Com. v. Charles, K. ( 2017 )

J-S85033-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
KENNETH A. CHARLES, :
:
Appellant : No. 3687 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 23, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0014400-2007
BEFORE: PANELLA, RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
Kenneth A. Charles (“Charles”) appeals from the Order dismissing his
first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We
affirm.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and
procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See
PCRA Court Opinion, 1/15/16, at 1-3.
On appeal, Charles raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether trial and appellate counsel[2] were ineffective for
failing to file post[-]sentence motions in this matter[,]
depriving [Charles] of his post-sentence rights?
2. Whether [Charles] also asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that the lack
of fingerprint evidence supported a finding that [Charles] did
not commit a burglary inside the house?
1
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2
Charles was represented by the same attorney at trial and on direct appeal.
J-S85033-16
Brief for Appellant at 5 (footnote added).
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
grounds if the record supports it. We grant great deference to
the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Further, where
the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is
de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
In his first issue, Charles contends that trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions challenging (1) the
verdict as against the weight of the evidence (on the basis that Charles
lacked the intent to commit burglary because he entered the house upon
invitation); and (2) his sentence as excessive. Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
Charles asserts that, “with respect to sentencing and weight of the evidence
issues on appeal, post[-]sentence motions are a statutory artifice. No other
issues on appeal require that the [a]ppellant prove merit - if the [a]ppellant
can demonstrate that he asked for an appeal in a timely fashion, it will be
restored as a matter of law.” Id. at 11-12. Charles nevertheless states that
“if the [a]ppellant fails to file post[-]sentence motions with regard to weight
of the evidence and sentencing before appeal, even if he cannot prove that
-2-
J-S85033-16
he would prevail in the lower court, it will be deemed waived by the
appellate courts.” Id. at 12. On this basis, Charles argues that the PCRA
court erred by dismissing his Petition. Id.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Charles’s first issue, set forth
the relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit. See PCRA
Court Opinion, 1/15/16, at 3-8. We agree with the determination of the
PCRA court, which is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal
error, and affirm on this basis as to Charles’s first issue. See id.
In his second issue, Charles contends that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to request a jury instruction that the lack of fingerprint evidence
supported a finding that he did not commit a burglary inside the house.
Brief for Appellant at 13. Charles asserts that “there were no fingerprints
recovered from the location[,] or any of the items in the house ….” Id. at
14. On this basis, Charles claims that a jury instruction was warranted. Id.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Charles’s second issue, set
forth the relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit. See PCRA
Court Opinion, 1/15/16, at 9-10. We agree with the determination of the
PCRA court, which is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal
error, and affirm on this basis as to Charles’s second issue. See id.
Order affirmed.
-3-
J-S85033-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
-4-
Circulated
Received 6/14/2016 6:06:51 AM Superior 01/18/2017 04:29
Court Eastern PM
District
Filed 6/14/2016 6:06:00 AM Superior Court Eastern District
3687 EDA 2015
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF CP-51-CR-OO 14400-2007
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
IIII III7394244131
Ill/II I Ill Ill I I Ill
FILED
KENNETH CHARLES JAN 1 5 2011;
OPINION Post Trial Unit
BRONSON,J. January 15, 2016
I. PROCEDURALBACKGROUND
On July 2, 2008, following a jury trial before this Court, defendant Kenneth Charles was
convicted of burglary (18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)). N.T. 07/02/08 at 4-5.1 On August 12, 2008, the
Court imposed a sentence of ten to twenty years incarceration. N.T. 08/12/08 at 10. Defendant
was represented at trial, sentencing, and on appeal by the Defender's Association of
Philadelphia.
On December 30, 2009, the Superior Court affirmed defendant's judgment of sentence.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocator on July 14, 2010. Defendant then filed a pro
se petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") on September 10, 2010. Emily
Cherniack, Esquire was appointed to represent defendant on July 16, 2012. On July 27, 2014,
Ms. Cherniack filed an Amended PCRA Petition ("Amended Petition") raising claims that trial
counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of
the evidence; 2) failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the excessiveness of the
Court's sentence; and 3) failing to request a jury instruction regarding the lack of fingerprint
evidence. Amended Petition at ,r,r 8, 11-13. On October 6, 2015, after reviewing defendant's
1
A prior trial had resulted in a hung jury.
PCRA Petition and the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, this Court ruled that the claims set
forth in defendant's petition were without merit. On that day, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the
Court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing ("907 Notice"). On
November 23, 2015, the Court entered an order dismissing defendant's PCRA Petition. This
appeal followed.
