Com. v. Yendriga, W. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S51005-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    WAYNE ALLEN YENDRIGA,
    Appellee                 No. 1868 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 13, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0009128-2012
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    DOMINICK ALAN CARTER,
    Appellee                 No. 2018 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 11, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008025-2012
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    LAWRENCE M. CUNNINGHAM,
    Appellee                 No. 2024 MDA 2013
    J-S51005-14
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 21, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005423-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    MONIQUE VERA WINSTON,
    Appellee                 No. 2135 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 28, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0003800-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    BRIAN KEVIN DOLL,
    Appellee                 No. 2164 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 4, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006256-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    ANDREA NICOLE LUMBAN-TOBING,
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    J-S51005-14
    Appellee                     No. 151 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 23, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008104-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    HEIDI ARLENE HARTMAN,
    Appellant                    No. 253 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 7, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007320-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    SHAWN MICHAEL NESS,
    Appellee                     No. 273 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006765-2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 20, 2014
    In    this   consolidated   appeal   involving    eight   defendants,   the
    Commonwealth contends that the sentencing courts in question erroneously
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    computed the maximum sentence that could be imposed upon the respective
    defendants for a conviction of driving under
    pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) where each
    defendant     refused   chemical   testing   and   had   a   prior   DUI.   The
    Commonwealth acknowledges that the panel decision in Commonwealth v.
    Musau, 
    69 A.3d 754
    (Pa.Super. 2013), is applicable herein. In Musau, a
    panel of this Court concluded that a defendant who was convicted of DUI
    under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), refused chemical testing for the offense in
    question, and had a prior DUI could be sentenced to a maximum of only six
    months.      The Commonwealth maintains that Musau was erroneously
    decided in that it improperly construed 18 Pa.C.S. § 3803. As we are bound
    by the decision in question, we are constrained to affirm.
    Initially, we set forth the factual background of the cases at issue
    herein, all of which were instituted in York County.     In each instance, the
    pertinent facts have been ascertained from a review of the affidavit of
    probable cause supporting the criminal complaint. We observe that, in some
    of these cases, the Commonwealth was ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement.     In those instances, the Commonwealth timely complied and
    preserved the issue now presented on appeal.
    At criminal action number 9128 of 2012, Wayne Allen Yendriga was
    charged wit
    Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), which prohibits a person from driving a vehicle after
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    consuming a sufficient amount of alcohol so as to render him incapable of
    safely driving. The offense was graded as a first degree misdemeanor. The
    criminal complaint indicates that at approximately 9:00 a.m. on October 19,
    2012, York Police Officer Joel Hopta was dispatched to the scene of an
    accident on Connelly Road, where a tractor trailer had hit a building.
    Yendriga was driving the truck when the accident occurred and displayed
    signs of intoxication.    Officer Hopta administered field sobriety tests to
    Yendriga. Yendriga was arrested after failing the tests, was given the proper
    warnings about the consequences of his failure to agree to a blood alcohol
    arrested that day and released on bail in December 2012.
    Yendriga failed to appear for three scheduled pre-trial conferences,
    which resulted in bail forfeiture and issuance of a bench warrant.       After
    being apprehended, Yendriga, on September 13, 2013, entered a no-contest
    plea to the offense.     The record of the September 13, 2013 proceeding
    indicates that Yendriga had a prior DUI, and the Commonwealth requested a
    sentence of one to five years in jail. Over objection, the trial court applied
    Musau and sentenced Yendriga to time served to six months.
    At criminal action number 0008025-2012, Dominick Alan Carter was
    charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor, endangering the welfare of a child, driving while under
    a DUI license suspension, careless driving, operating a motor vehicle that
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    contained an open alcoholic beverage container, and failing to have his
    minor child, who was in the front seat, fastened with a seat belt.         At
    approximately 1:30 p.m. on July 18, 2012, Pennsylvania State Trooper
    Matthew Pavone was dispatched to a parking lot near Lake Williams after an
    eyewitness observed Carter arrive at that location driving a car while visibly
    intoxicated.   Carter was in the company of his child.       Trooper Pavone
    interviewed Carter, concluded that he was drunk, and gave Carter the
    proper warnings about the consequences of his failure to agree to a BAC
    test. Carter refused BAC testing. On October 11, 2013, Carter entered a
    guilty plea to DUI and endangering the welfare of a child. At sentencing, the
    Musau for the DUI charge would be six months imprisonment, but it
    specifically objected to that maximum. Carter received a six-month prison
    term for the DUI.
