Com. v. Bestman, J. ( 2014 )


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  • J. S28009/14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION              SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                  :
    :
    JOSEPH BESTMAN,                          :         No. 3399 EDA 2012
    :
    Appellant      :
    Appeal from the PCRA Order, November 7, 2012,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0002168-2009
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                  :
    :
    JOSEPH BESTMAN,                          :         No. 3400 EDA 2012
    :
    Appellant      :
    Appeal from the PCRA Order, November 7, 2012,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0001313-2009
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:          FILED AUGUST 12, 2014
    Joseph Bestman appeals from the order of November 7, 2012, denying
    his PCRA1 petition as untimely filed. We affirm.
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J. S28009/14
    On July 16, 2009, appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one
    count each of retail theft, obstruction of a government function, and
    incarceration for resisting arrest, with credit for time served and immediate
    parole. (Notes of testimony, 7/16/09 at 11.) On the charge of obstruction
    of a government function, appellant received a sentence of one year of
    probation to run concurrently with the sentence on resisting arrest. (Id. at
    12.) On retail theft, appellant received a sentence of one year of probation
    to run consecutively to the sentence on resisting arrest; therefore,
    by one year of probation. (Id.)
    Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or take a direct appeal.
    otion to re-open sentence
    base
    counsel failed to advise appellant, a Liberian national, of the immigration
    PCRA petition and counsel was appointed. An amended petition was filed on
    January 4, 1992, and was a juvenile at the time of his guilty plea.
    Therefore, appellant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to accept his
    plea.
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    A hearing was held on August 11, 2011, at which both trial counsel,
    denied on November 7, 2012.2 This timely appeal followed. Appellant has
    complied with Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and the PCRA court has
    filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    of the 1995 amendments to the PCRA; therefore, the
    jurisdictional time limits established by those
    amendments govern this case. Commonwealth v.
    Fahy, 
    558 Pa. 313
    , 
    737 A.2d 214
    , 217-18 (1999). A
    PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one,
    must be filed within one year of the date the
    unless he pleads and proves one of the three
    exceptions      outlined     in      42     Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(1).[Footnote 2] Commonwealth v.
    Howard, 
    567 Pa. 481
    , 
    788 A.2d 351
    , 354 (2002). A
    judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct
    review by this Court or the United States Supreme
    Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking
    such review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Howard, at
    jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the
    merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
    timely filed. Commonwealth v. Abu Jamal, 
    574 Pa. 724
    , 
    833 A.2d 719
    , 723 24 (2003);
    Commonwealth v. Murray, 
    562 Pa. 1
    , 
    753 A.2d 201
    , 203 (2000). The timeliness requirements apply
    to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the
    individual claims raised therein. Murray, at 203.
    The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the
    burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one
    of the three exceptions. See Commonwealth v.
    Bronshtein, 
    561 Pa. 611
    , 
    752 A.2d 868
    , 871 (2002)
    2
    The hearing was held before the Honorable Charles C. Keeler, who also
    ed
    from the bench and the matter was reassigned to the Honorable Gregory M.
    Mallon.
    -3-
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    further requires a petition invoking one of these
    § 9545(b)(2).   On appeal from the denial of PCRA
    PCRA court are supported by the record and free of
    Abu Jamal, at 723.
    [Footnote 2] These exceptions are:
    the failure to raise the claim
    previously was the result of interference
    by    government       officials  with   the
    presentation of the claim in violation of
    the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or
    laws of the United States; (ii) the facts
    upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not
    have been ascertained by the exercise of
    due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is
    a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United
    States or the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania after the time period
    provided in this section and has been
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    54 A.3d 14
    , 16-17 (Pa. 2012).
    day,
    August 17, 2009, when the time for filing a direct appeal expired.3
    Therefore, appellant had until August 17, 2010 to file a timely PCRA petition.
    3
    The actual 30th day fell on Saturday, August 15, 2009; therefore, appellant
    had until the following Monday to file an appeal notice. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
    (excluding weekends and holidays from the computation of time).
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    Initially, we note that appellant was sentenced on July 16, 2009, to
    3
    it appears that appellant is no longer serving his sentence. 4 If so, then he is
    ineligible for PCRA relief. Our supreme court has held that, to be eligible for
    § 9543(a)(1)(i).   As soon as his sentence is completed, the petitioner
    becomes ineligible for relief, regardless of whether he was serving his
    sentence when he filed the petition. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 
    699 A.2d 718
    , 720 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Matin, 
    832 A.2d 1141
    , 1143
    (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    843 A.2d 1237
    (Pa. 2004). In addition,
    this court determined in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    703 A.2d 714
    (Pa.Super. 1997), that the PCRA precludes relief for those petitioners whose
    sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral consequences of their
    sentence. 
    Id. at 716
    (citations omitted).
    At
    applies to the statutory one-year time bar. Appellant attempted to invoke
    the after-recognized constitutional right exception, relying on Padilla v.
    4
    See
    out that on case 1313 of 2009 [appellant] is no longer serving a sentence.
    , which was
    July 16, 2009; it was imposed on July 16, 2009. That 22 month [sic]
    sentence expired in June of 2011. So for that additional reason [appellant]
    -5-
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    Kentucky, 
    559 U.S. 356
    (2010), in which the United States Supreme Court
    held that counsel must inform his client whether his plea carries a risk of
    deportation. However, this court determined in Commonwealth v. Garcia,
    
