Randhawa, R. v. Kaur, M. ( 2022 )

J-A23040-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RAVINDER S. RANDHAWA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MANDEEP KAUR : No. 533 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at
No(s): S-937-15
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 4, 2022
Ravinder S. Randhawa (“Husband”) appeals from the March 30, 2021
order entering a decree in divorce from Mandeep Kaur (“Wife”) and dismissing
the bulk of his exceptions to the equitable distribution scheme set forth in the
master’s third report and recommendation. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts this case, as gleaned
from the certified record, as follows:
Both parties are originally from the country of India.
Both had been married previously. [Husband] was
born December 10, 1976, has a tenth grade
education, moved to the United States at some
unspecified time prior his marriage to [Wife], lives
with his parents in Enola, Pennsylvania, works as a
gas station clerk and claims to earn $7.25 per hour for
forty hours a week. [Husband] has no retirement
benefits through his employment, claims to be on
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Medicaid, and suffers from several medical conditions
including high blood pressure, cholesterol and
diabetes.
[Wife] was born September 19, 1983, obtained what
was deemed a general degree from a college in India
(which she described as education encompassing
taking care of the home, stitching, cooking,
physiology — “if you get someone sick,” and playing
a guitar), never worked outside of the home until she
performed part-time work handing out food samples
to store customers in 2017, suffers from back
problems which she attributes to injuries received
from physical abuse perpetrated by [Husband], is
what she deems “homeless,” as she lives in housing
provided by WIC (Women In Crisis) in Schuylkill
County, [Pennsylvania], and has primary custody of
the parties’ male child, born July 13, 2007.
([Husband] testified that the date of birth of the child
was in 2010, while [Wife] testified at the 2018 hearing
that the child was eleven years old. The child support
order of October 5, 2017, pursuant to which
[Husband] was directed to pay $45.60 in basic
support and $20.00 on arrearages per month,
identifies the child’s birth date as July 13, 2007.)
[Husband] had been delinquent in paying support.
According to [Wife], she came to the United States
following her parents arranging a marriage with a man
she had never met. The marriage was apparently
short lived. Because her parents knew [Husband’s]
parents, it was deemed satisfactory for [Wife] to live
with [Husband’s] parents. According to [Wife],
“India” required that persons be married before
having children and, as a result, she and [Husband]
married in a mass religious ceremony on December
18, 2005 at a temple in Los Angeles, California known
as Sant Nirankari Mission. Per [Wife], the parties’
religion does not recognize a court ceremony.
However, due to a visa problem [Wife] had, the
parties participated later in a government proceeding
and obtained a certificate indicating they married on
August 20, 2012.
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[Husband] and [Wife] originally lived in California with
[Husband’s] parents and then moved to a home that
[Husband] had purchased. Because he failed to
maintain the loan payments, after a couple of years
the lender apparently foreclosed or otherwise
obtained possession of the property and the parties
thereafter moved to Pennsylvania. Due to
[Husband’s] poor credit resulting from the loan
default, [Husband] insisted that [Wife’s] name be
used for financial purposes, both for personal affairs
and for his business. (Evidence established the
existence of Bank of America business accounts with
one titled “Mandeep Kaur — Sole Prop DBA CSR
Transportation,” which supports this testimony.)
According to [Wife], she had no access to any financial
accounts; she was not allowed to pay bills; [Husband]
directed that she sign blank checks to accommodate
the transacting or business; and, she was not allowed
to inquire about business affairs or he would become
angry with her and beat her while saying she was a
wife and had to trust him. [Wife] was generally aware
that [Husband] had traveled to and engaged in
purchasing real property and doing banking activities
in India but she had little information about those
matters. Additionally, [Wife] claimed that [Husband]
monitored her activities; she was not allowed to talk
with her parents unless while supervised and via
speaker phone; she was not allowed to leave the
home without his consent, she was not allowed to
have any money in her possession; and, he kept
jewelry she had received as gifts in his truck.
[Wife] described [Husband] as not only a controlling
individual but also violent, as he would occasionally
hit her. Immediately prior to the parties’ final
separation, [Husband] had threatened to kill [Wife]
and their child. During that incident a neighbor heard
the commotion and called police, after which the
police arrested [Husband] and advised [Wife] to seek
a protection from abuse order. [Wife] did so and
moved from the parties’ home with the child into WIC
housing. When she left the parties’ home [Wife] took
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only her and the child’s clothing, some important
paperwork, and a vehicle.
