Com. v. Brunson, D. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DOUGLAS BRUNSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 93 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 7, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-02-CR-0008333-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016
Douglas Brunson (“Brunson”) appeals from the Order dismissing his
Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In December 2009, Brunson entered guilty pleas in four separate
cases (Nos. 200908333, 200907863, 200911431, and 200814294). As part
of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth agreed that it would make no
recommendation as to a specific sentence. On March 3, 2010, the
Honorable Jill Rangos (“Judge Rangos”) sentenced Brunson to prison terms
of 85-170 months for the case at 200907863, 90-180 months for the case at
200908333, 18-36 months for the case at 200814294, and 30-60 months
for the case at 200911431. The sentences imposed for the cases at
200907863 and 200908333 were set to run consecutively, with the lesser
sentences running concurrently.
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This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth
v. Brunson, 34 A.3d 225 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 12, 2012, Brunson filed a pro se PCRA Petition. The PCRA court
appointed Brunson counsel, who filed an Amended PCRA Petition. Brunson
argued that the trial court had applied incorrect Offense Gravity Scores
(“OGS”) to the charges at 200908333 and 200907863, resulting in
incorrectly enhanced prison terms. The Commonwealth conceded that
Brunson had been sentenced incorrectly at 200908333 and requested a
resentencing hearing, but maintained that the sentence imposed at
200907863 was correct.
At the resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth requested a standard
range sentence. Thereafter, Judge Rangos revoked the original sentence of
90-180 months in prison and imposed a revised sentence of 65-130 months.
Like the original sentence, the revised sentence was to run consecutive to
the sentence at case No. 200907863. On October 16, 2013, Judge Rangos
dismissed Brunson’s PCRA Petition as it related to case No. 200907863;
Judge Rangos reinstated Brunson’s post-sentence and appellate rights in
relation to case No. 200908333. Brunson filed a Post-Sentence Motion at
case No. 200908333, which was denied. Brunson filed a Notice of Appeal;
however, Brunson subsequently discontinued the appeal in February 2014.
On March 25, 2014, Brunson filed a timely PCRA Petition in relation to
case Nos. 200908333 and 200907863, claiming that ADA Tomasic’s remarks
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at resentencing violated the plea agreement, and that Brunson’s counsel was
ineffective for failing to advise Brunson of his right to withdraw the guilty
plea.
Judge Rangos filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and, eventually, an
Order dismissing the PCRA Petition on April 22, 2014. Due to a scrivener’s
error, however, Judge Rangos’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss and the dismissal
Order both incorrectly referenced only the case at No. 200907863. On
December 1, 2014, Judge Rangos issued an Order amending the April 22,
2014 Order so as to dismiss the Petitions at both case Nos. 200908333 and
200907863. Brunson, pro se, appealed this Order. On August 7, 2015, this
Court vacated Judge Rangos’s December 1, 2014 Amended Order,
concluding that Judge Rangos failed to file a proper Notice of Intent to
Dismiss. See Commonwealth v. Brunson, 131 A.3d 87 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(unpublished memorandum).
On August 24, 2015, upon remand, Judge Rangos issued a Notice of
Intent to Dismiss Brunson’s Petition. On September 11, 2015, Brunson, pro
se, filed both an Application for Leave to Amend his PCRA Petition and a
Response to Judge Rangos’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss. Judge Rangos
appointed Scott Coffey, Esquire, as Brunson’s counsel, who filed an amended
Response to Judge Rangos’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss. On January 7,
2016, Judge Rangos dismissed the PCRA Petition. Brunson then filed a
timely Notice of Appeal.
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On appeal, Brunson raises the following question for our review:
[] Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Brunson’s] PCRA Petition
since [Brunson’s] 12/17/09 plea agreement was violated during
[Brunson’s] 9/23/13 resentencing hearing, when the
Commonwealth improperly argued for a specific sentence at the
instant case, resulting in prejudice to [Brunson] since he
received a lengthier, and consecutive rather than concurrent,
sentence at the instant case due to the Commonwealth’s
violation of the plea agreement; moreover, trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to inform the trial court that the plea
agreement had been violated, and for failing to inform [Brunson]
that he had a right to withdraw his plea since the plea
agreement had been violated?
