In Re: Brown, P., Appeal of: Brown, P. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S28012-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: PRIVATE CRIMINAL                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    COMPLAINT PETITION OF PAUL A.              :        PENNSYLVANIA
    BROWN                                      :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: PAUL A. BROWN                   :
    :
    :
    :   No. 189 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 30, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-45-MD-0000275-2020
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED DECEMBER 09, 2021
    Paul A. Brown appeals from the order that denied his petition for review
    of a private criminal complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 506. We affirm.
    The trial court offered the following factual summary of this case.
    On May 4, 2020, [Appellant] filed private criminal complaint
    #1682 with the Monroe County Office of the District Attorney
    alleging defendant Diana Brown knowingly gave false information
    to authorities . . . . [Appellant] asserts Ms. Brown made false
    statements against him in connection with a divorce proceeding.1
    Specifically, [Appellant] denotes four counts in his Complaint
    against Ms. Brown: (1) [she] made an unsworn falsification in her
    complaint in divorce; (2) [she] improperly filed an affidavit
    relating to pending divorce proceedings; (3) [she] “knowingly and
    intelligently committed perjury in order for the court to grant her
    divorce;” and (4) [she] committed forgery by executing her
    attorney’s signature without authorization.
    ______
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S28012-21
    1 Notably, [Appellant] file[d] his Private Criminal Complaint
    against his ex-wife Diana Brown, who was the victim in a
    criminal case where [Appellant] pleaded guilty to one count
    each of attempted homicide and aggravated assault.
    [Appellant] disfigured Ms. Brown’s hand, gashed the back of
    her head, and severed her ring finger with a machete.
    On May 11, 2020, the Office of the District Attorney issued
    a disapproval of private criminal complaint #1682 (hereinafter
    “notice of disapproval”).     The notice of disapproval cited the
    following reasons: “(1) Matter was not reported to police for
    investigation; (2) The facts of the alleged offense are inadequately
    described; (3) Criminal prosecution is not warranted based on the
    alleged facts; (4) The statute of limitations has expired on the
    alleged crime; and (5) It is not in the best interest of the
    Commonwealth to pursue this matter.” [Appellant], an inmate at
    SCI Smithfield, received the notice of disapproval and timely filed
    a pro se Rule 506 Petition for review of private criminal complaint
    with th[e trial] court on June 1, 2020.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/20, at 1-2 (cleaned up).
    The trial court reviewed the private criminal complaint and the exhibits
    attached thereto and issued an opinion and order denying Appellant’s petition
    for review. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and both
    Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 After noting that
    Appellant’s private criminal complaint was not included in the certified record,
    this Court directed the trial court to supplement it to include all materials
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant submitted the notice of appeal, which was dated August 27, 2020,
    and was attached to a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, to prison
    authorities for mailing no later than August 28, 2020, which is the date of the
    mailing’s postmark. Accordingly, the notice of appeal was timely filed. See,
    e.g., Commonwealth v. Betts, 
    240 A.3d 616
    , 620 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2020)
    (explaining that, pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, “submissions from an
    incarcerated litigant are deemed to be filed when deposited into the prison
    mailing system, or handed over to prison officials for mailing”).
    -2-
    J-S28012-21
    which it reviewed in making its determination.             Having obtained the
    supplemental certified record from the trial court, this appeal is ripe for
    resolution.
    Appellant states the following questions for our review:
    1.     Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant]’s
    notice of appeal/petition for review without first ordering
    [Appellant] to file brief where he could provide verified proof, legal
    argument and proof of bad faith by the Assistant District Attorney,
    thus depriving [Appellant] of his right to fairly raise his meritious
    [sic] issues in the trial court.
    2.    Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant]’s
    notice of appeal/petition for review when the Assistant District
    Attorney’s reasons for denial of private criminal complaint # 1682
    was in part for (1) matter was not reported to the police, (2) the
    statue of limitation has expired on the alleged crimes and (3) it is
    not in the best interest of the Commonwealth to pursue this
    matter, same reasons in part for his denial of private criminal
    complaint # 1672 for the same accused, was plainly erroneous
    and done in bad faith.
    Appellant’s brief at iv.
    We begin our consideration of Appellant’s questions with our standard
    of review:2
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant claims that he presents us with a due process question of law
    subject to de novo, plenary review. See Appellant’s brief at iii. “We have
    held that the provision in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 506] allowing an appeal of the district
    attorney’s disapproval of such charges to the court constitutes sufficient
    checks and balances upon the district attorney's actions to comply with
    constitutional due process requirements.” In re Private Complaint of
    Owens Against Coker, 
    810 A.2d 172
    , 177 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up).
    Since Appellant does not complain that the Rule was not followed, due process
    is not implicated.
