In Re: J.R.S., Appeal of: J.S. ( 2022 )

J-S11033-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.R.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1224 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 32A-2021 O.C.
IN RE: J.D.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1226 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 33A-2021 O.C.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: June 29, 2022
J.S. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions filed by
the Jefferson County Children & Youth Services (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to
involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his daughter, J.R.S., born in
December 2003, and son, J.D.S., born in July 2007 (collectively, “the
Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8),
(11), and (b). We affirm.
J-S11033-22
This Court previously set forth the factual and procedural background of
this case as follows:
As a matter of background, [CYS] has been involved with
this family since 2017. On July 13, 2017, CYS filed dependency
petitions and alleged that the Children were without proper
parental care or control. [See] 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302(1).
Specifically, CYS received a report that indicated that the Children
were physically fighting with one another, throwing things, and
not listening to Mother. Mother stated several times to a service
provider that she could not handle the Children any longer and
she wanted them out of her home. On August 30, 2017, the trial
court held a hearing on the dependency petitions. In orders dated
August 30, 2017, and entered on September 6, 2017, the trial
court adjudicated the Children dependent. The orders directed
that the Children remain in their separate foster care placements.
On June 27, 2018, the trial court ordered termination of court
supervision, and reunified the Children with Mother and Father.
However, CYS continued to receive multiple referrals regarding
the family.
On November 10, 2019, CYS received a report that J.[R.]S.
returned home from the Meadows Psychiatric Center and resumed
her previous behaviors of screaming, not listening, and refusing
to follow instructions. Mother and J.[R.]S. engaged in a verbal
altercation that prompted the caseworker to call the police. On
November 12, 2019, the trial court granted CYS emergency
protective custody of J.[R.]S., and she was placed in foster care.
On December 5, 2019, J.[R.]S. was placed in a Group Home at
Pathways Adolescent Center because her foster care placement
was not able to manage [her] behaviors. Mother and Father
eventually ended their tumultuous relationship, and J.D.S.
remained in Father’s home. On July 24, 2020, J.[R.]S. moved to
a Group Home at Bethesda Lutheran Services because her
previous placement did not believe that J.[R.]S. would make any
more progress with them. On September 17, 2020, J.[R.]S.
moved to a Residential Treatment Facility at Perseus House-
Andromeda House for her to receive the mental health services
she requires.
On or about July 31, 2020, the trial court granted CYS
emergency custody of J.D.S. due to lack of parental care and
control in Father’s home. [See] N.T., 9/23/20, at 5. At that time,
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Mother was incarcerated because she violated a [Protection From
Abuse (“PFA”)] order that Father filed against her. Id. at 20[,]
25. [Mother remained incarcerated until October 2020.] J.D.S.
was placed in the same foster care home where he previously
resided. On August 4, 2020, the trial court adjudicated J.D.S.
dependent. On September 2, 2020, the trial court entered a no-
contact order between Father and CYS because Father was
continuously verbally abusive, harassing, and behaved
inappropriately to all personnel assigned to assist the family in the
home.
The trial court held an adjudication hearing on September
23, 2020. Rebecca Sallack, a caseworker for CYS, testified that
the underlying basis for emergency custody of J.D.S. was due to
the “continuous trauma that this child has dealt with over the
course of his life.” Id. at 29. More specifically, she testified that
Father constantly “badmouthed” and made “inappropriate
comments” about Mother, in front of J.D.S., to the home health
nurse, to CYS and to service providers. Id. at 7. Ms. Sallack
stated that Father was argumentative when asked if pest
management could perform an evaluation after reports of a bed
bug infestation of the home. Id. at 8. Ms. Sallack explained that
Father “fought” CYS until “after multiple attempts he eventually
gave in and said, Whatever, with an attitude, to have the home
looked at . . .. [W]hen pest management did the evaluation, they
found bed bugs in the home. [Father] then stated that [CYS]
asked pest management to say there was [sic] bed bugs in the
home.” Id. Father was also argumentative regarding counseling
for J.D.S. Id. at 9. Ms. Sallack stated that multiple service
providers indicated that Father behaved inappropriately, was
aggressive, and made them feel uncomfortable. Id. at 10-11.
