Com. v. Walker, J. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JONATHAN WALKER, :
:
Appellee : No. 1064 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Order entered March 15, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0014255-2010
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE and JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
T
oral motion for a new trial
on the charges of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), and
robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). In a Memorandum dated April 8,
2014, we remanded this case to the trial court for the preparation of a
supplemental opinion to address the role the medical records of Tabitha King
supplemental opinion, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering
a new trial.
J-S12022-14
A brief summary of the relevant factual and procedural history is as
follows.1 On October 1, 2010, Walker attacked King from behind as she
ascended the steps from the subway concourse with her three-year-old son.
N.T., 3/29/12, at 18. Walker hit King in the right leg with an umbrella and
pulled her backwards, causing her to fall down a full flight of concrete stairs.
Id. at 18-19. During a bench trial on March 29, 2012, King testified that she
was taken to the hospital by the police on the night of the attack and was
treated for a mild hand and foot sprain resulting from her fall down the
stairs. Id.
into evidence as Exhibit C-1 by way of stipulation, whereby defense counsel
specifically noted that the records reflected that King was treated on the day
after the incident. Id. at 69-71. Walker and the Commonwealth agreed
that King did not suffer serious bodily injury. Id. at 72, 75-78. Rather, the
Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that Walker intended to cause King
serious bodily injury.
The trial court issued its verdict, finding Walker guilty of recklessly
endangering another person (REAP), aggravated assault, robbery, and
possession of an instrument of crime (PIC). Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/13, at
1.
1
A more detailed summary of the facts and procedural history is set forth in
our previous memorandum. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 1064 EDA
2013 (Pa. Super. April 8, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
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conviction of robbery of the first degree and aggravated assault of the first
degree because the Commonwealth did not prove that he had specific intent
to cause serious bodily injury to King. N.T., 1/17/13, at 5-7. The trial court
denied the Motion. Id. at 10.
the trial court to revis -discovered
the night of the attack, but rather left the hospital and came back the next
day to be treated. N.T., 3/15/13, at 4, 6-11. In
claim of after-discovered evidence, the Commonwealth argued that the
information was highlighted in the medical records and further, that all
medical records were entered into the record by way of stipulation. Id. at 7,
11. The trial court judge stated that he did not review the entirety of the
medical record, and if he had, he may have decided the case differently. Id.
Id. at
14-15.
The Commonwealth timely filed an appeal and herein raises the
err in ordering a new trial, supposedly in the interest of justice, where there
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Our standard of review of an order granting a new trial in the interest
of justice is abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Dorm, 971 A.2d 1284,
1288 (Pa. Supe
mere error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, manifest
unreasonableness, misapplication of law, partiality, and/or prejudice. Id. at
1288-89 (citing Commonwealth v. Hacker, 959 A.2d 380, 392 (Pa. Super.
2008)).
As we previously stated, it was undisputed that King did not suffer
before the trial court was whether the Commonwealth satisfied the elements
of aggravated assault by proving that Walker intended to cause serious
bodily injury.
tially irrelevant, since it otherwise
generally, and thus granted a new trial based upon the weight of the
evidence.
wrongly convicted of aggravated assault, and that there was a discrepancy
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as to what was stipulated to i
testified to during trial, the court properly granted a new trial, as it was
Court Opinion, 7/22/13, at 5. Because the trial court did not provide an
whether Walker intended to cause serious bodily injury and ultimately, its
grant of a new trial, we remanded this case to the trial court for the
preparation of a supplemental opinion to address this issue.
The trial court provided further explanation of its decision to grant a
new trial in its supplemental opinion, stating:
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel reiterated his
motion for relief to which the court heard brief
argument. Before the defense made its
argument
the waiver trial, what was submitted, just medical
Thereafter, the court inquired as what testimony was
injuries, to which the Commonwealth replied that the
victim sustain[ed] a sprained foot and wrist.
