Com. v. Martinez, A., Jr. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A11002-18
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    AMAVILES MARTINEZ, JR.
    Appellant                No. 1350 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 31, 2017 In the
    Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at Nos:
    CP-06-CR-0000907-2014
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 14, 2018
    Appellant, Amaviles Martinez, Jr., appeals from his judgment of
    sentence of six to fifteen years’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by
    a felon1 and possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. 2 We
    affirm.
    On February 6, 2014, Berks County probation officers visited Appellant’s
    residence while Appellant was on probation for a corrupt organizations
    conviction. The officers discovered a substantial amount of marijuana and a
    firearm during the visit.
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
    2   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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    On March 21, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an information charging
    Appellant    with    the   above     offenses    along   with   possession   of   drug
    paraphernalia. The trial court granted Appellant an extension of time until
    May 16, 2014 to file omnibus pretrial motions. Appellant did not file a motion
    to suppress until October 24, 2016, two years and five months after the
    extended deadline.         On October 27, 2016, the trial court denied the
    suppression motion as untimely.
    Almost two months later, on December 22, 2016, Appellant filed a
    motion seeking reconsideration of the order denying his suppression motion.
    Appellant admitted that his initial motion was both untimely and boilerplate in
    nature but asked the court to excuse these defects in the interests of justice.
    On December 27, 2016, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
    On March 13, 2017, Appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration
    fleshing out his argument for suppression.          In essence, Appellant asserted
    that (1) on the afternoon of February 6, 2014, probation officers visited his
    residence without advance notice and demanded entry without any reasonable
    suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing; (2) Appellant did not voluntarily consent
    to their entry; (3) during the visit, the probation officers obtained
    incriminating statements from Appellant without first providing Miranda3
    warnings; and (4) based on these incriminating statements, a probation officer
    found marijuana in the living room, and (5) a police officer who responded to
    ____________________________________________
    3   Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
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    the probation officer’s call unlocked a bedroom door and found a gun inside.
    On March 17, 2017, the court denied Appellant’s second motion for
    reconsideration.
    The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to sever the
    firearms charge from the other charges. During trial on the firearms charge,
    Appellant’s wife testified that she owned the firearm instead of Appellant and
    that she obtained the firearm to “protect her family.” N.T., 6/7/17, at 136.
    Nevertheless, the jury found Appellant guilty of the firearms charge. On July
    26, 2017, the trial court, sitting without a jury, found Appellant guilty of the
    remaining charges.
    On July 31, 2017, the trial court imposed sentence.           Appellant filed
    timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied, and a timely notice
    of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    The trial court stated in its opinion that it denied Appellant’s initial suppression
    motion and two motions for reconsideration because they were untimely and
    boilerplate in nature. Trial Ct. Op., 10/5/17, at 4-5.
    Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:
    A. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion first, by
    failing to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s
    amended motion to suppress based on violation of the Appellant’s
    rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
    States constitution and analogous provisions of the Pennsylvania
    constitution, and second, thereby in effect denying the motion to
    suppress?
    B. Whether, in this prosecution of [Appellant] for alleged unlawful
    possession of a firearm, the trial court erred and abused its
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    discretion by barring [Appellant’s] wife from testifying to the
    circumstances supporting her testimony that she alone obtained
    the firearm for protection of her household and family?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    In his first argument, Appellant objects to the trial court’s refusal to hold
    a pretrial hearing due to the tardiness of his suppression motion. We review
    decisions denying leave to file an untimely suppression motion for abuse of
    discretion. Commonwealth v. Long, 
    753 A.2d 272
    , 279 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    The Rules of Criminal Procedure require defendants to file suppression
    issues within an omnibus pretrial motion.           Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B).       The
    defendant must file and serve the omnibus motion “within 30 days after
    arraignment . . . unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for
    cause shown.”     Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A).      If the defendant files an untimely
    suppression motion, “the issue of suppression of such evidence shall be
    deemed to be waived” unless the court excuses the defendant’s tardiness in
    the “interests of justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). The “interests of justice” test
    requires consideration of “the length and cause of the delay, the merits of the
    suppression claim, and the court’s ability, considering the complexity of the
    issues and the availability of the witnesses, to hold the hearing promptly.”
