Com. v. Dean, S. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S21041-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    STEVIE D. DEAN,                          :
    :
    Appellant              :     No. 1632 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 29, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0000046-2016
    BEFORE:    LAZARUS, DUBOW, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:          FILED MAY 26, 2017
    Stevie D. Dean (Appellant) appeals from the aggregate judgment of
    sentence of four to ten years of imprisonment, plus costs and restitution,
    entered after he pled guilty to robbery and resisting arrest.     Appellant’s
    counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    (Pa. 2009).     We grant counsel’s petition and affirm Appellant’s
    judgment of sentence.
    On July 2, 2014, Appellant and his alleged co-conspirators entered into
    the home of a 71-year-old man and inflicted serious bodily injury upon him
    during the theft of his firearms and electronics; Appellant also attempted to
    flee during his arrest on that date.      See, e.g., Criminal Information,
    2/12/2016, at Counts 3, 5. Charges were brought against Appellant in July
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S21041-17
    2014 at docket number CP-43-CR-0001013-2014, but ultimately were nolle
    prossed by the Commonwealth without prejudice.         In October 2015, the
    Commonwealth charged Appellant in the instant case with 20 counts
    stemming from the events of July 2, 2014.
    On April 14, 2016, Appellant pled guilty to resisting arrest and one
    count of robbery and agreed to testify against a co-conspirator, in exchange
    for which the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining counts, agreed to
    standard-range, concurrent sentences not to exceed ten years, and affirmed
    that it would not oppose Appellant’s parole at his minimum sentence. Order,
    4/15/2016.
    On June 29, 2016, Appellant was sentenced according to the plea
    agreement, based upon a prior record score (PRS) of four.1 Appellant timely
    filed a post-sentence motion, wherein he argued that the proper PRS was
    three rather than four. At the hearing on Appellant’s motion, the trial court
    indicated that it found merit in the claim, but that it would no longer accept
    the plea agreement with the lower standard range sentences that were
    available using a PRS of three. N.T., 9/7/2016, at 2. Therefore, if Appellant
    pursued his motion, the trial court would vacate the sentence and put the
    case back on the trial list, although Appellant had already testified against
    his co-conspirators and given statements that could be used by the
    1
    Appellant’s counsel agreed at the sentencing hearing that Appellant’s PRS
    was four. N.T., 6/29/2016, at 9.
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    Commonwealth against Appellant. 
    Id. at 2-4.
    Appellant ultimately chose to
    follow counsel’s advice to withdraw the motion to modify sentence. 
    Id. at 5.
    On September 28, 2016, Appellant pro se filed a notice of appeal and
    an application for the appointment of counsel.      The trial court entered an
    order providing that plea counsel’s appearance was thereby withdrawn, and
    appointing   new   counsel   to   represent   Appellant   on   appeal.   Order,
    9/29/2016. After a post-appeal conference, the trial court ordered Appellant
    to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant
    timely complied.
    In this Court, Appellant’s counsel filed both an Anders brief and a
    petition to withdraw as counsel. Accordingly, the following principles guide
    our review of this matter.
    Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders
    must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious
    examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly
    frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth
    issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any
    other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation
    thereof….
    Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders
    petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the
    right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any
    additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.
    If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical
    requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to
    withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions
    (e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an
    advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s
    petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our
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    own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If
    the appeal is frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and
    affirm the judgment of sentence. However, if there are non-
    frivolous issues, we will deny the petition and remand for the
    filing of an advocate’s brief.
    Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 720-21 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified portions of the Anders
    procedure:
    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
    counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
    summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to
    the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel
    believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s
    reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel
    should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case
    law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that
    the appeal is frivolous.
    
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    .
    Based upon our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and
    Anders brief, we conclude that counsel has substantially complied with the
    technical requirements set forth above.2         Therefore, we now have the
    responsibility “‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an
    independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly
    frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1249 (Pa. Super.
    2015) (quoting 
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354
    n. 5).
    2
    Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s motion.
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    In his Anders brief, counsel offers the following issues of arguable
    merit.
    I.     Whether the trial court erred when [it] failed to credit
    Appellant for the time served in incarceration from July 2,
    2014 through January 8, 2015, and for the time served on
    house arrest from January 8, 2015 through February 3,
    2015?
    II.    Whether the trial court erred when [it] sentenced Appellant
    based upon [its] calculation of Appellant’s [PRS] as a four
    (4)?
