In the Int. of: A.M. Appeal of: A.M. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.M. : No. 2121 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered November 14, 2013,
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Juvenile Division, at No. CP-67-JV-000479-2013.
BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014
Appellant, A.M., a juvenile, appeals from the order of disposition
entered after he was adjudicated delinquent on a charge of making
ounsel has filed a petition to withdraw and a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we
affirm the dispositional
William Penn High School on May 20, 2013. The record reflects that Vladimir
Jean-Baptiste, Jr. testified that on that day, May 20, 2013, he entered a
restroom at William Penn High School. N.T., 9/17/13, at 13. When he was
inside the restroom, another student approached him and told him to be
quiet. Id. Vladimir identified this other student as Appellant. Id. at 14.
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Appellant proceeded to make a phone call, and Vladimir testified that he
Id. at 19. When Vladimir returned to his classroom, the school went on
lockdown. Id.
School Security Officer Richard Muldrow, Jr. testified that after the
bomb threat was called in, he began a sweep of the building and lockers.
N.T., 9/17/13, at 30. Mr. Muldrow found a broken cell phone outside the
Id. at 30-33. Mr.
Mul Id. at
34. A video recording from the school on the day in question showed
Appellant entering the bathroom with a cell phone and then leaving the
s classroom. Id. at 38. The
classroom. Id.
Officer Ritchie P. Blymer testified that upon learning of the 911 call
wherein a person called in the bomb threat, he drove to the school. He was
apprised of the broken cell phone and the video recordings. N.T., 9/17/13,
at 56. The officer testified that the broken phone was a deactivated phone
that was only capable of calling 911. Id. at 60. Officer Blymer further
testified that after reviewing the video and still pictures from the video, it
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was his conclusion that the images showed Appellant near the restroom
holding a hand-held device. Id. at 62.
While Appellant testified on his own behalf, the juvenile court found
threats had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.1 Juvenile Court
Opinion, 11/15/13, at 3 (unnumbered page). On November 14, 2013, the
juvenile court entered an order of disposition adjudicating Appellant
delinquent. A timely appeal was filed, and on November 27, 2013, the
juvenile court entered an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement. App
file an Anders brief, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
1
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the crime of terroristic threats, in
relevant part, as follows:
Terroristic threats
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic
threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly,
a threat to:
***
(3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or
cause terror or serious public inconvenience with
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror
or inconvenience.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(3).
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Before we address the questions raised on appeal, we first must
Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). There are procedural
and briefing requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw
on appeal. The procedural mandates are that Counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that
he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise
additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the
Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).
In this case, Counsel has satisfied those directives. Within his petition
to withdraw, counsel averred that he conducted a conscientious examination
of the record. Following that review, Counsel concluded that the present
appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel sent Appellant a copy of the Anders
brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter, a copy of which is attached
to the Anders brief. In the letter, Counsel advised Appellant that he could
represent himself or that he could retain private Counsel to represent him.
dictates in Santiago, which provide that:
in the Anders brief that accompanies court-
petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of
the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2)
refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
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supports the appeal; (3) se
concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate
the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes
on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032 (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361).
Santiago. It sets
forth the factual and procedural history of this case, cites to the record,
outlines pertinent case authority and refers to issues that Counsel arguably
believes support the appeal. Anders Brief at 4-9. Further, the brief sets
ing that the appeal is frivolous. Id. at 11-13.
We are satisfied that Counsel has met the requirements set forth in
Cartrette, and we will now address the issue raised in the Anders brief,
which is set forth below:
1. elinquency for
terroristic threats is against the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence ?
Anders Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).
Initially we note that our standard of review of dispositional orders in
juvenile proceedings is well settled. The Juvenile Act grants broad discretion
to juvenile courts in determining appropriate dispositions. In re R.D., 44
A.3d 657, 664 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 56 A.3d 398 (Pa. 2012).
Indeed, t ition
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absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In the Interest of J.D., 798 A.2d
210, 213 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In addition, a petition alleging that a child is delinquent must be
disposed of in accordance with the Juvenile Act. Dispositions which are not
set forth in the Act are beyond the power of the juvenile court.
Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 366-367 (Pa. Super. 2008)
showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.
The purpose of the Juvenile Act is as follows:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide
for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision,
care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the
protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for
offenses committed and the development of competencies to
enable children to become responsible and productive members
of the community.
intent to protect the community while rehabilitating and reforming juvenile
In the Interest of J.C., 751 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Super.
2000).
As noted above, in the statement of questions involved, Counsel
presents challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The
standard of review this Court utilizes in challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence is as follows:
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When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
made, our task is to determine whether the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner,
were sufficient to enable the fact-finder to find every element of
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. Moreover, we must defer to the
credibility determinations of the [juvenile] court, as these are
within the sole province of the finder of fact. The trier of fact,
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses, is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence.
In re T.G., 836 A.2d 1003, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
With respect to the weight claim, we note that:
[w]e may only reverse the j
sense of justice. Moreover, where the court has ruled on the
the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to
whether the juvenile court palpably abused its discretion in
ruling on the weight claim.
assailable of its rulings. Conflicts in the evidence and
contradictions in the testimony of any witnesses are for the fact
finder to resolve[.]
In re J.M., 89 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).2
2
We are constrained to point out that, while Counsel presented a challenge
to the weight of the evidence before the juvenile court and in his statement
of questions presented in the Anders Brief, Counsel fails to discuss the
weight of the evidence in the argument portion of the Anders Brief. Despite
Counsel abandoning this issue on appeal, this Court will, as part of our
independent review in cases involving petitions to withdraw, address the
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timony established that Appellant used a cell phone
from a school restroom to call in a bomb threat to 911 operators. This
testimony, which the juvenile court deemed credible, established that
Appellant communicated a threat causing serious public inconvenience,
terror, or serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror or inconvenience pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(3).
Upon review, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that
Appellant made the bomb threat and that the elements of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2706(a)(3) were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
sense of justice. As noted, the record established that Vladimir heard
Appellant make a phone call and say
9/17/13, at 19. Here, the juvenile court re
the weight of the evidence, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the
For the reasons discussed above and following our independent review
wholly frivolous, and we
weight of the evidence. See Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 355 n.5 (stating that
it is the responsibility of the reviewing court to independently review the
record and make a determination whether the appeal is wholly frivolous).
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assessment of the appeal, and because we conclude that Counsel has
withdraw.
Dispositional order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2014
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