Segreaves, O. v. Segreaves, R. ( 2021 )

J-S31018-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
OLGA SEGREAVES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROSS SEGREAVES :
:
Appellant : No. 888 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 9, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Civil Division at No(s): C-48-PF-2016-00811
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2021
Appellant, Ross Segreaves, appeals from the order entered in the
Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which found Appellant in
indirect criminal contempt of court for violating an order under the Protection
From Abuse (“PFA”) Act,1 in favor of Appellee, Olga Segreaves. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Appellant and Appellee were married, and they are the parents of two minor
children. In September 2016, while divorce proceedings were underway, the
parties had a heated confrontation.
On or about September 21, 2016, [Appellee] obtained a
temporary [PFA] Order in the instant case…. Per the request
of [Appellee], that temporary Order was dismissed without
prejudice on October 3, 2016. On that same date of October
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
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3, 2016, [Appellee], by and through her counsel, … and
[Appellant], who was pro se, reached an agreement that
was made part of the record wherein [Appellee] agreed to
withdraw her PFA in exchange for exclusive possession of
the marital home and other modifications to the parties’
Custody Order.
On November 18, 2016, the [trial court] conducted a
hearing on a Petition for Contempt filed by [Appellee]
wherein [Appellee] alleged violations of the parties’
agreement of October 3, 2016. [Appellee] alleged that
[Appellant] showed up at her home on multiple occasions
and repeatedly harassed her. Following this hearing, [the
trial court] reinstated the temporary PFA Order. [Appellee]
later obtained a final PFA Order against [Appellant], which
was set to expire November 18, 2019. [The trial court]
directed that [Appellant] could only contact [Appellee] on
matters pertaining to the custody of their children.[2]
[Appellee] filed a request for an extension of the final PFA
Order on October 31, 2019. A hearing was scheduled for
November 8, 2019. The [trial court] entered the first
extension of the PFA Order on November 5, 2019, extending
the PFA Order until November 22, 2019. On November 22,
2019, by agreement of the parties, the final PFA Order was
extended for an additional three years and is now in effect
until November 22, 2022. On September 3, 2020, at the
request of [Appellee], the [trial court] entered an Order
modifying the PFA Order to prevent [Appellant] from
contacting the following individuals, all of whom were
friends or acquaintances of [Appellee]: 1) Sue Gunderman;
2) Martin Gunderman; and 3) Jorge Parra. [Appellant] had
sent them numerous letters from prison concerning
[Appellee].
(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 13, 2021, at 4-6) (internal citations omitted).
Between November 18, 2016 and December 14, 2020, the trial court
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2 The final PFA order specifically prohibited Appellant “from having ANY
CONTACT” with Appellee, “either directly or indirectly through a third
party….” (Order, 1/24/17, at ¶3) (emphasis in original).
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found Appellant guilty of ten (10) charges of indirect criminal contempt for
violating the PFA order.3 At the December 14, 2020 contempt hearing, the
court explained Appellant’s most recent violations of the PFA order as follows:
THE COURT: Sir, the contempt petition that is date-
stamped September 3, 2020, alleges that while you were
incarcerated [you] wrote letters to [Appellee’s] close
friends, mailed them to their family business address, and
told her friends to ask [Appellee] to come before me and
ask for your release.
The friend has appeared numerous times here on previously
scheduled hearings and gave me a stack of letters from you,
sir. Do you admit you did these things?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, I have already stated that. Yes.
THE COURT: Sir, the contempt petition that was date-
stamped November 5, 2020, alleges that on October 17,
2020, [Appellee] received a … health guide on bipolar
disorder, and then a couple of days later, a letter came
addressed to her [from the] International OCD Foundation.
And that on November 4, 2020, [Appellee’s] friend received
a letter … at her work at St. Luke’s Hospital campus, and
that it was addressed from a correctional facility. Do you
admit that you sent these items?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
(N.T. Contempt Hearing, 12/14/20, at 11-12). The court also warned
Appellant that he would face additional prison time if “in any way, shape, or
form” he contacted Appellee, “or anyone associated with [Appellee] for any
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3 In addition to the criminal contempt charges, Appellant entered a guilty plea
to first-degree misdemeanor stalking of Appellee on June 1, 2018. The court
sentenced Appellant to three (3) to six (6) months’ imprisonment, followed by
twenty-four (24) months of probation for the stalking conviction.
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reason[.]” (Id. at 15).
On December 16, 2020, Appellee filed another indirect criminal
contempt private complaint. In it, Appellee alleged that Appellant had sent
an additional letter to her friend’s place of employment at St. Luke’s Hospital,
and the letter was “disturbing” to her friend. (Criminal Contempt Private
Complaint, filed 12/16/20, at ¶2). Appellee’s complaint included the letter,
which speculated about various medical conditions that Appellant believed
were affecting him. At the conclusion of the letter, Appellant asked Appellee’s
friend to contact both Appellee and Appellee’s attorney to inform them about
Appellant’s purported medical conditions.
The court conducted a contempt hearing on March 12, 2021. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court found Appellant guilty of indirect criminal
contempt and sentenced him to six (6) months’ incarceration. Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal on April 9, 2021. On April 12, 2021, the court
ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement
on April 28, 2021.
Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
Did the trial court err in finding that Appellant violated the
PFA order with wrongful intent?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
On appeal, Appellant contends that he sent a letter to Appellee’s friend
“for the purpose of passing on urgent concerns about the health of
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[Appellant’s] family, which included the parties’ minor children.” (Id. at 8).
