Com. v. Predmore, S. ( 2018 )

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2018 PA Super 313COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
STEPHEN PREDMORE
Appellee No. 238 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered December 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0000062-2016
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J.,
LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and
MCLAUGHLIN, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 27, 2018
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the trial
court’s order granting the pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus of
Appellee/defendant, Stephen Predmore, on the charge of attempt to commit
criminal homicide. 1 The trial court found the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient prima facie evidence that Appellee had a specific intent to kill the
victim, Alexander Marsicano. The Majority agrees, but does so by failing to
view the Commonwealth’s prima facie evidence in the best light to which it is
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1 “Criminal Homicide” is classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or
involuntary manslaughter. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(b). Murder in turn is
classified as murder either in the first, second, or third degree. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2502(a)–(c). The crime charged in this case is attempt to commit first
degree murder. The Majority correctly observes that the crime of attempted
second or third degree murder does not exist. See Commonwealth v.
Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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entitled and by impermissibly weighing the prima facie evidence as if it were
a jury deciding this case.
The Majority appropriately recognizes that our standard of review of a
decision to grant a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to examine
the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, and that as a question of law, this Court’s
review is plenary. Majority Opinion at p.3-4, citing Commonwealth v.
Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111-12 (Pa. Super. 2016). In the pretrial setting,
the focus of a habeas corpus hearing is to determine whether sufficient
evidence exists to hold a defendant in government custody until he may be
brought to trial. Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 676 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super.
1996), citing Commonwealth v. Owen, 580 A.2d 412, 413 (Pa. Super.
1990). The habeas corpus petition is similar in purpose to a preliminary
hearing. Id. In making a pretrial determination, a court is not limited to
reviewing the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing. Id. The
Commonwealth also may present additional evidence at the habeas corpus
stage in an attempt to establish a prima facie case that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is the person who committed the crime. Id.A pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the procedure for testing
whether the Commonwealth has furnished prima facie evidence against the
defendant at his preliminary hearing. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 936 A.2d
1148, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 947 A.2d 735 (Pa. 2008).
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The prima facie hurdle is less demanding than the Commonwealth’s
burden at trial of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth
v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). A prima facie case exists when
the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the
crime charged and establishes sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief
that the accused committed the offense. Id. The evidence need only be such
that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, a judge would be warranted in
permitting the case to go to a jury. Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 172 A.3d
5, 10 (Pa. Super. 2017). Further, as stated, “the evidence must be considered
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth so that inferences that would
support a guilty verdict are given effect.” Id. “The weight and credibility of
the evidence is not a factor at this stage.” Id.Here, at the habeas hearing, the Commonwealth presented testimony
from the investigating State Police trooper in addition to admitting into
evidence the transcript from the preliminary hearing. Therefore, to comply
with our appropriate standard of review, I initially shall set forth the prima
facie evidence, before considering the legal question raised, viewing it in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Marsicano, the victim, was the first witness called by the Commonwealth
at the preliminary hearing held on January 8, 2016. He testified that
Cheyenne Eberhart was his ex-girlfriend as of December 12, 2015, the date
of the incident in question. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 1/8/16, at 5. He was
on his way home and driving past her residence. Id. at 5-6. He stopped in
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the parking lot by Eberhart’s apartment next to a truck owned by Appellee
with whom he used to be friends. Id. at 6–7. He got out of his vehicle and
at some point Appellee appeared. Appellee walked to his truck and got into
an argument with Marsicano that then escalated into a fight. Id. at 7. Before
fighting, Marsicano said to Appellee that it was “messed up how he was talking
to [Eberhart] behind my back.” Id. at 8. At that point, the argument ensued
and Appellee shoved Marsicano, who then shoved him back before the two
broke out into a fight. Id. They were both shoving and punching each other
in the face and chest. Id. at 9. Eberhart came out of her apartment and tried
to break up the fight by getting between the two of them and pushing them
away. Id. at 9-10. At that point, Marsicano backed up. Appellee went to his
truck. Id. at 10. Marsicano was about a foot away from the truck, but about
3 or 4 feet away from Appellee. Id. at 11. Appellee opened the door to his
vehicle, opened the glove box, put a clip into a pistol, cocked it, and then
pointed it at Marsicano. Id. at 11. Marsicano testified he was approximately
2½ to 3 feet away at the time Appellee pointed the gun at him and let off 3
shots. Id. at 12-13. When the first shot was fired Marsicano had his back to
Appellee and was in the process of running away when Appellee let off two
more shots. Id. at 12-13. He attempted to turn and run away when he first
saw the firearm. Id. at 13. He was hit in the back of both calves. Id. at 13.
