In the Int. of: L.J.D.H., Appeal of: L.D.H. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.J.D.H., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
J.D.H., T.M.H., K.F.L.H., AND K.J.H., : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR CHILDREN :
:
:
APPEAL OF: L.D.H., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 701 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Dated February 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000934-2017,
CP-51-AP-0000935-2017, CP-51-AP-0000936-2017,
CP-51-AP-0000937-2017, CP-51-AP-0000938-2017,
FID No. 51-FN-387238-2009
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2018
L.D.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees dated and entered on
February 5, 2018, granting the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department
of Human Services (“DHS” or the “Agency”) seeking to terminate involuntarily
her parental rights to her minor children, L.J.D.H. (born in April of 2009);
J.D.H. (born in October of 2007); T.M.H. (born in August of 2005); K.F.L.H.
(born in July of 2001); and K.J.H. (born in April of 1999) (collectively, the
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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“Children”), with their putative father, W.H. (“Father”), pursuant to the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1,2 We affirm.
In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court aptly set
forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal, as follows:
DHS first became aware of this family when it received a
General Protective Services report alleging that the Children were
truant from school. (N.T. 2/5/18 at 6). At an adjudicatory hearing
held on April 26, 2016, this [c]ourt adjudicated the Children
dependent pursuant to the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1)
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1 The trial court entered separate decrees on February 5, 2018, that
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother, Father and any
unknown, putative father to the Children. See Opinion, N.T., 4/3/18, at 1,
n.1. We issued a Rule to Show Cause order to ascertain why counsel for
Mother filed a single notice of appeal from five separate decrees terminating
Mother’s parental rights to her five children. In his response dated March 27,
2018, counsel explained that the error occurred through oversight. Our
Supreme Court recently suggested that separate notices of appeal must be
filed where appeals have been taken from more than one trial court docket.
See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). In Walker, the
Supreme Court held that “Rule 341(a) will, in accordance with its Official Note,
require that when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one
lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The failure to do
so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id. at 977. Language in Walker
indicates, however, that the holding will apply prospectively from the date of
the decision, June 1, 2018. In view of this, we elect to forgo quashal but
caution counsel to proceed with greater care in future cases.
2 Father is not a party to this appeal nor is any unknown father a party, nor
has Father or any unknown putative father filed his own appeal. To the extent
that the trial court changed the permanency goal for the Children to adoption
in these decrees, Mother has waived any challenge to the goal change by her
failure to raise the issue in her concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal as well as the statement of questions involved section of her brief. See
Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797
(Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised
in both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the
statement of questions involved in her brief on appeal).
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and (5),] and allowed the Children to remain in Mother’s home.
(Trial Ct. Order 4/26/16 at 1). On April 28, 2016, DHS removed
the Children from Mother’s home pursuant to an Order of
Protective Custody after it received another report alleging
inappropriate medical care, truancy and unsuitable housing. (N.T.
2/5/18 at 7). A shelter care hearing was held for the Children on
April 28, 2016, at which time [the] [c]ourt granted full legal
custody of the Children to DHS and placed the Children with their
Paternal Grandmother, L.B. (Trial Ct. Order 4/28/16 at 1).
Mother was granted liberal supervised visits with the Children at
the agency. (Id.).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 2.
On September 21, 2017, the Agency filed petitions seeking involuntary
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and a change in the
Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351. On February 5, 2018, the trial court commenced an
evidentiary hearing on the petitions. Mother was not present, and her counsel,
Attorney Daniel Kurland, who appeared on her behalf, did not present any
evidence. Father and his counsel, Attorney Lisa Visco, were present. The
Children were represented by Attorney Meredith Rogers, as their child
advocate (legal counsel), and their former child advocate, Attorney Jay
Stillman, as their GAL. N.T., 2/5/18, at 6.3 The Agency, through its counsel,
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3 In In re Adoption of L.B.M., ___ Pa. ___, 161 A.3d 172 (2017) (plurality)
our Supreme Court held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires that counsel be
appointed to represent the legal interests of any child involved in a contested
involuntary termination proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interest
as synonymous with his or her preferred outcome. The L.B.M. Court did not
overrule this Court’s holding in In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012),
that a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) who is an attorney may act as legal counsel
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Attorney Rachel Hantgan, presented the testimony of Sheronda Ball, a
caseworker with the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) and Turning Points
for Children, and Joe Sargent, the CUA case manager. Id. at 6. Father
presented the testimony of his mother, L.B. (“Paternal Grandmother”), who
was the Children’s caregiver since April of 2016. Id. at 38.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court made findings of fact with
regard to the testimony, as follows:
Sheronda Ball[ ] testified that the Children had been in
foster placement for approximately twenty-two months. (N.T.
