In Re: Est. of McKean, P. Appeal of: Haines, L. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF PERRY M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MCKEAN, DECEASED PENNSYLVANIA
JUNE L. CONFER, ADMINISTRATRIX
APPEAL OF: LARRY HAINES
No. 1396 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
at No: 2012-0378
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DONOHUE, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2014
Appellant Larry Haines appeals the July 12, 2013 order of the Court of
ordering him to return certain firearms and life insurance proceeds. After
review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural background of this matter can be
summarized as follows. Perry M. McKean (McKean) lived in Centre County.
finance
to a hospital in Clinton County. Upon release from the hospital, McKean
became a resident of the Heartland Personal Care Home, Clinton County. In
o Adjudicate Incapacity and Appoint a
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After a hearing, the trial
court declared McKean incapacitated and appointed Appellant as plenary
guardian of the estate and his person (May 31, 2012). Shortly after the
appointment, McKean died intestate, survived by 35 heirs at law.
In August 2012, Appellee June L. Confer, the Administratrix of
letters of administration, which the trial court promptly granted. In February
cause why he should not account for all funds spent, with receipts and
at 2. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the petition for April 27, 2013.
The scheduling order was mailed and received by Appellant. Appellant
appeared at the hearing pro se.
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1
In the petition, Appellant alleged, inter alia
dementia to the degree that he cannot make or communicate responsible
djudication of
Incapacity and for the Appointment of a Plenary Guardian of the Estate and
Person of Perry M. McKean, 5/3/12, at 2, 3.
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At the April 27, 2013 hearing, Appellant testified, inter alia, that: (i)
McKean granted him a power of attorney sometime in 2011, (ii) McKean
alerted me. He said he has dementia and he said he has got
4/27/13, at 13-14; (iv) in January 2012, he named himself as a beneficiary
id. at 16, and as
id.; (v) in January 2012,
Appellant took possession of the firearms, as a gift from McKean, id. 15, 18;
(vi) both gifts (insurance proceeds and firearms) were made by McKean
while he was suffering from dementia, id. at 16, 21, and (vii) a caseworker
Id. at 15.
On May 9, 2013, the trial court issued an order and findings directing
Appellant to return the firearms and the life insurance proceeds. On May 20,
2013, counsel for Appellant filed exceptions to the May 9, 2013 order. As a
result, the trial court vacated the May 9, 2013 order. Appellee, in the
meantime, also filed an answer to the exceptions. A hearing was scheduled
to address the exceptions and the answer for June 25, 2013. At the hearing,
supplement his own testimony. In particular, the trial court noted Appellant
testified at the previous hearing, was given ample opportunity to address the
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court, and there was nothing else Appellant could add. Regarding the
additional evidence Appellant intended to offer (doctor report and bank
records), the court noted the evidence would not be admissible (and counsel
for Appellant acknowledged so). The trial court, nonetheless, allowed
[chronological list of events relevant to the matter] and Pertinent documents
[several documents Appellant intended to introduce in evidence through his
court confirmed the May 9, 2013 order, adding some language pertaining to
]
must return certain firearms and that the life insurance policy proceeds be
at 2. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following claims for our review:
1. Did the [trial court] commit [an] abuse of discretion or error
of law by determining that the April 17, 2013, proceeding
the allegation that the pre-guardianship transfer by Mr.
McKean to Appellant were invalid and that therefore the gifted
guns and the life insurance proceeds had to be turned over to
referred only to post-guardianship activities and did not
mention life insurance at all?
2. Was the evidence received at the April 17, 2013, proceeding
guns and his life insurance beneficiary designation?
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The first claim, stated clearly, is whether the trial court erred in
refusing to reopen the proceeding to allow Appellant who acted pro se up
to that point to introduce additional evidence after he retained counsel. We
eopening the proceeding as follows:
the case after a party has closed for the taking of additional
testimony, but such matters are peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and a denial of (an) opportunity for a
rehearing for the purpose of introducing additional evidence will
Commonwealth v. Deitch Co.,
449 Pa. 88, 295 A.2d 834 (1972). Such a ruling will be disturbed
only if the court has abused its discretion. Thomas v. Waters,
350 Pa. 214, 38 A.2d 237 (1944). See also Van Buren v.
Eberhard, 377 Pa. 22, 104 A.2d 98 (1954).