Upon cross-examination, Marsicano reiterated that he dated Eberhart
for about six months and that their relationship ended a couple months before
the incident in question. Id. at 17. Eberhart lived right off the Route 115 on
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Valley Road. Id. He could see her house from Route 115. Id. He left Route
115 in order to go by Eberhart’s home. Id. He did so at approximately 12:45
a.m. Id. He went to Eberhart’s home because he saw Appellee’s truck in the
parking lot of her apartment complex. Id. He found this problematic because
Appellee was always trying to talk to Eberhart behind his back when they were
together. Id. at 18–19. He got out of his vehicle in the parking lot to verify
if what he saw was Appellee’s vehicle. Id. at 20. He was going to go back to
his car and proceed home when Appellee came outside. Id. It was at that
point Appellee approached him and started having a conversation with him.
Id. at 20-21. They then wound up fighting and Eberhart came out of the
apartment to break up the fight. Id. at 21. She pushed them apart. Id. He
did not know at the time why Appellee went to his truck, but he heard a gun
being loaded and cocked and watched it being pointed at him. Id. at 22.
Appellee turned towards Marsicano and Marsicano then went to run before
Appellee let off three shots. Id. He claimed that Appellee did not say anything
to him; he just shot. Id. at 22, 24. He had his back to Appellee when he was
shot while running. Id. at 22-23. When Marsicano saw the gun being pointed
at him it was pointing at his chest to face level. Id. at 24. It was at that point
he turned and started running and was shot while his back was to Appellee.
Id. at 24. Marsicano admitted that he did have past altercations with Appellee
and engaged in arguments and fights that involved Eberhart when Marcicano
was dating her. Id. at 27. Specifically, he and Appellee argued over Appellee
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trying to talk to Eberhart when Marsicano was dating her. Id. at 27. This
occurred approximately two months before they broke up. Id.
Eberhart testified next on behalf of the Commonwealth. She testified
that on December 12, 2015, she was at her apartment with Appellee watching
a movie. Id. at 29. Appellee left her residence to go outside after she received
a phone call from a blocked ID put in place after previous harassment from
Marsicano. Id. at 29-30. She watched Appellee walk to the end of a sidewalk,
make a right to the parking lot, and immediately heard fighting. Id. at 30.
At that point, she could not see what was taking place, but ran to the side of
the building and witnessed Marsicano and Appellee fighting. Id. at 30–31.
She attempted to break up the fight by stepping between them when they
were arguing as she was yelling at them. Id. at 31. She did not see Appellee
go to his truck or anything in his hands. Id. at 32. After she broke the men
apart the first time, they again began to argue, leading to a second fight. Id.
at 32. She testified that the fighting did not break then because a gun was
visible to her at which time she saw Marsicano grab Appellee’s arms telling
him to shoot him while the gun was flailing in the air. Id. The last thing she
saw was Marsicano grabbing Appellee’s arms and Appellee stating to
Marsicano “the gun is loaded, you idiot.” Id. at 32 – 33. She then heard the
gun go off and observed Marsicano facing Appellee from approximately 5 feet
away. Id. at 33. The men were not touching each other. Id. She testified
the first shot she saw was aimed at the pavement. Id. While she heard a
second shot, she never saw it. Id. Appellee then got into his vehicle to leave
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while Marsicano was still standing before Marsicano then laid down on the
ground and started vomiting. Id. at 33–34.