Ms. Sallack explained that Father was “constantly argumentative,
belligerent, verbally aggressive, takes very little responsibility for
his part of the kids being removed, [and] blames [Mother] for the
majority of the issues.” Id. at 12. Ms. Sallack recounted an
incident where Father choked J.[R.]S. and admitted that he told
J.[R.]S. “she will have to be a little [f------] whore to keep a roof
over her head.” Id. at 13-14.
With regard to Mother, Ms. Sallack testified that there was
an extensive history of Mother’s aggressive behavior towards
Father and the Children. Id. at 27. Notably, Ms. Sallack testified
that a no-contact order was put in place between J.[R.]S. and
Mother because “the phone calls [between them] were getting
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aggressive, and J.[R.]S.’s behaviors were increasing . . . she was
fighting with peers, fighting with staff, threatening to harm
herself, [and] threatening suicide.” Id. at 17[,] 26. Ms. Sallack
testified that chaos, noise, and arguments exacerbate symptoms
of anxiety for J.[R.]S. Id. at 34. Ms. Sallack explained that
J.[R.]S. should avoid conflicts and interactions with people who
cannot manage their behaviors, and recommended a goal change
for J.[R.]S. Id.
Ms. Sallack opined that the Children need a plan for
permanency. Id. at 27. She explained, “[t]his has gone on
entirely too long, and it’s- - like I said, this is not something that’s
new. If you go back through the case record, and this fighting
and this bickering and the police [being] called, this is years and
years and years on these kids.” Id. at 27.
On the record, at the conclusion of the September 23, 2020
hearing, the trial court stated it would change the Children’s goals
to adoption, and enter its orders on that same date. . . . Father
and Mother filed timely notices of appeal . . ..
In re J.S., 260 A.3d 102 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at
**1-6). This Court affirmed the goal change orders. See id. (unpublished
memorandum at *18).
Thereafter, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary termination of
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to Children. The trial court conducted a
hearing on September 2, 2021. Father participated via telephone from
Florida, where he had relocated, and was represented by counsel. Mother was
present and represented by counsel. Further, the Children were represented
by a guardian ad litem and court-appointed legal counsel. During the hearing,
the Agency presented the testimony of Ms. Sallack. Mother and Father each
testified on their own behalf. The guardian ad litem and legal counsel for the
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Children argued in favor of termination of parental rights. See N.T., 9/2/21,
at 84-86.1
On September 16, 2021, the trial court entered decrees terminating
Father’s parental rights.2 Father filed timely notices of appeal, as well as
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court sua sponte consolidated Father’s appeals.
The trial court complied with Rule 1925(a).3
Father raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt made an error of law or abused
its discretion in terminating [Father’s] parental rights under
23 Pa C.S.[A. § 2511](a)(2)?
[2.] Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt made an error law or abused its
discretion in terminating [Father’s] parental rights under 23
Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511](b)?
Father’s Brief at 6.
____________________________________________
1 Although the trial court incorporated the dependency records into the
termination proceedings, see N.T., 9/2/21, at 56-57, those records are not
included in the certified record. However, this omission does not impair our
review. Additionally, the trial court admitted Exhibit CYS 1, which consists of
documentation regarding Father’s status as a registered sexual offender in
Florida. See id. at 14. However, this exhibit is not included in the certified
record. Nevertheless, given Father’s admission that he is a registered sexual
offender, the omission of the exhibit does not impair our review. See id. at
82.
2The trial court also involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to J.R.S.
and J.D.S. Mother’s appeals are pending at separate docket numbers, and we
address her appeals in a separate memorandum.
3In lieu of authoring a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court relied on its
September 16, 2021 opinion explaining the basis for its decrees.
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Our standard of review of a decree involuntarily terminating parental
rights is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations
and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the
court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the
opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 and
requires the trial court to conduct a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for
termination under subsection (a) followed by the consideration of the needs
and welfare of the child under subsection (b). The initial focus is on the
conduct of the parent. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007).
