Com. v. Zurburg, B. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S69042-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    BRANDEN ZURBURG                          :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 440 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-22-CR-0001585-2001
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2018
    Branden Zurburg (Appellant) appeals pro se from the trial court’s order
    denying his “Petition to Vacate Conviction for Lack of Subject Matter
    Jurisdiction, Denial of Consent, and Rescission of Signatures.” We affirm.
    In 2001, Appellant responded to an internet advertisement placed by an
    agent from the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Child Sexual Exploitation Task
    Force. Appellant and the agent exchanged emails, and thereafter Appellant
    arrived at a Harrisburg area hotel and expressed his intent to engage in sexual
    activities with three children under the age of 13.       The agent arrested
    Appellant and he was charged with numerous crimes. Appellant was tried by
    a jury in 2004. The trial court summarized:
    [Appellant] was convicted of multiple sex crimes against a
    minor in January of 2004 and was sentenced to nine (9) to forty
    (40) years of imprisonment. [Appellant] filed a PCRA petition and
    his direct appeal rights were reinstated in October of 2006. On
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    December 3, 2007, the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s]
    judgment of sentence. On April 8, 2009, [Appellant] filed a PCRA
    petition and was appointed counsel. This Court dismissed such
    petition on December 2, 2009. [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal,
    and on September 22, 2010, the Superior Court quashed the
    appeal for untimeliness and failure to comply with appellate rule
    requirements.
    Over seven years later, on November 2, 2017, [Appellant]
    filed a pro se “Petition to Vacate Conviction for Lack of Subject
    Matter Jurisdiction, Denial of Consent, and Rescission of
    Signatures.” This Court denied [Appellant’s] petition on February
    5, 2018, and this appeal followed. [Appellant’s] Statement of
    Matters Complained of on Appeal includes eight points for review,
    most of which are conclusory statements asserting a lack of this
    Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 1.
    Preliminarily, we note that rather than treating Appellant’s November 2,
    2017 petition as his second petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition
    because “the petition consists of disorganized thoughts and no analysis or
    discussion regarding the issues he is attempting to raise.” Trial Court Opinion,
    6/11/18, at 1-2; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that “[t]he action
    established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral
    relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the
    same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect . . .”);
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    803 A.2d 1291
    , 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002)
    (holding that “any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final
    will be treated as a PCRA petition.”).    The trial court subsequently noted,
    however, that had it treated Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition, the
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    petition would be untimely and the trial court would lack jurisdiction. Trial
    Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 2 n.1.
    The trial court should have treated Appellant’s petition as his second
    PCRA petition. Nonetheless, we agree with the trial court that under the PCRA,
    the petition would not merit relief or even jurisdiction because it did not meet
    the one-year time restriction of the PCRA, having been filed more than seven
    years after the Superior Court’s quashal of Appellant’s first PCRA – from which
    Appellant did not seek allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court.
    Commonwealth v. Zurburg, 153 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Sept. 22, 2010)
    (unpublished).
    “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an
    untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 
    996 A.2d 1076
    , 1079
    (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    837 A.2d 1157
    ,
    1161 (Pa. 2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of
    the date on which the petitioner’s judgment became final, unless one of the
    three statutory exceptions apply:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was      the
    result of interference by government officials with    the
    presentation of the claim in violation of              the
    Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or           the
    Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
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    or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
    period provided in this section and has been held by
    that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of
    these exceptions “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
    presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).     If a petition is untimely, and the
    petitioner has not pled and proven any exception, “neither this Court nor the
    trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply
    do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.”
    Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 
    923 A.2d 466
    , 468 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 
    895 A.2d 520
    , 522 (Pa. 2006)).
    We further agree that Appellant has failed to development a meaningful
    argument. On appeal, he phrases his issues as follows:
    1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER
    JURISDICTION TO CHARGE, CONVICT AND SENTENCE
    [APPELLANT]?
    2. WHETHER THE COMMONWEALTH’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO
    [APPELLANT’S] PETITION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR LACK OF
    SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, INDICATES THAT THE FACTS
    WITHIN [APPELLANT’s] PETITION ARE TRUE?
    3. WHETHER THE COMMONWEALTH’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO
    [APPELLANT’S] PETITION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR LACK OF
    SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, STIPULATE THAT THE
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IS VOID AD [sic] INITIO?
    4. WHETHER CONSENT FROM THE GOVERNED MUST EXIST FOR
    ANY GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO BE EXERTED UPON AN
    INDIVIDUAL?
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    5. WHETHER [APPELLANT] HAS THE RIGHT TO RESCIND HIS
    SIGNATURE FROM ALL COURT DOCUMENTS IF [APPELLANT] WAS
    NOT AFFORDED THE RIGHT TO KNOW THE TRUE NATURE OF THE
    CHARGES?
    6. WHETHER [APPELLANT’S] AFFIDAVIT STIPULATES A PRIMA
    FACIE CASE?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Although he presents six issues, Appellant’s summary of the argument
    simply states:
    Appellant avers that the trial court committed fraud upon
    the court when stating that facts. [sic] Appellant also avers that
    the trial court never informed him of the true nature of the charges
    which deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction.
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    The argument section of Appellant’s brief is not “divided into as many
    parts as there are questions to be argued,” in contravention of Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(a). Moreover, Appellant’s argument is largely nonsensical. His most
    cogent statements are that he “never committed any sex crime against an
    actual minor,” and he was convicted of a “victimless crime” because the
    Commonwealth “use[d] fictitious entities (kids) . . . to prosecute Appellant.”
    See Appellant’s Brief at 7-11. Appellant fails to support his assertions with
    citations to legal authority and the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring
    that an appellant develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant
    legal authority).
    In response, the Commonwealth observes that Appellant’s claims are
    “unintelligible,” and he “has failed to cite pertinent legal authority or develop
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    any cognizable argument.” Commonwealth Brief at 7. The trial court likewise
    states that Appellant’s “underlying petition provide[d] no legal authority; he
    [did] not cite to any statutes or case law to support his claims, which are
    confusing at best.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 1. We agree with the
    Commonwealth and the trial court. Although Appellant is pro se, his status
    does not relieve him of his duty to properly raise and develop an appealable
    claim.   Smathers v. Smathers, 
    670 A.2d 1159
    , 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996).
    This is particularly so because this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal from the
    denial of his first PCRA petition on the basis that, inter alia, “Appellant has
    waived all issues on appeal by failing to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2111, et seq,
    relative to the format and content of his appellate brief.” Commonwealth v.
    Zurburg, 153 MDA 2010 at 1 (Pa. Super. Sept. 22, 2010) (unpublished).
    For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/2/2018
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