Upon cross-examination, Eberhart again testified that she and Appellee
were watching a movie at her residence and that she previously had a
relationship with Marsicano for about four months that ended about mid-
October before the December incident. Id. at 35 – 36. Marsicano had been
in constant contact, harassing her from mid-October to December 12, 2015.
Id. at 36. Consequently, she blocked him on all social media and had his
phone number blocked. Id. Nonetheless, Marsicano continued to use text
apps on his phone to contact her daily and to harass her every day that
eventually caused her to secure a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order against
him. Id. at 36–37. When the initial fight broke up, both Marsicano and
Appellee took a step back from each other and continued arguing verbally.
Id. at 38. Less than a minute lapsed before the second round of fighting
began. Id. She disagreed with Marsicano’s testimony that there was only
one round of fighting before he stepped back after she broke it up. Id. She
also disagreed with Marsicano’s testimony that after he first saw the gun he
turned and began to run away. Id. She never saw Marsicano turn to run
away, testifying that when the second round of fighting began Marsicano
grabbed Appellee’s arms telling him to shoot him. Id. at 39. She did not
observe Appellee threaten Marsicano after he retrieved his gun. Id. Rather,
Marsicano grabbed Appellee’s arms while the gun was flailing in the air when
Appellee stated to Marsicano, “the gun’s loaded, you fucking idiot.” Id. at 40.
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She was fearful of Marsicano because he was grabbing Appellee’s arms. Id.
Eberhart testified that Marsicano was telling Appellee to shoot him, saying “I
dare you, motherfucker.” Id. She stated that Marsicano appeared to be
intoxicated when he appeared at her home and engaged in the fight with
Appellee. Id. at 41–42.
Upon redirect, Eberhart confirmed again that, when she heard the first
shot, Marsicano was approximately five feet away from Appellee and there
was no physical contact at that point. Id. at 44. Upon re-cross, she testified
again that the first shot went into the ground. Id.
The final witness to testify at the preliminary hearing was Pennsylvania
State Police Trooper Jeffrey Kowalski, who responded to the December 12,
2015 incident. Id. at 46. He testified that Appellee indicated he was acting
in self-defense in order to stop the beating. Id. at 50. In his affidavit of
probable cause, Trooper Kowalski stated that the argument turned physical,
and that upon breaking away from one another, Appellee went to his truck,
opened the passenger door, obtained a Ruger model SR 9C9-millimeter pistol,
pointed the gun in the direction of Marsicano, and discharged three rounds.
Id. at 51–52. At the conclusion of Trooper Kowalski’s testimony, the
magistrate bound the charges over for court.
Appellee again filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the trial
court. A hearing was held on June 20, 2016. At that time, the Commonwealth
submitted the transcript from the preliminary hearing as an exhibit. N.T.
Hearing, 6/20/16, at 3. The Commonwealth again called Trooper Kowalski to
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testify. He again testified that he responded to a shooting at Eberhart’s
residence and that he had an opportunity to speak with Appellee. Id. at 6.
Appellee advised the trooper what happened that evening and provided a
verbal and written statement. Id. at 7. Appellee admitted that he retrieved
a firearm from his truck that was located in the parking lot of Eberhart’s
apartment building. Id. He obtained it from the center console. Id. Appellee
did not have a permit to conceal the weapon. Id. On cross-examination, the
Trooper indicated he spoke to four individuals on the evening of the incident,
but none were ever asked if there was a specific intent to kill Marsicano that
evening. Id. at 11. Instead, individuals provided statements indicating that
the gun was fired in the direction of Marsicano by Appellee. Id. The Trooper
confirmed that Appellee indicated he was at Eberhart’s residence on the
evening of the incident to watch a movie. Id. at 12. His understanding was
that Marsicano appeared at the incident site while driving up Route 115 when
he was able to see the rear of Eberhart’s residence and Appellee’s truck parked
there. Id. at 12. He knew that Marsicano and Eberhart were formerly
boyfriend and girlfriend. Id. at 12-13. Marsicano confirmed to the Trooper
that he stopped because he saw Appellee’s truck at Eberhart’s home. Id. at
13. Marsicano indicated that Appellee approached him in the parking lot of
the apartment complex and that a fight ensued that began with a verbal
altercation before it became physical. Id. The gun was retrieved after the
fight became physical, a shoving match started, the men ended up on the
ground, and that, after they were separated, Appellee went to his vehicle and
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obtained the gun. Id. at 13–14. Marsicano and Appellee were separated
when the shots were fired, Id. at 14, and witnesses who provided statements
to Trooper Kowaski also indicated that after the gun was obtained, Marsicano
and Appellee struggled again, but then became separated and that is when
the shots were fired. Id.
