DiPaolo, D. v. Times Publishing ( 2016 )


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  • J-A04011-16
    
    2016 PA Super 125
    DOMINICK D. DIPAOLO,                            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY, D/B/A
    ERIE TIMES NEWS, CYBERINK, LP, D/B/A
    GOERIE.COM, LISA THOMPSON,
    EDWARD PALATELLA JR., AND MICHAEL
    MACIAG,
    Appellants                No. 1713 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order October 10, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
    Civil Division at No(s): 14004-2011
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J.
    DISSENTING OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:                    FILED JUNE 15, 2016
    Because I am of the opinion that neither Thompson’s notes on the
    November 10, 2010 hearing nor the reporters’ spreadsheet are crucial to
    Judge DiPaolo’s case, I respectfully dissent.
    The qualified First Amendment [reporter’s] privilege
    protects members of the news media from divulging their
    sources, including unpublished information. See United States
    v. Cuthbertson, 
    630 F.2d 139
    , 147 (3d Cir.1980); Riley v. City
    of Chester, 
    612 F.2d 708
    , 714-15 (3d Cir.1979). This privilege,
    designed to protect freedom of the press by insuring a free flow
    of information to reporters, will be overcome only where a
    demonstrated, specific need for evidence presents a paramount
    interest to which the privilege must yield. Riley v. City of
    Chester, supra at 715-716 (citing United States v. Nixon,
    
    418 U.S. 683
    , 713 (1974)). The determination of whether the
    privilege has been overcome must be made on a case-by-case
    basis, balancing the rights of reporters under the First
    Amendment against the interests of those seeking the
    J-A04011-16
    information the reporters possess.            Id.; McMenamin v.
    Tartaglione, 
    590 A.2d 802
    , 811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). This
    balancing of interests will tip in favor of disclosure of information
    where: 1) the information sought is material, relevant and
    necessary; 2) there is a strong showing that it cannot be
    obtained by alternative means, and 3) the information is crucial
    to the plaintiff’s case. Riley v. City of Chester, supra at 716-
    717; McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 
    supra.
    Davis v. Glanton, 
    705 A.2d 879
    , 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
    The trial court ordered production of the notes taken by Thompson on
    the Unicredit court hearing of November 10, 2010, before Judge Dunlavey.
    Thompson had reported on this hearing in two articles, one published on
    November 11, 2010, and one published on November 14, 2010. As noted by
    the learned Majority, Judge DiPaolo filed a three-count complaint averring
    “libel with respect to a series of print and online articles and blogs published
    on November 14, 2010; November 28, 2010; April 16, 2011; and April 17,
    2011.” Majority Opinion, at 1. Thus, the November 11, 2010 article, which
    paraphrased Judge Dunlavey’s “I am certain” comment at the hearing as
    “likely” in the article, was not cited as a basis for Judge DiPaolo’s libel
    claims. In fact, Judge DiPaolo averred that Thompson’s November 11, 2010
    article was “a fair report of the proceedings and did not in any way intimate
    or suggest that Judge Dunlavey questioned Judge DiPaolo’s practices in the
    proceeding.”    Amended Complaint, 12/28/11, at ¶ 57.               Accordingly,
    Thompson’s notes for the November 11, 2010 article are not crucial to
    Judge DiPaolo’s case.
    -2-
    J-A04011-16
    The trial court also ordered the production of an unpublished
    spreadsheet prepared by reporters Palatella and Maciag.      The spreadsheet
    purportedly contained collected data and analysis of the hundreds of
    Unicredit cases filed in Judge DiPaolo’s court, some of which were from
    outside of Judge DiPaolo’s jurisdiction.    According to Judge DiPaolo, the
    April 17, 2010 article “ran a purportedly ‘in-depth’ report on Judge Dipaolo’s
    office and the Unicredit cases, titled: “Judge’s cases from outside district,’”
    suggesting that his handling of the Unicredit cases was improper because
    some of the debtors were not located in his ward and because he had
    familial relationships with some of the debtors and Unicredit’s president.
    Amended Complaint, 12/28/11, at ¶¶ 92, 99, 101, 102.            Judge DiPaolo
    further averred that the challenged April 17, 2010 article was “published
    within a month before the primary elections, in which Judge DiPaolo was
    running for reelection both the Republican and Democratic ticket.” Amended
    Complaint, 12/28/11, at ¶ 95.
    As Appellants contend, Judge DiPaolo did not assert that the
    spreadsheet contained inaccurate or defamatory information.        Appellants’
    Brief at 23. Thus, its relevance is unproven. Moreover, Judge DiPaolo has
    not provided any showing—let alone a strong one— that he could not obtain
    by alternative means the data purportedly contained in the spreadsheet
    concerning cases filed in his own office. Finally, Judge DiPaolo has failed to
    -3-
    J-A04011-16
    demonstrate how the spreadsheet is crucial to a defamation claim based on
    the April 17, 2010 article. Davis, 
    705 A.2d at 885
    .
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1713 WDA 2014

Filed Date: 6/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/15/2016