In the Int. of: L.Y.M., a Minor ( 2021 )


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  • J-A28011-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INT. OF: L.Y.M., A MINOR            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.R., MOTHER                    :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 826 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Decree Entered April 29, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans’ Court at
    No(s): 13 AD 2021
    IN THE INT. OF: B.M.R.R., A MINOR          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.R., MOTHER                    :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 827 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Decree Entered April 29, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans’ Court at
    No(s): 14 AD 2021
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 21, 2021
    M.R. (Mother) appeals1 nunc pro tunc from the trial court’s decrees
    involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her children, L.Y.M. (born
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The appeals at 826 MDA 2021 and 827 MDA 2021 were consolidated sua
    sponte by our Court on July 15, 2021. See Pa.R.A.P. 513; Pa.R.A.P. 2138.
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    10/05) and B.M.R.R. (born 11/14) (collectively, Children). Counsel has also
    filed an application seeking leave to withdraw on appeal pursuant to Anders
    v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and In re Adoption of V.E., 
    611 A.2d 1267
     (Pa. Super. 1992). Due to Mother’s consistent failure to comply with
    court-ordered objectives in order to resolve the significant mental health
    issues that prevented her from capably parenting Children, we affirm. We
    also grant counsel’s application to withdraw.
    In December 2018, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
    Youth (CYS) received a referral regarding concerns about Mother’s mental
    health and her ability to care for her family. Although CYS offered Mother
    services to address the issue, she did not participate in any mental health
    treatment at the time. CYS closed the case in January 2019. Weeks later,
    CYS received another referral that Mother was being admitted to an inpatient
    mental health program and that no family members were able to care for
    Children. Following an emergency shelter care hearing on February 6, 2019,
    Children were taken into protective custody. On April 2, 2019, Children were
    adjudicated dependent and legal and physical custody was transferred to CYS.
    Children were placed in kinship foster care.      A family service plan was
    established for Mother, requiring her to obtain a psychological evaluation and
    court-ordered signed releases. Mother visited a behavioral health center for
    the evaluation, but never had the evaluation conducted because she refused
    to sign the required consents. The court permitted Mother to have supervised
    visitation with Children at CYS.
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    The court held permanency hearings in September 2019, March 2020,
    June 2020, and November 2020. Mother continued to refuse to sign releases
    for her psychological evaluation and remained homeless. CYS had to change
    Children’s placements 14 times due to Mother making threats to Children’s
    foster parents and visiting their foster homes unannounced.          Mother was
    arrested for receiving stolen property in October of 2019. In March 2020, the
    court ordered no in-person contact between Children and Mother; Children
    were ordered to remain in kinship care. Sibling visitations were permitted to
    continue.
    On February 4, 2021, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
    Mother’s parental rights to Children based upon 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1),
    (2), (5), (8), and (b). On April 29, 2021, the court held a termination hearing,2
    at which Mother, CYS paralegal Ann Almoureux, CYS caseworker Kristin
    Brown, CYS caseworker Brittni Tallman, and CYS caseworker supervisor Aesha
    Wiggins testified. Ms. Almoureux testified that Mother would frequently send
    her “alarm[ing] and disturbing” emails using disparaging and offensive
    ____________________________________________
    2  On March 2, 2021, the court appointed Sarah E. Hoffman, Esquire, as
    guardian ad litem (GAL) and legal counsel for Children. See 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2313(a) (children have statutory right to counsel in contested involuntary
    termination proceedings) and In re K.R., 
    200 A.3d 969
     (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
    banc), but see In Re: T.S., E.S., 
    192 A.3d 1080
    , 1092 (Pa. 2018) (“[D]uring
    contested termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, where there is no
    conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-guardian ad
    litem representing the child’s best interests can also represent the child’s legal
    interests.”). Attorney Hoffman has not filed a brief on appeal, but concurs
    with Mother’s counsel that the instant appeal is frivolous.
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    language, and accusing Ms. Almoureux and CYS caseworkers of lying to
    Children about Mother. N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/29/21, at 13-14. CYS
    intake caseworker Tallman testified that when she first became involved in
    the case, Mother told her that she was overwhelmed as a single mom who
    received very little parenting support.          Id. at 21.   Ms. Tallman discussed
    therapy programs with Mother to address her problems, but Mother told her
    that she was not interested in formal treatment. Id. In February 2019, Ms.
    Tallman testified that she had to request that Children be placed in emergency
    temporary custody due to concerns regarding Mother’s mental health. Id. At
    that time Mother began an inpatient program and CYS placed Children in foster
    care. Id. at 23. Ms. Tallman also testified that Mother refused to sign any
    releases with regard to her court-ordered psychological evaluation. Id. at 27-
    28. Ms. Tallman testified that Mother arrived, unannounced, at her brother’s
    house when he was caring for Children and refused to leave which “caus[ed]
    a lot of stress for [Mother’s] family members and [C]hildren[.]” Id. at 28.3
    Finally, Ms. Tallman testified that Mother never completed a psychological
    evaluation while she was assigned to her case, that Mother failed to submit to
    all requested urine screens, and that Mother also did not submit proof of
    employment. Id. at 29-30.