Upon cross-examination, Trooper Kowalski indicated that Marsicano
stated he was shot twice in his legs and that he feared for his life when the
gun was pointed at him. Id. at 15. One bullet struck the victim in his lower
right leg and one in the lower left leg. Id. at 16. Finally, he indicated that
Marsicano showed up to Eberhart’s house uninvited and that Appellee
indicated he was simply defending himself to stop the beating perpetrated by
Marsicano. Id. at 18.
A crime generally consists of two elements, a physical, wrongful deed,
the actus reus, and a guilty mind that produces the act, the mens rea.
Commonwealth v. Ricker, 170 A.3d 494, 502, n. 7 (Pa. 2017) (Saylor, C.J.,
concurring). The Crimes Code provides that “[a] person commits an attempt
when with intent to commit a specific crime [the mens rea], he does any act
which constitutes a substantial step [the actus reus] towards the commission
of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). A conviction for attempted murder
requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant had a specific intent to kill and took a substantial step towards that
goal. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645 (Pa. 2008). “[I]n the
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attempt setting, the mens rea level of ‘intentionally’ attaches to the result.”2
Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613, 622 (Pa. 2011); see Roebuck,
32 A.3d at 622 n.20 (“[T]o be guilty of criminal attempt, a defendant’s
conscious objective must be to cause the result necessary to the substantive
crime.”). Thus, to prove that Appellant had the mens rea for attempted
murder, the Commonwealth had to establish that Appellee had the “conscious
objective,” that is, the goal, of killing the victim. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hall,
830 A.2d 537, 541 (Pa. 2003) (to prove defendant had mens rea for
aggravated assault, Commonwealth was required to prove that he had
“conscious object to inflict serious bodily injury” on victim). “The mens rea
required for first-degree murder, specific intent to kill, may be established
solely from circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d
147, 160 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). It also may be established
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2In Commonwealth v. Clopton, 289 A.2d 455 (Pa. 1972), our Supreme
Court offered a classic definition of attempt, to wit:
An attempt … is an overt act done in pursuance of an intent
to do a specific thing, tending to the end but falling short of
complete accomplishment of it. In law, the definition must
have this further qualification, that the overt act must be
sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to form one of
the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full
execution. So long as the acts are confined to preparation
only, and can be abandoned before any transgression of the
law or of others’ rights, they are within the sphere of intent
and do not amount to attempts.
Clopton, 289 A.2d at 457-58, citing Commonwealth v. Ellis, 37 A.2d 504,
505-06 (Pa. 1944).
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through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2005). “Specific intent may be
formed in an instant.” Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 313 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2011).