2/5/18 at 20). Ms. Ball testified that Mother’s single case plan
objectives were as follows: 1) attend the Children’s medical
appointments and school meetings with the kinship parent; 2)
complete parenting classes at the Achieving Reunification Center
(“ARC”); 3) seek mental health parenting classes at . . . [ARC];
3) seek mental health treatment and register for Intellectual
Disability Services [(“IDS”)]; and 4) secure stable housing. (Id.
at 8). In regards to Mother’s compliance with her objectives, Ms.
Ball testified that Mother was noncompliant. (Id. at 15).
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pursuant to section 2313(a) as long as the dual roles do not create a conflict
between the child’s legal and best interests. In In re T.S., 2018 Pa. LEXIS
4374 (filed August 22, 2018), ___ Pa. ___ ,___ A.3d ____ (2018), the
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the children’s
GAL to act as their sole representative during the termination proceeding
because, at two and three years old, they were incapable of expressing their
preferred outcome. The Court explained, “if the preferred outcome of the
child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-
verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or
her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption
Act that counsel be appointed ‘to represent the child,’ 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a),
is satisfied where the court has appointed an attorney-[GAL] who represents
the child’s best interests during such proceedings.” Id. at ___, 2018 Pa.
LEXIS 4374 at *27-28. Here, both legal counsel and a GAL were appointed to
represent the Children, and the trial court acknowledged that the Children’s
express preferred outcome was adoption by their paternal grandmother. N.T.,
2/5/17, at 60.
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Specifically, Mother does not engage in the Children’s medical
treatment. (Id. at 8-9). Ms. Ball testified that K.F.L.H. has a
brain tumor and is being closely monitored by medical
professionals. (Id. at 21). K.F.L.H. also has medical issues with
her liver and cholesterol. (Id.). Ms. Ball indicated that it would be
important for Mother and Father to attend K.F.L.H.’s medical
appointments in order to understand the type of care that K.F.L.H.
needs; however, neither parent consistently attends K.F.L.H.’s
medical appointment. (Id. at 22). T.H. was diagnosed with
autism and a speech impediment and receives services from Child
Guidance.FN1 (Id. at 23). Parents have not participated in T.H.’s
services nor have they attended his medical appointments. (Id.).
With respect to parenting classes, Mother completed a
parenting class at the ARC. (Id. at 9). Mother was also referred
to family school in order to receive additional parenting skills but
was prematurely discharged as a result of non-compliance and
inconsistent attendance. (Id.). Mother also had a mental health
evaluation at Behavioral Health Services, which recommended
that she participate in individual therapy. (Id. at 9-10). Mother
has never successfully completed a mental health program and
did not engage in therapy. (Id. at 10). Mother also failed to
register for Intellectual Disability Services. (Id. at 13)[.]
In regards to Mother’s housing, CUA determined that
Mother’s home was unsuitable for the Children when they visited
in May 2017. (Id. at 10-11). CUA offered to assist the parents
with housing repairs, but were unable to assist the family because
Mother would not allow them back into the home. (Id. at 31).
Father would set up appointments with CUA to visit the home, but
would not allow CUA entry into the home when they arrived.
(Id.). Ms. Ball stopped trying to access the home in November
2017 because Mother and Father were uncooperative. (Id. at 12).
Mother denied that her home needed repairs. (Id. at 30). Mother
also falsely reported that she moved to another location. (Id. at
12). Ms. Ball testified that Mother’s single case plan objectives
have been consistent throughout the life of this case and that she
discussed the objectives with Mother. (Id. at 19; 29). Mother
indicated that she did not need any of the services recommended
by CUA. (Id. at 30).
Ms. Ball testified that it would be in the Children’s best
interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights as Mother has never
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with CUA. (Id. at
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19-25). Ms. Ball also indicated that Mother could not keep the
Children safe. (Id.). Ms. Ball testified that it would be in the
Children’s best interest to be adopted as they are thriving in their
pre-adoptive home, have expressed their desires to be adopted
and have never expressed an interest in visiting their parents.
(Id. at 20; 33-34). The CUA case manager, Joe Sargeent, also
testified that the Children are safe in Paternal Grandmother’s
home and have all indicated that they want to be adopted. (Id.
at 36).
Paternal Grandmother also testified at the TPR hearing.
Paternal Grandmother indicated that she notifies the parents of
the Children’s medical appointments and that Mother never
attends any appointments. (Id. at 39). Paternal Grandmother
also indicated that Mother never visits the Children. (Id. at
40-41). Paternal Grandmother stated that the Children are doing
well and do not express an interest in seeing their parents. (Id.
at 41). Paternal Grandmother wishes to adopt all five children.
(Id.).
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FN1 Child Guidance is a resource center that provides
community-based therapeutic, supportive and preventative
behavioral healthcare services for children and families with
mental health needs and developmental disabilities.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 2-4 (footnote in original).