    -3-
    J-S28012-21
    Appellate examination of a trial court’s review of the District
    Attorney’s decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint
    implicates the following:
    When the district attorney disapproves a private criminal
    complaint solely on the basis of legal conclusions, the trial court
    undertakes de novo review of the matter.             Thereafter, the
    appellate court will review the trial court’s decision for an error of
    law. As with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review
    is de novo and the appellate scope of review is plenary.
    When the district attorney disapproves a private criminal
    complaint on wholly policy considerations, or on a hybrid of legal
    and policy considerations, the trial court’s standard of review of
    the district attorney’s decision is abuse of discretion.          This
    deferential standard recognizes the limitations on judicial power
    to interfere with the district attorney’s discretion in these kinds of
    decisions.
    In re Miles, 
    170 A.3d 530
    , 534–35 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up).
    As detailed above, the district attorney supplied multiple reasons for its
    disapproval, including both legal and policy considerations. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 7/30/20, at 2 (quoting Notice and Record of Disapproval of Private
    Criminal Complaint, 5/11/20).     Accordingly, the following legal principles
    govern our examination of Appellant’s issues:
    [T]he appellate court will review the trial court’s decision for an
    abuse of discretion, in keeping with the settled principles of
    appellate review of discretionary matters. The district attorney’s
    decision not to prosecute a criminal complaint for reasons
    including policy matters carries a presumption of good faith and
    soundness.      The complainant must create a record that
    demonstrates the contrary. Thus, the appropriate scope of review
    in policy-declination cases is limited to whether the trial court
    misapprehended or misinterpreted the district attorney’s decision
    and/or, without a legitimate basis in the record, substituted its
    judgment for that of the district attorney. We will not disturb the
    trial court’s decision unless the record contains no reasonable
    grounds for the court’s decision, or the court relied on rules of law
    -4-
    J-S28012-21
    that were palpably wrong or inapplicable. Otherwise, the trial
    court’s decision must stand, even if the appellate court would be
    inclined to decide the case differently.
    The private criminal complainant has the burden to prove the
    district attorney abused his discretion, and that burden is a heavy
    one. In the Rule 506 petition for review, the private criminal
    complainant must demonstrate the district attorney’s decision
    amounted to bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality.            The
    complainant must do more than merely assert the district
    attorney’s decision is flawed in these regards. The complainant
    must show the facts of the case lead only to the conclusion that
    the district attorney’s decision was patently discriminatory,
    arbitrary or pretextual, and therefore, not in the public interest.
    In the absence of such evidence, the trial court cannot presume
    to supervise the district attorney’s exercise of prosecutorial
    discretion, and should leave the district attorney’s decision
    undisturbed.
    In re Private Criminal Complaints of Rafferty, 
    969 A.2d 578
    , 581–82
    (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).
    Appellant argues that the district attorney’s office “had ample
    knowledge of acts committed by Diana Brown but denied Appellant’s private
    criminal complaint in bad faith,” such as by erroneously indicating (1) that the
    statute of limitations had expired when it had not at the time Appellant filed
    the complaint, and (2) that Appellant had not notified the police of the crimes
    for investigation when he served the police with the private criminal complaint
    simultaneously with providing it to the district attorney. See Appellant’s brief
    at 6, 8-10. Notably, Appellant does not provide argument to dispute the other
    reasons offered by the district attorney, namely that Appellant offered an
    inadequate description of the facts, that the facts alleged did not warrant
    -5-
    J-S28012-21
    prosecution, and that prosecution was not in the best interest of the
    Commonwealth.
    The trial court offered the following explanation for its denial of
    Appellant’s petition:
    In the instant case, to the extent it may be understood,
    [Appellant]’s private criminal complaint fails to set forth a
    coherent basis upon which a criminal prosecution could be
    initiated. In fact, his claims appear wholly frivolous and entirely
    devoid of merit.
    [Appellant] first contends Ms. Brown made an unsworn
    falsification to authorities when she filed a complaint in divorce on
    November 30, 2017 stating, “There is currently no pending action
    of divorce or annulment between the parties.” See Complaint in
    Divorce, 8963 CV 2017, 11/30/17. [Appellant] believes this
    constitutes an unsworn false statement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 4904(a). In support, [Appellant] offers an alleged petition for
    dissolution of marriage filed with the Supreme Court of Jamaica
    (“Jamaican Petition”) on December 22, 2008.                  Notably,
    [Appellant] concedes the Jamaican Petition was not granted, and
    that he was lawfully married at the time Ms. Brown filed the
    complaint in divorce in Monroe County. Thus, [Appellant] argues
    a divorce was pending in Jamaica at the time Ms. Brown filed the
    complaint in divorce.
    This claim is wholly frivolous and devoid of merit. At a
    hearing for the action in divorce, Judge Jennifer Harlacher Sibum
    asked Ms. Brown, “One of the other allegations in the many filings
    that Mr. Brown put to the court was that the two of you have a
    pending divorce in Jamaica, is that true?” N.T. 3/29/19, 8963 CV
    2017, [at] 9. Ms. Brown responded, “There is no pending divorce.