The Majority states that for purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that
Appellee took a substantial step toward the commission of a killing. See
Majority Opinion at p. 7. I agree. The sole issue presented here challenges
the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill. I conclude
the Commonwealth presented more than enough prima facie evidence of
specific intent to kill to allow the charge of attempted criminal homicide to
proceed to a jury trial.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
adduced during the preliminary hearing and before the trial court established
the following. Prior to December 12, 2015, animosity existed between
Marsicano and Appellee based upon Marsicano’s belief that Appellee had been
communicating with Eberhart while Marsicano and she were dating. On
December 12, 2015, at or about 12:45 a.m., Marsicano was driving past
Eberhart’s residence when he noticed Appellee’s truck parked outside her
apartment. He turned off the highway and stopped his vehicle in the parking
lot next to Appellee’s truck outside Eberhart’s apartment. Appellee was
visiting Eberhart at the time. Despite Eberhart complaining about Marsicano
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harassing her prior to this time and securing a PFA order against him,
Marsicano proceeded to call Eberhart while she was in her apartment with
Appellee. Given the acrimonious history between Marsicano and Appellee and
Appellee’s belief that Marsicano was outside Eberhart’s apartment, Appellee
went to the parking lot outside Eberhart’s apartment and found Marsicano in
the parking lot next to his truck. A fistfight eventually ensued between
Appellee and Marsicano because Appellee believed the victim was trying to
harass Eberhart who was then his girlfriend. The two men began quarreling
and exchanging shoves and punches. Eberhart arrived and managed to step
in between them and break up the fight.
Instead of ceasing hostilities, Appellee intentionally and purposefully
went to his truck to procure a gun with the intent of firing it at Marsicano.
Thereafter, Appellee walked over to his truck, opened the door, retrieved a
gun from the glove compartment, loaded the gun, cocked it, turned toward
Marsicano and pointed the gun at his face to chest to level. According to
Marsicano, he was several feet away from Appellee when Appellee pointed his
gun at his face and chest before firing three shots at him. At this point,
Marsicano stated that he feared for his life. According to Eberhart, Marsicano
grabbed Appellee’s arms and while the gun was flailing in the air, Appellee
warned Marsicano that the gun was loaded. Not taking heed, Marsicano
taunted Appellee to go ahead and shoot him. Appellee fired three shots. The
first hit the pavement. The second and third hit Marsicano in his left and right
calves while he was attempting to run away from Appellee, thus evidencing
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that the second and third shots were not meant to scare, but to harm the
victim.
Unlike the trial court and Majority, I conclude that the Commonwealth
submitted ample prima facie evidence of a specific intent by Appellee to kill
Marsicano. The mens rea of Appellee’s specific intent to kill had its origins in
the acrimony between Marsicano and Appellee that existed prior to the date
in question. This pre-existing acrimony evolved into a fistfight on the night in
question. As the evidence indicates, after the fight, Appellee went to his truck
to retrieve his gun, loaded and cocked it, and then pointed it at Marsicano’s
face and chest, sufficiently evidencing a specific intent to kill. Marsicano told
trooper Kowalski that he feared for his life when Appellee pointed the gun at
him. “A gun is a lethal weapon; pointing it towards a person, and then
discharging it, speaks volumes as to one’s intention.” Commonwealth v.
Hall, 830 A.2d 537, 543 (Pa. 2003). Firing multiple shots speaks even more
loudly as to Appellee’s intent. Id. (firing two shots “evidenc[es] a more settled
intent . . . than a single shot”). The Majority briefly mentions these acts in its
summary of the facts, Majority Op. at 6, but fails to construe them in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth. Thus, the Commonwealth presented
sufficient facts to establish prima facie evidence of a specific intent to kill by
Appellee.
In its opinion disposing of Appellee’s motion for habeas corpus relief,
the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth did not establish a specific
intent to kill for the crime of attempted murder. The trial court arrived at this
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conclusion relying upon case law that “a specific intent to kill may be inferred
from the use of a deadly force upon a vital part of the human body.” Trial
Court Opinion, 12/12/16 at p. 3-4, citing Geathers, 847 A.2d at 737 (citation
omitted in original). From this, the trial court concluded that since the lower
legs are not a vital part of the body and Marsicano was shot in his calves below
the knee, it could not find any specific intent to kill had been established. Id.
at 4. I disagree.
The statement that a specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use
of a deadly force upon a vital part of the human body is merely a presumption
of fact that permits a jury to find intent from the use of a deadly weapon upon
a vital part of the body. Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30 (Pa.
