Andre, S. v. Hinton, N. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SYLVIE ANDRE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NYREE D. HINTON :
:
Appellant : No. 1578 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Orders Entered July 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at
No(s): DR-0014321
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2022
Nyree D. Hinton appeals from the order establishing his child support
obligation and the order denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction. As these orders are unappealable, we quash.
This support action commenced in March 2021 when the Office of Child
Support Services in Stamford, Connecticut submitted a Uniform Support
Petition to the Northampton County Domestic Relations Section (“DRS”). Trial
Court Opinion, filed October 1, 2021, at 1-2. The Petition had been filed in
Connecticut in January 2021, naming Sylvie Andre as the petitioner and
asserting Hinton is responsible for the support for one child (“Child”). Id. at
2. Attached to the Petition was Child’s Connecticut birth certificate, listing
Hinton as Child’s father, and a Connecticut Department of Public Health
Acknowledgement of Paternity form, indicating Hinton had signed it after
Child’s birth in the presence of a notary. Id.
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The court directed the parties to appear before a DRS conference officer
in April 2021. Hinton, who is self-represented, was present telephonically, and
made statements regarding his residence, employment, income, and student
loans. Id. at 2-3. Among other things, Hinton told the conference officer that
he resided in the City of Easton and earned $75,000.00 per year. Id. at 2.
Hinton contested that he is Child’s father, and the conference officer informed
him that an Acknowledgment of Paternity form and birth certificate state that
he is Child’s father. Id. at 3.
Following the conference, the officer called Hinton to request
corroborating documentation regarding his income and expenses. See Order,
4/27/21, at 5. The conference officer noted that based on Hinton’s statements
“that the writing on the Acknowledgement of Paternity is not his & that the
document has been falsified, this matter is being listed for a Court hearing
before a Judge where parties can testify under oath.” Id. The trial court
entered an order continuing the proceedings. Id. at 1.
Hinton filed multiple documents, including a written demand for a de
novo hearing and several motions to dismiss the support action on the basis
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4. The court noted on
the docket that the demand for a de novo hearing was premature, as a
recommended order had not been issued. Id. at 3. The court scheduled a
hearing and ordered the parties to appear at the “hearing De Novo. listed on
defendant’s Motion to dismiss [sic].” Order, 4/30/21.
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At the hearing, Hinton refused to be sworn before the court.1 The court
thereafter entered an order denying Hinton’s motions to dismiss, “based upon
[Hinton]’s failure to present evidence in support of said motion[s], as he
refused to be sworn to tell the truth and did not continue with the
proceedings.” Trial Ct. Op. at 6. The court also entered an order establishing
Hinton’s monthly support obligation at $893.00.2 Id. The order states that it
is “[f]inal.” See Order dated July 14, 2021, at 1. However, the court issued
notice that Hinton could request a de novo hearing within 20 days. Id. at 5;
Trial Ct. Op. at 14.
Hinton filed both a “Notice to Request De Novo Hearing” and a notice of
appeal.3 Hinton raises the following:
I. The Trial Failed to Comply with Proper Court Procedures & Due
Process Pursuant Rule 1910.7. Pleading by Defendant Not
Required. Question of Jurisdiction or Venue or Statute of
Limitations in Paternity
II. The Trial Court Had No Personal Jurisdiction Over Appellant
Pursuant Rule 1910.2 Venue. Transfer of Action
____________________________________________
1 Andre attended telephonically from Connecticut. Trial Ct. Op. at 4.
2This was comprised of $812.00 for support and $81.00 towards the total of
$5,259.30 in arrears. Hinton received a 4% downward deviation from the
guideline support amount based on his student loan expense. Trial Ct. Op. at
6.
3 Hinton’s initial Notice of Appeal erroneously stated his appeal was from
orders entered on June 13 and 14, 2021, although he attached the orders
dated July 13 and 14, 2021, denying his motions to dismiss and establishing
his support obligation. Hinton has since filed an Amended Notice of Appeal
reflecting that his appeal is from the orders dated July 13 and 14, 2021, which
were entered on the trial court docket on July 15, 2021.
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III. The Trial Court Failed Review Important Evidence & Abused
Its Discretion by Accepting an Incomplete Acknowledgement of
Paternity Form Pursuant 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) & Selectively
Accepting Evidence from Defendant
IV. The Trial Court Had No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
Federal Interstate Contract Pursuant Procedural rule 1910.11
V. The Trial Court Erred in Establishing Paternity Without Due
Process for the Defendant for Refusal to Swear In – Constitutional
Violations
VI. The Trial Court Withheld Critical Evidence & Erred by Not
Granting Discovery Pursuant Rule 1930.5 – Constitutional
Provisions
VII. The Trial Court Made Material Misstatements of Fact
VIII. The Trial Court Erred in the Calculation Support & Arrears
Hinton’s Br. at 6 (unpaginated).
We do not consider any of Hinton’s issues because his appeal is
premature. An appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of the trial
court. Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 dictates that a final
order is one which disposes of all claims and parties; disposes of only some
claims or parties but is specifically entered as a final order and “upon an
express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of
the entire case;” or disposes of a petition for post-conviction collateral relief.
See id. at (b), (c), (f). Hence, where an award of child support does not
resolve all the issues of the case, the order is interlocutory. See Deasy v.
Deasy, 730 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa.Super. 1999) (quashing appeal of interlocutory
child support award where court had granted father’s exceptions in part and
remanded the case for a hearing and determination of support obligation);
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McCandless v. Freedman, 700 A.2d 546, 548 (Pa.Super. 1997)
(“[I]nterim/temporary support orders are not appealable”).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explains that it entered the
support order as an interim order and gave Hinton notice of his right to
demand a de novo hearing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 14-17. And, because Hinton
has indeed filed a demand for a de novo hearing, the Rules of Civil Procedure
require that a new hearing be held. See id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11(f)-(i)).
The support order was therefore not a final determination of the merits of the
case, but an interlocutory order. Although the support order purported to be
“final,” the parties and the court clearly contemplated further proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, the order denying Hinton’s motions to dismiss does not qualify
as a final order, as it does not dispose of any claims or parties or otherwise
meet the definition of a final order under Rule 341. Further evidentiary
proceedings before the trial court may resolve questions surrounding
jurisdiction and the calculation of child support. If one or both parties find
those resolutions to be erroneous, they may appeal at the conclusion of the
case.
Where an order is interlocutory, an appeal may be taken as of right if it
is from a collateral order under Appellate Rule 313, or if the appeal meets the
criteria for an interlocutory appeal as of right under Appellate Rule 311. See
Pa.R.A.P. 311, 313. A collateral order is one that is “separable from and
collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important
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to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is
postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). A party may also appeal an interlocutory order by
permission, under Appellate Rule 312. See Pa.R.A.P. 312.
Neither order in this case qualifies as a collateral order, as the questions
involved are central to the case. Nor does Appellant have a right to an
interlocutory appeal as of right. Relevant here, Rule 311 allows for the
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order sustaining venue or personal
jurisdiction. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(b). However, such an order only qualifies for
appeal under this Rule if the plaintiff files an election that the order shall be
deemed final or “the court states in the order that a substantial issue of venue
or jurisdiction is presented.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(1), (2). Neither circumstance
has occurred here. Nor has Hinton sought permission to appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
312. As the orders from which Hinton appeals are unappealable, we quash the
instant appeal.
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/12/2022
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