Com. v. Donmoyer, S. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN DONMOYER
Appellant No. 1441 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 1, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No: CP-38-CR-0000528-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 7, 2021
Appellant, Steven Donmoyer, appeals from the July 1, 2020 judgment
of sentence imposing five years of probation for driving under the influence of
a controlled substance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1) and (d)(2). We affirm.
The trial court’s opinion includes this summary of the pertinent facts:
At the jury trial, Trooper Justin Kline of the Pennsylvania
State Police testified that on November 23, 2018, at
approximately 3:16 p.m., he was engaged in traffic safety detail
along Route 22 just below the intersection with State Route 72.
At that time, he observed a red Honda Accord driven by
[Appellant] exiting Route 22 onto State Route 72 without
activation of a turn signal. As a result of his observation, Trooper
Kline effected a traffic stop. Upon approaching the vehicle,
Trooper Kline observed that [Appellant’s] eyes were glassy and
his pupils were constricted. He also found [Appellant] to be overly
talkative and nervous.
As per his training and experience, Trooper Kline
determined that these observations were consistent with a person
who was under the influence of a controlled substance.
Specifically, Trooper Kline determined that these indicators led
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him to believe that [Appellant] was under the influence of a central
nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine. When he asked
[Appellant] if he had been using that drug, [Appellant] did not
answer, but instead offered that he had taken two prescription
hydrocodone tablets several hours earlier and showed Trooper
Kline a pill bottle which contained one pill. Trooper Kline also
noted that [Appellant] said that he was coming from his brother’s
home, but he was only able to give a vague description of its
location. Trooper Kline acknowledged that [Appellant] did not
produce his driver’s license because it was in his other vehicle, but
was able to recall and recite his correct license number. The
Commonwealth presented a video recording of a portion of the
traffic stop at trial.
At Trooper Kline’s request, [Appellant] agreed to perform
field sobriety tests. Trooper Kline administered SFSTS and ARIDE
tests and found that [Appellant] exhibited multiple signs of
impairment which indicated that he was under the influence of
controlled substances to the extent he was incapable of safe
driving. [Appellant] consented to a chemical test of his blood and
was transported to Good Samaritan Hospital (“GSH”) to have his
blood drawn.
[…]
Ayako Chan-Hosokawa, a Forensic Toxicologist at MNS Labs
also testified. Chan-Hosokawa was qualified as an expert in the
field of forensic toxicology for determining the presence of
controlled substances in a whole blood sample. […] Chan-
Hosokawa stated her opinion that [Appellant’s] sample contained
caffeine, amphetamine, and methamphetamine and that
amphetamine and methamphetamine may compromise
someone’s cognitive abilities while driving. She could not say with
certainty whether hydrocodone would be detected if an individual
had ingested that substance four hours prior to a blood draw.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/20, at 2-3, 5 (footnote omitted).
A jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned DUI charges and the
trial court found him guilty of related summary traffic offenses at the
conclusion of a January 29, 2020 trial. On July 1, 2020, the trial court imposed
five years of probation, with the first 90 days to be served on house arrest.
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Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion asserting, among other things,
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied
that motion on October 22, 2020. This timely appeal followed. Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction under
§ 3802(d)(2). He also argues that his convictions under § 3802(d)(1) and (2)
are contrary to the weight of the evidence. We review these issues in turn.
We begin with the sufficiency of the evidence under § 3802(d)(2).
“[O]ur standard of review is de novo, however, our scope of review is limited
to considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420–21 (Pa.
2014).
(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
[…]
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s
ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of
the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient
evidence under § 3802(d)(2) because the Commonwealth did not produce
expert evidence of the effects of amphetamine and methamphetamine on a
person’s ability to drive a car.
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In Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme
Court held that “subsection 3802(d)(2) does not limit, constrain, or specify
the type of evidence that the Commonwealth can proffer to prove its case.
Id. at 1239.