Thereafter, after learning that a discrepancy existed
between the testimony taken during trial and the
evidence included in the exhibits, the court admitted
that it had failed to read all of the information
contain[ed] in the exhibits prior to deliberation of the
evidence. Because a discrepancy existed concerning
determined that the likelihood was also possible that
other discrepancies could have been present in the
record as well. As the court knew that it had not
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performed its duty as fact-finder properly, this court,
in the interest of justice, granted the defendant a
new trial. After granting a new trial, the court stated:
I was required to do as fact-finder
some things in those records, had I reviewed, I
might
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/14, at 2 (emphasis in original)
(internal citations omitted). The trial court also specially noted that the
-trial
Id. at 3.
Rule 704 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a
trial judge to hear an oral motion for extraordinary relief prior to sentencing.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(1). Rule 704 provides, in pertinent part:
(B) Oral Motion for Extraordinary Relief.
(1) Under extraordinary circumstances, when the
interests of justice require, the trial judge may,
before sentencing, hear an oral motion in arrest of
judgment, for a judgment of acquittal, or for a new
trial.
(2) The judge shall decide a motion for extraordinary
relief before imposing sentence, and shall not delay
the sentencing proceeding in order to decide it.
(3) A motion for extraordinary relief shall have no
effect on the preservation or waiver of issues for
post-sentence consideration or appeal.
Id.
error in the pr
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relief post-sentence, the judge should grant a motion for extraordinary relief
the opportunity to address only those errors so manifest that immediate
2
The Comment further
error in the proceedings, the interests of justice are best served by deciding
Id.
In Dorm, a jury convicted Dorm on charges of statutory sexual assault
Dorm, 971
rtained a
on the charges of aged- Id. In reaching its
were confusing because the instructions blended the offenses of IDSI and
SSA and because the verdict slip included a charge for statutory IDSI, which
is not a crime in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1286-
the aforementioned errors produced an inherent
could not be said that either count SSA or age-based IDSI was in fact
Id.
2
As we noted in our previous memorandum, the Commonwealth argued
that the trial court committed error in granting a new trial under Rule
704(B). However, the Commonwealth failed to develop its argument or cite
to any authority to support its assertion. As a result, we need not address
this issue.
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]
it could not just arbitrarily pick one of [the] offenses, assigning the guilty
Id. The Commonwealth appealed the
After reviewing the record, we affirmed the trial
for the non-existent crime and order a new trial in which proper instructions
and a proper verdict slip allow deliberations on the IDSI offense actually
Id. at 1289. In reaching our conclusion that
Id. at 1288 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Powell
court may grant a new trial sua sponte Id.
Much like Dorm, in the case presently before this Court, the trial court
granted a new trial after recognizing an error on its part that produced an
reveals that the trial court did not reconsider or reweigh the evidence
suggests. Rather, the supplemental opinion clarifies that the dialogue prior
breakdown i
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failed to perform its duty as fact-finder in considering all the evidence prior
to making its decision as to guilt or innocence, thereby prejudicing the
Opinion, 7/7/14, at 3.
-finder] to
evaluate evidence adduced at trial to reach a determination as to the facts
Commonwealth v. G.Y., 63 A.3d 259, 269-70 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super.
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finder to determine whether the evidence is believable in whole, in part, or
not at all, and to assign weight to the evidence that it believes as it deems
Commonwealth v. George, 878 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa. Super.
2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court
failed to fulfill its role and function as the fact-finder when it failed to
consider the entirety of the record prior to issuing its determination.
achieving justice in those instances where the original trial, because of taint,
unfairness or error, produces something other than a just and fair result,
Donoughe v.
Lincoln Elec. Co., 936 A.2d 52, 67-
court determines that the process has been unfair or prejudicial, even where
the prejudice arises from actions of the court, it may, sua sponte, grant a
Commonwealth v. Riley, 643 A.2d
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1090, 1093 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Powell
Powell, 590 A.2d at 1243.
The trial court in this case candidly admitted that the adjudicatory
process had been unfair to Walker because of its own failure to read,
evaluate, and consider all of the evidence submitted at trial prior to issuing
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finder resulted in an error in proceedings, which produced inherent
unfairness to Walker. As a result, we conclude that the error warranted
immediate relief and accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
decision to grant a
new trial in the interest of justice.
Order affirmed.
Jenkins, J. joins the Memorandum.
Ford Elliott, P.J.E. files a Dissenting Memorandum Statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/26/2014
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