Zapert, K. v. Horn, W. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A14038-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    KIMBERLY L. HORN, N/K/A                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    KIMBERLY L. ZAPERT,                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM A. HORN                            :
    :   No. 172 MDA 2022
    Appellant               :
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Civil Division at No(s):
    0085-FS-2018
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: JULY 5, 2022
    Appellant/Father William A. Horn appeals from the Custody Order
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County on December 30, 2021,
    following a custody trial granting Appellee/Mother Kimberly L. Horn, N/K/A
    Kimberly L. Zapert primary physical custody and Father periods of supervised
    physical custody of the parties’ three minor children: M.H. (born 2005); B.H.
    (born 2008); and A.H. (born 2011) (collectively referred to herein as “Minor
    Children”). The parties also were awarded shared legal custody of the Minor
    Children and required to participate in reunification therapy.
    Recognizing that while there appears to be no physical risk of harm to
    the Minor Children if supervised visits were discontinued but also recognizing
    testimony indicates there remains a mental and emotional risk of harm to the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A14038-22
    older children if supervised visits were discontinued, following a careful
    review, we affirm the Custody Order and the well-reasoned opinion of the
    Honorable George W. Wheeler.
    The instant appeal arises from the latest proceeding in an acrimonious
    and litigious custody matter between Mother and Father. The parties were
    married on August 1, 2006, and a divorce decree was entered on October 13,
    2020. Relevant to the instant appeal, Mother filed a Petition for Protection
    from Abuse (“PFA”) on April 18, 2018, wherein she sought a protective order
    for herself and the Minor Children, and a temporary PFA order was entered
    that day.
    A hearing on the PFA was scheduled for August 3, 2018, and on that
    date the parties entered into a stipulation which, inter alia: vacated the
    temporary PFA order; dismissed the PFA; provided Mother and Father shared
    legal custody of the Minor Children; and provided Mother with primary physical
    and Father partial, supervised custody of the Minor Children, with the caveat
    that M.H. and B.H. may choose not attend the supervised periods of custody.
    On September 12, 2018, Father filed a Petition for Modification of
    Custody wherein he averred that supervision of his custody visits was no
    longer needed and requested that he be granted primary physical custody of
    the Minor Children.   On November 29, 2018, the parties entered into a
    Temporary Agreement and Order wherein the parties would share legal
    custody, with Mother having primary physical custody.      The Order further
    provided that Father would receive supervised partial custody with no set
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    schedule but specified that all three Minor Children were required to attend
    the custodial periods unless their counselors were to indicate in writing that it
    would be therapeutically harmful for any or all of them to attend such
    visitation.
    On January 11, 2019, a guardian ad litem was appointed for all three
    Minor Children.    Several motions filed by both Mother and Father and custody
    conferences were held thereafter, and additional Temporary Agreements and
    Orders followed.
    Ultimately, a custody trial commended on September 15, 2021, and the
    trial court entered its Custody Order and Opinion on December 30, 2021.
    Therein, the trial court made the following findings in support of its
    determination regarding custody of the Minor Children:
    1 . Both parties exhibit an extreme level of distrust and animosity
    toward each other. The conflict is of such a degree that it is likely
    neither parent, if permitted, would support continuing physical
    contact with the other. Father is adamant and focused in his belief
    that all issues between the parties and the challenges that those
    problems present for the children are the result of a designed and
    Intentional effort by Mother to remove him entirely from the
    children’s lives. Father seems to suggest that the proper remedy
    would simply be to grant him complete custody and exclude
    further interference by mother. Mother has maintained custody of
    the children for a period of nearly three (3) years. The children
    have only participated in supervised visitation sessions with
    Father during that time, Mother's conduct and demeanor towards
    Father strongly suggests that she wishes to minimize and control
    Father's contact to the maximum extent possible. It is noted that
    Mother is as adamant in her position that Father is entirely
    responsible for all current challenges as Father is in his counter
    position. Mother has suggested that contact between the children
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    and Father should be entirely supervised and perhaps avoided
    entirely until “the children are older.”
    2. There is no evidence that Mother has engaged in physical abuse
    of any of the children. There is evidence, in the form of testimony
    from Mother, and B.H., that Father, prior to the parties’ separation
    in 2018, struck at least one (1) of the children, B.H. Father does
    not dispute that he struck the child but testified that he did so in
    the form of spanking as a form of discipline and not as abuse.