1976). This presumption arises from the fact that it is common knowledge
that such a use is likely to cause death and therefore, entitles a jury to infer
that the intent of a person using such a weapon in such a manner was to kill.
Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa. 1939). As a presumption
of fact, it permits a prima facie inference. O’Searo, supra. Nonetheless, as
the Majority correctly recognizes, the absence of the use of a deadly weapon
against a vital part of a victim’s body does not preclude a finding of intent to
kill, it only precludes the use of the presumption. Majority Opinion at 11,
citing Kluska, 3 A.2d at 402. The trial court committed error by incorrectly
concluding that, if a deadly weapon was not used against a vital part of a
victim’s body, no specific intent to kill for attempted murder may be inferred.
The trial court failed to recognize that the intent to kill from use of a deadly
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weapon upon a vital part of a victim’s body is merely a factual presumption
that does not preclude proving specific intent otherwise. Moreover, the trial
court had an obligation to examine the entire prima facie evidence offered by
the Commonwealth before determining whether a prima facie case had been
established for attempted murder.
The Majority faults the Commonwealth for only addressing the actus
reus of attempted murder and not the mens rea, or specific intent, which is
the issue in this case. The Majority states that the Commonwealth only
describes its proof of the actus reus of attempted murder, and then improperly
and summarily concludes, absent invocation of a relevant presumption, that
the mens rea naturally flows from proof of the former. Majority Opinion at 7.
Respectfully, I disagree.
In its brief, the Commonwealth points to prima facie evidence wherein
Appellee went to his vehicle, retrieved a pistol from the glove box, put a clip
in the pistol, cocked it and then pointed it at Marsicano. Commonwealth’s
Brief at 16. The Commonwealth notes Appellee then fired three shots at the
victim while he was attempting to run away, striking him in both legs. Id.
From this, the Commonwealth argues that the factfinder could reasonably find
that Appellee took a substantial step toward the intentional killing of
Marsicano. Id. While it is true, as the Majority notes, that the juxtaposition
of a “substantial step” and “intentional killing” in the text of the
Commonwealth’s brief suggests some confusion, it seems clear from the
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Commonwealth’s brief that it is arguing its prima facie evidence was sufficient
to satisfy both the mens rea and actus reus of attempted murder.
In the absence of a presumption, it is necessary to discuss substantial
step evidence as that may bear upon proof of a specific intent to kill. An act
is a substantial step if it is a major step towards the commission of a crime
and strongly corroborates a jury’s belief that a person, at the time they did
the act, had a firm intent to commit that crime. See Geathers, supra;Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions § 12.901a.1.
Therefore, to connect the specific intent and a substantial step in the crime of
attempted murder, by necessity, there must be a showing as to how the
substantial step relates to specific intent. See Geathers, supra (specific
intent to kill proven where defendant and victim had a verbal altercation, the
situation calmed, defendant left the scene and returned with a gun, defendant
shot at victim but missed, victim ran and defendant shot two more times,
victim ran down the street and defendant shot again striking left side of
victim’s head). I, therefore, would not fault the Commonwealth for summarily
discussing all of its prima facie evidence to establish the required specific
intent to kill. As explained in greater detail, supra, the prima facie evidence
offered by the Commonwealth in fact was much more than that briefly
described above from its brief.
On the merits of establishing a prima facie case of specific intent, the
Majority concludes that it is not reasonable to infer that the Commonwealth
produced evidence of a specific intent to kill for three reasons. First, the
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victim, Marsicano, instigated a confrontation with Appellee over his ex-
girlfriend, Eberhart. Second, there was a complete lack of any verbal
expression of intent to kill by Appellee despite the scuffle that occurred before
the shooting. Third, the near impossibility of Appellee missing any area or
vital portion of the victim’s body from the range at which he fired, but for an
intent to scare or harm, fell short of a specific intent to kill. Majority Opinion
at 16.
In my opinion, the Majority errs in its analysis both by weighing the
prima facie evidence and by repeatedly interpreting this evidence in a light
more favorable to Appellee than, as required, to the Commonwealth.
