Discover Bank v. Robertson, A. ( 2017 )

J-A13023-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DISCOVER BANK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANGELIQUE ROBERTSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 3600 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Civil Division at No(s): 8343 CV 2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J. and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 09, 2017
Angelique Robertson appeals, pro se, from the order entered on
December 22, 2015, denying her petition to vacate an arbitration award.1
The appellee in this matter, Discover Bank, was awarded a judgment in the
amount of $13,445.90 against Robertson. In this appeal, Robertson appears
to raise a myriad of claims, including trial court error for switching the name
on the filed documents and certain Federal Arbitration Act2 violations. Based
on the following, we quash this appeal.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
As of the date of this memorandum, Discover Bank has not filed a
responsive appellee brief in this matter.
2
9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
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The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history as follows:
On October 7, 2014, Appellee Discover Bank [“Discover
Bank”] filed a Complaint against “Angelique Roberston,” alleging
she failed to make monthly payments pursuant to a credit card
through [Discover Bank]. In the Complaint, [Discover Bank]
demanded judgment in [it]’s favor, and prayed for over
$13,000.00 in damages. The Complaint was accompanied by an
Account Summary for the card in question, which named
“Angelique Roberston” as the account holder.1
___________________
1
The Complaint and Account Summary lists the address
for “Angelique Roberston” as 19 Rollingwood Trail,
Saylorsburg, PA 18353. This is the same address used by
[Robertson] on each document filed with this Court, and
the address where each of this Court’s Orders have been
sent.
___________________
The Complaint was personally served upon an “Angelique
Roberston” by the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office on October 17,
2014. Thereafter, an Answer was filed by [Robertson] on
October 20, 2014. After denying she had knowledge of each of
the Complaint’s averments, [Robertson]’s Answer made four
affirmative defenses. Chief among these affirmative defenses
was [Robertson]’s argument that she was not the party named
in the lawsuit, as her name was Angelique Robertson, not
“Angelique Roberston.” In response to [Robertson]’s Answer,
[Discover Bank] filed a Reply to New Matter on January 22,
2015. This pleading, however, changed the caption to list
“Angelique Robertson” as the named Defendant. The Reply to
New Matter denied each of [Robertson]’s affirmative defenses.
On March 2, 2015, [Discover Bank] filed a Praecipe for
Arbitration in this matter, listing [Robertson] as the named
Defendant.2 The arbitration hearing was conducted on April 20,
2015, where no party was present for [Robertson]. The
arbitration panel entered judgment in [Discover Bank]’s favor
and against [Robertson] for the full amount sought in [Discover
Bank]’s Complaint.
___________________
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2
This Praecipe listed [Robertson]’s address as the same
address as “Angelique Roberston” in the Complaint. It
further certified a copy had been delivered to [Robertson]
at that address.
___________________
On April 29, 2015, [Robertson] filed a Petition to Vacate
the Arbitration Award and Dismiss the Case without Prejudice.
This Court issued a Rule Returnable upon [Discover Bank]
regarding this Petition. The caption on the Rule Returnable
listed “Angelique Roberston” as the named Defendant, and was
served upon [Robertson] at the Rollingwood Trail address.
[Discover Bank] filed its Reponse to the Rule Returnable on May
20, 2015, denying the averments in [Robertson]’s Petition.
[Discover Bank] then filed a Praecipe for Argument on
[Robertson]’s Petition on October 19, 2015. Argument was held
on December 7, 2015; no party was present for argument on
behalf of [Robertson], and no brief in support of [Robertson]’s
Petition was filed with the Court. Thereafter, this Court issued
an Order on December 22, 2015, denying [Robertson]’s Petition
(“December 22, 2015 Order”).