    I initiated a divorce in 2008 that was discontinued when Mr. Brown
    returned to the picture in 2010.” Id. After consideration, Judge
    Sibum concluded, “All [the Jamaican Petition] tells me is that there
    have been problems in this marriage for a long time and they
    clearly haven’t gotten any better.” Id. at 22. There is no evidence
    submitted to rebut Ms. Brown’s characterization of the Jamaican
    Petition, and we find no basis in the alleged facts to warrant
    criminal prosecution.
    -6-
    J-S28012-21
    Next, [Appellant] contends, “On January 24, 2018, [Ms.]
    Brown filed an affidavit under section 3301(d) of the Divorce code.
    Ms. Brown’s affidavit was made subject to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4909, i.e.
    Witness or informant taking bribes but should have been made
    subject to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to
    authorities.’’ At most, this allegation amounts to a ministerial
    error. [Appellant]’s belief that a ministerial error amounts to
    “fraud upon the court” is wholly frivolous and devoid of merit.
    [Appellant]’s third allegation returns to the Jamaican
    Petition. Specifically, [Appellant] argues “On March 29, 2019, Ms.
    Brown testified under oath that she don’t recall that she has not
    actually seen the Jamaica Petition. Ms. Brown further testified
    that she put the divorce on hold but provide[d] no verified proof.”
    As a result, “Ms. Brown knowingly and intelligently committed
    perjury in order for the court to grant her divorce.” For the
    reasons discussed, supra, this argument is without merit. Ms.
    Brown was extensively questioned and cross-examined in the
    divorce action before Judge Sibum. [Appellant] presents no
    evidence whatsoever to support his bald assertions. Even a
    cursory review of the hearing before Judge Sibum reveals Ms.
    Brown to be a credible witness attempting to begin a new life after
    a violent attack by her ex-husband.
    Finally, [Appellant] contends Ms. Brown forged her
    attorney’s signature, asserting “On January 24, Ms. Brown filed an
    affidavit with attached Certificate of Compliance upon close
    inspection [of] Attorney Strunk’s handwriting and signature were
    forged.” [Appellant] offers no evidence to support this claim
    beyond a cut and copied comparison, without context or
    explanation, of Attorney Strunk’ s cursive signature and a printed
    signature. As such, this claim lacks merit and criminal prosecution
    is not warranted under the facts alleged.
    Here, the district attorney disapproved the private criminal
    complaint on [the five aforementioned grounds]. Based on our
    review, the facts of the case do not lead only to the conclusion
    that the district attorney’s decision was patently discriminatory,
    arbitrary or pretextual.       To the contrary, the facts here
    demonstrate wholly frivolous claims devoid of merit. As such, we
    see no basis in fact or law to initiate a criminal prosecution.2
    ______
    2 We note that we need not reach the question of whether
    the statute of limitations has expired on the alleged crime.
    -7-
    J-S28012-21
    Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(B)(l), the alleged crimes
    likely fall within the five year limitation. However, because
    [Appellant]’s claim is entirely devoid of merit, and because
    we find the District Attorney did not abuse his discretion in
    declining to initiate prosecution, we are not required to
    reach a legal conclusion on this issue.
    [Appellant]’s claims are devoid of merit and certainly do not
    meet the heavy burden of demonstrating the district attorney’s
    decision amounted to bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality. We
    recognize the importance of prosecutorial discretion and the
    district attorney’s duty to conserve and devote the resources of
    his office to cases in which there is a likelihood of a conviction. As
    such, the district attorney’s decision not to prosecute a private
    criminal complaint for reasons including policy matters carries a
    presumption of good faith and soundness. Here, we will not
    disturb the sound judgment of the district attorney. As a result,
    [Appellant]’s petition is denied.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/20, at 5-8 (cleaned up).
    Appellant has offered this Court no basis to conclude that the trial court
    “misapprehended or misinterpreted the district attorney’s decision,” or that its
    decision lacked “a legitimate basis in the record.” Rafferty, 
    supra at 581
    .
    On the contrary, the trial court clearly examined the evidence proffered by
    Appellant and stated reasonable grounds for its conclusion that several of the
    bases stated by the district attorney were sufficient to justify its decision.
    This Court has observed that, “[b]oth the district attorney and the trial court
    have a responsibility to prevent the misuse of judicial and prosecutorial
    resources in the pursuit of pointless prosecutions.” In re Miles, supra at
    535.   We are convinced that both have satisfied that responsibility in the
    instant case.
    Order affirmed.
    -8-
    J-S28012-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/9/2021
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 189 EDA 2021

Judges: Bowes, J.

Filed Date: 12/9/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2021