Defendant has now appealed the Court's dismissal of his PCRA Petition, alleging that:
1) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to file post sentence motions; and 2)
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding the lack of
fingerprint evidence. Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal ("Statement of Errors") at
,r,r 1-2. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's claims are without merit, and the PCRA
Court's order dismissing his PCRA Petition should be affirmed.
II. FACTIJAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this matter is set forth in this Court's 1925(a) opinion filed in
defendant's direct appeal as follows:
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the following witnesses: Gregory
Staton, Barron Draper, Flora Lee Adams, Flora Belle Adams, Marie Gethers,
Michael Gethers, Philadelphia Police Officers Daniel Villafane and Jacqueline
Orth, and Detective John Ellis. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the testimony of these witnesses established the following.
On July 3, 2007, Flora Lee Adams lived at 723 West Roosevelt Boulevard
in Philadelphia with her daughters Marie Gethers and Flora Belle Adams. N.T.
07/01/2008 at 9, 51, 62-63. When she left for work that day at 6:00 a.m., Flora
Lee Adams did her customary check that all of the doors to her home were secure.
N. T. 07/01/2008 at 21. When Ms. Gethers and Flora Belle Adams left for work
separately between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., each secured the locks on each of the
two front doors. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 53-54, 58, 64-66, 88. Only Flora Lee
Adams, Flora Belle Adams, Ms. Gethers, and Ms. Gethers' husband, who did not
live in the home, had a key to the front doors. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 42, 52-53, 57,
2
63, 86-87, 111-112. Flora Lee Adams alone had keys to the other doors of the
house. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 17-18, 23, 25-26, 42. None of these individuals gave
2
While Flora Lee Adams and Ms. Gethers testified that Mr. Gethers did not have a key at that time, Mr. Gethers
testified that he did. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 42, 87, 111.
2
anyone permission to enter the house while they were working during the day.
N.T. 07/01/2008 at 27, 54, 68, 112.
Around 5 :00 p.m., Ms. Gethers returned from work, unlocked the front
doors, and then relocked them once she was inside. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 66, 69,
97. Walking into the vestibule, Ms. Gethers saw defendant standing in the living
room. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 67-68, 97. Frightened, Ms. Gethers unlocked the front
doors and went onto the porch as defendant followed and tried to calm her. N.T.
07/01/2008 at 69-70, 97-98. Defendant told Ms. Gethers that someone had let
him in the house and had then gone to Checkers, but would return soon, and that
he would wait with her for the police. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 71, 99-100. Ms.
Gethers then called her husband and 911. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 71, 73.
Mr. Draper, a neighbor, noticed defendant and Ms. Gethers on the porch
as he arrived home from work and saw that Ms. Gethers appeared to be upset.
N.T. 06/30/2008 at 70, 72-73, 89, 91. Mr. Draper walked over to the two and
after speaking to Ms. Gethers, began to question defendant. N.T. 06/30/2008 at
73-75, 89; 07/01/2008 at 71, 73-74, 100. Defendant repeated that he had been
invited into the house by some friends who had left to get something to eat, but
were to return. N.T. 06/30/2008 at 74, 76, 92-93. Defendant told Ms. Gethers
and Mr. Draper his true name and gave Mr. Draper the true name and phone
number of his employer. N.T. 06/30/2008 at 75-76, 92; 07/01/2008 at 103.
After fifteen minutes had passed, neither the police nor defendant's friends had
arrived. N.T. 06/30/2008 at 77, 91; 07/01/2008 at 75, 100, 103. Defendant
announced that he had to leave, and then called Ms. Gethers' cell phone so that
she would have his phone number before departing on foot. N.T. 06/30/2008 at
77, 83; 07/01/2008 at 76-77, 102-103. After defendant left, Mr. Draper
discovered that one of the basement windows of the home had been broken. N.T.
06/30/2008 at 80-83, 95-103; 07/01/2008 at 77. When Mr. Draper and Ms.
Gethers went inside, they discovered that a water jug holding spare change had
been moved from the master bedroom and placed inside a shopping cart in the
middle of the living room. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 77-78. The shopping cart had
been moved from its usual place in the dining room, and the laundry which had
been inside it had been dumped out onto the floor. N.T. 07/01/2008 at 20, 26-27,
34-35.
Trial Court Opinion, filed March 12, 2009 at pp. 2-4.