[Husband] was an over-the-road truck driver, and
owned and operated a trucking business during the
marriage. At separation he owned or possessed a
tractor, trailers, and van.
[An accident following the parties’ separation resulted
in the destruction of Husband’s trailer and loss of his
commercial driver’s license.]
Trial court opinion, 3/30/21 at 2-5.
The parties separated on March 18, 2014 and Husband filed a divorce
complaint on May 26, 2015, raising claims relating to the equitable distribution
of the marital estate. Kent D. Watkins, Esq. (“Master Watkins”) was appointed
to address the parties’ claims and a hearing was ultimately conducted on
October 15, 2018. Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed a report and
recommendation on March 8, 2019. On March 27, 2019, Husband filed
exceptions to Master Watkins’ report and recommendation. Thereafter, on
May 23, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying Husband’s exceptions
and remanding this matter with instructions for the parties to clarify and
supplement the record with additional evidence.
On July 23, 2019, a second hearing was conducted during which the
parties were given the opportunity to present additional evidence on their
assets and liabilities. Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed an amended
report and recommendation on December 6, 2019, detailing his equitable
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distribution plan. Both parties filed exceptions to Master Watkins’ amended
report and recommendation.
Thereafter, the trial court reviewed the parties’ exceptions and the
supplemental record and found that several significant issues affecting the
proper analysis of the parties’ assets and liabilities remained outstanding. On
May 1, 2020, the trial court again remanded this matter to Master Watkins for
the submission of additional evidence. A hearing was subsequently held on
June 20, 2020.
Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed a third report and
recommendation on November 12, 2020. Specifically, Master Watkins made
the following recommendations in his report:
[T]hat [Husband] be awarded the following:
[Husband’s] clothing ($10,000.00), Household goods
and furnishings ($5,000.00), ICICI Prudential Life
Insurance Policy ($11,217.00), Four mobile phones
($500.00), Four dinner sets ($800.00), Two
comforters ($275.00), IPad ($200.00), Share of
pension ($3,700.00), and 1/3 Interest in 11-plus
acres of land in India – ($200,000.00 – unknown
increase in value), together with other foreign-held
land assets. Additionally, the Master recommended
that Plaintiff be responsible for the unpaid taxes to the
IRS, hospital bill to Schuylkill Medical Center, credit
card bill with Capital One, credit card loan, and NHS
Human Services in Sunbury, Pennsylvania.
[T]hat [Wife] receive the following: 2012 Volkswagen
Passat ($15,000.00), M&T Bank checking and saving
accounts #298 ($2,231.30), Bank of Baroda checking
account #0780 ($13,600.00), ICICI Bank Account
#5572 ($2,952.00), ICICI Bank Account #4838
($7,000.00), [Wife’s] interest in [Husband’s] pension
($3,000.00), ICIC Bank Account ($6,190.00), TAB
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Bank Account ($1,755.00), Bank of America Account
#5790 ($2,006.00), ICICI Bank Account #2966
($2,700.00), IGIC Bank Account #7600 ($182.00),
Household goods and furnishings ($5,000.00), Dishes
and cookware ($1,200.00), One laptop computer
($300.00), One IPad ($200.00), One Play Station
game console ($200.00), and [Wife’s] non-marital
jewelry value and its value to be assigned to her
($25,000.00).
Trial court opinion, 3/30/21 at 15-16; see also Third Amended Master’s
Report, 11/12/20, at 10-11.
Husband subsequently filed exceptions to this report on November 30,
2020. On March 30, 2021, the trial court entered an opinion and order
dismissing the bulk of Husband’s exceptions and adopting the equitable
distribution scheme set forth in the third report and recommendation. A
decree in divorce was entered that same day.
On April 27, 2021, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal.
On April 29, 2021, the trial court directed Husband to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Husband filed his timely Rule 1925(b) statement on May 14, 2021. On June
3, 2021, the trial court filed a comprehensive, eight-page Rule 1925(a) opinion
which adopted its prior opinion authored in support of the March 30, 2021
order.