    III.   Whether the trial court erred when [it] failed to properly
    memorialize the filing and resolution of Appellant’s motion
    addressing Rule 600 issues?
    Anders Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    We first consider whether the trial court failed to award Appellant the
    required credit for time served. The relevant statute provides as follows.
    (1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
    shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a
    result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is
    imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is
    based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior
    to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the
    resolution of an appeal.
    ***
    (4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later
    prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts that
    occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the maximum term
    and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such
    prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody under the
    former charge that has not been credited against another
    sentence.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9760.
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    Here, the trial court’s sentencing order provided that Appellant was
    entitled to credit for 397 days served, including the time between his initial
    arrest on July 2, 2014, and his release to house arrest on January 8, 2015.
    Sentence, 6/29/2016, at 2 (pages unnumbered). Because Appellant in fact
    received credit for the period of incarceration complained of, his assertion
    that the trial court failed to award credit for that time is baseless.3
    The claim that the trial court erred in not awarding Appellant credit for
    the time he spent on house arrest is also without merit. Our Supreme Court
    has held that “time spent subject to electronic monitoring at home is not
    time spent ‘in custody’ for purposes of credit toward a prison sentence.”
    Commonwealth v. Birney, 
    910 A.2d 739
    , 741 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Kyle, 
    874 A.2d 12
    (Pa. 2005)). Accordingly, we agree
    with counsel that the appeal is frivolous as to the credit time issues.
    The next issue identified by counsel is that the trial court erred in
    sentencing Appellant based on a PRS of four rather than three. As discussed
    3
    Appellant’s counsel contends that there was no error in failing to award
    credit for the 191 days served between July 2014 and January 2015 because
    Appellant was not charged with the crimes at issue until October 16, 2015.
    Anders Brief at 8. The Commonwealth argues that Appellant is not entitled
    to credit for that time because he was not arrested on the instant charges
    until October 16, 2015. Commonwealth’s Brief at 2. However, as noted
    above, Appellant was initially arrested on July 2, 2014, in relation to the
    events giving rise to the October 16, 2015 charges. N.T., 6/29/2016, at 11-
    12. Because there were “Rule 600 issues,” the Commonwealth withdrew the
    charges in February 2015 and refiled them on October 16, 2015. 
    Id. at 11.
    Hence, both the Commonwealth and Appellant’s counsel are wrong;
    pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(4), the trial court properly awarded Appellant
    credit for the time served on the initial charges.
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    above, Appellant chose in the trial court to withdraw his post-sentence
    motion raising this issue.     Accordingly, it is not preserved for appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 
    860 A.2d 31
    , 40 (Pa. 2004).                  Because
    claims that have not been preserved are waived, and raising a waived claim
    is frivolous, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s second issue lacks merit.
    Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 
    943 A.2d 285
    , 291 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    The last issue identified by counsel as arguably supporting this appeal
    is that the trial court erred in not making a record of its ruling on Appellant’s
    Rule 600 motion.     Appellant’s counsel, the Commonwealth, and the trial
    court contend that Appellant never filed a Rule 600 motion in this case.
    Anders Brief at 9; Commonwealth’s Brief at 4; Order 10/26/2016 at 1
    (pages unnumbered).        Our review of the record confirms that while
    Appellant filed a Rule 600 motion in the case filed at CP-43-CR-0001013-
    2014, no such motion was filed in the instant action. Because Appellant did
    not raise a Rule 600 claim in the trial court, he waived this issue and raising
    it for the first time on appeal would be frivolous.        Commonwealth v.
    Hankerson, 
    118 A.3d 415
    , 420 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“It is axiomatic that an
    issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
    Based upon the foregoing, we agree with counsel that the issues
    identified as arguably supporting this appeal are frivolous.      Moreover, we
    have conducted “a full examination of the proceedings” and conclude that
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    “the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.”4 
    Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1248
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition
    to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/26/2017
    4
    We have conducted our review mindful of the fact that “upon entry of a
    guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those
    sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what
    has been termed the ‘legality’ of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth
    v. Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    , 1275 (Pa. 2014). Because the incidents took
    place in Mercer County, Appellant did not preserve any claim that his plea
    was invalid by filing a motion to withdraw it, and the sentences are within
    the statutory limits, we discern no viable claims or defenses not addressed
    by Appellant’s counsel in the Anders brief.
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