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    378 A.2d 1262
    , 1266 (Pa. Super. 1977). The
    trial court should invoke the “interests of justice” exception when “the merits
    of counsel’s [untimely] motion [are] so apparent that justice require[s] that it
    be heard.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 
    372 A.2d 687
    , 693 (Pa. 1977),
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    overruled on different grounds, Commonwealth v. Grant, 
    813 A.2d 726
    ,
    738 (Pa. 2002).
    Courts are unwilling to apply the “interests of justice” exception in the
    defendant’s favor when he raises an untimely suppression issue whose merits
    are not apparent.     Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 695 (where officers requested
    consent to inspect defendant’s automobile and boots after short, informal
    questioning period in defendant’s home in which officers twice advised
    defendant of his right to refuse consent, defendant’s motion at murder trial to
    suppress evidence relating to automobile and boots on ground that he had not
    been advised of his Miranda rights before consenting to inspection did not
    raise apparently meritorious claim; thus, “interests of justice” did not require
    that such motion be heard).        Courts are also reluctant to excuse untimely
    motions arguing issues that the defendant could have timely raised by the
    original due date. Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 
    844 A.2d 556
    , 561 (Pa.
    Super.   2004)    (trial   court   properly      denied   defendant’s    supplemental
    suppression   motion       as   untimely    where    defendant    knew      facts    and
    circumstances surrounding traffic stop at time of original suppression motion
    but limited original motion to different issue and did not file supplemental
    motion until four months later, after court had denied original motion);
    compare Commonwealth v. Long, 
    753 A.2d 272
    , 279-80 (Pa. Super. 2000)
    (trial court properly considered, in prosecution for driving under the influence,
    defendant’s   oral    suppression      motion       presented    at     conclusion    of
    Commonwealth's case, on ground that recently obtained videotape of traffic
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    stop and arresting officer’s trial testimony provided basis for the motion not
    available pretrial).
    In this case, the original deadline for Appellant’s motion to suppress was
    Monday,    April   21,    2014,   thirty    days    after   Appellant’s    arraignment.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). Appellant requested and received an extension to file
    his motion until May 14, 2014.        Despite this extension, he did not file his
    original suppression motion until October 24, 2016, two years and five months
    after the extended deadline, and he failed to present good cause for this
    lengthy delay.     Bluntly put, Appellant displayed abject indifference to the
    court’s schedule. Moreover, Appellant’s original motion and initial motion for
    reconsideration    were    boilerplate     in   nature.     His   second    motion   for
    reconsideration, which claimed that the probation officers performed the
    search without his consent and failed to provide Miranda warnings, was more
    detailed than his prior motions, but its merit was not “so apparent that justice
    required it be heard.” Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 693. Further, nothing prevented
    Appellant from raising these arguments 2½ years earlier in a timely
    suppression motion.        We conclude that the trial court acted within its
    discretion by denying Appellant’s original motion to suppress and motions for
    reconsideration without a hearing.
    In his second argument, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
    precluding Appellant’s wife from explaining her reasons for obtaining the
    firearm that law enforcement officers discovered in the residence. We review
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    the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth
    v. Hanford, 
    937 A.2d 1094
    , 1098 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    We conclude that this ruling was a proper exercise of the trial court’s
    discretion. The court explained that it permitted Appellant’s wife to testify
    that the gun belonged to her and not Appellant, but it barred testimony about
    her reasons for owning the gun because they “[had] no bearing on any
    material fact. The material fact in this case was possession of the gun by
    Appellant. Whether [Appellant’s wife] had acquired the gun legally or with a
    substantial justification was irrelevant [to whether Appellant was in possession
    of the gun].” Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (emphasis added). We also observe that this
    ruling did not prejudice Appellant, for his wife still managed to explain her
    reason for obtaining the gun by testifying that she needed the gun to “protect
    her family.” N.T., 6/7/17, at 136.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/14/18
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