Com. v. Cush, C. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S23010-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER CHARLES CUSH                   :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1965 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 24, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-09-CR-0006327-2016
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 08, 2018
    Appellant, Christopher Charles Cush, appeals1 from the judgment of
    sentence entered on April 24, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
    County. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    On April 24, 2017, Appellant appeared before this [c]ourt
    and pled nolo contendere to one count of Receiving Stolen
    Property.1 These charges arose when, on May 6, 2016, victim
    [Ms. M.] left her home in Newtown Township, Bucks County,
    Pennsylvania at noon and returned at approximately 3:00 P.M. to
    ____________________________________________
    1 In his notice of appeal, Appellant purports to appeal “from the withdrawal of
    post-sentence motions, entered on June 13, 2017.” Notice of Appeal,
    6/16/17, at 1. It is evident however, that Appellant is challenging the
    judgment of sentence imposed on April 24, 2017. See Commonwealth v.
    Shamberger, 
    788 A.2d 408
    , 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“In a criminal action,
    appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial
    of post-sentence motions.”).
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S23010-18
    find that the interior door, basement door and kitchen window
    [were] open, and that her kitchen and master bedroom [were] in
    disarray. [Ms. M.] found that various items of jewelry, cash, a
    violin and two DeWalt cordless drills were missing from the home.
    An investigation by Detective Christopher Bush of the Newtown
    Township Police Department revealed that Appellant had sold one
    Yamaha violin and one DeWalt Cordless drill to a Philadelphia
    pawnshop on the same day at approximately 4:39 P.M.2 Two shoe
    tread impressions were found on the first floor of the victim’s
    home between the kitchen and second floor stairway. Detective
    Bush identified one of these partial impressions as being
    consistent with that of a Converse sneaker.          According to
    Detective Bush, this sneaker tread impression was consistent with
    the tread impression and design of a pair of Converse sneakers
    worn by the Appellant. Ms[.] M[.] did not recognize the Converse
    sneaker tread impression as belonging to any member of her
    household.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
    2 Specifically, Appellant received $75 cash for the
    violin, sold at 4:39 P.M., and $40 cash for the DeWalt
    Cordless drill, sold at 4:44 P.M.
    On August 2, 2016, Newtown Township Police charged
    Appellant with Burglary,3 Criminal Conspiracy to commit
    Burglary,4 Criminal Trespass by Entering a Building or Occupied
    Structure,5 Theft by Unlawful Taking,6 and Receiving Stolen
    Property.7 On January 3, 2017, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ
    of Habeas Corpus arguing that Counts 1 through 4 were
    improperly held for court following his preliminary hearing. On
    March 2, 2017, a hearing was held before The Honorable Albert J.
    Cepparulo in which Counts 1 [through] 4[2] were dismissed. Upon
    request of the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office, the
    Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office issued a McPhail8 letter on
    March 8, 2017, allowing Bucks County to prosecute Appellant’s
    case. Appellant proceeded to trial on Count . . . . 5, and on March
    28, 2017, after a two-day jury trial before The Honorable Diane E.
    ____________________________________________
    2 While the trial court in its opinion indicates that Counts 1, 3, and 4 were
    dismissed by Judge Cepparulo, the parties at Appellant’s plea hearing
    indicated that Counts 1 through 4 were dismissed. N.T., 4/24/17, at 27. The
    same is indicated on Appellant’s sentencing order. Order, 4/24/17, at 1.
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    Gibbons, the court declared a mistrial due to a hung jury. On April
    24, 2017, Appellant appeared before this [c]ourt for a second trial
    and subsequently entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea to
    Count 5.9 Upon the Commonwealth’s recommendation, this
    [c]ourt sentenced Appellant to one day less than 1 year to one
    day less than 2 years [of] incarceration.
    3   Count 1: 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(2).
    4   Count 2: 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a).
    5   Count 3: 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
    6   Count 4: 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
    7   Count 5: 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
    8   Commonwealth v. McPhail, 
    692 A.2d 139
     (Pa. 1997).
    9  Specifically, Appellant pled nolo contendere to
    “retaining a violin and DeWalt drill knowing that they
    had been stolen or probably been stolen.”
    On April 27, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for
    Reconsideration of Sentence, followed by a counseled Motion to
    Modify and Reconsider Sentence on May 3, 2017. In both Motions,
    Appellant argued that he intended to cooperate with the
    Commonwealth in exchange for a reduced sentence. On May 24,
    2017, prior to the disposition of his motions to reconsider
    sentence, Appellant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal to the Superior
    Court from this court’s sentence imposed April 24, 2017.
    Commonwealth v. Christopher C. Cush, No. 1697 EDA 2017. On
    June 13, 2017, a hearing was held and Appellant withdrew his pro
    se Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Modify and
    Reconsider Sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a counseled
    Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court on June 16, 2017.
    Commonwealth v. Christopher C. Cush, No. 1965 EDA 2017. On
    August 7, 2017, the Superior Court dismissed Appellant’s pro se
    Notice of Appeal, No. 1697 EDA 2017, as duplicative of the appeal
    docketed at No. 1965 EDA 2017.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/17 at 1-3 (internal citations omitted).
