Com. v. Williamson, K. ( 2017 )

J-S61039-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KARL WILLIAMSON,
Appellant No. 2687 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 6, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0001215-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2017
Appellant, Karl Williamson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a stipulated bench trial in which the trial court found him
guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, knowing or
intentional possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and fleeing or attempting to elude the police. Specifically, he
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
The suppression court summarized the pertinent facts of the case as
follows:
At approximately 2:00 P.M. on November 21, 2013,
Philadelphia Police Officer Michael Berkery was conducting a
routine patrol in the area of the 4700 block of Longshore Avenue
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S61039-17
in the City and County of Philadelphia. Officer Berkery observed
[Appellant] driving a black Lincoln Navigator past him. Officer
Berkery observed that the vehicle had heavy tint on all windows
except the windshield. Specifically, Officer Berkery noted that
the tint was dark enough that he could only see a figure inside of
the vehicle, but could not “make out” [Appellant]. [Appellant]
had pulled the Navigator into a parking spot. Officer Berkery’s
partner exited the vehicle and approached the driver’s side of
the Navigator. The police vehicle’s lights and sirens were not
activated. Officer Berkery’s partner knocked on the window and
asked [Appellant] twice to roll down his window. Instead,
[Appellant] pulled out of the parking space at a high rate of
speed. The officers then pursued [Appellant] through several
turns to the 6900 block of Tulip Street, a total distance of
approximately three blocks. . . . Officer Berkery described the
area as a high narcotics area of the city. In making a
credibility determination, [the suppression] court found Officer
Berkery credible in all respects.
(Supplemental Opinion, 11/17/16, at 1-2) (record citations omitted)
(emphases added).
The factual history of the case is continued in the trial court’s opinion:
After following [Appellant] with activated lights and sirens, the
officers stopped [Appellant], who then proceeded to exit the
vehicle. The officers pursued [Appellant] on foot. As [Appellant]
was running, he threw a small black bag on the highway.
[Appellant] continued fleeing by jumping fences and the sort.
Officers retrieved the bag on the highway and took the keys out
of [Appellant’s] vehicle. [Appellant] did not stop until he was
tased by the officer and was commanded to stop and get on the
ground. After that, he continued to run and was finally caught
by officers and placed into custody. Inside the black bag was
one clear sandwich bag with a large off-white chunky substance
confirmed to be cocaine or heroin. There was also a small bag
noted to have offwhite powder also alleged to be heroin.
[On s]earch incident to arrest, the officer recovered a razor
blade in [Appellant’s] pocket and a small clear bag with unused
baggies. Recovered from the front seat of the vehicle was a
scale and a couple thousand additional new and unused baggies.
All of the narcotics were placed on a property receipt 3126678.
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The paraphernalia was placed on 3126679. The total weight the
[sic] of the cocaine was 6.296 grams and the total weight of the
heroin was 0.118 grams.
(Trial Court Opinion, 11/08/16, at 2-3) (record citations omitted).
The trial court found Appellant guilty of all charges, as previously
noted. (See id. at 3). On August 6, 2015, the court sentenced him to a
term of not less than nine nor more than twenty-three months of
incarceration followed by a four-year period of reporting probation. This
timely appeal followed.1
Appellant presents one question on appeal.
Did not police [sic] lack reasonable suspicion that
[A]ppellant committed a motor vehicle code violation or any
other crime, and therefore did not the initial stop and
subsequent pursuit of [A]ppellant violate his rights under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 3).
Our standard of review is well-established:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s
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1 Appellant filed a court-ordered statement of errors on December 29, 2015.
The trial court filed an opinion on November 8, 2016. The suppression court
filed an opinion on November 17, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate
court] is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the
court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to
[ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 148, 151–52 (Pa. Super. 2015),
appeal denied, 138 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2016) (citations omitted).
When reviewing an order denying suppression, this Court
must review the record in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and determine whether
the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record.
Provided that there is support in the record for the court’s factual
findings, this Court will not reverse the order denying
suppression unless the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are in error.
Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 832–33 (Pa. Super. 1997),
appeal denied, 736 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
It is well[-]settled that the purpose of both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is to protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures. In the seminal case
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968), the United States Supreme Court indicated that police
may stop and frisk a person where they had a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In order to determine
whether the police had a reasonable suspicion, the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be
considered. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101
S. Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). “Based upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” Id. at 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690. Pennsylvania
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courts have consistently followed Terry in stop and frisk cases,
including those in which the appellants allege protections
pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001) (some citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
There are three relevant cognizable categories of interactions
between persons and police: a mere encounter, an investigative
detention, and a custodial detention or arrest. Commonwealth
v. Polo, 563 Pa. 218, 759 A.2d 372, 375 (2000). A mere
encounter need not be supported by any level of suspicion, and
does not require a person to stop or respond. Id. An
“investigative detention,” or Terry stop, must be supported by
reasonable suspicion; it subjects a person to a stop and a period
of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Id. An arrest
or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause. Id.“Pennsylvania courts have consistently followed Terry in stop
and frisk cases, including those in which the appellants allege
protections pursuant to Article I, [§] 8. . . .” In the Interest of
D.M., [supra] at 1163 (citing Commonwealth v. Cook, 558
Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (1999); Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (1997)); see also
Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 561 Pa. 368, 750 A.2d 807, 810
n. 2 (2000) (“Pennsylvania has consistently followed Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in stop and frisk cases.”) (citing
Jackson, at 574; Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323,
676 A.2d 226, 230 (1996) (Terry stop constitutional under
Article I, § 8)). Relying on that language from In the Interest
of D.M., we noted an investigative detention under the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 8 “is coterminous.”
Commonwealth v. Revere, 585 Pa. 262, 888 A.2d 694, 699 n.