    At criminal action number 5423 of 2013, Lawrence Cunningham was
    charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor and driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street.
    At approximately 2:45 a.m. on July 12, 2013, York Police Officer Matthew
    way on the one-way North Hartley Street.              Cunningham appeared
    intoxicated, Officer Dewitt gave    him   the   proper   warnings about the
    consequences of his failure to agree to BAC testing, and Cunningham, who
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    had been convicted of DUI in 2004, refused that testing.    On October 11,
    2013, Cunningham entered an open guilty plea to the DUI offense. After the
    Commonwealth again voiced its objection to the Musau holding regarding
    the maximum sentence that could be imposed, on October 21, 2013,
    Cunningham was sentenced to ninety days to six months in the county jail.
    At criminal action number 3800 of 2013, Monique Vera Winston was
    charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor and driving with a suspended license-DUI related. At
    approximately 2:30 a.m. on March 17, 2013, State Trooper Shawn Panchik
    observed Winston operating her car on Interstate 83 North near mile marker
    twenty-five and ascertained that she had a suspended license. After being
    stopped, Winston exhibited signs of impairment and was transported to a
    hospital for BAC testing. Trooper Panchik gave Winston the proper warnings
    about the consequences of her failure to agree to BAC testing, but she
    refused it. On July 29, 2013, Winston entered an open guilty plea to both
    charges, and she was sentenced on October 28, 2013. Winston received a
    jail term of ninety days for the DUI-suspension, and, over objection, a six-
    month jail term for the DUI offense.
    At criminal action number 8104 of 2013, Andrea Nicole Lumban-Tobing
    was charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor and driving in the incorrect lane of a roadway.       At
    approximately 1:30 a.m. on October 3, 2013, West York Borough Police
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    Officer Scott A. Musselman stopped Lumban-Tobing after he observed her
    driving her car in an easterly direction in the westbound lane of West King
    Street. After she displayed signs of intoxication, Officer Musselman arrested
    Lumban-Tobing and transported her to a booking center for purposes of
    drawing blood. Officer Musselman disseminated the proper warnings about
    the consequences of her failure to agree to BAC testing, but Lumban-Tobing,
    who had been convicted of DUI in March 2013, declined to have her blood
    drawn. On December 23, 2013, Lumban-Tobing entered a guilty plea to the
    DUI charge, and the Commonwealth withdrew the summary offense.            The
    Commonwealth acknowledged that Musau impacted on the sentencing
    holding.   Lumban-Tobing was sentenced to forty-five days in jail
    followed by ninety days house arrest.
    At criminal action number 7320 of 2013, Heidi Arlene Hartman was
    charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor, failing to keep her vehicle within her lane of traffic,
    failing to stop at a stop sign, careless driving, and failing to wear her seat
    belt.    At about 5:00 p.m. on September 21, 2013, Pennsylvania State
    Trooper Travis Kauffman was on routine patrol in York City.      He observed
    Hartman fail to stop her vehicle at a stop sign and then cross into the
    oncoming lane of traffic.     Trooper Kauffman initiated a traffic stop, and
    Hartman displayed numerous signs of intoxication.     Hartman was arrested
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    for DUI, Trooper Kauffman gave her the proper warnings about the
    consequences of her failure to agree to BAC testing, and Hartman refused to
    undergo that testing.     Hartman was convicted of DUI in 2004.           On
    January 7, 2014, Hartman pled guilty to the DUI offense and the remaining
    charges were nol prossed.      The Commonwealth noted its objection to
    prohibition to imposition of a sentence that exceeded six months.
    Hartman was sentenced to six months of intermediate punishment.