III. DISCUSSION
An appellate court's review of a PCRA court's grant or denial of relief "is limited to
determining whether the court's findings are supported by the record and the court's order is
otherwise free oflegal error." Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1996)
3
(citing Commonwealth v. Legg, 669 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 1995)). The reviewing court "will
not disturb findings that are supported by the record." Id.Here, defendant's claims pertain to the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is presumed effective and the burden to prove otherwise lies
with the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 728 (Pa. 2000), n.10 (citing
Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242, 250 (Pa. 1998)). To obtain collateral relief based
on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell
below accepted standards of advocacy and that as a result thereof, the petitioner was prejudiced.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Pennsylvania, the Strickland standard is
interpreted as requiring proof that: (1) the claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim had
arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked any reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of
counsel caused the petitioner prejudice. Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 648 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 974-75 (Pa. 1987). To satisfy the third prong of the
test, the petitioner must prove that, but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d
1067, 1084 (Pa. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If the PCRA court determines that
any one of the three prongs cannot be met, then the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing as
such a hearing would serve no purpose. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008), app. denied, 956 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2008).
A. Failure to File Post-Sentence Motions
Defendant first claims that his "trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
file post sentence motions in this matter depriving the Defendant of his post-sentence rights."
Statement of Errors at ,i 1. In his Amended Petition, defendant claimed that he wanted to file a
post sentence motion challenging both the weight of the evidence and the excessiveness of his
4
sentence. Amended Petition at~~ 11-12. This claim is without merit as defendant cannot
demonstrate that he requested counsel file such a motion or that he was prejudiced by counsel's
failure to do so.
1. Post-Sentence Motion Challenging the Weight of the Evidence
In his Amended Petition, defendant alleged that he "wanted to file post sentence motions
[challenging the weight of the evidence] where defense was that he had entered the dwelling
after being invited by another individual and thus did not possess the intent necessary to commit
the crime of burglary." Amended Petition at~ 11. Initially, defendant fails to establish that his
claim is of arguable merit as defendant never alleges that he requested either trial or appellate
counsel to file any post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence in this matter.
Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a post sentence motion that defendant never
requested. Commonwealh v. Velasquez, 563 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In addition, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to
file a motion claiming that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. It is well-
established that a new trial may only be granted by the trial court where the verdict was so
contrary to the weight of the evidence as to "shock one's sense of justice." Commonwealth v.
Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 878 A.2d 864 (Pa. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hunter, 554 A.2d 550, 555) (Pa. Super. 1989)). Moreover,
credibility determinations are solely within the province of the fact-finder, and "an appellate
court may not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact."
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 63 A.3d 327 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40
A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2012)). In considering a claim that the trial court erred in refusing
to find that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence, "appellate review is limited to
5
whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim." Taylor, 63
A.3d at 327 (quoting Shaffer, 40 A.3d at 1253).
Here, the evidence admitted at trial plainly established that defendant committed a
burglary when he entered the victim's home. Each resident of the home testified that they left
the home with the doors securely locked. N.T. 7/1/08 at 21, 53-54, 58, 64-66, 88. None of these
individuals gave anyone permission to enter the house while they were working during the day.
N.T. 7/1/08 at 27, 54, 68, 112. Marie Gethers testified that she returned home to find defendant
standing in the living room. N.T. 7/1/08 at 67-68, 97. While the jury heard defendant's assertion
that he was let into the home by some unknown individual, the jury also saw evidence that a
basement window of the home had been broken, that a water jug holding spare change had been
moved from the master bedroom and placed inside a shopping cart in the living room, that the
shopping cart had been moved from its usual place in the dining room, and that the laundry
inside the cart had been dumped onto the floor. N.T. 6/30/08 at 80-83, 95-103; 7/1/08 at 20, 26-
27, 34-35, 77-78.3 The Commonwealth further established defendant's intent and lack of
mistake through the introduction of a prior burglary, where defendant was discovered by police
hiding in a basement after prying open a rear door with a screwdriver. N.T. 5/30/08 at 9; 6/30/08
at 46-63. Therefore, there was compelling evidence to support the jury's conclusion that
defendant entered the home without permission with the intent to commit a theft. As a result, the
Court would have properly denied any post-sentence motion based on the weight of the
evidence.
Accordingly, the record establishes that defendant's claim of counsel's ineffectiveness
for failing to file a post-sentence motion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is
without merit.
3
Defendant's assertion came in at trial through the testimony of the victims in this case. Defendant did not testify at
trial.
6
2. Post-Sentence Motion Challenging Defendant's Sentence
Defendant also claimed in his Amended Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the sentence of 10 to 20 years, and that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present this claim on appeal. Amended Petition at
,r 12. However, nowhere in defendant's Amended Petition does he allege that he requested
counsel file a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. As
stated above, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a post sentence motion that
defendant never requested. Velasquez, 563 A.2d at 1275. With no post sentence motion
challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing being filed, the matter was waived for
purposes of direct appeal. Appellate counsel, therefore, cannot be faulted for failing to raise a
waived claim on appeal.