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    Appellant presents the following issue for our review: “Whether it was
    improper for the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas to exercise venue when
    the alleged crime of receiving stolen property occurred in Philadelphia
    County?” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant asserts that once the charges of
    burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful taking were dismissed, the
    nexus between Appellant’s charges and Bucks County was broken, and
    therefore, Bucks County was no longer the proper venue in which to prosecute
    Appellant for receiving stolen property. Id. at 8, 10-12. Appellant further
    maintains that because venue was improper, his conviction for receiving stolen
    property should be reversed and the sentence vacated. Id. at 8.
    “[W]hen a defendant enters a guilty plea,[3] he or she waives all defects
    and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the jurisdiction
    of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth
    v. Stradley, 
    50 A.3d 769
    , 771 (Pa. 2012). As noted, Appellant is challenging
    venue in this case. Our Supreme Court has explained that “[s]ubject matter
    jurisdiction and venue are distinct.” Commonwealth v. Bethea, 
    828 A.2d 1066
    , 1074 (Pa. 2003). “Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the competency
    of a court to hear and decide the type of controversy presented. Jurisdiction
    is a matter of substantive law.” 
    Id.
     (internal citation omitted). “Venue relates
    ____________________________________________
    3 “It is well established that a plea of nolo contendere is treated as a guilty
    plea in terms of its effect upon a given case.” Commonwealth v. V.G., 
    9 A.3d 222
    , 226 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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    to the right of a party to have the controversy brought and heard in a
    particular judicial district.     Venue is predominately a procedural matter,
    generally prescribed by rules of this Court. Venue assumes the existence of
    jurisdiction.” 
    Id.
     (internal citations omitted).
    Thus, Appellant’s challenge to venue is not a challenge to the court’s
    jurisdiction. Additionally, Appellant’s claim does not contest the validity of the
    plea or the legality of sentence. Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to venue
    has been waived by entry of his plea of nolo contendere.
    Assuming arguendo that Appellant had not waived his claim, we agree
    with the trial court’s conclusion that venue in this case was proper.4 “Venue
    in a criminal action properly belongs in the place where the crime occurred.”
    Commonwealth v. Gross, 
    101 A.3d 28
    , 33 (Pa. 2014). “Generally, venue
    begins in the court with a geographic connection to the underlying crime. If
    a litigant moves to change venue, that litigant must demonstrate some
    necessity to justify the change in venue.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 
    985 A.2d 720
    , 722 (Pa. 2009).          The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
    contemplate that there may be a choice of venue in a criminal case and that
    cases may be transferred when necessary and appropriate. Rule 130(A)(3)
    ____________________________________________
    4 Appellant challenged venue by oral motion on March 2, 2017. The trial court
    denied this motion by order entered March 24, 2017. Although the notes of
    testimony from these proceedings are not in the record, the parties agree that
    the motion was made orally on March 2, 2017. Appellant’s Brief at 5;
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.
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    of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states, “When charges arising
    from the same criminal episode occur in more than one judicial district, the
    criminal proceeding on all the charges may be brought before one issuing
    authority in a magisterial district within any of the judicial districts in which
    the charges arising from the same criminal episode occurred.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
    130(A)(3).    Moreover, this Court has held that where multiple offenses
    committed across several counties are to be prosecuted in one county, “it is
    not necessary that the county so chosen be the situs of each and every crime
    charged. It is enough that one of the offenses being tried occurred in that
    county.”   Commonwealth v. Brookins, 
    10 A.3d 1251
    , 1259 (Pa. Super.
    2010). Venue may be changed
    “when it is determined after hearing that a fair and impartial trial
    cannot be [sic] otherwise be had in the county where the case is
    currently pending.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 584(A). The moving party bears
    the burden of showing that such a change is necessary and must
    demonstrate that he or she cannot receive a fair and impartial trial
    in the county in which venue was originally established. See
    Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1075 (“[I]t is important to keep in mind the
    primary concern in change of venue cases; does the location of
    the trial impact on the ability of the parties to have their case
    decided before a fair and impartial tribunal?”). In evaluating the
    likelihood of prejudice, our Supreme Court has considered
    whether trial in the original venue caused the defendant to incur
    undue expense, whether the location of the trial rendered the
    defendant unable to obtain the presence of defense witnesses or
    evidence, whether the prosecution was engaged in forum
    shopping to obtain an advantage over the defense, see id. at
    1077, and of course, whether pre-trial publicity rendered a fair
    trial unlikely.
    Id. at 1259 (internal citation omitted).
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    Here, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established that
    the theft of the goods occurred in Bucks County. N.T., 9/26/17, at 5-8. While
    Appellant pled nolo contendere to receiving the stolen property, it is unclear
    where Appellant received those goods.5 The evidence is sufficient, therefore,
    to establish that at least one incident in this criminal episode occurred in Bucks
    County.      Moreover, this Court has provided the following analysis in
    addressing charges of receiving stolen property:
    It is ... well established that unexplained possession in the
    defendant of property recently stolen is evidence that he is the
    thief. . . . if the indictment charges receiving stolen goods only,
    the unexplained possession is evidence of guilt of that crime.