6 (2005). Thus, vehicle stops that are constitutional under
Terry are constitutional under Article I, § 8.
Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 117 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis
added). Furthermore,
Reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a motorist
must be viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer. In a Terry stop, the officer may
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ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine
his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or
dispelling the officer’s suspicions. A finding of reasonable
suspicion does not demand a meticulously accurate
appraisal of the facts. Indeed, even stops based on
factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the
mistake is objectively reasonable.
Id. at 120 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).
[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics
of a location in determining whether the circumstances are
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.
Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop
occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual
considerations in a Terry analysis. Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 144, 147–148 [ ] (1972).
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused
the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing
the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous,
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion. Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing
the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty
from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists.
Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based
on commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior. See [ ] Cortez, [supra at] 418.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (some citations
omitted) (emphases added).
In Pennsylvania, a police officer has authority to stop a
vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation
of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred. Our
Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as:
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a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to
effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability
in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the
seizure, a police officer must be able to point to
“specific and articulable facts” leading him to
suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the
totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due
weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from
the facts in light of the officer's experience and
acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered
collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Thus,
under the present version of Section 6308(b), in order to
establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which led him to
reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code[.]
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 Pa. 1, 14 A.3d 89, 95–96
(2011) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
“[W]hether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality
was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an
objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality of
the circumstances.” Id. at 96.
Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113, 116 (Pa. Super. 2012) (one
footnote omitted).
Our Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:
Sun screening and other materials prohibited.−
No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun
screening device or other material which does not permit a
person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the
windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).
In this appeal, Appellant maintains that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation to initiate a stop, in violation of his
constitutional rights. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 9). We disagree.
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Appellant argues chiefly that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
him because Officer Berkery testified that he and his partner could see a
shadowy figure inside the vehicle. (See id. at 12; see also N.T. Motion,
9/23/14, at 11 (“You could see a figure, but you couldn’t make it out clearly
because how dark [sic] it was.”)).
In support, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 5 A.3d 261,
263 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[Y]ou could see figures in the vehicle. You could
see there was a driver.”). (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12). Appellant’s
reliance is misplaced.
Initially, we note that Brubaker is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence for his conviction of violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). See
Brubaker, supra at 262. This appeal, in contrast, challenges only the
denial of a motion for suppression. Different standards of review apply. We
review the denial of suppression not to establish the sufficiency of the
evidence for conviction, but only to decide if the suppression court properly
determined that the police had reasonable suspicion that a violation of the
Vehicle Code was occurring or had occurred. See Farnan, supra at 116.
Next, we note that Appellant quotes a single pair of phrases, out of
total context, to support the unwarranted inference that the mere
visualization of a figure inside the vehicle disproves a violation of section
4524(e)(1). (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12). It does not.
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Actually, the Brubaker decision cited several other factors in support
of its conclusion of insufficiency. See Brubaker, supra at 263 (policer
officer testified he could see inside vehicle during afternoon stop, but
questioned whether interior would be visible at night; officer further testified
that tint was “one of the lighter ones[.]”). Seeing a shadowy figure is not
per se conclusive proof of lack of reasonable suspicion.
Additionally, we assess reasonable suspicion from the totality of the
circumstances, not merely from an isolated phrase. See Wardlow, supraat 124–25. Furthermore, unprovoked flight is a factor which supports the
conclusion of reasonable suspicion. See id.In fact, even a mistaken belief that a violation of the Vehicle Code had
occurred is enough: “A finding of reasonable suspicion does not demand a
meticulously accurate appraisal of the facts. Indeed, even stops based on
factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is objectively
reasonable.” Chase, supra at 120 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Appellant further argues that when the police got within five feet of the
vehicle, “any basis for their initial suspicion dissipated,” obviating the need
for an investigative detention. (Appellant’s Brief, at 12). This argument is
unavailing. See Commonwealth v. Vincett, 806 A.2d 31, 33 (Pa. Super.
2002), appeal denied, 816 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2003) (colorable defense to
underlying traffic violation does not affect validity of traffic stop;
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suppression inquiry analyzed from perspective of police officer, not from
perspective of defendant). This conclusion also assumes that the windows
were insufficiently tinted to constitute a violation of section 4524(e)(1), a
self-serving conclusion not supported by the record.
Finally, Appellant notes that his brother testified that later photographs
of the vehicle proved that only the back windows were heavily tinted. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 9 n.2; see also N.T. Motion, 9/23/14, at 13-16).
However, in rebuttal, Officer Berkery testified that the photographs did not
have the tint which he observed when he initiated the traffic stop the
preceding November. (See N.T. Motion, 9/23/14, at 17-20).
This undeveloped argument would not merit relief. It was the role of
the suppression court, sitting as factfinder, to resolve conflicts in the
testimony. The suppression court judge was free to believe all, part, or
none of a witness’s testimony. See Commonwealth v. Haslam, 138 A.3d
680, 687 (Pa. Super. 2016). Also, “[i]t is the sole province of the
suppression court, as finder of fact, to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super.
1993) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Here, we conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the suppression court’s conclusion that the police had
specific and articulable facts for a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the
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Vehicle Code had occurred, is supported by the record.2 Appellant’s
constitutional rights were not violated.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins the Memorandum.
Judge Ransom concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/7/2017
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2 Because Appellant only claims that the police lacked reasonable suspicion,
we need not address whether the police possessed probable cause, and we
decline to do so. For a comparison of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion for the required level of justification in a vehicle stop, see
Commonwealth v. Haines, 166 A.3d 449, 454 (Pa. Super.2017); see also
Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992–93 (Pa. Super. 2015);
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1286 (en banc) (Pa. Super.
2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327 (Pa. 2011).
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