In the Int. of: K.T., Appeal of: K.T. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.T. :
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: No. 1245 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered October 13, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000197-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY :
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES :
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: No. 1279 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered October 13, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s):
CP-02-AP-0000197-2019
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JUNE 2, 2022
In these consolidated matters, the Allegheny County Office of Children,
Youth, and Families (CYF) and K.T. (Child), through her guardian ad litem,
appeal the denial of the petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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of K.S.T. (Mother) as to her six-year-old daughter, Child.1 CYF filed its petition
on November 30, 2020, pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) and (b)
under the Adoption Act. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (b). The orphans’
court determined that CYF established the grounds for termination under
Section 2511(a), but that CYF failed to provide clear and convincing evidence2
that termination best served Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b).
Thus, the court concluded that CYF failed to meet the second prong of the
bifurcated termination analysis; the court found that the evidence presented
proved that Child had an emotional bond with Mother, and permanently
severing that bond would have a detrimental impact on Child. The court
denied CYF’s petition, and CYF and Child timely appealed. After careful review,
we affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court summarized the evidence presented
regarding Mother’s history and involvement with CYS, deeming it to have
clearly and convincingly established the statutory grounds for involuntary
termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8):
Mother first came to the attention of CYS dating back to 2009, but
the present case regarding [C]hild began upon [C]hild’s birth in
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1Child was born in June 2016. The parental rights of Child’s biological father,
E.M. were terminated by Order of the court dated October 13, 2021. E.M. has
not filed an appeal of the order terminating his parental rights.
2 Clear and convincing evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
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2016 when [C]hild was born drug exposed, resulting in concerns
about Mother’s substance use.
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Due to continued substance abuse and housing instability, as well
as a report of an incident involving Mother’s older child, CYF
removed [C]hild from the home on March 7, 2017. By this time,
CYF had become concerned with Mother’s mental health… In June
of 2017, [C]hild [, who was originally placed with her maternal
grandmother] was re-placed with her godmother, [N.P.], an
adoptive resource, where she has remained since that time.
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Mother has had continuing issues with substance abuse, having
attempted several times to abstain, with the help of CYF, which
started at a young age.
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She started out hanging out at bars and started using marijuana
at the age of 14 or 15. This became a daily habit and she
eventually started using cocaine, which was sometimes offered to
her by patrons at the adult entertainment club where she worked.
Her early life has resulted in the diagnosis of several mood and
personality disorders. As a result, she has experienced issues
focusing, as well as regulating her responses to stress. This had
led to a history of summary citations and criminal charge(s).
Mother has made progress in dealing with her mental health
concerns, as well as substance use concerns, but has had trouble
improving her judgment and achieving and maintaining a stable
pattern of adjustment. Mother continues to be unable to
understand the role of drugs in her life and how they affect
behavior otherwise and, in combination with the other concerns
regarding her mental health, this results in a guarded prognosis
for improvement.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO) at 2-3, 14 (citations omitted).
CYF presents one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion in denying CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of Mother, K.T. after CYF proved by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights
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would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?
CYF’s Brief at 3. Child presents a substantially identical issue in this appeal.
Child’s Brief at 6.
We begin our review by setting forth our standard of review:
When a trial court makes a “close call” in a fact-intensive case
involving a goal change or the termination of parental rights, the
appellate court should review for an abuse of discretion and for
whether evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions; the
appellate court should not search the record for contrary
conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
In the Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021). And further,
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon a determination of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.3 As stated
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3 In In re C.M.K. 203 A.3d 258 (Pa. Super. 2019), our Court explained the
bifurcated analysis as follows:
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above, the court found that statutory grounds for termination existed under
Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8); these findings are uncontested, and CYF
therefore met the first prong of the bifurcated analysis. We therefore review
whether the second prong of the analysis was met. Section 2511(b) states in
relevant part:
(b) Other considerations. – The court in terminating the rights of
a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to beyond the control
of the parent.
23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b).
Our Court has explained the application of Section 2511(b) as follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry
into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the
parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child
of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory ground for
termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child[.]
Id. at 261-262 (citation omitted).
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reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the
bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). In regard to
the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, but whether
termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.
See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted).
Further, we note that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her child
is a major aspect of the [Section 2511(b)] best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the
intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent.” Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.
Super. 2010)).
