Com. v. Turton, B. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S50031-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    BRYON GEORGE TURTON,
    Appellant                    No. 313 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order entered January 27, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012460-1994.
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:                            FILED AUGUST 12, 2014
    petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    -46.   PCRA counsel has also filed a
    petition to withdraw. We affirm.
    The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On October
    5, 1994, police charged Appellant, then nineteen years old, with one count
    of criminal homicide involving the strangulation death of his girlfriend. On
    January 31, 1996, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder.         On
    March 28, 1996, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without
    the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. In an
    unpublished memorandum filed on December 15, 1997, we affirmed
    J-S50031-14
    counsel to address an ineffective assistance claim raised by Appellant in his
    appeal.     Commonwealth v. Turton, ___ A.2d ___ (Pa. Super. 1997)
    (unpublished).
    Upon remand, the trial court appointed new counsel, and the trial
    court held an evidentiary hearing on December 8, 1998. By order entered
    February 15, 2001, the trial court denied Appellant relief.   Appellant once
    again filed a timely appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum
    filed on April 27, 2004, we affirmed the trial court.   Commonwealth v.
    Turton, 
    852 A.2d 1256
    (Pa. Super. 2004).        On October 20, 2004, our
    Suprem                                        allocatur. Commonwealth v.
    Turton, 
    862 A.2d 1255
    (Pa. 2004).
    On August 21, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
    court appointed counsel, and on October 2, 2013, PCRA counsel filed an
    amended petition. The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent
    response.    By order entered January 27, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed
    y untimely, and because Appellant
    failed to establish the applicability of an exception to the time bar.   This
    appeal followed.   Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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    iled an Anders1
    brief and a petition to withdraw. Compliance with Anders applies to counsel
    who seeks to withdraw from representation on direct appeal.                 Anders
    imposes stricter requirements than those imposed when counsel seeks to
    withdraw during the post-conviction process pursuant to the dictates of
    Commonwealth            v.   Turner,       
    544 A.2d 927
      (Pa.     1988),   and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    See Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 
    866 A.2d 1109
    , 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super.
    wishes to raise have no merit under a Turner/Finley analysis.
    Our Supreme Court has summarized:
    These cases establish the procedure for withdrawal of
    court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on criminal
    convictions.   Independent review of the record by
    competent counsel is required before withdrawal is
    permitted. Such independent review requires proof of:
    1)         -                              sel detailing the
    nature and extent of his [or her] review;
    2)        -
    the petitioner wished to have reviewed;
    3)                                                  -
    meritless;
    4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent
    review of the record; and
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967).
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    5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the
    petition was meritless.
    Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    , 876 n.1, (Pa. 2009) (citations
    nsel has complied with the mandates of
    Turner and Finley, as summarized in 
    Pitts, supra
    .                     Thus, we must
    PCRA petition was untimely filed, and Appellant cannot establish an
    exception to t
    petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
    supported    by   the   evidence    of   record   and    is   free    of    legal   error.
    Commonwealth v. Halley, 
    870 A.2d 795
    , 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA
    findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 
    768 A.2d 1164
    ,
    1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).        Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a
    hear
    claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the
    record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
    772 A.2d 1011
    (Pa. Super. 2001).
    The   timeliness   of    a   post-conviction     petition     is    jurisdictional.
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation
    omitted). Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither an appellate court nor
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    the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. Id                 out jurisdiction,
    raised in an untimely petition. 
    Id. Generally, a
    petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an
    exception to the time for filing the petition. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-
    Taylor, 
    753 A.2d 780
    , 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under
    these exceptions
    been interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; or
    (2)   there   exists   after-discovered    facts    or   evidence;   or   (3)   a   new
    Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).                 A PCRA petition
    
    Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783
    . See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to
    the time restrictions of the PCRA must be pled in the petition, and may not
    be raised for the first time on appeal.         Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    936 A.2d 521
    , 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.
    raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
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    Because Appellant did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the
    l of
    ninety thereafter, on January 18, 2005.            42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3);
    U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition over seven years
    later.    As a result, his PCRA petition is patently untimely unless he has
    satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated
    exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 
    741 A.2d 1258
    , 1261
    (Pa. 1999).
    Appellant has failed to prove the applicability of any of the exceptions
    under the exception of subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) because the United States
    Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller v. Alabama,
    
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012).         In Miller, the high court held that mandatory
    
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460
    . Appellant asserts that the
    Miller decision should be applied retroactively to his life sentence.
    Initially, we note that the Miller holding is inapposite because
    Appellant was not a juvenile when he killed his girlfriend. Moreover, even
    had Appellant been a juvenile at the time, our Supreme Court has
    determined that the Miller decision should not be applied retroactively. See
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    generally, Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    81 A.3d 1
    (Pa. 2013). Thus,
    to Section 9545(b)(iii).
    Alternatively, Appellant attempts to establish an exception to the
    Miller
    present counsel, however, this same evidence was referenced in the United
    Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    (2005) and Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010).         At best, Appellant
    Commonwealth v. Marshall, 
    947 A.2d 714
    , 720 (Pa. 2008); see also
    Commonwealth v. Lark, 
    746 A.2d 585
    , 588 n.4 (explaining that matters of
    In sum, Appe
    to meet his burden of proof with regard to any exception to the timeliness
    -conviction reli
    withdraw.
    Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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    J-S50031-14
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/12/2014
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