Com. v. Smith, Q. , 121 A.3d 1049 ( 2015 )

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2015 PA Super 173COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
QUAWI SMITH
Appellant No. 1892 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0406011-2004
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2015
Appellant, Quawi Smith, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:
On March [30], 2006, following a bench trial, [Appellant]
was found guilty of first-degree murder and possession of
an instrument of crime. On May 19, 2006, this court
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On March 27,
2009, the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s] convictions
and sentence. [Appellant] did not file an appeal with the
state Supreme Court. On December 3, 2009, [Appellant]
filed a timely pro-se [PCRA] petition, and later hired
private attorney Brian McMonagle, Esq., who filed an
amended PCRA petition on October 9, 2012.
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1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Subsequently, on January 16, 2014, this court issued a
Notice of Dismissal pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907] to both
[Appellant] and Mr. McMonagle. On June 12, 2014, this
court, following consideration and review, formally
dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without a hearing.
On July 7, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro-se Notice of
Appeal, and later that same week, Craig M. Cooley, Esq.,
was appointed to represent [Appellant] for the appeal of
his PCRA dismissal. Thereafter, Mr. Cooley filed a [Rule]
1925(b) Statement, which is the basis for this opinion.[2]
A brief summation of the facts in this case is as follows: On
October 21, 2002, Jermaine Daniels, the victim, confronted
[Appellant] in front of a Chinese food market at 59th and
Belmar Streets in Philadelphia because [Appellant] had
attempted to rob [the victim] a few days earlier.
[Appellant] and the victim were engaged in a verbal
confrontation when [Appellant] withdrew a firearm and
shot the victim in the forehead. [Appellant] fired two
additional shots as the victim was falling to the
ground―one penetrating his heart and lung. As
[Appellant] fled, he fired his gun back towards the crowd
that quickly gathered. No one else was injured, but the
victim died at the scene.
(PCRA Court Opinion, filed January 15, 2015, at 1-2) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
[APPELLANT] HAS A STATE AND/OR FEDERAL RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING HIS
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2
The court ordered a Rule 1925(b) statement on July 28, 2014, but sent the
notice to Mr. McMonagle, who had already withdrawn from the case on July
15, 2014. New counsel claimed he did not receive notice of the Rule
1925(b) order until August 14, 2014. The next day, new counsel filed a
petition for an extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, to which
the court did not respond. New counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on
behalf of Appellant on October 15, 2014. The court’s opinion responds to
that statement.
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INITIAL-REVIEW POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS. …
THE PCRA COURT VIOLATED [APPELLANT’S] DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS BY FINDING THAT [APPELLANT] WAIVED HIS
PCRA INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
PRESENT THEM TO THE PCRA COURT TWENTY DAYS
AFTER THE PCRA COURT ISSUED ITS 907 NOTICE. …
(Appellant’s Brief at i-ii).3
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s
determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied,
612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the
findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those
findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). “[A] petitioner is not entitled to a
PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a
hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the
petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Taylor,
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3
Appellant failed to include in his brief a separate statement of questions
involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116. Nevertheless, Appellant presents two issues
for review in the table of contents, followed by discussion of those issues
with citation to pertinent authorities in a separate argument section of the
brief. Consequently, our review is unimpeded. See Commonwealth v.
Carr, 543 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa.Super. 1988) (stating minor defects in brief
do not impair appellate court’s ability to exercise meaningful review).
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933 A.2d 1035, 1040 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 715, 951
A.2d 1163 (2008); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). “A reviewing court on appeal must
examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record
in order to determine whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there
were no genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an
evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468
(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 685, 934 A.2d 72 (2007).
Appellant asserts he had a constitutional right to effective trial and
appellate counsel. Appellant avers he needed an effective initial-review
PCRA attorney to develop fully and meaningfully present his trial and
appellate counsel ineffectiveness claims, which is a federal due process right.
Appellant maintains he had a state-created liberty interest in obtaining relief
when he filed his pro-se PCRA petition based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the Commonwealth had to afford him reasonable procedures to
vindicate his liberty interest in obtaining relief based on trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness. Appellant asserts he had a federal due process right to an
effective PCRA attorney to uphold this state-created liberty interest.
Appellant also contends his rule-based right to effective initial review
PCRA counsel qualifies as a state-created liberty interest under federal due
process principles. Appellant insists the PCRA court’s Rule 907 Notice and
twenty-day response period were fundamentally inadequate because the
notice did not inform Appellant of: (1) his right to effective PCRA counsel;
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(2) his right to challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness, which must be
brought within the response period; and (3) that a failure to file timely PCRA
counsel ineffectiveness claims results in waiver of those claims. Appellant
submits the absence of these principles in the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice
violated his due process rights and rendered his waiver of claims
unintelligent and unknowing because an indigent prisoner cannot waive his
PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims based on the bare information provided
in the court’s Rule 907 notice. Appellant concludes that this Court must
remand his case to the PCRA court with instructions to review and adjudicate
Appellant’s claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness which Appellant raised
for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement. We disagree.
