Com. v. Yelverton, C. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER CLARENCE YELVERTON
Appellant No. 3384 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered October 23, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0001105-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2016
Appellant, Christopher Clarence Yelverton, appeals from the judgment
of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County on
October 23, 2014 following his convictions of possession of a firearm,
carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a controlled
substance.1 Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts as follows.
On September 27, 2013, Defendant Christopher Clarence
Yelverton was arrested by Pennsylvania State Troopers Preston
Gray and Jeffrey Hand, and charged with Manufacture, Delivery
or Possession with Intent to Deliver, Theft by Unlawful Taking,
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Respectively, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(16).
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Receiving Stolen Property, Possession of a Firearm, Firearms Not
to be Carried Without a License, Possession of a Controlled
Substance and two summary motor vehicle offenses, Driving
Without a License and Disregard of Traffic Lane.[2]
The matter was fixed for trial on October 20, 2014. On the
day of trial, the Commonwealth withdrew Counts Two (Theft by
Unlawful Taking) and Three (Receiving Stolen Property). A
Suppression Hearing preceded a waiver trial, and this [c]ourt
upheld the search and seizure of the quantity of marijuana and a
firearm found in a bag in the trunk of the vehicle which
defendant was driving, and which was titled in the name of his
passenger, Tyrickah Cooper. The [c]ourt sustained the
suppression motion on certain statements and the case
proceeded to a waiver trial on the same day. . . .
....
At the conclusion of the Suppression Hearing, we made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law (in part):
. . . On September 27, 2013 shortly after midnight
[Appellant] was operating a motor vehicle in
Bensalem Township when he was observed by
Troopers Gray and Hand, Pennsylvania State Police.
[] The court observed on a video the driving of
the vehicle by the person who turned out to be
[Appellant] of the Chevy Malibu and observed what
the [c]ourt believes was erratic driving from the far
right side of the lane in which he was operating his
vehicle in rapid motion to the left side of the lane in
which he was operating his vehicle, on both
occasions crossing the solid white line that
delineated the lane that he was in.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/15, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
____________________________________________
2
Respectively, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), 3925(a),
6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a),
3309(1).
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On appeal, Appellant raises only one issue: “Did the trial court err in
failing to suppress physical evidence that was discovered after an
unconstitutional traffic stop?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In reviewing a challenge to an order denying suppression of evidence,
our standard of review is limited to determining
whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the
record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court,
the appellate court considers only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
as a whole. When the record supports the findings of the [trial]
court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing. In the interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89
(Pa. 2013).
When the detention of a driver cannot serve an investigatory purpose,
this Court has clarified the quantum of cause necessary for an officer to stop
a vehicle as follows.
In such an instance, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to
articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the
questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe
that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision
of the [Motor Vehicle] Code.
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
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Appellant argues only that “[t]he Pennsylvania State Police did not
have probable cause to effect a traffic stop on the vehicle that Appellant was
operating.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant alleges that the police needed
to have probable cause to initially stop Appellant, as the basis for the stop
was an alleged violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1), an offense for which no
further investigation is necessary.3 Appellant’s Brief at 9. Accordingly, our
current analysis is limited to the legality of the initial traffic stop.
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Jeffrey Hand testified that the
abrupt swerve made by Appellant’s vehicle out of its lined lane of travel
around 12:10 a.m. led him to believe Section 3309 of the Motor Vehicle
Code had been violated. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 10/20/14, at 6-11. The
trial court, as a part of the suppression hearing, observed the video of the
Appellant’s driving and concluded that the driving was “erratic”. As stated,
the trial court noted Appellant’s vehicle moved from the far right side of the
lane in “rapid” motion to the left side of the lane crossing the solid white line
____________________________________________
3
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to
all others not inconsistent therewith shall apply:
(1) Driving within single lane.--A vehicle shall
be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved
from the lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).
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that delineated the lane in which he was traveling. Whether an officer
possesses probable cause to stop a vehicle for a violation of this section
depends largely upon on whether a driver’s movement from his lane is done
safely. Commonwealth v. Cook, 865 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. 2004), citing
Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001). Based on the
record of the suppression hearing, we conclude the trooper articulated
specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which
would provide probable cause to believe that Appellant was driving unsafely
outside of his lane of travel in violation of Section 3309(1). Appellant was
driving erratically and swiftly moving from the right side of his lane to the
left side crossing the white lane delineators each time. As such, the record
supports the trial court’s factual findings and its determination that the stop
was based on probable cause. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 10/23/14, at 55.
The initial traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle was therefore lawful, and
Appellant’s argument fails. Cf. Gleason (crossing the solid white fog line two
times by six to eight inches over a distance of approximately one quarter
mile, did not establish probable cause of a violation of Section 3309(1)).
As Appellant is not entitled to relief on his only issue raised on appeal,
we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/20/2016
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