[Robertson] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court
on January 12, 2016. On January 28, 2016, the Monroe County
Prothonotary notified [Discover Bank] that its request to enter
judgment in this matter was returned, due to [Robertson]’s
appeal. This Court issued an Order on February 1, 2016,
directing [Robertson] to file a Concise Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal within 21 days as required by Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) (“1925(b) Statement”), which [Robertson] filed on
February 11, 2016. However, the Superior Court issued an
Order on February 4, 2016, stating that because there was no
judgment entered in this matter, [Robertson] was ordered to
praecipe this Court to enter judgment. [Robertson] was further
directed to file a certified copy of this Court’s docket, reflecting
entry of judgment, within ten days of the Order. The Superior
Court’s Order listed “Angelique Roberston” as the named
Defendant. See Discover Bank v. Angelique Roberston, 240 EDA
2016 (Pa. Super. Feb. 4, 2016) (per curiam) (“February 2, 2016
Order”).
Thereafter, neither this Court nor the Superior Court’s
dockets reflect any activity on the case until February 26, 2016.
On that date, the Superior Court issued an Order, quashing
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[Discover Bank]’s appeal, sua sponte, for failure to comply with
the February 4, 2016 Order. Like its prior Order, the Superior
Court’s February 26, 2016 Order listed the named Defendant as
“Angelique Roberston.”3 See Discover Bank v. Angelique
Roberston, 240 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Feb. 26, 2016) (per
curiam) (“February 26, 2016 Order”). The February 26, 2016
Order, quashing [Robertson]’s appeal, was made part of this
Court’s record by the Monroe County Prothonotary on April 8,
2016.
___________________
3
However, the Order referred to the February 4, 2016
Order by naming [Robertson] as the named Defendant.
___________________
The next activity in this case occurred on October 21,
2016, when [Discover Bank] filed a Praecipe for Judgment on
Award of Arbitrators. On November 2, 2016, [Robertson] filed
the instant Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court, once again
appealing our December 22, 2015 Order. [Robertson] filed [her]
1925(b) Statement in conjunction with the second Notice of
Appeal. Both the Notice of Appeal and 1925(b) Statement are
identical to those filed in [her] first appeal.
On appeal, [Robertson] raises six statements of error,
which distill into four central arguments. [Robertson] argues 1)
she is not the party named in this action; 2) the arbitration panel
failed to follow the “flow of information” and therefore violated
both federal and Pennsylvania law; 3) her failure to file a brief in
support of her Petition to Vacate was “non-prejudicial;” and 4)
[Discover Bank] did not timely file an “Entry of Order” regarding
our December 22, 2015 [order].
Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/2016, at 1-4 (emphasis added).
Initially, we note:
While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a
pro se litigant, … [a petitioner] is not entitled to any particular
advantage because she lacks legal training. As our supreme
court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent
[herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent,
assume the risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training
will prove [her] undoing.
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Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation
omitted). Although we will not quash Robertson’s appeal on this basis, it
merits mention that her brief is disjointed, rambling, and lacking at various
points.3
We will first address the issue of whether Robertson was properly
attached to this matter. As indicated in the factual history, with respect to
several documents filed in this matter, the “s” and the “t” were transposed
in Robertson’s surname. Based on this typographical error, Robertson has
continuously maintained that Discover Bank failed to name the correct party
to the action.
Pursuant to Rule 1033 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, “[a] party, either by filed consent of the adverse
party or by leave of court, may at any time change the form of
action, correct the name of a party or amend his pleading. The
amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which
have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading,
even though they give rise to a new cause of action or
defense....” Pa.R.C.P. 1033.
[Rule 1033] has repeatedly been interpreted as requiring
the liberal evaluation of amendment requests ..., in an
effort to secure a determination of cases based upon their
merits, ... rather than based upon a mere technicality....
Despite this liberal amendment policy, Pennsylvania
appellate courts have repeatedly ruled that an amendment
will not be permitted where it is against a positive rule of
____________________________________________
3
For example, Robertson does not list any statement of questions involved,
see Pa.R.A.P. 2116, and her argument section is not “divided into as many
parts as there are questions to be argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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law, or where the amendment will surprise or prejudice the
opposing party.
...
[T]he prejudice inquiry is limited to an evaluation of
whether undue prejudice exists.