The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies one of the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in section 2511(a). Id. Only if the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 2511(b),
relating to the needs and welfare of the child. Id. We have defined clear and
convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance,
of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (11), and (b).4 Where, as here, the
trial court determines that there are grounds for termination under more than
one subsection of section 2511(a), we need only agree with the trial court’s
determination as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Given this latitude, we analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant to
subsections (a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
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4 Notably, Father has not raised any challenge related to the trial court’s
determinations under subsections 2511(5), (8), and (11) in either his concise
statement or in his statement of questions presented. As such, Father has
waived any claim of error related to these subsections. See In re
M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that issues not
raised in the concise statement or in the statement of questions presented are
waived). It follows that we may affirm the decrees on the basis of subsections
2511(5), (8), and (11).
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
****
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). In order to affirm a termination of parental
rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d
380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).5
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5 We are mindful that, because J.R.S. is now eighteen years old, Father’s
appeal of the decree terminating his parental rights to J.R.S. may be moot.
As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the
judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. In re D.A., 801 A.2d
614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that an issue before a court is moot if in
ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force
or effect). Although J.R.S. is no longer a child, this Court will decide questions
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In Father’s first issue, he challenges the trial court’s determination that
the Agency established grounds for termination under section 2511(a)(2).
With regard to section 2511(a)(2), this Court has explained:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be
met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations
omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
As such, “[a] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of
____________________________________________
that otherwise have been rendered moot when one or more of the following
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: (1) the case involves a question
of great public importance; (2) the question presented is capable of repetition
and apt to elude appellate review; or (3) a party to the controversy will suffer
some detriment due to the decision of the trial court. Id. Here, Father will
clearly suffer detriment as a result of the termination of his parental rights to
J.R.S. Accordingly, we find the doctrine of mootness is overcome and continue
with our analysis.
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uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at
1105 (citation omitted).
With respect to section 2511(a)(2), Father argues that any incapacity
or refusal resulting in a lack of parental care and control no longer exists.
Father claims that marital and family discord was the essential concern in this
matter and that it was not always deemed to be a challenge unable to be
overcome. Further, he asserts that he has remedied the situation by obtaining
a PFA order against Mother and relocating to Florida. Father maintains that
“[b]y taking these actions, and putting a huge distance between himself and
[Mother], . . . he has remedied the conditions and causes underlying any
incapacity.” Father’s Brief at 8.
In finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant
to section 2511(a)(2), the trial court reasoned:
[J.R.S.] was removed from her parents’ care on November
10, 2019. [J.D.S.] followed on July 31, 2020. Neither parent was
able to provide appropriate care and control in either instance.
Both individually and as a couple, their lives were defined by anger
and hostility. Unable to control even themselves, they were
certainly incapable of controlling their children, who quite
naturally absorbed and regurgitated the ugliness surrounding
them.
Since the beginning of the [C]hildren’s dependency, Mother
and Father have sought to blame one another for the conditions
that led to their removal and prevented their return. . ..
****
Like Mother, Father underwent extensive therapy in relation
to the dependency proceedings, and the only thing it seemed to
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teach him was which phrases and buzz words to use while trying
to convince the [c]ourt that he was learning and making progress
toward his treatment goals. In doggedly refusing to cooperate
with CYS except on his own terms; in becoming so aggressive with
Pathways’ [staff] that he was cut off from further communication
while [J.R.S.] resided there; and in engaging with Agency staff
and third-party providers in such a manner as to warrant a
comprehensive no-contact order, moreover, he proved that all the
therapy and other services he had received made no difference
whatsoever. If anything, he was worse at the end than he had
been at the beginning. At the height of his abrasiveness,
moreover, Mother was out of the house. More specifically, Mother
was in jail. Unquestionably, then, even were the [c]ourt to
entertain the idea that one competent adult can “make” another
competent adult behave badly, it can say unequivocally that
Mother bore no responsibility for Father’s behavior after she was
arrested for violating the temporary PFA order. There being no
evidence that Father has rectified the conditions that led to [the
C]hildren’s removal and ultimately to the goal change, therefore,
the [c]ourt wholly rejects the idea that he would be able to
immediately care for the [C]hildren should they be remanded to
his custody in Florida.