In any event, defendant must establish that, had counsel presented such a motion, it
"would have led to a different and more favorable outcome at ... sentencing." Commonwealth v.
Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1131-32 (Pa. 2007). This Court would not have altered defendant's
sentence had counsel moved for reconsideration. The record in this matter established that the
Court considered the nature and circumstances of this offense, the presentence investigation
report, the sentencing guidelines, the need for the protection of the public, and the gravity of the
offense in relation to its impact upon the victims. N.T. 8/12/08 at 9. It was clear to the Court
that defendant, having been convicted of eight prior burglaries, and having served multiple state
sentences for those convictions, was unable to be rehabilitated and that defendant would be
committing additional burglaries upon release from custody. N.T. 8/12/08 at 9-10. Because the
sentence was fair, fully justified by the record, and would not have been reduced, defendant was
not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of sentence.
7
Moreover, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's
failure to challenge defendant's sentence, even had trial counsel preserved this issue for appeal.
"Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion." Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 552 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Pa. Super. 1988), app. denied, 571 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1989); see
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007). Where the sentence falls outside the
Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence should be affirmed on appeal unless it is "unreasonable." 42
Pa.C.S. § 978l(c)(3); see Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 130 (Pa. Super. 2006). "The
sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes
into account the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the
gravity of the particular offenses as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the
community." Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal
denied, 820 A.2d 703 (Pa. 2003). The factual basis and reasons for the departure must be stated
on the record. Id.Here, the Court plainly stated its reasons for departing above the sentencing guidelines
and sentencing defendant to the maximum possible penalty allowed by law. Defendant was a
career burglar, whose record demonstrated that he was unable to be rehabilitated. Given
defendant's eight prior burglary offenses, it was clear to the Court that any sentence imposed by
the Court would not serve to rehabilitate defendant, or deter him from committing new burglaries
upon his release. The Court's sentence, therefore, was entirely reasonable and could not have
been successfully challenged on appeal. As defendant cannot demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to present a claim concerning defendant's sentence,
defendant's claim must fail. Sneed, 899 A.2d at 1084.
8
B. Failure to Request Jury Instruction Regarding Lack of Fingerprint Evidence
Finally, defendant avers that "trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury
instruction that the lack of fingerprint evidence supported a finding that the Defendant did not
commit a burglary inside the house." Statement of Errors at 12. This claim is without merit.
The standard of review pertaining to jury instructions is clear:
The trial court possesse[s] broad discretion in phrasing its instructions to the jury
and [is] permitted to choose its own wording so long as the law [is] clearly,
adequately and accurately presented to the jury for consideration. Furthermore, a
trial court need not accept counsel's wording for an instruction, as long as the
instruction given correctly reflects the law. It is axiomatic that, in reviewing a
challenged jury instruction, an appellate court must consider the charge in its
entirety, not merely isolated fragments, to ascertain whether the instruction fairly
conveys the legal principles at issue. Instructions will be upheld if they adequately
and accurately reflect the law and are sufficient to guide the jury properly in its
deliberations.
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 802 (Pa. 2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Rainey,
928 A.2d 215, 242-243 (Pa. 2007). A claim alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to
request a particular jury instruction lacks arguable merit where the defendant was not legally
entitled to such an instruction. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 52 (Pa. 2012) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 462 (Pa. 2011)).
Here, the Court's instructions clearly informed the jury that the lack of evidence could
support a finding of reasonable doubt and require a verdict of not guilty:
Now, although the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the defendant is
guilty, this does not mean that the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond all
doubt or to a mathematical certainty, nor must the Commonwealth demonstrate
the complete impossibility of innocence. That is not required. What is required is
that the Commonwealth prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a reasonable
doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible
person to pause or hesitate in the acting upon a matter of the highest importance
in his or her own affairs. A reasonable doubt must fairly arise out of the evidence
that was presented or out of the lack of evidence presentedwith respect to some
element of each of the crimes charged.
9
I •
N.T. 7/1/08 at 227-228 (emphasis added). The instruction requested by defendant, that "the lack
of fingerprint evidence supported a finding that the [defendant] did not commit a burglary inside
the house," did not further explicate the law. Instead, it was an argument in favor of a not guilty
verdict that trial counsel was permitted to make to the jury. Defendant has not cited, and this
Court is unaware of, any authority requiring the Court to set forth defendant's theories and
arguments in the jury charge. Accordingly, defendant's underlying claim is without arguable
merit and defendant's derivative claim of counsel's ineffectiveness must fail. Miller, 987 A.2d
at 648. No relief is due.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's order dismissing defendant's PCRA Petition
should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
GLENN B. BRONSON, J.
10