    Father was charged with harassment as a result of the incident
    and was found not guilty. Mother has repeatedly asserted in this
    proceeding, in contact with the GAL and with others. that Father
    struck B.H. so violently during this episode that he suffered a
    separated tailbone. According to mother, the child was seen at
    Geisinger Hospital in Danville for a previously scheduled
    appointment the following day, despite this no evidence in the
    form of medical testimony or record has been presented in any
    proceeding, nor, according to her report, to the GAL, to support
    this serious allegation. This matter, and several others, have been
    the subject of investigations all of which were determined to be
    unfounded.
    There is testimony that at least the two (2) older children
    observed Father strike Mother prior to separation. Father denies
    this. Additionally, Mother and the children have reported that
    Father is loud and demeaning towards them at times including the
    use of threating language, inappropriate names and sarcasm.
    There is no evidence to suggest any acts of abuse by Father post-
    separation. Rather, evidence demonstrates that the numerous
    supervised visits between Father and the children have gone quite
    well. While an allegation of abuse regarding an event during a visit
    was investigated, it was ultimately. deemed unfounded. The
    supervision reports and the testimony of the custody supervisor
    make clear that physical safety has not been a concern during
    Father's, custody periods.
    3. Post-separation, Mother has performed all parental duties on
    behalf of the children. Prior to separation, the evidence suggests
    that Father was active and that both parents actively participated
    in and shared parental duties, including assistance with school
    work, meals, transportation, and discipline.
    4. All three (3) children are currently enrolled in the Wellsboro
    Area School District (WASD) and have been for at least a year and
    a half The children have developed friendships and connections
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    within their respective schools and are generally content. The
    children have expressed a desire to remain within the WASD and
    Wellsboro community. There have been academic struggles for
    the two (2) older children, which are being appropriately
    addressed. Additionally, at least B.H. receives additional support
    services through his school. Similarly, they are connected to and
    engaged in the Wellsboro community. The children have
    progressed socially and emotionally during their time in Wellsboro
    5. Evidence related to extended family revealed that Father has a
    twin brother who resides within Tioga County and is known to the
    children. Father has a sister who resides in Pennsylvania several
    hours away, and Paternal Grandmother resides with her.
    Mother's extended family includes her two (2) adult
    children, from a prior marriage, who reside outside of
    Pennsylvania. Her husband resides with her and the children in
    Wellsboro.
    6. The children are clearly bonded with each other and express a
    desire to remain, together. They currently reside together with
    their mother, and Father's periods of supervised custody are
    scheduled to occur together.
    7. Each child clearly expressed a desire to continue to reside with
    Mother. The two (2) older children have both requested the ability
    to “opt-out” of scheduled periods of custody with Father. Both
    currently do so at times, with the oldest, M.H., declining most
    opportunities for time with her father.
    M.H. has, expressed fear of and anger and frustration with
    her Father. She feels Father refuses to accept or acknowledge any
    of his, past behaviors, which include allegations of abuse. She also
    feels Father minimizes the impact that the events occurring in the
    home have had on her and her sibling [sic]. Additionally, she
    expresses concern that Father has not “done his work” to address
    his anger and to work toward reunification. Also, she is aware that
    Father dismisses the appropriateness or necessity of her therapy.
    Further, M.H. is very aware of each of her parent’s disdain of the
    other. M.H. at one point suggested that she would be content to
    have no contact with Father if she could so, choose but later made
    clear she is willing to see her father but would like to maintain a
    substantial amount of control over the same. M.H. is a bright,
    articulate young lady who seems to express herself comfortably,
    this observation is consistent with: the reports of others including
    therapists and the GAL. It is clear M.H. has thought extensively
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    about her relationship with her father and wants it to be better
    but feels that will require investment in the relationship and
    changes by her father.
    B.H. also expressed some fear of and frustration with his
    father. B.H. as discussed above, is alleged, by Mother, to have
    suffered physical and verbal abuse by Father. B.H. reports these
    allegations to be true. Similar to his older sister, B.H. is frustrated
    that Father does not acknowledge any past conduct or a need for
    any change to be made by Father. B.H. likes the current custody
    arrangement whereby he sees his father for periods of supervised
    custody. He would like to have the option to refuse his Father's
    periods of custody. While B.H. is younger than his sister he is also
    well versed, likely too much so, in the hostility between his
    parents.
    A.H., the youngest child, expresses that she wants to
    continue seeing her father, but does not want to live with him or
    stay at “his house”. She does not express any fear of her Father
    or spending time with him.