In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court
stated:
In the instant case, this court considered the evidence and
testimony presented and found that CYF failed to demonstrate,
clearly and convincingly, that termination would meet the needs
and welfare of [Child]. The evidence presented and submitted to
this Court instead proved that [Child] had an emotional bond with
her Mother, and that permanently severing that bond would have
a determinantal impact on [Child].
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/22/21, at 15. The court noted that of seven
witnesses called by CYF at the two-day trial, only two testified as to the bond
between Mother and Child: Amanda McCloy, caseworker for CYF4 and Dr. Neil
Rosenblum, a clinical psychologist who performed three individual and
interactional evaluations of Mother and Child, and of foster mother and Child,
over a two and one-half year period. Id. at 16-17; See CYF Exhibit 3 –
Forensic Evaluation Reports by Neil D. Rosenblum, Ph.D., 5/19/18, 1/14/20,
12/18/20.
In its opinion, the court highlighted Dr. Rosenblum’s forensic evaluation
reports regarding Child’s eagerness to spend time with Mother as well as his
testimony regarding Child’s attachment to Mother, the fact that she very much
enjoys seeing and spending time with Mother, and the reluctance Child
displayed at having to leave Mother at the end of a visit. TCO at 17. The
court further accentuated Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that there has been no
significant period of time where Mother and Child have not been in some sort
of contact, and that Mother sees Child more than many of the parents he has
evaluated in similar situations. Id. at 18. Finally, the court referred to Dr.
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4 Ms. McCloy provided testimony regarding Mother’s treatment for substance
abuse and her criminal history; however, she provided scant testimony
regarding the bond between Mother and Child, noting only that when being
transported to her visits, Child looks forward to seeing Mother and that Mother
was generally nurturing of Child; she testified that due to Covid and the need
for virtual contact only, she had never had to opportunity to observe in-person
interaction between them. N.T. 5/12/21 at 92, 128.
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Rosenblum’s specific statement that Child should be allowed to maintain some
degree of contact with Mother.5 Id. The orphans’ court concluded that “the
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5 At the hearing, the orphans’ court questioned Dr. Rosenblum at length,
inquiring specifically whether he thought that Mother would ever be in a
position to assume a safe and secure environment for [Child] to grow and
develop. Dr. Rosenblum answered as follows:
Not for this child, no. Again, I believe the die has been cast.
Attachment is most critically formed in the--between one and two
years of life. This child has lived now almost five years in the
same home. I think she has a secure foundation, a secure
relationship with her primary caregiver. I would say the verdict
would be out as to whether birth mother might ever be in a
position to parent a child successfully. But for this child I believe
there would be significant trauma for [Child] to be removed from
this home. So I don’t see a very favorable prognosis even if
[Mother] was functioning significantly better than she is now,
which, again, there’s no guarantee. But I think for this child the
train has left the station quite some time ago.
N.T., 5/13/21 at 127. The court then referred to Dr. Rosenblum’s final report,
quoting back to him the doctor’s final statement, wherein he indicated that
Child should be allowed to maintain some degree of contact with her mother
and that he saw no harm in occasional visits, even if supervised; the court
asked Dr. Rosenblum whether he believed that Child should be allowed to
maintain some contact with Mother and Dr. Rosenblum responded,
Yeah. I always – almost always feel that way. I don’t believe that
birth mother [is] malicious towards her daughter. I think her love
is genuine. Again, I think life has not given birth mother the best
support or help in forming a positive identity for herself and a
positive direction in her life. As I said, there’s a lot of conflict right
now and existing animosity between the foster mother and the
birth mother. But if we were to look at ideally what would be in
[Child]’s best interest, certainly the love that her mother has for
her if it can be shaped into a supportive role, not a critical role,
not putting foster mother down, not criticizing her care, there’s
always an advantage to having those connections to, you know,
biological roots and people who love you.
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evidence clearly established that if the emotional bond between [Child] and
[Mother] was permanently severed, then [Child] would be adversely affected,”
and that it was “within its discretion when it denied CYF’s petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights.” Id. at 18-19.