Brief for Appellant at 3 (capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA
petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by evidence of
record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059,
1061 (Pa. Super. 2011). “We will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court
if they are supported by the record, even where the record could also
support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Keaton, 82 A.3d 419, 426
(Pa. 2013).
Brunson asserts that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his Petition
where his resentencing counsel, J. Richard Narvin, was ineffective for failing
to inform the trial court of the plea agreement violation. Brief for Appellant
at 9, 13. Brunson asserts that the resentencing court would have had the
“option of imposing an even lower sentence, and running it concurrently” if
the Commonwealth “had not pushed for a specific sentence” and that as a
result, Brunson was “prejudiced.” Id. at 13; see also id. at 9, 12. Further,
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Brunson asserts that the resentencing court should have allowed him to
withdraw his guilty plea and that it erred by not doing so. Id. at 13-14.
To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Brunson must demonstrate by
a preponderance of evidence that “(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable
merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have
some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for
counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Ali, 10
A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). Counsel is presumed to be effective and the
burden is on the appellant to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v.
Hannible, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011). A failure to satisfy any prong of
the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).
A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel
during a plea process as well as during trial. The law does not
require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his
decision to enter a plea of guilty. Instead, the defendant must
show that counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing,
involuntary, or unintelligent plea. The voluntariness of the plea
depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Therefore, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the
entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the
ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or
unknowing plea.
Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
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To withdraw a guilty plea where a sentence has already been imposed,
“a showing of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice is required before
withdrawal is properly justified.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794
A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered into
involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Id.To ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, the trial court
must inquire into the following six areas:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has a right to trial by
jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent
until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of
sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
such agreement?
Commonwealth v. Young, 695 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. (stating that a written plea colloquy may supplement
an oral colloquy). “The determination of whether the defendant understood
the connotations of the plea and its consequences is made by an
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examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.”
Young, 695 A.2d at 417 (citation omitted).
Further,
[a]ssuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when
the parties enter the plea agreement on the record, and the
court accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the
court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Likewise,
[t]here is an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to
honor any and all promises made in exchange for a defendant's
plea. Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that
duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea
bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a defendant
might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give
up the very valued constitutional guarantees attendant the right
to trial by jury.
Although a defendant has no constitutional right to have
an executory plea agreement specifically enforced, once a plea
actually is entered, and was induced by a prosecutor’s promise
to abstain from making a sentencing recommendation, that
promise must be fulfilled. In determining whether a particular
plea agreement has been breached, we look to what the parties
to this plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of
the agreement.
Where the Commonwealth violates a term of the plea
agreement, the defendant is entitled to receive the benefit of the
bargain.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations, quotation marks, brackets omitted).
At the guilty plea colloquy,1 the Commonwealth noted that it would
“stand silent at the time of sentencing.” N.T., 12/17/09, at 3. Judge
Rangos asked whether there were any agreements between Brunson and the
1
The record indicates that Brunson completed a written guilty plea colloquy;
however, the colloquy is not included in the record.
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Commonwealth besides the Commonwealth’s stipulation and Brunson
responded “[n]o....” Id. at 3-4. Judge Rangos then explained the various
possible sentences and fines that she could impose upon Brunson in each of
his cases. Id. at 6-7.2 Brunson then answered “[y]es” when asked whether
he was “pleading guilty because [he] [was], in fact, guilty.” Id. at 8. Based
on the colloquy, Judge Rangos declared that Brunson had “made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to trial” and accepted his plea.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 382 n.11 (Pa. Super.
2010) (stating that “a defendant is bound by the statements he makes
during his plea colloquy[.]”) (citation omitted).
At the resentencing hearing, Assistant District Attorney Kelly D.
Tomasic’s (“ADA Tomasic”) made recommendations to Judge Rangos
regarding Brunson’s new sentence:
As [Brunson’s counsel] accurately summarized, at the first
case, [No. 200908333], the Commonwealth indeed agrees that
[Brunson] should be resentenced as the [sentencing] guideline
form incorrectly stated that [Brunson] was being charged with
robbery-inflict serious bodily injury. That should be and has
been on the new guideline form changed to robbery-threaten
serious bodily injury which, in fact, lowers his standard range.