Additionally, Father did not articulate even a generic plan
for how he might address his own deficiencies, reengage with [the
Children], and thus arrive at the place where the here [sic] could
safely be reunited as a family, and considering his dependency
history, the [c]ourt is certainly unwilling to assume he would take
any meaningful steps to make that happen should it decline to
terminate his parental rights. Regardless of what he might be
willing to do to alleviate the other issues that have kept him and
[the C]hildren apart, moreover, Father cannot undo the fact that
he is a convicted sex offender under a perpetual duty to register
in his jurisdiction of residence.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/21, at 6-8 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations underlying its decision to involuntarily terminate
Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2). While Ms. Sallack testified
that Father was initially compliant with the family service plan goals, she
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subsequently indicated noncompliance and a lack of progress. See N.T.,
9/2/21, at 20-21. Ms. Sallack described minimal compliance by Father at the
time of the goal change in September 2020. Id. at 20. She similarly stated
that, subsequent to the June 2020 review hearing, Father was not compliant
with the child permanency plans. Id. at 27. She likewise noted no progress
since July 2020, which continued after the goal change in September 2020.
Id. at 39-40. Importantly, Ms. Sallack noted that services were stopped on
September 2, 2020, because the Agency obtained a no-contact order as a
result of Father’s aggressive and inappropriate behavior, which continued
even after Mother was no longer in Father’s home. Id. at 31, 40, 43. For
these reasons, Ms. Sallack explained that “[i]t is the [A]gency’s position that
the parental rights of . . . [Father] be terminated and the [C]hildren be free
for adoption.” Id. at 36.
As the record substantiates the trial court’s finding under section
2511(a)(2) that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect,
or refusal has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or
subsistence necessary for his physical and mental well-being, and that Father
cannot or will not remedy this situation, Father’s first issue merits no relief.
We next determine whether termination was proper under section
2511(b). Where the grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) are
met, the trial court shall then give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child under
subsection 2511(b). See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The emotional needs
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and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability. Id. The determination of the
child’s needs and welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. Id. The utmost attention should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
Id.
The evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task. “In cases
where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is
reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis,
therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert
testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.
Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations
omitted). Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the [s]ection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . ..
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
While a parent may profess to love the child, a parent’s own feelings of
love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental
rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. A child’s life “simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Rather, “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Father challenges the trial court’s finding that his bonds with the
Children were not sufficient to warrant preservation and claims that the court
failed to evaluate those bonds and to adequately weigh the effects of their
severance. Father asserts that J.R.S. has significant emotional ties to her
parents and was begging the trial court to permit her to return to them as late
as June 2020. Father argues that the Agency never completed an updated
bonding assessment, and instead relied on a 2017 assessment. According to
Father, for reasons out of the parents’ control, the assessments scheduled in
2020 were cancelled and rescheduled, but ultimately never completed. Father
maintains that, unless his rights are reinstated, the Children will lose out on
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the paternal support provided to date, and the opportunity to rebuild their
relationship in a new environment away from the previous domestic problems.
The trial court determined that the involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the Children’s needs and welfare
under section 2511(b). The trial court explained its findings, as follows:
[J.D.S.] is in a good home with a family that has loved him
and met his needs for two of the last three years. Physically and
emotionally, his foster parents have engaged with him as though
he were their own son and hope they will have the opportunity to
do just that for the rest of their lives. Perpetually in conflict with
his natural parents, [J.D.S.] has also responded well to his foster
family and shown commendable progress, both academic and
psychological, under their care. Fully reciprocating their love, he,
too, wants his place in the family to become permanent—to have
his foster parents adopt him and give him their last name.