    At criminal action number 6256 of 2013, Brian Kevin Doll was charged
    with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first degree
    misdemeanor.    At about 7:00 p.m. on August 3, 2013, Hellan Township
    Police Sergeant Drew Heistand was dispatched to the site of a traffic
    accident on Pleasant Valley Road.    When he arrived, there was a vehicle
    upside down in the middle of the road.      Doll chanced upon the accident
    scene driving a white van that stopped behind one of the fire trucks. Doll
    and indicated that Doll appeared to be intoxicated.
    Sergeant Heistand approached Doll and detected a strong odor of
    alcohol emanating from his breath. Sergeant Heistand advised Doll to call
    for someone to retrieve him from the accident scene and said that he would
    not be arrested if he complied with this directive. Doll ignored the officer,
    entered his van, and attempted to leave the scene. Doll was unable to do so
    due to the presence of fire trucks. After Sergeant Heistand processed the
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    intoxicated driver involved in the accident, he again approached Doll, who
    failed field sobriety tests and was arrested. Doll was taken to a hospital for
    a blood test. After being given the correct warnings about the consequences
    of his failure to agree to BAC testing, Doll refused to undergo that testing.
    The record indicates that Doll had a prior DUI conviction within the ten years
    prior to August 2013.    N.T. Plea, 11/4/13, at 3.    Doll pled guilty to the
    charged offense on November 4, 2013, and was sentenced to six months
    of Musau.
    At criminal action number 6765 of 2013, Shawn Michael Ness was
    charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) graded as a first
    degree misdemeanor and two summary traffic offenses.        At approximately
    1:30 a.m. on September 2, 2013, State Trooper Michael Levinsky was on
    patrol on Highway 30 in York City. He observed Ness driving his Volkswagen
    erratically and stopped him. Ness appeared intoxicated and had a prior DUI
    conviction from 2008.    Ness refused to undergo BAC testing following his
    arrest.   After pleading guilty on January 9, 2014, Ness was sentenced to
    forty-five days in jail followed by ninety days house arrest.   The sentence
    was the result of the sente                                           Musau.
    been five years.
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    In these consolidated appeals, the Commonwealth presents one
    held that six
    nd
    offense)
    imposable for a second DUI conviction involving a BAC refusal relates to the
    legality of the sentence imposed.   
    Musau, supra
          Issues relating to the
    legality of a sentence are questions of law, as are claims raising a court's
    interpretation of a statute. Our standard of review over such questions is de
    novo                                            Commonwealth v. Akbar, 
    91 A.3d 227
    , 238 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    As the Commonwealth readily concedes, as it did before each
    sentencing court, 
    Musau, supra
    , applies in each case.            Musau was
    convicted of DUI general impairment under § 3802(a)(1) and refused BAC
    testing at the time of his DUI arrest. Musau also had a DUI conviction within
    the ten years prior to the offense at issue. He was sentenced to ninety days
    to five years imprisonment, and, on appeal, he contended that the statutory
    maximum sentence that could be imposed was six months. We agreed and
    reversed the sentence.
    Our decision rested upon application of language in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803.
    We reached our result by finding a conflict between 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(a)(1)
    and § 3803(b)(4). The first provision states:
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    (a) Basic offenses.--Notwithstanding              the    provisions     of
    subsection (b):
    (1) An individual who violates section 3802(a) (relating to
    driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and
    has no more than one prior offense commits a misdemeanor for
    which the individual may be sentenced to a term of
    imprisonment of not more than six months and to pay a fine
    under section 3804 (relating to penalties).
    75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(a)(1). On the other hand, § 3803(b)(4) provides                (4) An
    individual who violates section 3802(a)(1) where the individual refused
    testing of blood or breath, or who violates section 3802(c) or (d) and who
    has one or more prior offenses commits a
    75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(b)(4).      A first-degree misdemeanor is punishable by a
    maximum of five years imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(6); 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 1104(1).