    However, such evidence is not conclusive and may be rebutted.
    It is for the trier of fact alone to say whether the guilt of the
    defendant is a reasonable inference, fairly deducible from his
    possession of recently stolen property, in light of all the
    circumstances, including the reasonableness of his explanation, if
    any, as to how he came into possession.
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    451 A.2d 470
    , 473 (Pa. Super. 1982).
    At the preliminary hearing, evidence established that Appellant sold the
    items stolen in Bucks County at the pawn shop in Philadelphia County.
    Documentation acquired from the pawn shop reflects that the stolen items
    were presented for sale by Appellant.            N.T., 9/26/16 at 17-20.     Video
    surveillance from the pawn shop reflected that Appellant was the individual
    ____________________________________________
    5 There is no evidence supporting Appellant’s claim that “it is undisputed that
    the alleged crime of receiving stolen property occurred in Philadelphia.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 10. The evidence establishes only that Appellant sold the
    stolen property in Philadelphia.
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    who sold the stolen goods. Id. at 20. Further, the evidence establishes that
    Appellant was at the pawn shop selling the stolen items within hours of the
    theft in Bucks County. Id. at 18. Additionally, testimony established that
    shoe impressions were discovered at the scene of the burglary in Bucks
    County. N.T., 9/26/16, at 20-21. The treads were consistent with Converse
    foot wear.     Id. at 21-22.       Appellant was identified as wearing Converse
    sneakers. Id. at 24. Moreover, Ms. M. testified that no one in her home wore
    Converse shoes. Id. at 15. Thus, the rebuttable inference that Appellant was
    the thief due to his possession of the stolen goods is supported by the
    additional evidence regarding Appellant’s presence at the pawn shop with the
    stolen items within hours of the theft and the shoe tread marks found at the
    scene of the crime. Accordingly, the totality of circumstances supports the
    conclusion that Appellant was involved in the crime that occurred in Bucks
    County. Venue was therefore proper in Bucks County.6
    Appellant cites to Thomas in support of his position that Bucks County
    was an improper venue. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. In Thomas, a Delaware
    ____________________________________________
    6Our Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause the Commonwealth selects the
    county of trial, . . . it shall bear the burden of proving venue is proper-that is,
    evidence an offense occurred in the judicial district with which the defendant
    may be criminally associated, either directly, jointly, or vicariously.” Gross,
    101 A.3d at 33. The Court determined that venue should be proven by a
    preponderance of evidence. Id. “Because venue is not part of a crime, it
    need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as essential elements must
    be.” Id. Furthermore, “venue need not be proven by direct evidence but may
    be inferred by circumstantial evidence.” Id. For reasons discussed, venue in
    Bucks County has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
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    County home was burglarized, and a vehicle was stolen. Thomas, 
    451 A.2d at 470-471
    . Thomas was later found and arrested in Montgomery County.
    
    Id. at 471
    . The stolen vehicle was recovered in Montgomery County. 
    Id.
    Thomas was charged in Delaware County with burglary, theft by unlawful
    taking, theft by receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use of a motor
    vehicle. 
    Id.
     Thomas was acquitted of the burglary and theft-by-unlawful-
    taking charges. 
    Id.
     As a result, this Court concluded that the nexus between
    the remaining charges, receiving stolen property and unauthorized use of a
    motor vehicle, and Delaware County was broken. 
    Id.
     As a result, this Court
    reversed the conviction because Delaware County did not have jurisdiction to
    prosecute the crime. 
    Id.
    Thomas is distinguishable from the current case. As noted, in this case,
    additional evidence tying Appellant to the theft in Bucks County supported the
    inference that Appellant had committed the crimes of burglary and theft in
    Bucks County. That evidence included Appellant’s possession of the stolen
    items shortly after the theft, his pawning of those items, and the fact that he
    wore shoes having similar tread marks to those discovered at the scene of the
    burglary and theft.     Moreover, Appellant has failed to present evidence
    rebutting that inference. Thomas, 
    451 A.2d at 473
    . Thus, we find Thomas
    to be inapplicable to this case.
    Furthermore, Appellant has failed to establish that he could not receive
    a fair and impartial trial in Bucks County. Brookins, 
    10 A.3d at 1259
    . Thus,
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    even if Appellant’s claim had not been waived, venue was proper in Bucks
    County, and the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to transfer
    venue to Philadelphia County.7
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/8/18
    ____________________________________________
    7 We note that even if venue were not proper, Appellant would not be entitled
    to vacation of his sentence. When improper venue is determined, the
    appropriate remedy is transfer of the case to another judicial district. Gross,
    101 A.3d at 36. “[D]ismissal is disproportionate and unjust where a court
    merely finds another judicial district provides a more appropriate forum.” Id.
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