informed the plaintiffs that the
revised deposit agreement contained “important information
about [the depositor’s] [sic] account.” After reviewing the letter
and revised deposit agreement, the Court finds that the plaintiffs
were sufficiently notified that the terms and conditions of their
accounts would change . . . . The plaintiffs’ apparent failure to
read the revisions to their accounts is irrelevant to the issue of
whether they agreed to arbitrate or are subject to those changes.
***
The absence of the plaintiffs’ signature on a new card does
not alter the fact that the plaintiffs accepted the terms of the
arbitration agreement by continuing to utilize their accounts. The
plaintiffs could have simply declined to accept the arbitration
provision by terminating their account before the effective date
of the amendment. Because the plaintiffs continued performance
under the revised deposit agreements. . , the Court finds that the
plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate their disputes with Union Planters.
113 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32 (citations omitted).
5
¶8. A review of arbitration law and contract law leads us to a different conclusion.
Submitting to arbitration means giving up the right to file a lawsuit in a court of competent
jurisdiction. Waiving that right requires more than implied consent:
Waiver presupposes full knowledge of a right existing, and an
intentional surrender or relinquishment of that right. It
contemplates something done designedly or knowingly, which
modifies or changes existing rights or varies or changes the terms
and conditions of a contract. It is the voluntary surrender of a
right. To establish a waiver, there must be shown an act or
omission on the part of the one charged with the waiver fairly
evidencing an intention permanently to surrender the right alleged
to have been waived.
Ewing v. Adams, 573 So. 2d 1364, 1369 (Miss. 1990). We find absolutely no evidence that
either of the Rogerses voluntarily and knowingly waived their right to access to the courts. As
another federal district court has held:
[T]his court has no hesitation in finding that the parties never
agreed to arbitration and that plaintiff did not waive her right to
seek adjudication of her claims in court. The application was the
only document plaintiff ever signed; there is, of course, no
mention in its contents of the arbitration endorsement. That
endorsement is part of the insurance contract which plaintiff
received upon completion of the application process. When
plaintiff received the policy, she was given the option of
"return[ing] it for any reason," in which case, the policy was "void
from the beginning...." There was no notice, no discussion, and no
negotiation of the arbitration endorsement, circumstances, which,
in this court's view, hardly signify either agreement or waiver.
The arbitration endorsement is therefore not enforceable, and this
matter may proceed in this court.
McCreary v. Liberty Nat'l Life, 6 F. Supp. 2d 920, 920-21 (N.D. Miss. 1998) (quoted with
favor in Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Battle, 873 So. 2d 79, 83 (Miss. 2004)). See also
6
Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (arbitration
agreement not binding without express or implicit consent by customer); Gustavsson v.
Washington Mut. Bank, 850 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (same); DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626 (Md. 2003) (citing Mattingly v. Hughes Electronics Corp., 810
A.2d 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)) (where contract mandated written notice of changes and
written notice of addition of arbitration clause was not given, arbitration was not binding on
customer).
¶9. As in McCreary and Pre-Paid, the Rogerses signed signature cards for the four banks
prior to their merger with Union Planters, and these signature cards did not contain arbitration
provisions.
¶10. The use of basic contract construction rules also leads us to the conclusion that the
Rogerses were not bound by Union Planters’ arbitration provision. A cardinal rule of
construction of a contract is to ascertain the mutual intentions of the parties. Miss. Transp.
Comm’n v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 753 So. 2d 1077, 1084 (Miss. 2000). Intent
should first be sought in an objective reading of the words employed in the contract. Id. We
find that the general provisions of the mail-outs and the specific provisions of the arbitration
clause are in conflict (i.e., the general provisions require “use” of the account only, whereas
the specific provisions of the arbitration clause require “use” of the account and the execution
of a signature card), causing ambiguity. Ambiguities in a contract are to be construed against
the party who drafted the contract. Id. at 1085. And specific language controls over general
7
inconsistent language in a contract. Id. Construing the ambiguities against Union Planters, the
drafter of the contract, we find that the specific provisions of the arbitration clause supplant
the general provisions.
¶11. Therefore, because Rogers did not execute a new signature card after Union Planters
bought out the various banks, the arbitration clause does not apply to her, and the circuit judge
was correct in denying Union Planters’ motion to compel arbitration.
¶12. We are aware that there is a split in authority on this issue and that other jurisdictions
which have held that the right of access to the courts may be implicitly waived. Cf., e.g.,
Jureczki v. Banc One Texas, N.A., 252 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 75 Fed. Appx. 272(5th Cir. 2003) (arbitration agreement in force at time of execution of bank signature card
valid even though customer claimed ignorance thereof); Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D.
574 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (notice of change of terms in credit card agreement sufficient to bind
customer to arbitration provision where customer continued to use account); SouthTrust Bank
v. Williams, 775 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 2000) (same). However, we find that waiving the right to
have access to the courts is something much more significant and of a different character than
changing the terms and conditions of a bank account, assent for which can be obtained simply
by the continued use of the account. See McCreary, Stone, Gustavsson and Mattingly, supra.
