Fox, J. v. Fox, L. ( 2017 )

J-S03038-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
JOSEPH J. FOX, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
LINDA L. FOX, :
:
Appellant : No. 1177 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered July 13, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Civil Division at No(s): 209 of 2002-D
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 20, 2017
Linda L. Fox (Wife) appeals from the order entered July 13, 2016
denying her motion for specific performance. Specifically, Wife seeks
enforcement of a provision in a marital settlement agreement regarding
payments triggered by certain modifications of a child support order. We
affirm.
Wife and Joseph J. Fox (Husband) were married on May 28, 1989.
Subsequent to Husband’s filing of a complaint for divorce, the parties
entered into a marriage settlement agreement dated November 18, 2002.
The agreement provided, in relevant part, the following:
Husband covenants and agrees to pay Wife child support in
the amount of [$1,200] per month until such time as the minor
child obtains the age of [21] and/or obtains a Bachelors or
equivalent degree, whichever is later. This agreement is non-
modifiable and incorporated as part of the marriage settlement
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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agreement. In the event that the Court enters an order for child
support in an amount less than [$1,200], Husband shall pay to
Wife the difference between the support order and [$1,200.]
Marriage Settlement Agreement, 11/18/2002, at ¶ 5(F).
On February 29, 2016, Husband filed a petition for special relief,
requesting, inter alia, that the court “reform the [marriage settlement
agreement] to terminate or limit the duration of the child support payments”
and “to provide that as long as child support is to be paid that it is paid
directly to his son.” Petition for Special Relief, 2/29/2016, at 3. After
conducting a hearing on March 29, 2016, and receiving briefs from the
parties, the trial court entered an order, which stated in pertinent part that
“[Husband’s] child support obligation shall cease as of May 31, 2016.”
Order, 5/31/2016, at 1.
Wife did not appeal the May 31, 2016 order. Instead, on June 24,
2016, Wife filed a motion for specific performance of the marital settlement
agreement. In the motion, Wife contended that ¶ 5(F) of the agreement
sets forth two types of payments: (1) a child support payment in excess of
the statutory requirements, which extends past the age of majority until
certain circumstances are met, and (2) a second alternative payment, which
is triggered upon any court entering an order for child support in an amount
less than $1,200. See Motion for Specific Performance, 6/24/2016, at ¶¶ 2-
5. Wife asserted she was entitled to the alternative payment contemplated
by ¶ 5(F) because the trial court’s May 31, 2016 order constituted “an order
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for child support in an amount less than [$1,200]” as set forth by ¶ 5(F) of
the marriage settlement agreement. See id. at ¶¶ 6-8. After hearing
argument on Wife’s motion on July 12, 2016, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion without further explanation. Order, 7/12/2016, at 1.1
Wife timely filed an appeal from the July 12, 2016 order. Wife
complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The trial court did not
file an opinion and instead, on August 26, 2016, submitted a letter to this
Court stating it was adopting its memorandum opinion dated May 31, 2016.2
In the letter, the trial court suggests Wife should have appealed the May 31,
2016 order and posits that Wife’s motion for specific performance “is just her
way of getting a second bite at the apple without a record to aid the
Honorable Court in its decision.” Letter to Superior Court Prothonotary,
8/26/2016, at 1.
On appeal, Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion or erred
as a matter of law by denying payment to Wife after a “judicial reduction of
child support.” Wife’s Brief at 2. Preliminarily, we agree with the trial court
that, because Wife did not appeal the May 31, 2016 order, the issue of
whether the trial court properly interpreted the marriage settlement
1
No transcript was made of the motion presentation.
2
The May 31, 2016 memorandum opinion accompanied its order ruling on
Husband’s petition for special relief.
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agreement when considering Husband’s request to reform the agreement to
terminate or limit his child support payments is not before us. What is
before us is Wife’s contention that Husband still owes her $1,200 a month
because the May 31, 2016 order constituted “an order for child support in an
amount less than [$1,200]” within the meaning of ¶ 5(F) of the marriage
settlement agreement, thereby triggering the alternative payment
contemplated by ¶ 5(F).
In considering this issue, we bear in mind that, unless it is merged into
the divorce decree, marital settlement agreements are governed by the law
of contracts. Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa. Super.
2007).
Because contract interpretation is a question of law,
this Court is not bound by the trial court’s
interpretation. Our standard of review over
questions of law is de novo and to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the
appellate court may review the entire record in
making its decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
The standard of enforceability of a marital settlement agreement is
well settled: “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should
be bound by the terms of their agreements.” Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d
308, 313 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting McMahon v. McMahon, 612 A.2d
1360, 1363 (Pa. Super. 1992)) (citations omitted). “We are not permitted
to review the reasonableness of a marital settlement agreement to
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determine its validity.” Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. Super.
2005). A trial court has “neither the power nor the authority to modify or
vary the decree unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or mistake.”
Bianchi v. Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super. 2004).
As described above, in his petition for special relief pre-dating the July
12, 2016 order at issue, Husband had requested the trial court reform the
marriage settlement agreement, which it did in its May 31, 2016 order.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that Husband’s “child support
obligation shall cease as of May 31, 2016.” Order, 5/31/2016, at 1. We
note that many of Wife’s arguments in her brief concentrate on why she
believes the trial court erred in interpreting the marriage settlement
agreement in the May 31, 2016 order. However, Wife did not appeal that
order, so we are limited to interpreting the marriage settlement agreement
as it exists after the entry of the trial court’s May 31, 2016 order. Here, it is
impossible for us to conclude that the May 31, 2016 order was merely “an
order for child support” within the meaning of ¶ 5(F), thereby triggering the
alternative payment. Instead, the order reformed the agreement to
eliminate Husband’s child support obligations entirely. As such, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion or err in denying Wife’s motion for specific
performance as there was nothing left in ¶ 5(F) of the marriage settlement
agreement for Husband to perform.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/20/2017
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