Without a prospective adoptive family, [J.R.S.]’s future is
less certain. Odd though it may sound to someone unfamiliar with
[her] family history, however, the [c]ourt concludes without
hesitation that being a legal orphan will better serve the girl’s
interests than being forced to return to the destructive impact of
one or both of her highly dysfunctional parents. Less equipped
than her brother to process and outwardly manage the emotional
turmoil that has accompanied her interactions with Mother and
Father both before and after she was removed from their home,
[J.R.S.] has only been able to achieve lasting stability since the
[c]ourt severed all communication between them. All past
attempts to reunify the family have resulted in [J.R.S.]’s
regression, and whereas neither Father nor Mother has alleviated
the internal conditions that led to the girl’s removal in the first
place, the [c]ourt has zero expectation that another attempt at
this point will be successful. On the contrary, forcing [J.R.S.] back
into a toxic relationship with either or both of them could prove
even more harmful now, as she will soon be an adult without a
statutory right to the stabilizing services available to her through
CYS and the [c]ourt. While terminating Mother[’s] and Father’s
parental rights may not achieve for [J.R.S.] the same happy
ending available to [J.D.S.], therefore, it is no less what is in her
best interests as she nears the age of majority and independence.
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Counterintuitive as it may seem, it is in her best interests to sever
the parental bonds that have been nothing but distressing even
though she does not now have another family waiting to adopt
her.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/21, at 8-9.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s finding that the
Children’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b).
Significantly, a no-contact order went into place in July 2020 and phone calls
and visits with J.R.S. stopped due to their negative impact on her. See N.T.,
9/2/21, at 21, 29-30, 39. Ms. Sallack described the situation as follows:
So while [J.R.S.] was at Pathways Adolescent Center,
[Mother] was going to visit [J.R.S.] on grounds. She was being
taken up by family members to visit with [J.R.S.] [Father] was
making phone calls. The phone calls and the visits were stopped
on July 8, 2020, [and] that was when the no contact order went
in . . . because Pathways had called and said that after phone calls
and visits between the parents and [J.R.S.], there were major
behavior issues. [J.R.S.] would fight with other students.
[J.R.S.] would scream. [J.R.S.] was verbally aggressive.
She would threaten to kill herself, and her mental health declined
after those visits. And [Father] got verbally aggressive with the
staff at Pathways. And Pathways had asked to not be able to have
contact with him because they could not reason with him on the
phone.
Id. at 29-30.
Further, while J.R.S. remained in a residential treatment facility at the
time of the termination hearing, the Agency was exploring potential foster
home placements. Id. at 35, 42. Ms. Sallack noted that J.R.S. reported that
she is “ready to be with a family where she’s loved and accepted.” Id. at 50.
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Acknowledging the stability J.R.S. had achieved, Ms. Sallack confirmed that
not only had J.R.S. been in her current residential treatment facility placement
for almost one year, but she had learned to manage stress and anxiety. Id.
at 17, 19, 52-54. Ms. Sallack observed, “I had done a visit between [the
Children] three weeks ago, and that interaction between [the Children] was
talking about this day, talking about adoptions coming up, talking about
[J.D.S.] changing his name and [J.R.S.] wanting to find a family where she
could go and change her name as well.” Id. at 50-51.
Moreover, J.D.S. was placed with a pre-adoptive foster family with
whom he had resided for over a year at the time of the hearing, as well as
almost a year when placed previously, and with whom he was bonded and
doing well. Id. at 17, 35-36, 43, 49, 55. As such, he desired to be adopted
and change his name. Id. at 36, 51. Ms. Sallack testified that “[J.D.S.] is
happy where he is and ready to be adopted. . ..” Id. at 51.
While Father may profess to love the Children, his feelings of love and
affection for them will not preclude termination of his parental rights. See In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The Children are entitled to permanency and
stability, and their lives cannot be put on hold in the hope that Father will one
day summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting. Id. at
1125. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations that grounds existed for the
termination of Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and
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(b). As we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm the
decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to J.R.S. and J.D.S.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2022
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