    23 A.3d 1059
    (Pa.Super. 2011), that Padilla did not recognize a new
    review as an exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA.5
    Appellant also claims the trial court did not have subject matter
    jurisdiction because he was a juvenile at the time of his plea.    Appellant
    argues that Attorney Consadene should have filed a petition to transfer his
    case to juvenile court.      According to appellant, his sentence is a
    Appellant is correct that generally, subject matter jurisdiction is
    non-waivable; however, the issue would still have to be raised in a timely
    PCRA petition.
    The timeliness requirements of the PCRA do not vary
    alleged therein . . . .   To the contrary, . . . the
    s timeliness requirements . . . are intended to
    apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature
    Commonwealth v. Murray, 
    562 Pa. 1
    , 
    753 A.2d 201
    , 202-
    requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in
    nature, no court may properly disregard or alter
    5
    We note that Attorney Consadene testified at the PCRA hearing that
    appellant never told him he was a Liberian national, and he assumed he was
    a United States citizen. (Notes of testimony, 8/11/11 at 12.) The issue
    never came up, and Attorney Consadene had no reason to inform appellant
    of the immigration consequences of his plea. (Id.)
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    them in order to reach the merits of the claims
    raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untimely
    
    Id. at 203.
        Howard                                                    that a
    sentence was illegal, an issue deemed incapable of being waived, are not
    Commonwealth v. Grafton,
    
    928 A.2d 1112
    ,   1114      (Pa.Super.   2007),   citing   
    Fahy, supra
    ;
    Commonwealth v. Beck, 
    848 A.2d 987
    (Pa.Super. 2004).              Certainly, we
    -21.)
    Appellant has also filed a petition for remand, which this court denied
    without prejudice to re-raise the issue in his appellate brief.         Appellant
    claims he has after-discovered evidence proving that he was born on
    January 4, 1992, including a Pennsylvania non-driver identification card.
    This is not after-discovered evidence for PCRA purposes where
    appellant was certainly aware of his birthdate at the time of his plea.       In
    fact, appellant testified at the PCRA hearing that he purposely lied to the
    court about his age because he did not want his mother to know about his
    arrest. (Notes of testimony, 8/11/11 at 35.) Appellant told the court that
    he was 20 years old.     (Id.)   Attorney Consadene testified that the record
    indicated appellant was born on October 19, 1988, and he had no reason to
    think that date was incorrect.      (Id. at 13, 21-22.)   Attorney Consadene
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    J. S28009/14
    would have had no basis for filing a petition to transfer the case to juvenile
    court. (Id.)
    Appellant also argues that, in the alternative, he should be allowed to
    pursue the matter in a state habeas corpus
    23-24.) Appellant states that the remedy of habeas corpus is available for
    the rare instances where the PCRA offers no remedy. (Id. at 23.)
    [T]he PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for obtaining
    post-conviction collateral relief. Commonwealth v.
    Bronshtein, 
    561 Pa. 611
    , 614 n. 3, 
    752 A.2d 868
    ,
    869-70 n. 3 (2000). This is true regardless of the
    manner      in    which    the    petition is titled.
    Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 
    760 A.2d 50
    , 52 n. 1
    (Pa.Super.2000).        Indeed, the PCRA statute
    specifically provides for such treatment:
    The action established in this subchapter
    shall be the sole means of obtaining
    collateral relief and encompasses all
    other common law and statutory
    remedies for the same purpose that exist
    when this subchapter takes effect,
    including habeas corpus and coram
    nobis.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Simply because the merits of
    the PCRA petition cannot be considered due to
    previous litigation, waiver, or an untimely filing,
    there is no alternative basis for relief outside the
    framework of the PCRA.            See generally,
    Commonwealth v. Fahy, 
    558 Pa. 313
    , 332, 
    737 A.2d 214
    , 223-224 (1999) (citing Commonwealth
    v. Chester, 
    557 Pa. 358
    , 
    733 A.2d 1242
    (1999)).
    Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 
    781 A.2d 1259
    , 1261 (Pa.Super. 2001).
    Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential
    remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of
    habeas corpus.      
    Fahy, supra
    at 223-224;
    -8-
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    Commonwealth v. Chester, 
    557 Pa. 358
    , 
    733 A.2d 1242
    (1999). Issues that are cognizable under the
    PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and
    cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. See
    Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 
    554 Pa. 547
    , 
    722 A.2d 638
    (1998); see also Commonwealth v.
    Deaner, 
    779 A.2d 578
    (Pa.Super.2001) (a collateral
    petition that raises an issue that the PCRA statute
    could remedy is to be considered a PCRA petition).
    Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the
    PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a
    writ of habeas corpus.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    , 465-466 (Pa.Super. 2013).
    to
    advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, and for failure to
    move to have the case transferred to juvenile court, are certainly cognizable
    by bringing the identical claims in a habeas petition.          Simply because
    -bar
    applies, and he is left without a remedy under the PCRA, does not mean that
    his   claims     are   reviewable   pursuant   to   habeas     corpus.6    See
    Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 
    900 A.2d 407
    , 412 (Pa.Super. 2006),
    appeal denied                                                habeas corpus has
    been subsumed into the PCRA for claims that are cognizable under the Act
    6
    Ironically, if appellant had been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, he
    would likely be unable to bring a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness for
    failing to warn him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The PCRA
    does not apply to juveniles, and habeas corpus is limited to those juveniles
    who are presently detained. In re B.S., 
    831 A.2d 151
    , 154 (Pa.Super.
    2003).
    -9-
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    and is not available merely because an otherwise cognizable claim is
    jurisdictionally time-         
    Fahy, supra
    .
    petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/12/2014
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