Pursuant to our general standard, a need for expert
testimony arises when the jury is confronted with factual issues
whose resolution requires knowledge beyond the ken of the
ordinary layman. The need for expert testimony in a subsection
3802(d)(2) prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account not just the specific drug at issue,
prescription or otherwise, but also the nature and overall strength
of the Commonwealth's evidence[.]
Id. Because the arresting officer testified that he recognized signs of
impairment in the driver, and blood tests revealed diazepam and
nordiazepam, the evidence was sufficient—without expert testimony—to
sustain the conviction under § 3802(d)(2). Id. at 1240.
Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Etchinson, 916 A.2d 1169 (Pa.
Super. 2007), affirmed per curiam, 943 A.2d 262 (Pa. 2008). There, this
Court vacated the judgment of sentence because the evidence showed that
marijuana metabolites can remain in a person’s system long after intoxication
subsides; there was no other evidence that the defendant was impaired while
he was driving. Id. at 1172. Indeed, the expert testified that the amount of
marijuana metabolites in the defendant’s system was so small that it could
have been ingested weeks or months before the incident. Id. at 1175
(Bender, J. concurring and dissenting). Absent any evidence that the
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marijuana metabolites impaired the defendant while he was driving, the
conviction could not stand.
Etchinson does not support the need for expert testimony in this case.
Appellant’s blood test revealed amphetamine and methamphetamine in his
system, not marijuana metabolites. Further the Commonwealth’s expert
testified that amphetamine and methamphetamine can impair the ability to
drive. Finally, Trooper Kline observed multiple signs of impairment during the
field sobriety tests, and he testified that those signs were consistent with
ingestion of amphetamine and methamphetamine. For these reasons, we find
Etchinson distinguishable. The facts of this case closely align with those of
Griffith. We discern no merit in Appellant’s first argument.
Next, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence in support of his
convictions under § 3802(d)(1) and (d)(2).
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the
facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
justice. It has often been stated that a new trial should be
awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
prevail.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court:
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Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise
of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict
was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 3802(d)(1) provides in pertinent part:
1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:
[…]
(ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance, as
defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act, which has not been medically prescribed for the individual; or
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii).
As to this subsection, Appellant notes that his blood test failed to reveal
evidence of the prescription hydrocodone he claims he ingested. Appellant
further notes that the indications of impairment Trooper Kline observed are
more consistent with hydrocodone than with amphetamine and
methamphetamine. This argument lacks merit. First, the jury was free to
discredit Appellant’s claim that he took the prescribed hydrocodone at a time
when his blood test should have revealed its presence. Credibility
determinations are the province of the jury. Commonwealth v. Delmonico,
251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___, 2021
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WL 4983055 (Pa. October 27, 2021). Second, Trooper Kline and Chan-
Hosokawa testified that Appellant showed signs of impairment consistent with
amphetamine and methamphetamine. Trooper Kline testified that Appellant’s
constricted pupils were consistent with the hydrocodone Appellant claimed he
took, but Appellant exhibited multiple signs of impairment consistent with
amphetamine and methamphetamine. N.T. Trial, 1/29/20, at 38-39. We
discern no merit in Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge to his
conviction under § 3802(d)(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to award a new trial.
Under § 3802(d)(2), Appellant argues that the jury’s finding that he was
substantially impaired is against the weight of the evidence. Appellant claims
he was not driving erratically, and that he safely pulled his vehicle off the road
when Trooper Kline activated his flashers. We observe that evidence of erratic
driving is not necessary to sustain a conviction under § 3802(d)(2).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 831 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal
denied, 841 A.2d 531 (Pa. 2003). And, as we have already explained,
Trooper Kline testified that Appellant exhibited multiple signs of impairment
during his field sobriety tests. Those signs of impairment were consistent with
impairment caused by the controlled substances revealed in Appellant’s blood
test. Again, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to
award a new trial.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/07/2021
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