On February 5, 2018, the trial court entered the decrees granting the
petitions to terminate involuntarily Mother’s parental rights to the Children,
pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. On March 5, 2018, Mother
timely filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues with regard to the
termination petitions:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such
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determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence
under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 [Pa.]C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8) and (b)[?]
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving
primary consideration to the effect that the termination would
have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the
child as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 [Pa.]C.S.A.
§ 2511(b)[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was
overwhelming and undisputed that Mother demonstrated a
genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to
maintain a parent-child relationship with her children[?]
Mother’s Brief at 8.
With regard to section 2511(a)(1), Mother argues that the trial court
erred when it ruled that she had, for a period of at least six months, evidenced
a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental rights to the Children or had
failed to perform her parental rights. Mother asserts that the evidence at trial
clearly demonstrated that she had taken substantial and meaningful steps
towards exercising her parental duties and being a mother to her children.
Mother states that she attended a permanency review hearing on May 30,
2016, and that the testimony reflected that she was moderately compliant
with her SCP goals, as she had completed anger management, healthy
relationship, and parenting services through ARC. See Mother’s Brief at 15.
With regard to section 2511(a)(2), Mother contends that the trial court
erred when it ruled that her repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal has caused the children to be without essential parental care, control
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or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental wellbeing, and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by her. Mother asserts that the evidence presented at
trial showed that she attempted to complete her FSP goals as she understood
them. Mother alleges that she never fully understood her objectives and,
therefore, could not complete them. Mother’s Brief at 16 (citing N.T.,
2/5/2018, p. 30 at 1-14). Mother states,
Specifically, notwithstanding the fact that Mother refused
IDD [Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities] services, it is not
clear that she understood what IDD services truly were. Ms. Ball
simply stated that Mother did not wish to see another therapist.
If Mother had fully understood that her intellectual disabilities
warranted additional support in her attempts to reunify with her
children perhaps she would have accepted said services. (N.T.[,]
2/5/2018, p. 30 at 1-14).
Mother’s Brief at 16.
Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the
requirements of section 2511(b) were satisfied. Mother argues that the
testimony presented at the hearing suggested that, had she fully understood
her objectives, then she would have been inclined to complete them, and,
once completed, it would have been in the best interests of the children to not
terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother asserts that evidence of her
disabilities and her failure to understand her FSP objectives/goals provides
clear and convincing evidence that the trial court improperly terminated her
parental rights to the Children. Id.
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In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275,
284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has
been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
because the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors
America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634
(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at
28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539
Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-326, 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa.
2012).
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The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C.,
837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination
of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will
consider section 2511(a)(1) and (2) together, as did the trial court. Section
2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
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***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as
follows.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court
must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 602, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa.
1988).
Further, this Court has stated:
the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and
not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The
court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and
consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination
of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light
of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the
involuntary termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as
follows.
As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds
for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can
seldom be more difficult than when termination is based
upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in
enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent
who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of J.J., [511 Pa. 599, 605,] 515 A.2d 883, 891
(Pa. 1986) (quoting In re: William L., [477 Pa. 322, 345,] 383
A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 326-327, 47 A.3d 827.
This Court has long recognized that a parent is
“required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities.” In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super.
2002) (citation omitted). “[A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period
of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. (citation omitted).
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Regarding the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children,
the trial court stated as follows:
Under these specific facts and circumstances, [the c]ourt found
clear and convincing evidence that Mother demonstrated a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the Children and failed
to perform any parental duties for at least six months preceding
the filing of the termination petitions on September 21, 2017. The
Children were removed from Mother’s home approximately
seventeen months prior to the filing of the petitions, and Mother’s
refusal to parent since that time was demonstrated by her failure
to actively participate in the Children’s lives. According to the
testimony of the CUA social worker, many of the Children have
serious medical issues; however, Mother has never attended the
Children’s medical appointments. (Id. at 21-23). Paternal
Grandmother also testified that Mother does not visit the Children
or attend their medical appointments. (Id. at 39). Mother’s
refusal to participate in the Children’s lives demonstrates her
desire to relinquish parental claim to the Children. Furthermore,
based on the allegations of medical neglect and inadequate
housing, Mother was referred to family school for parenting
classes; however, Mother never completed family school. (Id. at
9). These minimal objectives would have demonstrated Mother’s
interest in caring for her children; however, Mother made little
efforts to fulfill these objectives. Additionally, Mother offered no
evidence that she made even the slightest efforts to re-establish
ties with her children during the six-month period prior to the filing
of the termination petitions. Accordingly, this Court found
termination of Mother's parental rights warranted pursuant to
2511(a)(1).
***
In In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.