    ____________________________________________
    3Ms. Tallman also testified that because of Mother’s unannounced visits, CYS
    was not permitted to disclose Children’s foster placement addresses to Mother.
    Id. at 28.
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    CYS supervisor Wiggins testified that she recalled during a supervised
    visit at CYS, Mother was “very angry,” and was “yelling at [Ms.] Tallman” and
    the foster parent, which made Children “very upset” to the point they were
    “hysterical, crying” and “screaming.” Id. at 40-43, 41 (“[There] was a lot of
    yelling, cursing, [and] crying with [Mother].”). Due to the tense situation,
    CYS security was called to intervene. Id. During the fray, Mother climbed
    into the foster parent’s vehicle and had to be physically removed by agency
    staff. Id. at 42.4 Ultimately, supervised visitation was moved from CYS to
    the YMCA to address concerns regarding Mother’s volatile behavior. Id. at
    44. At a September 2019 permanency hearing, another caseworker testified
    that Mother had threatened foster parents, arriving unannounced at the foster
    home. As a result of Mother’s behavior, as stated above, CYS had to change
    Children’s placements multiple times5 throughout the life of the case. Id. at
    51-52. At the March 2020 permanency review hearing, the court ordered no
    in-person contact between Mother and Children. Id. at 58.
    Following the termination hearing, the court granted CYS’ termination
    petitions and terminated Mother’s rights to Children pursuant to sections
    ____________________________________________
    4Ms. Wiggins also testified that Mother, on more than one occasion, removed
    or attempted to remove another one of her children from the Milton Hershey
    School, where that child attends, in violation of school policy. Id. at 43-44.
    Mother was criminally charged with interference with custody. Id. at 45.
    Ultimately, that child was adjudicated dependent. Id. at 49.
    5   CYS changed L.M.’s placement eight times and B.R.’s placement six times.
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    2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.6 Mother filed timely
    notices7 of appeal.8 On February 12, 2020, counsel filed a petition for leave
    to withdraw with our Court, pursuant to Anders, 
    supra,
     and V.E., 
    supra.
     In
    V.E., our Court stated:
    Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
    appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental
    rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the
    record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if
    he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base
    the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required
    and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in
    which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and
    evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the court holds that
    appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must
    submit an Anders brief.
    ____________________________________________
    6   23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
    7 Instantly, Mother has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v.
    Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018), where she filed notices of appeal for each
    docket number and designated the relevant docket number on each notice by
    placing a check mark next the appropriate docket number to identify which
    notice corresponded with each appealed case. See Commonwealth v.
    Johnson, 
    236 A.3d 1141
     (Pa. Super. 2020) (where defendant filed four
    notices of appeal and listed all four docket numbers on all four notices,
    defendant complied with Walker by italicizing one relevant docket number on
    each notice to identify which notice corresponded with each appealed case);
    see also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 
    235 A.3d 350
     (Pa. Super. 2020)
    (applying holding in Johnson and reiterating that Commonwealth v.
    Creese, 
    216 A.3d 1142
     (Pa. Super. 2019), is expressly overruled so far as it
    mandates notice of appeal may only contain one docket number; fact that
    defendant placed both docket numbers on single notice of appeal “is of no
    consequence”).
    8 In light of counsel’s intent to file an Anders brief, counsel did not file a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in compliance with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
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    In re Adoption of V.E., 
    611 A.2d at 1275
    . Moreover, we held that “any
    motion to withdraw representation, submitted by appointed counsel, must be
    accompanied by an advocate’s brief, and not the amicus curiae brief
    delineated in [Commonwealth v.]McClendon, [
    434 A.2d 1185
     (Pa. 1981)].
    See also In re Adoption of R.I., 
    312 A.3d 601
    , 602 (Pa. 1973) (“the logic
    behind . . . an individual in a criminal case being entitled to representation by
    counsel at any proceeding that may lead to ‘the deprivation of substantial
    rights’[,] . . . is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent parent faced
    with the loss of her child.”).
    In her Anders brief, counsel raises the following issue for our
    consideration, “[Did] the trial court abuse[] its discretion and commit[] an
    error of law when it terminated [Mother’s] parental rights?” Anders Brief, at
    4.
    Before reaching the merits of Mother’s appeal, we must first address
    counsel’s application to withdraw. To withdraw under Anders, counsel must:
    (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
    determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
    of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the
    [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
    or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
    of the court’s attention.[9]
    Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
    banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 
    978 A.2d 995
    , 997 (Pa. Super.
    ____________________________________________
    9   Mother has not raised any additional arguments on appeal.
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    2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
    the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court
    has held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy
    of the letter sent to [the] client advising him or her of their rights.”
    Commonwealth v. Millisock, 
    873 A.2d 748
    , 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this
    Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there
    are   any   additional,   non-frivolous    issues   overlooked   by   counsel.”
    Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    133 A.3d 1246
    , 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (footnote omitted).