On appeal, Husband raises a litany of issues for our review:
1. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by finding that it was
incredible that [Wife] would have access to
[Husband’s] business account, since the
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undisputed evidence clearly established that
Wife withdrew significant funds from the bank
account, as confirmed by her signature on
various checks, the evidence established that
[W]ife withdrew $7,600.00 from the TAB bank
account on February 18, 2014, and $10,000.00
on March 12, 2014, which were clearly marital
funds, and by failing to credit the $10,000.00
which [W]ife withdrew from the TAB account to
her, and by finding that the $10,000.00 should
be considered as having been used for payment
of marital debts and expenses during the
marriage, since there was absolutely no
evidence of record which established that the
funds were used for the payment of marital
debts and expenses, and the only evidence was
that these funds were withdrawn by [W]ife?
2. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by finding that the parties
were married on December 18, 2005, since the
credible, documentary evidence which existed
regarding the date of marriage was
documentary evidence submitted by [H]usband,
which reflected that the parties were married on
[A]ugust 21, 2012?
3. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by failing to take into
consideration that Husband was only holding a
minimum wage low paying job, and that he did
not even graduate from high school, but that
wife holds a bachelor’s degree in arts,
philosophy, home economics, physiology and
music, and that as a result she is more qualified
to obtain suitable employment?
4. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by not only awarding the
bulk of the marital estate to [W]ife, but by also
recommending that [H]usband be responsible
for 100% of the marital debt, without imposing
any responsibility on [W]ife, although they also
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recommended that [H]usband receive a
minuscule portion of the marital estate?
5. Did [t]he Master and [the trial court] err and
abuse their discretion in formulating their
equitable distribution scheme since when one
considers all of the factors enunciated under the
divorce code since, it is clear that it is [H]usband
who should have been awarded the bulk of the
marital estate, since, amongst other things, he
is being forced to pay 100% of the marital debt?
6. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by concluding that
Husband did not disclose all of the assets
required of him by the court order dated [M]ay
15, 2020, and that he did not disclose the value
of lands held in India or the increase in value
between the date of marriage and the date of
separation, since Wife did nothing in order to
obtain a valuation of this property, and all
assets had been disclosed, and the Master and
the [trial court] used the alleged non-disclosure
as a reason to award to Wife an unconscionable
share of the marital estate and the [trial court]
penalized Husband?
7. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and
abuse their discretion by ignoring one of the
most significant factors enunciated under the
divorce code, dealing with who acquired and
preserved the marital estate, and by totally
ignoring the fact that it was Husband who
acquired the marital estate, and they only made
reference to the fact that Wife was the
homemaker, which establishes clear error?
8. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and
abuse their discretion in formulating their
recommended equitable distribution award, and
misapply the factors enunciated under the
divorce code warrant the distribution requested
by [H]usband in his exceptions, in the amount
of 80% of marital property[?]
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9. Did the [trial court] err and abuse it’s (sic)
discretion by finding that Husband had engaged
in marital misconduct [and] was controlling and
physically abused [W]ife throughout the
marriage, which is not relevant in determining
how marital property should be equitably
divided?
10. Did the [trial court] err and abuse its discretion
by finding that there were two sets of jewelry,
and by awarding one set to the Husband and the
other set to Wife, where the Master did not even
find that there were two sets of jewelry, and the
record is totally devoid of any evidence that
there were two sets?
11. Did the [trial court] err and abuse its discretion
by finding that Husband had numerous Indian
Bank Accounts, and by taking these accounts
into consideration, when there was no evidence
of record dealing with these phantom Indian
Bank Accounts[?]
Husband’s brief at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that the issues presented in Husband’s
“Statement of Questions Involved” do not align with those raised in the
“Argument” section of his appellate brief. Although Husband raises 11 distinct
issues above, the “Argument” section contains only 9 intertwined claims
delineated by Roman numerals and presented in an entirely different
sequence.
The record reflects that Husband has waived Issue 2 (Argument IV)
challenging Master Watkins’ finding with regard to the date of the parties’
marriage by failing to file an exception thereto.
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It is well settled that in order to preserve issues for appeal relating to a
master’s report and recommendation a party must file exceptions. Pa.R.A.P.
302(a); Lawson v. Lawson, 940 A.2d 444, 450 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating,
“a party who is dissatisfied with a master’s report [must] file exceptions to the
report, or waive any such objections.” (citation omitted)), appeal denied,
951 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2008). The failure to file a timely exception to a finding
in a master’s report and recommendation, as is the case here, results in waiver
of the claim. Sebastianelli v. Sebastianelli, 876 A.2d 431, 432 (Pa.Super.