As for its first reason for not finding specific intent to kill, the Majority
labels this event “an unprovoked instigation [by the victim] of a confrontation
with [Appellee]” to argue against specific intent. Majority Opinion, at 16. The
Majority blames the victim for causing the fight—and by so doing, lays the
foundation for suggesting that the victim brought the shooting on himself. It
is simply wrong, however, for the Majority to take this position, given the
principle that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. While a jury might conclude that the victim instigated the
fight, we are required at this stage of the proceeding to conclude that Appellee
instigated the fight by storming outside Eberhart’s residence to confront the
victim. The evidence could solidly support this inference. The assertion that
the victim instigated the confrontation falls flat when the evidence is construed
in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Blaming the victim for
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starting the fight is tantamount to interpreting and weighing the evidence in
a light most favorable to Appellee.
As for its second reason for not finding specific intent to kill, referencing
Commonwealth v. Cross, 331 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. 1974), the Majority
faults the Commonwealth for not proffering any evidence that Appellee
verbally indicated, directly or indirectly, his intent to kill Marsicano. In Cross,
a bullet penetrated the outer panel of a car door at a height near the stomach
of the victim. The evidence demonstrated a long-standing feud between the
defendant and the victim’s brother. Immediately prior to shooting, the
defendant yelled to the victim, “[t]his is for your brother.” While the
verbalization in Cross may well have supported a specific intent to kill, this
Court in no way suggested that an express verbal threat was a prerequisite to
establishing a specific intent to kill. The verbalization was merely part of the
evidence offered to prove specific intent in that case. The Majority’s criticism
that the Commonwealth did not offer any other circumstantial evidence to
prove a specific intent to kill is simply not in accord with the prima facie
evidence offered by the Commonwealth when viewed in a light most favorable
to the Commonwealth.
As for its last reason, the Majority posits that specific intent to kill is
absent in this case, because “the near impossibility of Appellee missing any
area or vital portion of the victim’s body from the range at which he fired, but
for an intent to scare or harm that fell short of a specific intent to kill.” Once
again, the Majority deprives the Commonwealth of its evidence viewed in the
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best light. A jury must decide whether intent to kill is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. This Court does not have that prerogative when reviewing
whether a prima facie case has been established. The evidence produced
before the trial court suggests that the events here were violent, highly
emotional and rapidly unfolding. The victim was attempting to flee at the time
the shots were fired, arguably while Appellee did not have complete control
over his gun having fired it immediately after the victim grabbed his arms
before attempting to flee. A jury could conclude that under these fraught
circumstances, the victim escaped death because of Appellee’s poor aim at
the time, and not because of a lack of intent to kill the victim, especially under
circumstances where the victim was taunting Appellee to shoot him.
Nor do I believe the Majority considers the shooting evidence in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth by viewing the first shot into the ground
as merely intending to scare the victim. Here, the evidence can be viewed far
differently. Appellee fired a second and a third shot at close range.3 Both
struck the victim, thereby evidencing an intent not to scare, but to harm. If
it was Appellee’s initial intention just to scare, his subsequent shots certainly
go far to dispelling that notion, as they were aimed at and hit the victim’s
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3 The Majority quotes the victim’s testimony indicating that Appellant shot at
him from at most two and a half to three feet away. Eberhart testified,
however, that the first shot was from five feet away. Id. at 33. The Majority
should have resolved this conflict by finding that the first shot was five feet
away, for this version of events was most helpful to the Commonwealth. The
greater the distance between Appellee and the victim, the greater the
likelihood that Appellee intended to kill him but simply aimed poorly.
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body. It is impermissible to infer under these facts that Appellee only wanted
to cause fright. A gun is designed to kill. See Hall, supra. Appellee aimed
his gun at the victim’s body. The question as to whether the discharge of
Appellee’s gun evidenced a specific intent to kill is a question for the jury, not
one for the trial court or this Court upon review of the Commonwealth prima
facie evidence.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the order
dismissing the charge of attempted murder and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
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