    Instantly, Mother’s counsel filed an application with our Court, dated
    August 19, 2021, seeking leave to withdraw her appearance as court-
    appointed counsel in this appeal. Counsel also filed an Anders brief, in which
    she acknowledges that “after conscientiously reviewing the facts of record and
    thoroughly evaluating the applicable statutes and relevant case law,” she has
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    determined that the appeal is wholly frivolous.            See Anders Brief
    (Anders/Santiago Analysis), 8/18/21, at 10. Counsel’s brief includes a
    somewhat truncated summary of the history and facts of the case. 
    Id.
     at 5-
    6. She raises the issue that “Mother contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion or committed an error of law when it involuntarily terminated her
    parental rights.” Id. at 7. Counsel then cites to subsections (a) and (b) of
    section 2511 of the Adoption Act—“Grounds for Involuntary Termination,” id.
    at 8, and the relevant standards and scope of review in termination cases.
    Id. at 9.
    Counsel offers the following facts to support her conclusion that Mother’s
    issue is wholly frivolous: (1) Children have been in foster care for two and a
    half years; (2) Children are bonded and working on issues with foster parents;
    (3) Mother did not follow any service plan objectives; (4) Mother failed to
    resolve her significant mental health issues, which led to Children being
    declared dependent and placed in foster care; (5) Mother has no home for
    Children; (6) Mother has no job to support Children’s needs; and (7) Mother
    has not been able to progress to unsupervised visits due to “acting out and
    traumatizing [C]hildren at visits.” Id.
    Counsel’s brief includes a letter, dated August 18, 2021, sent to Mother
    indicating that counsel has carefully and thoroughly reviewed Mother’s case
    and concluded that the appeal is frivolous. The letter also references that
    counsel is enclosing a copy of her application to withdraw, as well as a copy
    of her Anders brief filed with this Court. Finally, the letter advises Mother
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    that she has the right to pursue the appeal on her own, with another privately-
    retained attorney, and that Mother also may raise any additional issues pro
    se. We find that counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of
    Anders and Santiago, and, thus, we may review the issue raised by counsel
    and also conduct our independent review of the record to determine whether
    Mother’s appeal is, in fact, frivolous. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    934 A.2d 1287
    , 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (substantial compliance with Anders
    requirements sufficient).
    Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is well-
    settled:
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    After careful review of the record, we find there is ample, competent
    evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.         T.S.M., supra.
    Moreover, the court’s conclusions are not a result of an error of law or an
    abuse of discretion. Id.
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    Instantly, Children were initially removed from Mother’s care due to
    Mother’s severe mental health issues and inability to meet Children’s basic
    needs.   At the termination hearing, a caseworker testified that Mother
    continually failed to comply with her service plan objectives, including not
    completing a psychiatric evaluation and signing releases, being without stable
    housing or homeless, and behaving in such an erratic and troublesome way
    that the court had to cease in-person contact between Mother and Children.
    As the trial court recognizes:
    [I]t’s overwhelming that the best interests of these [C]hildren are
    that . . . [M]other’s . . . rights should be terminated and that these
    [C]hildren should be given a chance for permanency. . . . The
    [c]ourt can[no]t wait and hold the lives of the [C]hildren in
    ab[ayence] until [M]other . . . gets [her] act[] together and
    becomes . . . the kind of parent that [would make her] able to
    safely and lovingly raise these [C]hildren[.]
    N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/29/21, at 96. We agree.
    Since the time that Children were adjudicated dependent and put in
    placement, over two years ago, Mother has consistently failed to comply with
    her plan objectives in order to be reunited with Children.         Most notably,
    Mother’s significant mental health problems—the reason why Children were
    removed from Mother’s care—make her incapable of adequately and
    appropriately parenting Children. Because the record supports the conclusion
    that termination would best serve Children’s needs and welfare, the court
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    properly terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8).10
    See Adoption of C.J.P., 
    114 A.3d 1046
    , 1054 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A child’s
    life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
    ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”) (citation omitted).11
    Finally, following our independent review of the certified record, we
    conclude that the appeal is frivolous and unsupported in law or in fact. Thus,
    we grant counsel’s application to withdraw. In re V.E., 
    supra.
    Decrees affirmed.12 Application to withdraw granted.
    ____________________________________________
    10 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) (“The child has been removed from the care
    of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
    months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
    and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
    the child.”).
    11 An analysis of whether termination was proper under subsection 2511(b),
    which is part of the bifurcated termination process, also leads us to the same
    conclusion—an appeal of this issue would be frivolous. Mother has not had
    any in-person contact with Children since March 2020 and the record is devoid
    of any evidence that she and Children are bonded. Moreover, the stability
    that Children are experiencing with their current foster families, one of which
    is an adoptive resource, supports the fact that termination under subsection
    2511(b) would serve Children’s safety needs and intangibles such as love,
    comfort, security, and stability. In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    (Pa. Super. 2015).
    12 We can affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental
    rights with regard to any single subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W.,
    
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/21/2021
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