Super. 2003), Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau took
custody of the child, citing the mother’s inability to care for her
child due to the mother’s mental handicap. Id. at 1268. Following
adjudication of the child, the mother was ordered to apply for
welfare programs, obtain housing, and receive counseling in order
to promote her independence and parenting skills. Id. at 1269.
It was reported that the mother did not attempt to obtain welfare
or housing and refused counseling. Id. As a result, the trial court
terminated the mother’s parental rights approximately two years
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after the child was removed from the home. Id. at 1270. The
Superior Court found that the mother’s inability to develop
parenting skills, along with her refusal to fulfill her objectives,
would leave the child without proper parental care; thus,
termination of the mother’s parental rights was warranted under
Section 2511(a)(2). Id. at 1273.
Applying M.E.P. and the elements set forth under
2511(a)(2) to the instant case, it is clear that DHS met [its]
burden of demonstrating that termination was proper. The
evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under
2511(a)(2) existed given that Mother failed to demonstrate a
concrete desire or ability to remedy the problems that led to the
Children’s placement. The CUA worker credibly testified that
Mother refused the services offered to her, including mental health
treatment, assistance with home repairs and family school. (N.T.
2/5/18 at 9-10; 31-32). Mother’s BHS evaluation also
recommended individual therapy for Mother to address her
dependency issues and coping skills. (Id. at 9-10). The record
shows that Mother [declined] therapeutic services. (Id. at 30).
Without therapy, Mother would be unable to learn the coping skills
required to successfully parent the Children. Moreover, the
evidence established that “neglect” existed given that Mother did
not visit the Children or participate in their medical treatment.
(Id. at 21-23; 39). Considering that medical neglect was one of
the reasons DHS became involved with this family, the CUA social
worker believed it imperative that Mother engage in the Children’s
medical treatment. (Id. at 22). Mother’s refusal to do so
evidences her lack of interest in being reunified with the Children.
[The c]ourt found that Mother’s failure to comply with her
objectives throughout the life of this case has left the Children
without essential parental care, and the cause of such neglect,
refusal and continued incapacity will not be remedied by Mother.
Based on the foregoing, [The c]ourt found that competent
evidence existed to justify the termination of Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 6-9.
After a careful review of the record, this Court finds that the trial court’s
conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(1) and (2) is supported by
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competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of
S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. To the extent that Mother
suggests that she might have participated in services had she understood the
services available to her, rather than refused them, the trial court found that
Ms. Ball credibly testified that she had explained these services to Mother, and
Mother stated that she did not need to go to another counselor, and refused
the services. N.T., 2/5/18, at 30. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 9.
Thus, we find Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights because she demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere,
persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with
her children lacks merit.
If we find sufficient evidence to satisfy section 2511(a), we proceed to
review whether there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court
has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a)
is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. In
reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our
Supreme Court stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare
of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
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re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [533
Pa. 115, 121, 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-629, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where
direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not
only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were
the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would
be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
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In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary
termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where
placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child
is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated the following with
regard to section 2511(b):
In the instant matter, [the c]ourt determined that the
Children will not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s
parental rights are terminated. There was compelling testimony
that the Children are not bonded with Mother. (See N.T. 2/5/18
at 39-41). The CUA social workers and Paternal Grandmother
each testified that the Children do not request to see Mother. (Id.
at 33-34; 36; 41). Paternal Grandmother also indicated that
Mother does not regularly visit the Children. (Id. at 41). Mother
failed to offer any evidence establishing the existence of a parent-
child bond. The testimony demonstrated that the Children’s
primary bond is with the Paternal Grandmother. Furthermore,
[the c]ourt found Mother’s sporadic visits with the Children
insufficient to foster a meaningful and healthy parental
connection. [The c]ourt believes that [it is] no closer to
reunification now than [ ] when this case first came in in April
2016.
Additionally, in determining that termination would best
serve the needs and welfare of the Children, [the c]ourt
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considered that the Children have not expressed an interest in
seeing their parents and want to be adopted. (Id. at 33-34). For
the foregoing reasons, [the c]ourt properly granted DHS’s petition
to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 11-13.
After a careful review of the record, this Court finds that the trial court’s
conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b) is supported by competent,
clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa.
at 325-326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. The trial court appropriately considered the
needs of the Children and any affection the young children might feel for
Mother. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-629, 71 A.3d at 267; In re K.Z.S., 946
A.2d at 763. Although Mother believes that she still has a bond with the
Children and has had a bond with them since their birth, (see Mother’s Brief
at 19), this Court has held that a parent’s love of his child, alone, does not
preclude a termination. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(stating that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone,
will not preclude termination of parental rights). It is well-settled that “we
will not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re
Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726,
732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold
in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.”)). Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the
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trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant
to section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees of the
trial court.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/11/18
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