Dr. Rosenblum testified at great length regarding both the Mother-Child
relationship and Child’s relationship with her foster mother. He opined
unequivocally that Child’s strong, primary attachment is to her foster mother;
foster mother’s home is the only home Child can remember, she thrives under
her foster mother’s care, and she would experience significant trauma if she
were removed from the foster home. N.T., 5/13/21 at 120-21, 127. At the
hearing, he summarized his observations of the Mother/Child relationship as
follows:
Well, [Child] certainly knows her mother. She is always glad to
see her. I would say they have a playful relationship. Mother
does tend to try to be active with her and engage in positive
activities. I would say that [Mother] is not as - doesn’t treat
[Child] in as mature a fashion as her foster mother does. She
tends to fuss over her, refer to her as her baby. She is her
youngest child. She doesn’t provide her with the same degree of
structure or exposure to learning or cognitive activities as foster
mother does and she is not as directive in getting her to engage
in learning activities or developmental activities that would
expand her knowledge. But she’s nurturing. She’s affectionate
with [Child].
N.T., 5/13/21 at 85.
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Id. at 128.
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Dr. Rosenblum referred to foster mother as Child’s “instrumental
parent,” and to the relationship between Mother and Child as “a more ancillary
relationship.” Id. at 90. However, when questioned as to whether, if Child
were to have less or even no contact with Mother, the lack of contact would
be so detrimental to Child that the court should not terminate parental rights,
Dr. Rosenblum responded,
No. I think it would be a loss, but in my clinical opinion it does
not outweigh the need for the opportunity to move forward in her
life with the continuity of care and with the sound direction that
[Child] – and emotional support that she receives in her current
family environment.
Id. at 130.
On appeal, CYS claims the orphans’ court’s conclusions are manifestly
unreasonable and unsupported by the record. CYS acknowledges that the
record supports the court’s conclusion that there is an emotional bond
between Mother and Child but asserts that it erred when it neglected to
examine Child’s bond with her foster parent or consider Child’s need for
permanency as part of its needs and welfare analysis. Child contends that the
court took Dr. Rosenblum’s reports and testimony out of context to support
its conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not serve
Child’s needs and welfare. We cannot agree.
Over the course of two days of hearings, the orphans’ court questioned
Dr. Rosenblum at length as to whether he believed Mother might ever mature
to the point where she might provide a safe and secure family environment in
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which Child could grow. The orphans’ court heard testimony from Dr.
Rosenblum as to Child’s relationship with her foster mother and listened as
well to his opinion as to the trauma he believes Child would experience if she
were removed from her foster mother’s home. The record contains, inter
alia, Dr. Rosenblum’s final forensic evaluation, wherein he concludes that the
foster mother, who works as a teaching assistant at the same school Child
attends, is “very nurturing and emotionally supportive” and has done “an
excellent job of providing [Child] with a safe, stable and secure family
environment.” Forensic Evaluation Report, 12/18/20, at 11.
Our Supreme Court has instructed us that:
Termination of parental rights is among the most powerful legal
remedies that the judicial system possesses. The decision to
sever permanently a parent’s relationship with a child is often
bound up in complex factual scenarios involving difficult family
dynamics and multiple service providers. Our trial courts are
tasked with carefully considering and weighing all of the evidence
presented at termination hearings in determining whether the
petitioning party has met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that termination meets the exacting
standards outline in the Adoption Act.
In the Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1129.
Here, we allow that the record supports a finding that Child’s needs and
welfare may best be served by a life in foster mother’s home: “[i]f she remains
in her current placement, [Child] faces a very bright future, with a high
probability of continued success and sustained emotional growth in the years
to come.” Forensic Evaluation Report, 12/18/20, at 11. There is abundant
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evidence that Child’s bond with her foster mother is a strong one, and the
significant trauma that would be caused if Child was removed from the foster
home. While our Court has held that the orphans’ court can equally emphasize
the relationship between a child and a foster parent, we have not required the
court to do so. See N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103. Here, the orphans’ court’s denial
of the termination petition was ultimately informed by its evaluation of the
bond that clearly exists between Mother and Child, and its determination that
this bond was worth preserving. On appeal, we must review whether the
record supports that determination, and we find that it does.
Before the orphans’ court, Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluation, however
conditional (“if it can be shaped into a supportive role, not a critical role, not
putting foster mother down, not criticizing her care”), was that it would be in
Child’s best interest to be allowed to maintain some degree of contact with
Mother. N.T., 5/13/21, at 127-128. We cannot reweigh the evidence, and as
such we conclude that there is record support for the orphans’ court decision
to deny CYF’s termination petition under Section 2511(b). The orphans’ court
acted within its discretion, and we therefore affirm the court’s October 13,
2021 order.
Order affirmed.
Judge McCaffery joins the Memorandum.
Judge Murray files a Dissenting Memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/2/2022
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