United States v. Patrick Creed ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 99-4710
PATRICK CREED, a/k/a Brian Mitchell
Creed,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, District Judge.
(CR-99-122)
Submitted: April 20, 2000
Decided: May 3, 2000
Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
S. Neil Stout, FLAX & STOUT, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Sara E. Flannery, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Creed was convicted after a bench trial of knowingly
engaging in sexual contact with a child under twelve years old, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(1), 2246(3) (West Supp.
2000). On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to con-
vict him because the government failed to prove intent. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question
is not whether we are convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but rather whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favor-
able to the government, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Assuming, without deciding, that the government must show more
than the act of touching itself to prove intent, Creed's intent to have
sexual contact with a child under twelve may be inferred from his
actions during and after the incident. See United States v. Williams,
197 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1999) (outlining elements of
offense); United States v. Rohn, 964 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1992)
("Because intent is rarely capable of direct proof, [a] defendant's
intent can be inferred from his conduct and all the surrounding cir-
cumstances.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Finally, to the extent that Creed challenges the testimony of the gov-
ernment witnesses as being contradictory, we do not review the credi-
bility of the witnesses and "`assume that the[trier of fact] resolved all
contradictions [in the testimony] . . . in favor of the [g]overnment.'"
United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp. , 989 F.2d
1390, 1402 (4th Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999).
Because we find that the evidence was sufficient, we affirm
Creed's conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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