II. WHETHER ROGERS’ DELAY IN DETECTING THE
FORGERIES BARRED SUIT AGAINST UNION
PLANTERS.
8
¶13. The relationship between Rogers and Union Planters is governed by Article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, enacted in Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-4-101 through -504 (Rev.
2002). Section 75-4-406(a) & (c)5 provide that a bank customer has a duty to discover and
report “unauthorized signatures”; i.e., forgeries.6 Section 4-406 of the UCC reflects an
underlying policy decision that furthers the UCC’s “objective of promoting certainty and
predictability in commercial transactions.” The UCC facilitates financial transactions,
benefitting both consumers and financial institutions, by allocating responsibility among the
parties according to whomever is best able to prevent a loss. Because the customer is more
5
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-4-406(a) & (c) (Rev. 2002) provide as follows:
(a) A bank that sends or makes available to a customer a statement of
account showing payment of items for the account shall either return or
make available to the customer the items paid or provide information in
the statement of account sufficient to allow the customer reasonable to
identify the items paid. The statement of account provides sufficient
information if the items is described by item number, amount, and date
of payment.
***
(c) If a bank sends or makes available a statement of account or items
pursuant to subsection (a), the customer must exercise reasonable
promptness in examining the statement or the items to determine
whether any payment was not authorized because of . . . a purported
signature by or on behalf of the customer was not authorized. If, based
on the statement or items provided, the customer should reasonably have
discovered the unauthorized payment, the customer must promptly notify
the bank of the relevant facts.
6
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-3-403(a) (Rev. 2002) states that “an unauthorized signature is
ineffective except as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good
faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.”
9
familiar with his own signature, and should know whether or not he authorized a particular
withdrawal or check, he can prevent further unauthorized activity better than a financial
institution which may process thousands of transactions in a single day. Section 4-406
acknowledges that the customer is best situated to detect unauthorized transactions on his own
account by placing the burden on the customer to exercise reasonable care to discover and
report such transactions. The customer’s duty to exercise this care is triggered when the bank
satisfies its burden to provide sufficient information to the customer. As a result, if the bank
provides sufficient information, the customer bears the loss when he fails to detect and notify
the bank about unauthorized transactions. See, e.g., Am. Airlines Employees Fed. Credit
Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. 2000).
A. Union Planters’ Duty to Provide Information under § 75-4-406(a).
¶14. The court admitted into evidence copies of all Union Planters statements sent to Rogers
during the relevant time period. Enclosed with the bank statements were either the cancelled
checks themselves or copies of the checks relating to the period of time of each statement.
The evidence shows that all bank statements and cancelled checks were sent, via United States
Mail, postage prepaid, to all customers at their “designated address” each month. Rogers
introduced no evidence to the contrary. We therefore find that the bank fulfilled its duty of
making the statements available to Rogers and that the remaining provisions of § 75-4-406 are
applicable to the case at bar. See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Baker, 122 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2003) (bank’s duty under § 4-406 is satisfied when bank sends regular monthly
statements to customer).
10
¶15. In defense of her failure to inspect the bank statements, Rogers claims that she never
received the bank statements and cancelled checks. Even if this allegation is true,7 it does not
excuse Rogers from failing to fulfill her duties under § 75-4-406(a) & (c) because the statute
clearly states a bank discharges its duty in providing the necessary information to a customer
when it “sends . . . to a customer a statement of account showing payment of items.” See Miss.
Code Ann. § 75-4-406(a) (emphasis added). See also Stowell v. Cloquet Co-op Credit Union,
557 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1997) (once bank statements placed in mail, account holder bears risk
statements will be lost or intercepted). The word “receive” is absent. The customer’s duty to
inspect and report does not arise when the statement is received, as Rogers claims; the
customer’s duty to inspect and report arises when the bank sends the statement to the
customer’s address. A reasonable person who has not received a monthly statement from the
bank would promptly ask the bank for a copy of the statement. Here, Rogers claims that she
did not receive numerous statements. We find that she failed to act reasonably when she failed
to take any action to replace the missing statements.
B. Rogers’ Duty to Report the Forgeries under § 75-4-406(d).
¶16. A customer who has not promptly notified a bank of an irregularity may be precluded
from bringing certain claims against the bank:
(d) If the bank proves that the customer failed, with respect to
an item, to comply with the duties imposed on the
7
Since there was a series of forged checks, it is reasonable to assume that Reese
intercepted the bank statements before Rogers could inspect them. However, Union Planters
cannot be held liable for Reese’s fraudulent concealment.
11
customer by subsection (c), the customer is precluded
from asserting against the bank:
(1) The customer’s unauthorized signature . . . on the
item, if the bank also proves that it suffered a loss
by reason of the failure; . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-4-406(d)(1).
¶17. Also, when there is a series of forgeries, § 75-4-406(d)(2) places additional duties on
the customer:
(2) The customer’s unauthorized signature . . . by the
same wrongdoer on any other item paid in good
faith by the bank if the payment was made before
the bank received notice from the customer of the
unauthorized signature . . . and after the customer
had been afforded a reasonable period of time, not
exceeding thirty (30) days, in which to examine the
item or statement of account and notify the bank.
