Com. v. Harris, C. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-S67037-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    CHARLTON HARRIS,                         :
    :
    Appellant               :     No. 2704 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order July 25, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000859-2010
    BEFORE:    OTT, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:          FILED JANUARY 17, 2019
    Charlton Harris (Appellant) appeals from the July 25, 2017 order
    dismissing his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
    Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
    We glean the following factual and procedural history from the record.
    On December 18, 2009, Appellant and a co-conspirator entered the victim’s
    home and stole, inter alia, an Xbox 360, a Playstation 3, videogames, a
    television, two laptops, cell phones, designer bags, and jewelry. The victim
    observed the theft from outside the home and called the police. Appellant
    was apprehended shortly thereafter while getting into a cab, from which
    several of the above-mentioned items were subsequently recovered.        The
    victim identified Appellant as one of the individuals who had stolen items
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S67037-18
    from his home and identified the items in the cab as some of the stolen
    items.
    Based on the foregoing, Appellant was arrested and ultimately charged
    with burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen
    property, and conspiracy to commit burglary.         On October 11, 2013,
    Appellant pleaded guilty to all charges. On December 12, 2013, the court
    imposed a term of imprisonment of two to four years, followed by five years
    of probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal.
    On September 25, 2014, Appellant timely filed pro se a PCRA petition.
    Following appointment of counsel on March 10, 2016, Appellant filed an
    amended PCRA petition on January 9, 2017.1        In lieu of an answer, the
    Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss.      The PCRA court issued notice of
    its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to
    1 The lengthy delays during Appellant’s PCRA proceedings are not explained.
    Our Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he PCRA court [has] the ability
    and responsibility to manage its docket and caseload and thus has an
    essential role in ensuring the timely resolution of PCRA matters.”
    Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 
    52 A.3d 251
    , 260 (Pa. 2012) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Porter, 
    35 A.3d 4
    , 24–25 (Pa. 2012) (“[T]he court, not
    counsel, controls the scope, timing and pace of the proceedings below.”)).
    Additionally, “post-conviction counsel must ‘act expeditiously so as to reduce
    unnecessary delays and ensure the efficient administration of justice.’” 
    Id.
    (citing Commonwealth v. Sneed, 
    45 A.3d 1096
    , 1104 n.11 (Pa. 2012)).
    This type of delay is not acceptable.
    -2-
    J-S67037-18
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on June 22, 2017,2 and dismissed the petition on July 25,
    2017.
    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.3    On appeal, Appellant sets
    forth one issue for our review: whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing
    his PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    On review of orders denying PCRA relief, our standard is to determine
    whether the PCRA court’s ruling is free of legal error and supported by the
    record.     Commonwealth v. Orlando, 
    156 A.3d 1274
    , 1280 (Pa. Super.
    2017) (citation omitted).       Because Appellant claims that the PCRA court
    erred in denying his petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing, we
    also keep the following in mind.
    [T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction
    petition is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion
    to decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently
    frivolous and has no support either in the record or other
    evidence. It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal
    to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the
    record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court
    erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of
    material fact in controversy and in denying relief without
    conducting an evidentiary hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    993 A.2d 289
    , 295 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
    omitted). “Thus, to obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
    petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine
    2   Appellant did not file a response to the notice of intent to dismiss.
    3   Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -3-
    J-S67037-18
    issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief,
    or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”
    Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 
    856 A.2d 806
    , 820 (Pa. 2004).                See also
    Commonwealth v. Paddy, 
    15 A.3d 431
    , 467 (Pa. 2011).
    In seeking collateral review, Appellant claims that plea counsel was
    ineffective for ignoring Appellant’s request to file a motion to withdraw his
    guilty plea prior to sentencing.4 Amended PCRA Petition, 1/9/2017, at 4-6.
    In its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained that it dismissed Appellant’s
    PCRA petition without a hearing because Appellant’s “bald assertions” that
    he had requested counsel to withdraw the plea, without any corroborating
    evidence that he had actually made that request, failed to present a genuine
    issue of material fact. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/2018, at 3-4. Additionally,
    the PCRA court found Appellant’s claim to be refuted by the record based on,
    4 In his PCRA petition, Appellant also claimed, in a single sentence, that his
    guilty plea was coerced. Amended PCRA Petition, 1/9/2017, at 2. Aside
    from a single reference, his brief on appeal is devoid of any argument as to
    this claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 9 (“In his PCRA Petition, [Appellant]
    averred that he had not wished to plead guilty but that his trial counsel
    coerced him into pleading guilty[.]”). Instead, Appellant solely focuses on
    what he terms the “more important[]” claim: that counsel failed to file the
    requested motion to withdraw Appellant’s guilty plea. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, any
    claim that the PCRA court erred in finding that Appellant’s plea was not
    coerced is waived. See Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 
    74 A.3d 1081
    , 1086–
    87 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
    Procedure provides that ‘[t]he argument shall ... have ... the particular point
    treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
    deemed pertinent.’ Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Failure by the appellant to discuss
    pertinent facts or cite legal authority will result in waiver. Commonwealth
    v. Rhodes, 
    54 A.3d 908
    , 915 (Pa. Super. 2012).”).
    -4-
    J-S67037-18
    inter alia, Appellant’s failure to “mention his wish to withdraw his plea” at
    the sentencing hearing. Id. at 5.
    It is uncontroverted that counsel never filed a motion to withdraw
    Appellant’s plea. However, even assuming that Appellant raised a genuine
    issue of material fact as to whether he asked counsel to file a motion to
    withdraw his plea, Appellant is not automatically entitled to relief on appeal.
    As noted above, in order “to obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
    dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised
    a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have
    entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in
    denying a hearing.” D'Amato, 856 A.2d at 820 (emphasis added).
    In his amended PCRA petition, Appellant essentially argues that
    counsel was per se ineffective because counsel ignored Appellant’s request
    to file a motion to withdraw his plea. Amended PCRA Petition, 1/9/2017, at
    6.   We use the following standard to evaluate ineffective assistance of
    counsel claims.
    It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have
    provided effective representation unless the PCRA
    petitioner pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the
    underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s
    action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis
    designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3)
    prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable
    probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s error.
    The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
    petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.
    -5-
    J-S67037-18
    Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
    counsel’s ineffectiveness.
    Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    990 A.2d 795
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (internal citations omitted).
    Assuming arguendo that the basis for Appellant’s pre-sentence motion
    to withdraw his plea was because he “is actually innocent” and “was coerced
    into pleading guilty[,]” as alleged in his PCRA petition, Appellant offered no
    elaboration on these averments and no other argument as to why he was
    entitled to withdrawal of his plea.   Amended PCRA Petition, 1/9/2017, at 2.
    [A] bare assertion of innocence is no longer a fair and just
    reason permitting a pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.
    Instead, “a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least
    plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason
    for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” [Commonwealth v.
    Carrasquillo, 
    115 A.3d 1284
    , 1292 (Pa. 2015)].           Our High
    Court outlined that the correct inquiry “on consideration of such
    a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some
    colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that
    permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and
    justice.” 
    Id.
    Commonwealth v. Baez, 
    169 A.3d 35
    , 39 (Pa. Super. 2017).            Appellant
    has offered no such demonstration. Thus, Appellant was not entitled to an
    evidentiary hearing because even if the PCRA court found that counsel had
    failed to file the motion as requested, the underlying legal claim was without
    merit, and thus Appellant was not entitled to collateral relief. See D'Amato,
    856 A.2d at 820. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA
    court’s decision to deny Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.
    Order affirmed.
    -6-
    J-S67037-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/17/19
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2704 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 1/17/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/17/2019