Horowitz v. Universal Underwriters Ins., 397 Pa. Super.
473, 580 A.2d 395, 398-99 (Pa. Super. 1990).
In addition, “[t]he [R]ules [of Civil Procedure] shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding to which they are
applicable.” Pa.R.C.P. 126. “The court at every stage of any
such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of
procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.” Id.
Discover Bank v. Stucka, 33 A.3d 82, 88 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Here, the trial court found the following:
It appears from our review of the record that [Discover
Bank] made a typographical error when inputting the name on
the account in question. Indeed, the only difference between
“Angelique Roberston” and [Robertson]’s name is the
transposition of two letters in the surname. This typographical
error was then transferred to the Complaint’s caption when
[Discover Bank] filed [it] on October 7, 2014. When
[Robertson]’s Answer raised the argument that she was not the
named Defendant in the Complaint, [Discover Bank]’s
subsequent filings were changed so as to reflect [Robertson] as
the named Defendant. It appears, therefore, that [Robertson]
and the “Angelique Roberston” named in the Complaint are one
and the same, and that [Discover Bank]’s typographical error on
the account in question led to the Complaint’s caption containing
the same typographical error. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that [Robertson]’s address is the same as “Angelique
Roberston” in the Complaint and Account Summary. Further,
[Robertson] herself filed an Answer, a Petition to Vacate the
Arbitration Award and Dismiss the Case without Prejudice, two
Notices of Appeal, and two 1925(b) Statements, each using the
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same address listed for “Angelique Roberston” in the Complaint
and Account Summary.
Although [Discover Bank] did not request leave of Court to
amend the pleadings, and surely [Robertson] does not consent
to such an amendment, this Court itself changed the caption of
the case in its Orders following the December 7, 2015
argument.4 The amendment to the caption did not add a new
party, but rather corrected an error.
___________________
4
Similarly, this 1925(a) Statement lists [Robertson] as
the named Defendant.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/2016, at 7.
We agree with the trial court’s finding that Robertson is the properly
attached party to this matter. One can readily infer that when Discover
Bank changed the name to the correct spelling of Robertson in the
subsequent filings, it was requesting the opportunity to correct the name
pursuant to Rule 1033. Additionally, the trial court accepted this request in
its subsequent documents. Furthermore, this was a simple typographical
error and the record demonstrates that Robertson and “Roberston” are the
same person. Based on the liberal construction of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing this correction.
Next, we turn to whether we have jurisdiction to review this matter.
As indicated above, Robertson’s substantive claims stem from the December
22, 2015, order denying her petition to vacate the arbitration award.
We note:
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The Superior Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas,
regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount
involved, except such classes of appeals as are by any provision
of this chapter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or the Commonwealth Court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 742.
We are guided by the decision in Lyons v. Port Auth. of Allegheny
Cty., 475 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 1984). In Lyons, pursuant to a pretrial
agreement, the matter between the parties was transferred to the Board of
Arbitrations, which found in favor of the Port Authority. The appellant did
not file an appeal with the court of common pleas. Rather, the appellant
praeciped for judgment on the award and then filed an appeal to this Court.
The Port Authority responded that this Court lacked jurisdiction. The panel
agreed, holding:
We do not believe the instant appeal is from a final order of a
court of common pleas. This case was submitted to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Section 7361 of the Judicial Code, 2
Pa.C.S.A. § 7361 provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 7361. Compulsory arbitration.
(a) General rule. -- Except as provided in subsection (b),
when prescribed by general rule or rule of court such civil
matters or issues therein as shall be specified by rule shall
first be submitted to and heard by a board of three
members of the bar of the court.
...
(c) Procedure. -- The arbitrators appointed pursuant to
this section shall have such powers and shall proceed in
such manner as shall be prescribed by general rules.
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(d) Appeal for trial de novo. -- Any party to a matter shall
have the right to appeal for trial de novo in the court. The
party who takes the appeal shall pay such amount or
proportion of fees and costs and shall comply with such
other procedures as shall be prescribed by general rules.