Id. A bank may shorten the customer’s thirty-day period for notifying the bank of a series of
forgeries, and here, Union Planters shortened the thirty-day period to fifteen days. The statute
states that a customer must report a series of forgeries within “a reasonable period of time, not
exceeding thirty (30) days, . .” “The 30-day period is an outside limit only. However 30 days
is presumed to be reasonable and the bank bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Lawrence’s
Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 4-406:19, at 423 (3d ed. 2000); see also
Flagship Bank of Seminole v. Complete Interiors, Inc. 450 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
¶18. Although there is no mention of a specific date, Rogers testified that she and her son
began looking for the statements in late May or early June of 2001, after her husband had died.
12
Her son felt that it was prudent to consolidate some of the five bank accounts. When they
discovered that statements were missing, they notified Union Planters in June of 2001 to
replace the statements. At this time, no mention of possible forgery was made, even though
Neal, Jr., thought that “something was wrong.” In fact, Neal, Jr., had felt that something was
wrong as far back as December of 2000, but failed to do anything. Neal, Jr., testified that
neither he nor his mother knew that Reese had been forging checks until September of 2001.8
Courts in Louisiana and Texas have held that, under similar circumstances, a customer’s claims
against a bank for paying forged checks are without merit. See Marx v. Whitney Nat’l Bank,
713 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1998); Ju-Nel Homes, Inc. v. White Rock Bank of Dallas, 632 S.W.2d
648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
¶19. Rogers is therefore precluded from making claims against Union Planters because (1)
under § 75-4-406(a), Union Planters provided the statements to Rogers, and (2) under § 75-4-
406(d)(2), Rogers failed to notify Union Planters of the forgeries within 15 and/or 30 days
of the date she should have reasonably discovered the forgeries.
III. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN
DENYING UNION PLANTERS’ MOTIONS FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AND/OR JNOV.
¶20. We find that the circuit court erred when it denied Union Planters’ motions for directed
verdict and/or JNOV. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-4-406(e) (Rev. 2002) provides that the preclusion
8
Actually, it was Union Planters that notified Rogers that there had been forgeries, as
opposed to Rogers’ discovering the forgeries herself.
13
to bring claims against a bank may not apply if a customer “proves that the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care in paying the item and that the failure substantially contributed to [the]
loss.”9
¶21. The only evidence put on by Rogers during her case-in-chief was live testimony by
Rogers and her son, Neal, Jr., and the deposition testimony of three Union Planters officers.
Most of this testimony pertained to the facts underlying the investigation into the forgeries.
The only testimony regarding Union Planters’ policies was elicited from Diane Towles, who
said that it was not Union Planters’ practice to inspect a signature card every time a check was
presented for payment. Under the statute, the only way Rogers could escape preclusion of her
claims was to prove that Union Planters failed to exercise ordinary care in the payment of the
forged checks. Rogers presented absolutely no evidence concerning Union Planters’ alleged
failure to exercise ordinary care, much less present expert testimony on what ordinary care in
the banking business would be.
9
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-4-103(7) (Rev. 2002) provides as follows:
“Ordinary care” in the case of a person engaged in business
means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing
in the area in which the person is located, with respect to the
business in which the person is engaged. In the case of a bank that
takes an instrument for processing for collection or payment by
automated means, reasonable commercial standards do not
require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to
examine does not violate the bank’s prescribed procedures and
the bank’s procedures do not vary unreasonably from general
banking usage not disapproved by this chapter or Chapter 4.
14
¶22. In a recent case, a Georgia court held that summary judgment was appropriate where a
bank customer failed to present adequate evidence of the bank’s failure to exercise ordinary
care. The customer’s expert witness testified that he had never analyzed fraud detection
systems in the Atlanta area, that he did not know what fraud detection procedures the bank
utilized, and that he did not know what, if anything, the bank and other Atlanta area banks
informed their customers about fraud detection procedures. He opined that reasonable
commercial standards for banks in the Atlanta area did not require banks to inspect visually
every check and that no Georgia law required the bank to do so. Spacemakers of Am., Inc. v.
SunTrust Bank, 609 S.E.2d 683, 688-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
¶23. As stated, the Georgia court held this expert testimony to be insufficient to create a
question of fact for the jury. Because Rogers failed to put on any expert testimony pertaining
to ordinary care, Union Planters’ motions for directed verdict and/or JNOV should have been
granted.
CONCLUSION
¶24. The circuit court erred in denying Union Planters’ motion for JNOV because, under
§ 75-4-406, Rogers is precluded from recovering amounts paid by Union Planters on any of
the forged checks because she failed to timely detect and notify the bank of the unauthorized
transactions and because she failed to show that Union Planters failed to use ordinary care in
its processing of the forged checks. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and
render judgment here that Rogers take nothing and that the complaint and this action are finally
dismissed with prejudice.
15
¶25. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
SMITH, C.J., COBB, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
16