Appellant asserts that “it would take a hyper-literal reading of the PFA order
to find wrongful intent simply based on a momentary solicitation of Appellee’s
health alongside that of their children.” (Id.) Appellant argues that, “if
anything,” the letter amounted to a “de minimis infraction [of the PFA order
that was] insufficient to demonstrate wrongful intent.” (Id. at 8-9). Appellant
concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for indirect
criminal contempt. We disagree.
“[W]hen reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is given to the
discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, we are confined to a determination
of whether the facts support the trial court decision.” Commonwealth v.
Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting Williams v.
Williams, 681 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa.Super. 1996), aff’d, 554 Pa. 465, 721 A.2d
1072 (1998)). “We will reverse a trial court’s determination only when there
has been a plain abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of
the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of
record.” Commonwealth v. Griffiths, 15 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa.Super. 2003),
appeal denied, 581 Pa. 671, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004)).
“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence
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from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance
prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519
(Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262
(Pa.Super. 2008)).
Where a PFA order is involved, an [indirect criminal
contempt] charge is designed to seek punishment for
violation of the protective order. A charge of indirect
criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of an
order or decree of court occurred outside the presence of
the court. To establish indirect criminal contempt, the
Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently
definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no
doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had
notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must
have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted
with wrongful intent.
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Wrongful intent will be found where the contemnor knows or
reasonably should be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Stewart v.
Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 472 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Himes v. Himes,
833 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2003)). “It is imperative that trial judges
use common sense and consider the context and surrounding factors in
making their determinations of whether a violation of a court order is truly
intentional before imposing sanctions of criminal contempt.”
Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal
denied, 585 Pa. 686, 887 A.2d 1240 (2005) (emphasis in original).
Instantly, the trial court conducted a contempt hearing on March 12,
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2021. At the hearing, Appellee’s friend, Marina Mikhalik, testified that: 1) she
received a letter that Appellant sent to her place of employment in December
2020; 2) the letter made her feel uncomfortable; and 3) she informed Appellee
about the letter and forwarded it to Appellee. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/12/21, at
10-11). In the letter, Appellant claimed to “have potentially been poisoned
by toxic exposure to benzene[.]” (Id. at 13).
Appellant also testified at the hearing, and he admitted sending the
letter to Ms. Mikhalik. (Id. at 17). Appellant emphasized that his “intent was
not clearly to communicate with [Appellee]; it was to have my children and
my wife, their health taken care of.” (Id. at 23). Appellant further explained
that there was a “chimney collapse” at the parties’ residence over eleven years
ago, and he believed that the collapse exposed his family to “neurotoxins,”
which could cause brain damage or cancer. (Id. at 25).
The trial court evaluated the hearing testimony and the letter at issue,
concluding that Appellant acted with the requisite wrongful intent:
The letter that was admitted into evidence as Exhibit “P1”
at the March 12, 2021 hearing cannot be viewed in isolation.
The PFA Order against [Appellant] has been in effect since
2016 and extended on several occasions. [Appellant] has
not been compliant with the PFA Order since its
inception. Consistently since 2016, [Appellant] has
violated the PFA Order through communications with
[Appellee] that have been incessant and unrelenting in
nature, including and continuing while he is incarcerated in
state prison for violating the PFA Order. [Appellant] has
repeatedly threatened to kill [Appellee]. [Appellant]
violated his bail provisions by contacting [Appellee],
violated his probation by contacting [Appellee], alarmed his
probation officer with his behavior …, impersonated his
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therapist, has made death threats by and through his
mother, and has been arrested by the police at [Appellee’s]
house in violation of the PFA Order. [Appellant], who has
been criminally convicted of stalking and harassing
[Appellee], has continued unrelentingly to stalk and harass
her, even with the PFA Order in place. [Appellant] has been
repeatedly warned and counseled by [the trial c]ourt
concerning the prohibitions of the PFA Order, and he has
been ordered to receive mental health treatment.
[Appellant] has repeatedly claimed to have various mental
health diagnoses and ailments for which there is absolutely
no evidence of record. He has communicated with
numerous third parties at their homes and places of
employment in an effort to enlist them to help him
communicate with [Appellee] in violation of the PFA Order,
which resulted in at least one amendment to the Order.
(Trial Court Opinion at 35-36) (emphasis in original).
Our review of the record confirms the court’s conclusions. Although
Appellant insists that he sent the letter to Ms. Mikhalik for the good faith
purpose of giving his children relevant medical information, the court correctly
noted that Appellant did not actually provide any evidence to support the
purported diagnoses. Instead, Appellant asked Ms. Mikhalik to tell Appellee
that she should “expect a letter” from doctors, who would provide additional
information about Appellant’s medical condition. (See Letter marked as
Exhibit P1). The letter’s closing sentences reveal that Appellant’s true purpose
in writing to Ms. Mikhalik was to garner sympathy and further his goal of
reunification with Appellee and his children: “I love my wife and kids very
much, every day I cry because I miss them. Can you imagine my pain?” (Id.)
Based upon the court’s prior warnings, Appellant knew or should have
known that his conduct was wrongful. See Stewart, supra. Here, the trial
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court used common sense and considered the context and surrounding factors
in making its determination that Appellant had committed another contempt.
See Haigh, supra. Because the facts support the court’s decision, we cannot
say that it abused its discretion in concluding that Appellant acted with a
wrongful intent. See Kolansky, supra. Accordingly, no relief is due.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/17/2021
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