We just ask [the] Court to once again sentence [Brunson] within
that standard range. We leave that particular number and range
up to this Court.
***
2
Brunson also indicated that he understood the nature of the charges he
was facing, the factual basis for his plea, the rights he was foregoing, and
that he is presumed innocent. N.T., 12/17/09, at 4-5, 8.
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Now, we did concede relief that he should be resentenced
on these cases, but we certainly do not find any reasons for this
[c]ourt to go below that standard range into the mitigated, and
we certainly believe that these sentences should run
consecutive[ly]. There was a reason they were to run
consecutive[ly] in the first place, and we ask this [c]ourt to look
at that and look at its reasons that it placed on the record back
in, I believe, 2010 of [Brunson’s] life of crime.
N.T., 9/23/13, at 7, 24.
Thereafter, Judge Rangos stated the following:
And [in relation to case No. 200908333], in light of the fact that
the OGS was incorrect given the charge, which was threaten
serious bodily injury as opposed to [inflict] serious bodily injury,
and consistent with the intent of my original sentence, I did
sentence him in the standard range on that sentence, I would
today revoke that sentence of 90 to 180 [months] and re-impose
a sentence of 65 to 130 [months] ... and that sentence and the
other sentence at [case No. 200907863] continue[] to run
consecutive[ly] to each other.
***
[In relation to case No. 20098333], the original sentence of 90
to 180 months, it is revoked in light of the change in the [OGS].
The new standard range on that count is 60 to 72 months. In
accordance with the intent of the original sentence and having
considered all of the factors raised at the original sentencing
hearing as well as today, I have re-imposed sentence of 65 to
130 months. It will remain consecutive to the other sentence.
Id. at 27-29 (emphasis added).
With regard to ADA Tomasic’s statements at the resentencing hearing,
Judge Rangos stated the following:
[The] statement by [ADA Tomasic] had no effect on the
ultimate outcome of [Brunson’s] case. The statements made by
counsel are not evidence and this [c]ourt was not bound to
accept a sentencing recommendation from either counsel.
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Commonwealth v. Thuy, 623 A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super.
1993).
Instead, this [c]ourt, after reviewing the Pre-Sentence
Report, sentenced [Brunson] in the standard range of the
Sentencing Guidelines, as it did originally and as it intended to
do previously. The initial plea with a sentence in the standard
range was flawed in only one area. The [OGS] was erroneously
inflated, which caused the [c]ourt to impose an inflated sentence
believing the sentence to be in the standard range. At
resentencing, this [c]ourt used corrected Guidelines and
[Brunson] received the standard range sentence he would have
received initially had the [OGS] been accurately reported to this
[c]ourt.
Since the prosecutor’s statement had no effect on the
validity of the plea, nor did it impact this [c]ourt’s sentence,
counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform the [c]ourt that
the plea agreement had been violated. Even if counsel had
objected, this [c]ourt would not have imposed a different
sentence.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/16, at 4-5.
While ADA Tomasic recommended a sentence for Brunson at
resentencing, Judge Rangos did not utilize the recommendation. See id. at
4. Indeed, the trial court imposed a standard range sentence after
reviewing the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing guidelines,
and the correct OGS. See id.; N.T., 9/23/13, at 7, 25, 27-28; see also
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 663 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating
that “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a presentence investigation
report, we presume that the court properly considered and weighed all
relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s sentence.”). The PCRA court’s
conclusion that Brunson was not prejudiced by ADA Tomasic’s
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recommendation has support in the record, thus we will not disturb it. See
Keaton, 82 A.3d at 426.
As Brunson cannot demonstrate that “but for counsel’s ineffectiveness,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different,” his ineffectiveness claim must be rejected. See Ali, 10
A.3d at 291; see also Martin, 5 A.3d at 183. Further, the totality of the
circumstances indicates that Brunson entered into knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary plea agreement. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed
Brunson’s Petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2016
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