In Re: I.H.W.C., Appeal of: B.Z. ( 2014 )

J-S41031-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: I.H.W.C., A MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.Z., MOTHER
No. 581 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree December 27, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0074
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014
Appellant, B.Z. (Mother), appeals from the December 27, 2013 decree
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor son, I.H.W.C.1
After careful review, we affirm.2
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case may be
summarized as follows. I.H.W.C. was born in August 2012, and was placed
in the custody of the Northampton County Division of Children, Youth and
____________________________________________
1
J.C. (Father).
See Final Decree, 1/16/14, at 1-2. Father is not a party to this appeal.
2
The Guardian Ad Litem also filed a brief in this matter, wherein it agrees
terminating th
Guardian Ad Litem Brief
at 5, 9.
J-S41031-14
Families (CYF) three days after birth due to Mother exhibiting severe mental
health issues and being involuntarily committed for mental health treatment.
N.T., 12/17/13, at 23; see also Order for Emergency Protective Custody,
I.H.W.C. dependent. See Order of Adjudication, 9/28/12. Thereafter, the
series of family service plan (FSP) objectives for Mother. Specifically,
Mother was ordered to cooperate with mental health services; to participate
in and successfully complete psychological evaluations and follow through
with all recommendations; to cooperate with parenting education and life
skills training; and to maintain a stable residence for at least six months.
Permanency Plan/Court Directive and Interim Order, 9/28/12. Additionally,
Mother was granted supervised visitation of I.H.W.C. See id.; N.T.,
12/17/13, at 23.
Mother became extremely volatile wi
of her supervised visits with I.H.W.C. N.T., 12/17/13, at 23-24. The
evaluation, and precluded contact with I.H.W.C. until deemed stable by a
mental health professional. See Final Decree, 12/27/13, at ¶ 4. The record
reflects that Mother failed to complete a psychological or psychiatric
examination, and she has never provided verification of mental health
-2-
J-S41031-14
treatment. Id. at ¶ 6; see also N.T., 12/17/13, at 24-25. Furthermore,
Mother has not maintained a stable residence. N.T., 12/17/13, at 24. In
Mother failed to attend the adjudication and permanency review hearings.
Id.
On October 18, 2013, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
termination hearing, which Mother did not attend. Mother, who was
represented by counsel during said hearing, did not present any evidence.
CYF made an offer of proof during the hearing, and introduced the juvenile
See N.T.,
12/17/13, at 23-26. CYF did not present testimonial evidence. Thereafter,
2511(a)(1), (5), and (b).3 This timely appeal followed on January 27,
2014.4
____________________________________________
3
parental rights to I.H.W.C. wa
20, 2013, but filed on December 27, 2013. Thereafter, on December 30,
decree on the record. See
4
M Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
-3-
J-S41031-14
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review.
A.
failed to appear for proceedings because she
feared [] Father and when [CYF] stopped her
visits very early in the proceeding?
Preliminarily, we note that in its February 19, 2014 Rule 1925(a)
Opinion, 2/19/14, at 1. Upon review, we decline to find waiver in this
instance, as Mother was represented by counsel, Robert Glazer, Esquire
(Attorney Glazer), during the termination proceedings, and Attorney Glazer
stated on the record that Mother contests the termination of her parental
rights to I.H.W.C.. See N.T., 12/17/13, at 26-27. Accordingly, we now turn
We begin by noting our well-settled standard and scope of review.
When reviewing a decree entered by the [trial]
court [regarding a petition to terminate parental
rights], this Court must determine whether the
record is free from legal error and if the [trial]
evidence. Because the [trial] court sits as the fact-
finder, it determines the credibility of witnesses, and
on review, we will not reverse its credibility
determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.
In other words, [i]n cases involving [the]
termination of parental rights, our scope of review is
factual and legal determinations, are to be
considered. However, our standard of review is
-4-
J-S41031-14
limited to determining whether the order of the trial
court is supported by competent evidence, and
whether the trial court gave adequate consideration
to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the
child. We have always been deferential to the trial
court as the fact finder, as the determiner of the
credibility of witnesses, and as the sole and final
arbiter of all conflicts in the evidence.
In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citations omitted).
In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 606
(Pa. Super. 2012).
The Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, controls termination of
parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511; In re L.M., 923 A.2d
505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Specifically, Section 2511 requires the trial
court to engage in a bifurcated process before terminating parental rights.
Id.Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
-5-
J-S41031-14
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted). Moreover, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of
Section 2511(a) in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In
re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied,
863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
rights to I.H.W.C. under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as
follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination.
(a) General rule. The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
-6-
J-S41031-14
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
warranted termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). As discussed, this
Court has long recognized that parental rights may be terminated pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties. In
re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d
767 (Pa. 2004). We
2511(a)(1), as follows.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the
needs of a child. A child needs love, protection,
guidance, and support. These needs, physical and
emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
[C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a
positive duty[,] which requires affirmative
performance.
continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort
to maintain communication and association with the
child.
In re E.M., 908 A.2d 297, 304-306 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
-7-
J-S41031-14
Herein, the record reflects that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to I.H.W.C. or failed to perform her parental
duties for a period in excess of six months immediately preceding the filing
of the termination petition. Specifically, Mother failed to comply with both
er that
would have reinstated her supervised visits with I.H.W.C. At the time of the
filing of the termination petition, Mother had not seen I.H.W.C. for
approximately one year. N.T., 12/17/13, at 25. The record further reflects
that Mother has not maintained a stable residence during the entirety of
Id. at 24. Additionally, Mother failed to personally
-
Id. n, 2/19/14, at 2.
Mother now contends that she failed to attend any of the termination
was barred from
Brief at 9. Mother, however, fails to direct this Court to any evidence
demonstrating her alleged fear of Father, and her contention is belied by the
record. At the December 17, 2013 termination hearing, Attorney Glazer
medical issue. N.T., 12/17/13, at 2. Furthermore, the record reflects that
-8-
J-S41031-14
own conduct, and she has failed to take action to remedy the situation that
supervised visits with I.H.W.C.. Id. at 23-
court directed Mother to obtain a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, but
Mother failed to comply or participate in mental health treatment of any
kind. Id. at 24-25.; see also Final Decree, 12/27/13, at ¶¶ 4-6.
parental rights to I.H.W.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
We now turn to whether
I.H.W.C. is warranted pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must
engage in an analysis of the best interests of the
child by taking into primary consideration the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the
child. The trial court must consider intangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability. To this end,
this [C]ourt has indicated that the trial court must
also discern the nature and status of the parent-child
bond, paying close attention to the effect on the
child of permanently severing the bond.
In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In re K.M.,
53 A.3d 781, 791 (P However, in cases where there is no
evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that
-9-
J-S41031-14
J.M., supra
extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances
Id.
Instantly, CYF counsel, Valerie Cammarene, Esquire (Attorney
Cammarene) stated during the termination hearing that I.H.W.C. has been
in the same foster home since his placement shortly after his birth, and is
-cared for in this
the bond between Mother and I.H.W.C., there is no evidence that such a
bond exists. As discussed
time of birth in August 2012, and he has not seen Mother since October
2012, when he was approximately two-months old. Id. at 23. As such, it is
reasonable to infer that no bond exists between I.H.W.C. and Mother. See
J.M., supra
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of I.H.W.C., pursuant to Section
2511(b).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the December 27, 2013 decree
Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
- 10 -
J-S41031-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2014
- 11 -