As a prefatory matter, we observe that due process requires the post-
conviction process to be fundamentally fair, even though procedural due
process protections for PCRA proceedings are less stringent than they are for
a trial or direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930
A.2d 1264 (2007). “Thus, petitioners must be given the opportunity for the
presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Id. at 398, 930 A.2d at 1273.
Pennsylvania law makes clear:
While a PCRA petitioner does not have a Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel during collateral review, this
Commonwealth, by way of procedural rule, provides for
the appointment of counsel during a [petitioner’s] first
petition for post conviction relief. Pursuant to our
procedural rule, not only does a PCRA petitioner have the
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“right” to counsel, but also he has the “right” to effective
assistance of counsel. The guidance and representation of
an attorney during collateral review should assure that
meritorious legal issues are recognized and addressed, and
that meritless claims are foregone.
Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289, 307-08, 809 A.2d 271, 282-83
(2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 918, 123 S.Ct. 2277, 156 L.Ed.2d 136 (2003)
(internal citations and most quotations marks omitted). The rule-based right
to counsel and to effective assistance of counsel extends throughout the
post-conviction proceedings, including any appeal from the disposition of the
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Quail, 729 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa.Super.
1999); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(E). “[O]nce counsel has entered an appearance on
a [petitioner’s] behalf he is obligated to continue representation until the
case is concluded or he is granted leave by the court to withdraw his
appearance.” Id.Rule 907 controls the disposition of a PCRA petition without a hearing
and states in relevant part:
Rule 907. Disposition Without Hearing
Except as provided in Rule 909 for death penalty cases,
(1) the judge shall promptly review the petition, any
answer by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other
matters of record relating to the defendant’s claim(s). If
the judge is satisfied from this review that there are no
genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the
defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief,
and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings, the judge shall give notice to the parties of
the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the
notice the reasons for the dismissal. The defendant may
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respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the
date of the notice. The judge thereafter shall order the
petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended petition,
or direct that the proceedings continue.
* * *
(4) When the petition is dismissed without a hearing, the
judge promptly shall issue an order to that effect and shall
advise the defendant by certified mail, return receipt
requested, of the right to appeal from the final order
disposing of the petition and of the time limits within which
the appeal must be filed. The order shall be filed and
served as provided in Rule 114.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), (4). The purpose of a Rule 907 pre-dismissal notice is
“to allow a petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition and
correct any material defects, the ultimate goal being to permit merits review
by the PCRA court of potentially arguable claims.” Commonwealth v.
Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 714,
64 A.3d 631 (2013). The response to the Rule 907 notice “is an opportunity
for a petitioner and/or his counsel to object to the dismissal and alert the
PCRA court of a perceived error, permitting the court to discern the potential
for amendment.” Id. The response is also the opportunity for the petitioner
to object to counsel’s effectiveness at the PCRA level. Id. When a PCRA
court properly issues Rule 907 notice in compliance with the rules of criminal
procedure, an appellant is deemed to have sufficient notice of dismissal.
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 612 Pa. 698, 30 A.3d 487 (2011).
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“[A]bsent recognition of a constitutional right to effective collateral
review counsel, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for
the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying
PCRA matter.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1201 (Pa.Super.
2012). A petitioner’s failure to raise an ineffectiveness of counsel claim after
receiving Rule 907 notice results in waiver of the claim. Commonwealth v.
Pitts, 603 Pa. 1, 9 n.4, 981 A.2d 875, 880 n.4 (2009). See also
Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa.Super. 2014) (waiving
Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness of derivative PCRA counsel for failure to
assert it in response to Rule 907 notice); Ousley, supra at 1245 (stating
Pitts prohibits this Court’s review of petitioner’s ineffectiveness of PCRA
counsel claim, where issue was raised for first time in PCRA appeal). With
respect to the petitioner’s duties, PCRA claims are more civil than criminal in
nature, which places the burden of moving the case forward on the party in
the plaintiff’s position, who in this context is the PCRA petitioner.
Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 616 Pa. 608, 620, 52 A.3d 251, 258
(2012). The petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving claims on
their merits, and demonstrating timeliness of a petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9543(a), 9545(b).