2005).
We now turn to Husband’s challenges to the equitable distribution
scheme. Husband avers that the award of the bulk of the martial estate to
Wife while Husband is held responsible for 100% of the parties’ martial debt
was unsupported by the record (Issues 4 & 5; Argument V). Husband’s
brief at 32-34.
Specifically, Husband argues that Master Watkins and the trial court
erred in finding that: his contention that Wife withdrew money from his
business bank accounts and withheld rent money for her own personal use
lacked credibility (Issue 1; Argument III); that Wife was entitled to the
value of $25,000 worth of jewelry that was gifted to her by various family
members during the marriage (Issue 10; Argument VII); and that
numerous bank accounts in India could be attributed to Husband. (Issue 11;
Argument VIII). Id. at 29-31, 36-39.
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Our standard of review of awards of equitable distribution is well settled:
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an
award of equitable distribution. Our standard of
review when assessing the propriety of an order
effectuating the equitable distribution of marital
property is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to
follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find
an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of
clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find
an abuse of discretion unless the law has been
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
evidence in the certified record. In determining the
propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts
must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We
measure the circumstances of the case against the
objective of effectuating economic justice between the
parties and achieving a just determination of their
property rights.
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted),
appeal denied, 62 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2012).
The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing assets.
The divorce master and trial court must exercise discretion and rely on the
estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submitted
by both parties. Smith v. Smith, 653 A.2d 1259, 1265 (Pa.Super. 1995),
appeal denied, 663 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1995).
In determining the value of marital property, the court
is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence as to
the true and correct value of the property. Where the
evidence offered by one party is uncontradicted, the
court may adopt this value even though the resulting
valuation would have been different if more accurate
and complete evidence had been presented. A trial
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court does not abuse its discretion in adopting the only
valuation submitted by the parties. Absent a specific
guideline in the divorce code, the trial courts are given
discretion to choose the date of valuation of marital
property[,] which best provides for “economic justice”
between parties.
Baker v. Baker, 861 A.2d 298, 302 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 741 (Pa. 2007).
Here, Husband’s claims hinge in large part on his disagreement with a
number of Master Watkins’ findings. Specifically, Master Watkins found that
the evidence established that although Husband had utilized Wife’s name for
a number of his business accounts, he was in exclusive control of the parties’
financial affairs and his testimony to the contrary was not credible. Third
Amended Master’s Report, 11/12/20, at 5. Master Watkins further found that
Wife’s credibly testified that she had received approximately $25,000 worth
of jewelry as gifts from various family members over the course of the
marriage, and that the evidence established that the jewelry is her non-martial
property. Id. Additionally, Master Watkins found that the evidence
established that Husband had accumulated substantial savings from his
trucking business, which he transferred to multiple bank and retirement
accounts in India. Id. at 8-9.
In reaching these findings, the record reflects that Master Watkins relied
on the plethora of exhibits submitted by the parties, as well as the testimony
of each party at three separate hearings. The trial court found that Master
Watkins’ findings and credibility determinations were supported by the record,
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and elected not to believe Husband’s testimony with respect to these claims.
See trial court opinion, 6/3/21 at 2-3, 7.
We similarly decline to upset the credibility determinations of the fact-
finder. We have consistently explained that “a master’s report and
recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
consideration[,]” as the master is in the best position to observe the testimony
and demeanor of the parties. Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095.
(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Husband’s aforementioned
challenges to the equitable distribution scheme must fail.
Husband next argues that Master Watkins and trial court erred in failing
to consider numerous factors under the Divorce Code in fashioning its
equitable distribution award. Specifically, Husband contends that the fact that
he held a minimum wage job and did not graduate from high school and that
Wife had degree from a school in India (Issue 3; Argument VI); and that
he was the party who had acquired and preserved the martial estate (Issue
7; Argument II), were not properly considered. Husband’s brief at 27-29,
35-36.
Husband further contends that Master Watkins and the trial court erred
in “adding new factors to its equitable distribution scheme” by improperly
considering Wife’s allegations of Husband’s “martial misconduct” and abuse
during the marriage (Issue 9, Argument I); and the fact that Husband failed
to disclose the value of his property in India by the court-ordered deadline
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(Issue 6; Argument I). Id. at 25-27. Husband maintains that Master
Watkins and the trial court used this “nondisclosure and the alleged marital
misconduct [as] reasons to award Wife an unconscionable share of the martial
estate.” Id. at 26.
