Com. v. G.C. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
G. C.
Appellant No. 93 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 17, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000449-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014
G.C. appeals his judgment of sentence entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Cambria County after a jury convicted him of one count of
corruption of minors.1 After review, we affirm.
G.C. was charged with one count of corruption of minors and two
counts each of indecent assault and endangering the welfare of children
after his daughter, H.C., disclosed that G.C. repeatedly had her remove her
pants and underwear, ostensibly so that G.C. could check to see if she was
wiping properly, and touched her in her vaginal area, rubbing his fingers in a
circular motion. A jury convicted G.C. of one count of corruption of minors
and, on December 17, 2013, the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
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term of twenty-five years in prison pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2.2 G.C.
was also found to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9792 and was directed to comply with the registration provisions of Megan’s
Law IV.
G.C. did not file post-trial motions. He filed a timely notice of appeal
on January 9, 2014, followed by a court-ordered statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Two Rule 1925(a)
opinions were filed, one by the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, who
presided over G.C.’s trial, and a second by the Honorable Patrick T. Kiniry,
who ruled on G.C.’s pre-trial motions.
G.C. raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [G.C.’s]
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [G.C.’s] Motion
to Correct Amended Information?
3. Whether the trial court erred in “spotlighting” the jury
instruction relative to [Standard Jury Instruction] 4.13(B)
(Conviction Based on Victim’s Uncorroborated Testimony in
Sexual Offenses) during jury selection?
Brief of Appellant, at 6.
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2
Section 9718.2 imposes a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence on
offenders who have a prior conviction for certain offenses enumerated in 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. G.C. was convicted in 1993 of multiple such offenses
in relation to the sexual abuse of a daughter from a previous marriage.
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G.C. first claims that Judge Kiniry erred in failing to grant his Rule 600
motion to dismiss. G.C. claims that he did not agree to several continuances
requested by his trial counsel and, accordingly, the time attributable to those
continuances should not be deemed excludable for purposes of Rule 600.
We disagree.
We begin by noting that our standard of review with regard to claims
brought under Rule 600 is whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 861 A.2d 304, 309 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the
framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of
giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be
exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is
abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error
of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). Our scope of
review is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary
hearing and the findings of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858
A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004). We must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. at 1239.
In his Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Kiniry provides a thorough factual
and procedural history as it relates to the various continuances requested
and received in this matter. Accordingly, we will not recite those facts here,
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other than to note that the excludable time over which the parties disagree
is a total of 142 days attributable to requests made by defense counsel, but
allegedly either (1) not agreed to by G.C. or (2) agreed to by G.C. only
under duress.
Rule 600 requires that a defendant must be brought to trial within 365
days from the date on which the written complaint was filed against him.3
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). With regard to the computation of time,
Rule 600 provides as follows:
periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise
due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time
within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
delay shall be excluded from the computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added).
When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the period
prescribed under Rule 600, the defendant may file a written motion
requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
600 (D)(1). In considering the trial court’s ruling on a Rule 600 motion, this
Court may not ignore the dual purpose behind the Rule. Commonwealth
v. Murray, 879 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Those
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3
Rule 600 provides further guidelines for defendants who are incarcerated
prior to trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(B). However, G.C. was at liberty on bail
for the entire pre-trial period.
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two equally important functions are: (1) the protection of the accused’s
speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. Id.In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has
been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to
effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those
guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However,
the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to
insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution
delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of
the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be
construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to
punish and deter crime. In considering these matters, courts
must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the
prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of
the community to vigorous law enforcement as well. Strained
and illogical judicial construction adds nothing to our search for
justice, but only serves to expand the already bloated arsenal of
the unscrupulous criminal determined to manipulate the system.
Id. at 312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
Rule 600 clearly provides that only “periods of delay at any stage of
the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has
failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the
time in which trial must commence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). “Any other
periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Id. The
Comment to Rule 600 further provides that delay is excludable if it results
from “either the availability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney
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or any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (emphasis added).
Here, G.C. has not alleged that the Commonwealth engaged in any
misconduct or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence in bringing him to
trial. Moreover, the use of the disjunctive “or” in the Comment to Rule 600
demonstrates that there is no requirement that a defendant agree to a
continuance for it to be excluded from a Rule 600 computation; it is
sufficient that the continuance be requested by defense counsel alone. G.C.
has cited to no case law holding to the contrary. Accordingly, Judge Kiniry
properly excluded 142 days attributable the continuance requests by
defendant and/or defense counsel, and G.C.’s claim is without merit.
With respect to G.C.’s two remaining appellate issues, we have
reviewed the briefs, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, and we find
that the opinion of the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, thoroughly,
comprehensively and correctly disposes of these issues. For that reason, we
affirm based on Judge Krumenacker’s Rule 1925(a) opinion dated March 10,
2014. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event
of further proceedings in this matter.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/12/2014
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