In the absence of appeal the judgment entered on the
award of the arbitrators shall be enforced as any other
judgment of the court. For the purposes of this section
and section 5571 (relating to appeals generally) an award
of arbitrators constitutes an order of a tribunal. (emphasis
added).
Thus, it is clear that an award of arbitrators under this section
constitutes not an order of the common pleas court, but an order
of a tribunal.3 As provided by Section 7361, the sole avenue of
appeal from this order is to the court of common pleas for a trial
de novo. Since the order appealed from is an order of a tribunal
of arbitrators and not of a court of common pleas, we lack
jurisdiction and, accordingly, the appeal must be quashed.4
___________________
3
We do not read the next to the last sentence of §
7361(d) to indicate otherwise. While judgment on the
award of the arbitrators may be enforced as a judgment of
the court, the fact remains that the order on which the
judgment is entered is not an order of the court of
common pleas.
4
We recognize that Pa.R.A.P. 751 governs the transfer of
erroneously filed cases and provides that if an appeal is
brought in a court which does not have jurisdiction of the
appeal that court is not to quash the appeal, but to
transfer the record thereof to the proper court of this
Commonwealth. However, “[i]n appropriate
circumstances, a court may refuse, in the interest of
judicial economy to transfer a matter where that court
determines that under no circumstances could the
transferee tribunal grant the requested relief.” Smock v.
Commonwealth, 496 Pa. 204, 208-9, 436 A.2d 615, 617-
18 (1981).
Rule 751 provides that where an appeal is transferred it
“shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee court
on the date first filed . . .” in the court lacking jurisdiction.
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Instantly, that would mean that if we transferred an appeal
to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, it would
be treated as if it had been filed there on August 6, 1982.
However, appellant had only thirty days from the date the
award of the arbitrators was entered on the docket (June
8, 1982) to appeal to the court of common pleas. See
Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 281 Pa.Super. 193, 421 A.2d
1214 (1980); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5571; Pa.R.C.P. 1307.
Thus, an appeal filed on August 6, 1982 to the court of
common pleas would be untimely and that court would
lack jurisdiction to grant relief. Under these circumstances
we believe the proper course of action is to quash this
appeal.
Lyons v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 475 A.2d 151, 152-53 (Pa. Super.
1984).
We find that Lyons is substantially similar to the present matter and
therefore, we are guided by its determination. Turning to the facts sub
judice, we conclude that the December 22, 2015, order, from which
Robertson appeals, is not a final order of the court of common pleas. The
suit was submitted to a compulsory arbitration.4 Therefore, as indicated in
____________________________________________
4
We note this is evidenced by Discover Bank’s response to Robertson’s
petition to vacate the arbitration award:
[T]he arbitration related to this matter was conducted pursuant
to the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically as they relate to the
conduct of arbitration, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1301, et seq. Under these
rules, if [Robertson] is not satisfied with the outcome of the
arbitration, an appeal is the appropriate remedy, not a motion to
vacate. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1308.
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment on Arbitration
Award, 5/20/2015, at ¶4. Moreover, Rule 1301 states: “These rules apply
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Section 7361, Robertson should have sought relief from the December 22,
2015, order by appealing for a trial de novo with the Monroe County Court of
Common Pleas. Accordingly, because the appeal is from “an order of a
tribunal of arbitrators and not of a court of common pleas,” we lack
jurisdiction to review the underlying matter. See Lyons, 475 A.2d at 153.5
Therefore, we are compelled to quash this appeal.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/9/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
to actions which are submitted to compulsory arbitration pursuant to local
rule under Section 7361 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361.” Pa.R.C.P.
1301.
5
Moreover, as discussed in footnote four of Lyons, supra, even if this
matter was transferred to the court of common pleas, so that Robertson
could request a trial de novo, that court would also lack jurisdiction because
the 30-day period for filing an appeal from the arbitration’s decision expired
on May 20, 2015. See Pa.R.C.P. 1308. Therefore, this appeal, filed on
November 2, 2016, would be untimely.
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