    The     defendant   in   Musau    argued   that    the   use   of     the    term
    that a § 3802 (a)(1) conviction with a refusal and a prior DUI could be
    punishable as a first degree misdemeanor with a five-year maximum. The
    Commonwealth countered with a different statutory construction that gave
    § 3803(b)(4) controlling effect over § 3803(a)(1).           The panel in Musau
    adopted the interpretation of § 3803 advanced by the defendant and
    rejected the position that his maximum sentence could be five years.
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    Instead, it ruled that six months imprisonment was the maximum sentence
    that can be imposed for a second DUI offense involving BAC refusal.1
    Musau applies to the defendants at issue herein.                 They were all
    convicted of DUI general impairment under § 3802(a)(1), refused BAC
    testing, and had a prior DUI. Thus, that case provides that the maximum
    sentence applicable in each case was six months.
    The Commonwealth suggests that our decision in Commonwealth v.
    Barr, 
    79 A.3d 668
    (Pa.Super. 2013), compels a different result. However,
    Barr did not involve an interpretation of the conflicting provisions of § 3803
    and in no way can be construed as invalidating Musau.                  Instead, in that
    decision, we held that the question of whether a defendant refused BAC
    testing had to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    The Commonwealth also implies that the grant of allowance of appeal
    in Commonwealth v. Mendez, 
    71 A.3d 250
    (Pa. 2013), should impact
    upon our decision herein. In Mendez, our Supreme Court agreed to review
    the propriety of the memorandum decision in Commonwealth v. Mendez,
    
    62 A.3d 456
    (Pa.Super 2012). In Mendez, over President Judge Emeritus
    of statutory construction now
    advanced         by     the    Commonwealth      herein.    The   majority   found   that
    ____________________________________________
    1
    We noted in Commonwealth v. Concordia, 
    2014 Pa. Super. 155
    n.1 that
    cal.
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    § 3803(b)(4) rather than § 3803(a)(1) applied to a § 3802 (a)(1) DUI
    conviction as a second offense where the defendant refused BAC testing.
    Our Supreme Court gran
    a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum explicitly set out in 75
    Pa.C.S. § 3803, did not the majority violate the rules of statutory
    Commonwealth v. Mendez, 
    71 A.3d 250
    (Pa. 2013).
    We cannot read any particular outcome as to this grant of allowance of
    appeal, and it certainly cannot be viewed as an intention by our Supreme
    Court to overrule Musau and affirm Mendez. Thus, the grant of allowance
    of appeal has no impact herein.     While the Commonwealth maintains that
    Mendez is ripe for review since the appellee brief was filed, we disagree.
    Oral argument is not scheduled until September 9, 2014, all the justices
    must consider the issue, and a decision must be written.
    Using the tools of statutory construction, the Commonwealth also
    persuasively argues that Musau was wrongly decided and suggests that we
    interpret § 3803 so as to permit a five-year maximum in these cases. See
    e.g.,                                    Musau reading of the statue creates
    devotes a significant amount of compelling analysis to support its position
    that a five-year maximum sentence is permitted in these cases. While, as
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    outlined in 
    Concordia, supra
    at n.1, this position may have merit, we
    cannot overrule Musau because we are bound by that decision. Indeed, the
    Commonwealth consistently acknowledged at each sentencing in the present
    cases that the sentencing court was bound by Musau. It complained that
    Musau was wrongly decided.
    However, we are no less bound by the Musau decision than were the
    sentencing courts herein. As we observed in Commonwealth v. Pepe, 
    897 A.2d 463
    , 465
    panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court, Commonwealth v.
    Hull, 
    705 A.2d 911
    , 912 (Pa.Super. 1998), except in circumstances where
    intervening authority by our Supreme Court calls into question a previous
    decision of this Court. Commonwealth v. Prout, 
    814 A.2d 693
    , 695 n.2
    Pepe that, even when our Supreme
    Court has granted an appeal for purposes of determining the question before
    binding.   See also Regis Insurance Co. v. All American Rathskeller,
    Inc., 
    976 A.2d 1157
    , 1161 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2009) (Superior Court panel
    lacked the power to disregard and overrule binding prior panel decision).
    Hence, we are compelled to affirm.
    Judgments of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/20/2014
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