United States v. Paul C. Jones ( 2000 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                           No. 99-4075
    PAUL C. JONES, a/k/a Black,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
    James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
    (CR-95-66)
    Argued: March 3, 2000
    Decided: April 13, 2000
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Randy Virlin Cargill, MAGEE, FOSTER, GOLDSTEIN
    & SAYERS, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Ray B. Fitzger-
    ald, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney,
    Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Paul C. Jones was convicted upon a plea of guilty of engaging in
    a continuing criminal enterprise. See 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 848
     (West 1999).
    Jones appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court committed
    reversible error at the plea hearing because the court informed Jones
    that the mandatory minimum sentence for the plea offense was twenty
    years imprisonment when in fact it was life imprisonment. We agree
    with Jones and therefore vacate his conviction and remand for further
    proceedings.
    I.
    Jones and several other individuals were charged in Count One of
    a superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with the intent
    to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, see 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 846
    (West 1999). Count Two of the indictment charged that the drug oper-
    ation constituted a continuing criminal enterprise and that Jones was
    its "principal leader, organizer, and manager." J.A. 20; see 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 848
    (a), (b)(1). Count Two also alleged that "the violations
    committed by [Jones] or under his direction involved more than one
    and one-half kilograms of cocaine base." J.A. 20.
    On the day Jones' trial was scheduled to begin, he agreed to plead
    guilty to Count Two. The written plea agreement stated that "[t]he
    parties agree and will present evidence ... to establish that JONES's
    `relevant conduct' within the special meaning of that term under the
    Sentencing Guidelines exceeded 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base." J.A.
    57. This stipulation, in combination with Jones' agreement that he
    was an "organizer, supervisor, or manager" of the enterprise, J.A. 56,
    subjected Jones to a statutory minimum sentence of life imprison-
    ment. See 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 848
    (b). However, the plea agreement errone-
    ously stated that the statutory minimum penalty was 20 years
    2
    imprisonment and that life imprisonment was the statutory maximum
    sentence.1
    The error regarding the applicable sentencing range extended to the
    plea hearing, during which the court explicitly advised Jones that "the
    mandatory minimum penalty under Count 2 is imprisonment for a
    term of not less than 20 years" and that "[t]he maximum possible pen-
    alty under Count 2 is imprisonment for a term of life."2 J.A. 38. At
    the conclusion of the plea hearing, Jones pled guilty to Count Two
    and the district court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.
    The subsequently prepared presentence report correctly stated that
    the statute underlying the offense of conviction mandated a life term
    of imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Jones moved to withdraw his
    plea, arguing that the plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
    had been misinformed regarding the applicable statutory minimum
    sentence. The district court denied the motion because it concluded
    that Jones had not demonstrated a fair and just reason for withdrawal
    under the six-factor test employed by this court. See United States v.
    Wilson, 
    81 F.3d 1300
    , 1306 (4th Cir. 1996). In particular, the district
    court stated that Jones had offered "no credible evidence that his plea
    was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily." J.A. 69.
    At Jones' initial sentencing hearing, the court allowed Jones' attor-
    ney to further address the issue of the motion to withdraw. Counsel
    argued that had Jones known his guilty plea would result in a manda-
    tory life sentence, he would not have entered the plea. Jones also testi-
    fied at the hearing and reiterated that he would not have pled guilty
    had he known that the consequence of the plea would be a mandatory
    life sentence. The district court then granted the motion to withdraw,
    but later vacated its order in response to the Government's motion to
    reconsider. The district court also denied a second motion to with-
    draw and, following another sentencing hearing, sentenced Jones to
    life imprisonment.
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Both the prosecuting attorney and the defense attorney mistakenly
    believed that this sentencing range was correct and neither learned of the
    error until after the Rule 11 hearing.
    2 The district court also stated that Jones' case "[didn't] look like a
    maximum case." J.A. 38.
    3
    II.
    A defendant's decision to plead guilty must be a knowing and vol-
    untary one. See Parke v. Raley, 
    506 U.S. 20
    , 28 (1992). Rule 11(c)
    is intended to ensure that a guilty plea is "knowing" by requiring the
    district court to impart, and be sure that the defendant understands,
    certain information. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c); 
    id.
     advisory commit-
    tee's note to 1974 Amendment. Particularly, Rule 11(c) requires the
    district court to advise the defendant of any applicable mandatory
    minimum sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1); United States v.
    Goins, 
    51 F.3d 400
    , 402 (4th Cir. 1995). We review the adequacy of
    a Rule 11 proceeding de novo. See United States v. Thorne, 
    153 F.3d 130
    , 132 (4th Cir. 1998).
    Here, Jones was not accurately informed of the mandatory mini-
    mum sentence that would result from his guilty plea. In fact, he was
    misinformed. Therefore, a violation of Rule 11 occurred. This viola-
    tion is harmless, however, if it did not violate Jones' substantial
    rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h); Thorne, 
    153 F.3d at 133
    . A defen-
    dant's substantial rights are violated if the Rule 11 error affected his
    decision to plead. See Thorne, 
    153 F.3d at 133
    . A defendant's sub-
    stantial rights are likely not violated if, although the district court
    failed to mention the mandatory minimum sentence at the plea hear-
    ing, the defendant was otherwise aware of the mandatory minimum
    sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 
    927 F.2d 1060
    , 1062 (8th
    Cir. 1991) (holding that failure of district court to inform defendant
    of mandatory minimum sentence was harmless error when defendant
    was aware of the minimum from the indictment, the plea agreement,
    and the prosecutor's statements during the plea hearing); see also
    Goins, 
    51 F.3d at 402-03
     (noting rule and discussing cases).
    We conclude that the error here was not harmless. There is no sug-
    gestion that Jones was otherwise aware of the minimum sentence for
    his offense when he entered the plea. See United States v. Hourihan,
    
    936 F.2d 508
    , 510-11 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that fail-
    ure to inform defendant of mandatory minimum sentence was not
    harmless error when neither the indictment nor the plea agreement
    informed the defendant of the mandatory minimum and the parties
    contemplated a sentence less than the mandatory minimum). Further,
    the error certainly affected Jones' decision to plead; Jones articulated
    4
    the understandable position that he would not have pled guilty had he
    realized that the plea offense carried a mandatory life sentence.
    The Government argues that the plea should be upheld because
    Jones was informed that the maximum sentence was life and that sen-
    tencing was within the sole and complete discretion of the district
    court. The Government even goes so far as to suggest that the court
    was accurate in its statement that the statutory penalty ranged from
    twenty years to life because at the time of the plea hearing "it was by
    no means certain that the evidence would eventually convince the
    court that Jones should be held responsible for more than 1.5 kilo-
    grams of crack." Brief of Appellee at 7. We reject these arguments
    because the parties stipulated in a written plea agreement that Jones
    was responsible for 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. Consequently,
    Jones pled guilty to an offense that carried a statutory minimum sen-
    tence of life imprisonment and should have been informed of this fact.
    III.
    Because Jones' plea hearing was infected by a non-harmless Rule
    11 error, we vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.3
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Jones' arguments that
    the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw
    the guilty plea and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    5