Husband contends that had Master Watkins and the trial court properly
applied the factors in the Divorce Code, he would have been entitled to 80%
of the marital property as detailed in his exceptions. (Issue 8; Argument
IX). Id. at 39-43. We disagree.
This court has repeatedly explained that, “[i]n determining the propriety
of an equitable distribution award [], we must consider the distribution
scheme as a whole.” Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 643 (Pa.Super.
2005). “[W]hen a court divides the marital property, it must do so only after
considering ‘all relevant factors,’ including eleven specific factors listed in the
Divorce Code.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 199-200 (Pa.Super.
2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a), when fashioning
equitable distribution awards, the trial court must
consider: the length of the marriage; any prior
marriages; age, health, skills, and employability of the
parties; sources of income and needs of the parties;
contributions of one party to the increased earning
power of the other party; opportunity of each party
for future acquisitions of assets or income;
contribution or dissipation of each party to the
acquisition, depreciation or appreciation of marital
property, value of each party’s separate property,
standard of living established during the marriage;
economic circumstances of each party and whether
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the party will be serving as custodian of any
dependent children.
Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation
omitted). “The weight to be given to these statutory factors depends on the
facts of each case and is within the [fact-finder’s] discretion.” Schenk, 880
A.2d at 643 (citations omitted).
Instantly, we find that Master Watkins expressly considered all of the
relevant factors in making his recommendations as to how the parties’ marital
property should be distributed. See Third Amended Master’s Report,
11/12/20. Those factors included the parties’ educational background,
vocational skill, employability, and future earning capacity. Id. at 2, 6.
Master Watkins noted that although Husband is currently employed at a gas
station making $7.25 per hour, he supported the family during the marriage
and made a good living from the trucking business he owned. Id. at 2, 6-8.
Master Watkins also considered the fact that Wife was a homemaker and stay-
at-home mother to the parties’ minor child during the marriage, had never
worked full-time, and was not permitted by Husband to obtain employment.
Id. at 2, 7.
Master Watkins also considered the duration of the marriage; the
parties’ respective ages, their standard of living during the marriage; and the
fact that Wife’s contributions during the marriage allowed Husband to develop
and operate his trucking business. Id. at 6-9. Additionally, Master Watkins
took note of the fact that Wife serves as the primary custodian to the parties’
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minor child, whom she is raises alone with a minimal payment of $65 a month
in child support. Id. at 10.
Master Watkins expressly found that “[w]hile Husband’s future earning
capacity and ability to acquire capital assets is limited … his employment
situation is due to an accident [that] resulted in serious criminal charges …
[and the] loss of his CDL license[.]”. Id. at 6-7. Nonetheless, Master Watkins
concluded that “Wife is in greater need than Husband” given her lack of
employment history, general college degree from a foreign country, and low
earning expectation. Id. at 7.
Husband’s contentions on appeal merely challenge the weight to be
accorded the various factors, and as discussed, this matter was within the
province of Master Watkins, and not within the appellate court. See Schenk,
880 A.2d at 643; Moran, 839 A.2d at 1095.
We further find no merit to Husband’s contention that Master Watkins’
equitable distribution scheme was improperly based upon Wife’s allegations of
Husband’s “marital misconduct” and abuse during the marriage, nor the fact
that he failed to disclose the value of his property in India by the court-ordered
deadline. Master Watkins’ makes no specific mention of his consideration of
Husband’s misconduct or abuse in his third amended report and
recommendation, and the trial court specifically noted in its opinion that “[a]ny
abuse by [Husband] toward [Wife] … was not considered as an independent
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factor in the fashioning of [the equitable distribution] award.” Trial court
opinion, 6/3/21 at 6.
Additionally, Husband has provided no support in his brief for his
baseless allegation that Master Watkins and the trial court utilized his
nondisclosure of the value of his property in India as a reason to award Wife
“an unconscionable share of the martial estate.” See Husband’s brief at 26-
27. On the contrary, the record reflects that Master Watkins and the trial
court gave due consideration to all of the factors set forth in Section 3502(a)
in arriving at an equitable distribution scheme which, as a whole, achieved a
just determination of the parties’ marital property.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying
the bulk of Husband’s exceptions to the equitable distribution scheme set forth
in Master Watkins’ third report and recommendation.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/04/2022
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