In the instant case, Appellant filed a timely pro-se PCRA petition and
hired a private attorney, who filed an amended PCRA petition on October 9,
2012. Subsequently, on January 16, 2014, the PCRA court issued Rule 907
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notice to both Appellant and his privately-retained counsel. The Rule 907
notice indicated the court intended to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The court also informed Appellant and his counsel that they had twenty days
to respond to the notice. No response was filed.
Almost five months later, on June 12, 2014, the PCRA court formally
dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro-
se notice of appeal on July 7, 2014. The PCRA court appointed new counsel
on July 11, 2014, to represent Appellant for the appeal of his PCRA
dismissal; and Appellant’s privately-retained counsel withdrew from the case
on July 15, 2014. The court ordered Appellant on July 28, 2014, to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
but sent the notice of the order to privately-retained counsel who had
already withdrawn. Newly appointed counsel claimed he did not receive
notice of the Rule 1925(b) order until August 14, 2014. The next day, new
counsel filed a petition for an extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b)
statement, to which the court did not respond. New counsel filed a Rule
1925(b) statement on behalf of Appellant on October 15, 2014.
Initially, we conclude the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice was adequate
where the court advised the parties of its reasons for dismissal and
informing them of the twenty-day time limit to file a response to the notice.
Here, the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice indicated the reason for dismissal
was Appellant’s issues lacked merit and alerted Appellant to the twenty-day
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response period. The court sent the Rule 907 notice to Appellant,
Appellant’s counsel, and the District Attorney’s Office. The rule does not
impose on the court any duty to explain to Appellant how to proceed or
respond to the notice.
Appellant had an affirmative duty to preserve his claims. If Appellant
wanted to assert claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, he should
have consulted counsel and/or the court to learn the correct procedure.
Instead, Appellant did nothing in the almost five months between the court’s
Rule 907 notice and dismissal of the petition. Thus, Appellant’s substantive
issues concerning PCRA counsel’s assistance are waived, because Appellant
failed to respond to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice at any time before the
court dismissed his petition. See Rykard, supra; Ousley, supra;Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Once Appellant filed a notice of appeal, he waived his
right to complain about PCRA counsel’s stewardship, because Appellant was
unable to raise those claims for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement.
Moreover, throughout the PCRA proceedings Appellant, as petitioner,
bore the burden to plead and prove his claims. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9543(a), 9545(b); Renchenski, supra (reiterating that petitioner has duty
to meet provisions of PCRA). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bardo, ___
Pa. ___, 105 A.3d 678 (2014) (explaining counsel is presumed effective and
petitioner bears burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel);
Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 1, 981 A.2d 875 (2009) (noting
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petitioner must satisfy rigorous burden to warrant evidentiary hearing for
claims); Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 204, 961 A.2d 80 (2008), cert.
denied, 558 U.S. 1082, 130 S.Ct. 810, 175 L.Ed.2d 569 (2009) (stating
petitioner bears burden to demonstrate his issues have not been previously
litigated or waived). Compare Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103,
971 A.2d 1125 (2009) (plurality) (stating where PCRA petitioner in capital
case had evidentiary hearing on his PCRA claims, and Rule 907 notice was
not implicated, petitioner could raise ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel
claims for first time on appeal from denial of PCRA relief). Given Appellant’s
affirmative duties to preserve his claims of PCRA counsel’s service, in the
context of Rule 907 notice, Appellant cannot shift the burden to the court to
instruct Appellant how to do so.
Notwithstanding Appellant’s rule-based right to effective assistance of
PCRA counsel, we further observe that the PCRA is a creature of legislative
bounty, bearing no “constitutional” Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel during collateral review. See Haag, supra. Neither
the Commonwealth nor the court had any duty to instruct Appellant on how
to preserve his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including PCRA
counsel. In the framework of Rule 907 notice, the law makes clear Appellant
had to preserve his claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in a response to
the notice. See Pitts, supra; Rykard, supra. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement could not be used as the vehicle to raise his issues for the first
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time. Furthermore, although the certified docket entries indicate new
counsel filed another PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf, no court could
consider the second PCRA petition (that he filed while the current first
petition was pending on appeal) as a resource for preservation of his claims.
See Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585 (2000) (holding
court has no jurisdiction to review second PCRA petition, filed while appeal
from first PCRA petition is still pending).
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that in the context of Rule 907
notice, Appellant as PCRA petitioner had the duty to raise any claims of
ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in a response to the notice. Once the
PCRA court finally adjudicated Appellant’s petition, any claims not properly
preserved in a response to the Rule 907 notice were waived and could not
be raised for the first time in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement or in a
second PCRA petition filed while the first PCRA petition was still pending on
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judge Panella joins this opinion.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2015
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