In re J.E.F., 409 A.2d 1165, 1166 (Pa. 1979).
D
brief is devoid of any citation to authorities supporting his claim the trial
court should have provided him with another opportunity to supplement the
record once he retained counsel.
Nonetheless, the claim is without merit for several reasons. Appellant,
who chose to appear and proceed pro se up to the April 17, 2013 hearing,
cannot now blame others for the consequences of his choices. See Branch
Banking & Tr. v. Gesiorski, pro
se litigant is not entitled to any particular advantage because he lacks legal
training; any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding
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must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise
The trial court also no
opportunity to present evidence or testify during the April 17 [h]earing.
Rather, [Appellant] simply did not utilize the opportunity this [c]ourt granted
asked Appellant
evidence or issues to bring before [the trial court]. [Appellant] brought no
Id. at 7. The trial court also
noted:
Further, [Appellant] was indeed encouraged to obtain counsel,
but in no way did this allow [Appellant] a second bite at the
apple. Rather, this court urged [Appellant] to retain an attorney
to aid in dealing with any consequences of the April 17
[h]earing. [Appellant] did, in fact, retain counsel after the April
17 [h]earing, but this retention cannot permit [Appellant] a
second chance to prove the case.
Id. at 8 (citation to record omitted).
Appellant also fails to mention the trial court held a hearing on June
2
At
testimony because it had heard sufficient evidence from Appellant himself at
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2
We are unsure how the trial court could vacate the May 9, 2013 order and,
at the same time, hear exceptions to an order which just had been vacated.
However, neither the parties nor the trial court raises this issue.
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the prior hearing on the
The trial court, however, appeared willing to consider other evidence
made. The evidence, however, as acknowledged by Appella
inadmissible. Id. at 10-11.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
Appellant to supplement his testimony.
Appellant also argues an additional hearing was necessary because the
petition for citation of guardian concerned only post-guardianship gifting.3 It
was only at the April 17, 2013 hearing
of guardian g would also cover pre-guardian
activities. The issue is without merit.
Appellant omits some important procedural details, which are
important to understand what actually happened. As a review of the notes
of testimony of the April 17, 2013 hearing reveals, some of the information
gathered at the hearing was not available to Appellee at the time of the filing
of the petition. At the hearing, after Appellant disclosed he removed the
firearms in January 2012 and that around that same time he also named
himself beneficiary of a life insurance, there was some discussion, on the
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3
As noted above, the trial court of Clinton County appointed Appellant as
guardian on May 31, 2012.
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record, on how to proceed with the information gathered at the hearing.
petition requesting the return of the firearms and needed to consult with his
client regarding the insurance proceeds. The trial court, however, suggested
the firearms voluntarily, without the necessity of filing another petition. So,
he did. Appellant replied, apparently reiterating the firearms were a gift.
The trial court then noted the gift was made by an incapacitated person to a
atto
Appellee suggested Appellant retain counsel, which eventually he did. What
blame others for his choice to appear, testify, answer questions from the
trial court and Appellee, or for appearing unrepresented.
Next, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to impose what
proceeds.4 Despite how Appellant titled the claim, he is in fact challenging
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In Koffman v. Smith, 682 A.2d 1282, 1290-91, (Pa. Super. 1996), this
Court stated:
A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it. Traditionally, constructive trusts have
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence. See
this end, Appellant points to
various portions of his own testimony suggesting the weakened condition
and dependence of decedent was not so severe as to render him
testimony indicating that decedent, at relevant times (i.e., the times when
the gifts were made, January 2012), suffered from dementia. See Trial
Court Opinion, 10/4/13, at 10-11; see also N.T., 4/17/13, at 10, 15. The
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
been imposed where a party acquires legal title to property by
violating some express or implied duty owed to another.
