Com. v. Goff, A. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S79044-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    ANDRE GOFF                                 :
    :
    Appellant                :      No. 1553 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order June 6, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0309511-2005
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 19, 2017
    Appellant, Andre Goff, appeals nunc pro tunc from the order entered in
    the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first
    petition brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1           We
    affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    On February [9], 2006, a jury convicted [Appellant] on
    charges of robbery and possession of an instrument of
    crime [(“PIC”)].[2] On March 9, 2006, [Appellant] was
    sentenced to seven and a half to fifteen [years’]
    imprisonment followed by five [years’] probation.
    [Appellant] did not file a notice of appeal. [Appellant] filed
    a [pro se] petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act on
    July 24, 2006. On June 8, 2007, [Appellant’s] request for
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 907, respectively.
    J-S79044-17
    PCRA relief was granted. As a result, [Appellant’s] right to
    file a direct appeal was reinstated nunc pro tunc.
    [Appellant timely] filed a notice of appeal [nunc pro tunc]
    on July 5, 2007. On July 24, 2008, the Superior Court
    affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence. [Appellant’s]
    petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court was
    denied on April 1, 2009.
    On January 20, 2013, [Appellant] was arrested [while on
    parole] and charged with several firearms violations, to
    which he later pled guilty. [The] court held a Daisey
    Kates[3] hearing on April 12, 2013[,] after which
    [Appellant’s] probation was revoked. On June 7, 2013,
    [Appellant] was sentenced to two and a half to five
    [years’] imprisonment followed by five [years’] probation.
    [Appellant] did not file an appeal. On April 8, 2014, new
    counsel filed a PCRA petition alleging that Daisey Kates
    counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.
    Thereafter on June 6, 2014, [the] court held an evidentiary
    hearing, and after finding [Appellant’s] claim to be
    meritless, issued an order denying [Appellant’s] petition to
    reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. [Appellant
    timely] filed a notice of appeal on July 5, 2014[,] and on
    November 10, 2014, [the] court issued an opinion.
    [Appellant’s] appeal was dismissed on February 20,
    2015[,] for failure to file a brief. [Appellant] then filed a
    [pro se] petition under the [PCRA] on July 17, 2015. On
    April 22, 2016, [the] court granted [Appellant’s] right to
    appeal, nunc pro tunc, [from] the June 6, 2014 order
    denying PCRA relief. [Appellant timely] filed a notice of
    appeal [nunc pro tunc] to the Superior Court on May 19,
    2016.     On November 18, 2016, [the] court ordered
    [Appellant] to file a statement of [errors] complained of on
    appeal. [Appellant] filed this statement on November 29,
    2016, while his counsel filed a similar statement on
    December 3, 2016.
    ____________________________________________
    3 See Commonwealth v. Kates, 
    452 Pa. 102
    , 
    305 A.2d 701
    (1973)
    (holding there is no constitutional prohibition preventing trial court from
    conducting probation/parole revocation hearing before trial on new criminal
    charges which led to revocation claim).
    -2-
    J-S79044-17
    (PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 29, 2017, at 1-2).
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    WAS THE COURT’S IMPOSITION OF A NEW SENTENCE
    ILLEGAL WHERE APPELLANT HAD BEEN RELEASED ON
    PAROLE AND WHOSE PROBATION HAD NOT YET BEGUN?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 9).4
    Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
    examining whether the record supports the court’s determination and
    whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ford,
    
    947 A.2d 1251
    (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 
    598 Pa. 779
    , 
    959 A.2d 319
    (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court
    if the record contains any support for those findings.           Commonwealth v.
    Boyd, 
    923 A.2d 513
    (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    593 Pa. 754
    , 
    932 A.2d 74
    (2007).       Credibility determinations are within the province of the
    PCRA court when a hearing is held on the matter.                 Commonwealth v.
    Rathfon, 
    899 A.2d 365
    (Pa.Super. 2006).               If the record supports a PCRA
    court’s credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court.
    Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
    609 Pa. 442
    , 
    17 A.3d 297
    (2011).
    Appellant    argues     the   court     incorrectly   determined   he    violated
    probation, when in fact his probation term had not yet begun.                  Appellant
    claims the only option available to the court after revocation of Appellant’s
    ____________________________________________
    4 Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence, which is cognizable under
    the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vii).
    -3-
    J-S79044-17
    parole was to recommit him to serve out the remainder of his term of
    incarceration. Appellant avers his issue is a challenge to the legality of his
    sentence, which he cannot waive.      Appellant concludes this Court should
    vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. We disagree.
    Pennsylvania law states:
    If, at any time before the defendant has completed the
    maximum period of probation, or before he has begun
    service of his probation, he should commit offenses of
    such nature as to demonstrate to the court that he is
    unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same
    would not be in subservience to the ends of justice and the
    best interests of the public, or the defendant, the court
    could revoke or change the order of probation.            A
    defendant on probation has no contract with the court. He
    is still a person convicted of crime, and the expressed
    intent of the Court to have him under probation beginning
    at a future time does not change his position from the
    possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.
    Commonwealth v. Hoover, 
    909 A.2d 321
    , 323 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 
    420 A.2d 628
    , 630 (Pa.Super. 1980))
    (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted). If a court revokes
    a term of probation before the defendant has started to serve it, the court
    has the same sentencing options available that existed at the time of the
    original sentencing.   Commonwealth v. Ware, 
    737 A.2d 251
    (Pa.Super.
    1999), appeal denied, 
    561 Pa. 657
    , 
    747 A.2d 900
    (1999).
    “Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the
    sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be
    disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of
    -4-
    J-S79044-17
    discretion.” Commonwealth v. Perreault, 
    930 A.2d 553
    , 558 (Pa.Super.
    2007), appeal denied, 
    596 Pa. 729
    , 
    945 A.2d 169
    (2008). The Sentencing
    Code permits a court to revoke an order of probation under the following
    circumstances:
    § 9771.      Modification or revocation of order of
    probation
    (a) General rule.—The court may at any time terminate
    continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions
    upon which an order of probation has been imposed.
    (b) Revocation.—The court may revoke an order of
    probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions
    of the probation.       Upon revocation the sentencing
    alternatives available to the court shall be the same as
    were available at the time of initial sentencing, due
    consideration being given to the time spent serving the
    order of probation.
    (c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.—
    The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement
    upon revocation unless it finds that:
    (1) the defendant has been convicted of another
    crime; or
    (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
    likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
    imprisoned; or
    (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
    authority of the court.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(a)-(c).
    Instantly, after a jury convicted Appellant of robbery and PIC on
    February 9, 2006, the court sentenced him to seven and half to fifteen years’
    imprisonment plus five years’ probation. While on parole in January 2013,
    -5-
    J-S79044-17
    Appellant was arrested and charged with several firearms violations, to
    which he later pled guilty. After a hearing, the court anticipatorily revoked
    Appellant’s probation, and on June 7, 2013, resentenced him to two and half
    to five years’ imprisonment plus five years’ probation.
    The court had authority to revoke Appellant’s probation before he
    started serving his probation term.        See 
    Hoover, supra
    .      Appellant
    committed several firearm offenses, which demonstrated to the court that he
    was unworthy of probation.     See id.; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c).    The court
    resentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration and probation consistent
    with the options available at Appellant’s original sentencing.    See 
    Ware, supra
    . Therefore, the court imposed a legal sentence following revocation
    of Appellant’s parole/probation.   Accordingly, we affirm the order denying
    PCRA relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/19/2017
    -6-