Generally, an equitable duty to convey property arises only in
the presence of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake or abuse
of a confidential relationship. There is, however, no rigid
standard for determining whether the facts of a particular case
require a court of equity to impose a constructive trust; the test
is merely whether unjust enrichment can be avoided.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellate review of equity matters is as follows:
The trial judge, sitting in equity as a chancellor, is the ultimate
fact-finder. The scope of review, therefore, is limited. The final
decree will not be disturbed unless the chancellor committed an
error of law or abused his or her discretion. The findings of fact
made by the trial court will not be disturbed unless they are
unsupported by competent evidence or are demonstrably
capricious.
Roberson v. Davis, 580 A.2d 39, 40 (Pa. Super. 1990) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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trial court was free to believe all, some or none of the testimony. It is not
our role to re-
The trial court also found Appellant, who held a power of attorney
granted by McKean, occupied a position of trust to McKean. Trial Court
Opinion, 10/4/13, at 13. Wh
Id.
Id., at 10, 13 (citing In
re Shahan, 631 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1993) for the proposition that
5
Furthermore, the trial court noted Appellant
the power to gift assets on behalf of the princip[al] if that power was
Id. (citing 20 Pa.C.S.A.
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confidential relationship while not confined to any specific association of
parties, . . . generally exists between . . .principal and agent Shydlinski
v. Vogt, 179 A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. 1962) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Biddle v. Johnsonbaugh, 664 A.2d 159, (Pa. Super.
confidential relationship is deemed to exist as a matter of law
between a trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and
client, and principal and agent
such a relationship does not in itself cause a constructive trust to be
imposed; its effect is simply to impose a burden upon the party benefiting
from the transaction of proving that he took no unfair advantage of his
DePaul v. DePaul, 429 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Pa.
Super. 1981) (citation omitted).
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§ 5601.2;6 Metcalf v. Pesock, 885 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
Here, as t
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In relevant part, Section 5601.2, reads as follows:
Special rules for gifts
(a) General rule.--A principal may empower an agent to make
a gift in a power of attorney only as provided in this section.
(b) Limited gifts.--A principal may authorize an agent to make
a limited gift as defined under section 5603(a)(2) (relating to
implementation of power of attorney) by the inclusion of:
(1) the language quoted in section 5602(a)(1) (relating to
form of power of attorney); or
(2) other language showing a similar intent on the part of the
principal to empower the agent to make a limited gift.
(c) Unlimited gifts.--A principal may authorize an agent to
make any other gift only by specifically providing for and
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601.2(a)-(c).
Pursuant to Section 5603,
make only gifts for or on behalf of the principal which are limited
as follows:
(i) The class of permissible donees under this paragraph shall
consist solely of the principal's spouse, issue and a spouse of the
principal's issue (including the agent if a member of any such
class), or any of them.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5603(a)(2)(i).
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assets. And yet, the evidence presented at the April 17 [h]earing
demonstrated that [Appellant] did, in fact, gi
Id.
Appellant argues the trial court erred on this issue, without specifically
gift of guns and life insurance proceeds to Appellant were valid despite the
fact Appellant was an agent of McKean because McKean offered the gifts to
Appellant in return for services rendered. According to Appellant, such rule
applies even if the donor was weakened and dependent at the time he made
the gifts. In support, Appellant cites, in the following order, Joseph v.
Eastman, 344 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1965), Estate of Meyers, 642 A.2d 525 (Pa.
Super. 1994), Williams v. McCaroll, 97 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1953), and Estate of
Augustine, 695 A.2d 836 (Pa. Super. 1997).
The caselaw Appellant relies upon is inapposite. With regard to
Joseph, the court of appeals did not apply Pennsylvania law, as such its
authoritativeness is limited. Meyers deals with the determination of
property rights among parties to a joint account, which is not the case here.
Williams deals with the burden of proof as to testamentary capacity, which
is not at issue here. Augustine, the only case dealing with a power of
attorney, is cited for the proposition that a wife had authority to transfer her
a broad power of attorney,
regardless of the self-dealing nature of the gift to herself. Appellant fails to
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recognize Augustine was overruled by enactment of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601.2.
See also Metcalf, 885 A.2d at 541.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err or
abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the proceedings and in ordering the
return of the firearms and the life insurance proceeds with six (6) percent
interest from 5/6/13.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2014
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