    8. Father insists that his children have been intentionally alienated
    from him by Mother's conduct since the parties separated. Father
    adamantly denies that he committed any acts of abuse toward any
    of the children or Mother. Father essentially suggests that none of
    the services provided to the children are necessary but rather are
    part of the “plan” being executed by Mother. Mother insists that
    Father is dangerous and, that all actions she has taken have been
    in response to her fears for her safety and that of the children.
    The children have clearly adopted this position. As noted
    elsewhere, the children are all aware of the hostilities and
    accusations each parent have and continue to make against the
    other. It is clear that during the time since the parties separated,
    the children, despite the security of a home with their mother,
    limitations on father's contact and access to services continue to
    struggle with fears related to their father and their relationship
    with him.
    9. Father's current attitude and conduct strongly suggests that he
    would at times struggle, as the circumstances currently exist, to
    maintain a stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the
    children, particularly M.H. and B.H. Specifically, Father insists that
    he has never perpetrated any abuse but rather is the victim of
    Mother's conduct. M.H. and B.H. are equally insistent that Father
    did engage in abuse and refuses to acknowledge doing so or take
    any steps to remediate it. Father clearly discounts the children
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    participating in individualized counseling and views it as
    unnecessary, whereas the children (particularly M.H. and B.H.)
    view it as vital to their well-being. Additionally, the older children
    both clearly indicated that Father says and does things which
    make them feel disregarded. B.H. recounted incidents where
    Father has mocked, stereotyped or otherwise belittled persons
    based upon their physical appearance or physical or mental
    limitation. B.H. reports Father continued to do this even when
    advised by B.H. that he did not believe it was appropriate and
    asked him to stop. M.H. recounted a recent visit when, after
    choosing to not to attend several periods of custody, she
    approached Father and he refused to acknowledge or speak to
    her. On a later visit, Father minimized M.H.'s excitement regarding
    her orthodontic braces which had just been placed.
    10. Mother has demonstrated both the ability and willingness to
    attend to the physical, emotional, developmental, educational,
    and special needs of the children. Father similarly has
    demonstrated, prior to separation, the ability and willingness to
    meet the needs of his children. Subsequent to the separation,
    Father has struggled to engage with the service providers who
    have attempted to assist the family and the children individually.
    Father attributes this failure to others, noting that providers will
    not listen to him, that services being provided are not necessary,
    that providers misunderstand or misinterpret his conduct as
    hostile rather than frustration or that providers are not qualified
    to provide the services. Father demonstrates a complete refusal
    acknowledge any need of his, Children, absent an enthusiastic and
    unqualified acceptance, of his position that all of the experiences
    they have had, emotions they possess and the challenges they
    face are the sole result of Mother's alienation efforts. Father’s
    hostility toward the appropriateness or need for services of any
    kind is concerning as it would likely have a significant impact on
    particularly to two oldest children.
    11. The parties currently reside fifteen (15) to eighteen (18)
    minutes apart within Tioga County. Both maintain residences
    which are physically adequate to meet the needs of the children.
    While the parties reside in different school districts, both have
    adequate resources to provide any transportation to ensure
    custody can be, exercised as ordered.
    12. Father operates, with his twin brother, a bushiness which
    produces glass tools. The primary physical facility is located in
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    Tioga Borough, Tioga County. Father testified that he has
    substantial flexibility to take time away from work to care for the
    children. Father reports he previously regularly transported the
    children to school and adjusted his schedule as necessary to meet
    the needs of the children. Mother works from home on a limited
    basis and reports she has availability to meet any childcare needs.
    Mother has, since separation, met all childcare needs for the
    children, including transportation to and attendance at medical
    and other appointments.
    13. There is an extremely high level of conflict between the
    parties. Father attributes total responsibility for the parties
    separation to Mother, Further, he insists that Mother has
    deliberately alienated the children from him. Mother is equally
    insistent that all of her actions are intended to protect the safety
    of and advance the well-being of the children. This extreme level
    of conflict is known to the children and has been a significant
    impediment to their well being and the relationship they have with
    Father.
    14. There is no evidence of drug or alcohol abuse by either party
    or any member of either household.
    15. Neither party is limited as to their ability to care for the
    children by any physical or mental limitation. Mother suffers from
    Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, as do two (2) of the children, but this
    does not substantially limit her ability to perform parental duties.
    Both parties underwent psychological evaluations which revealed
    no mental health condition that would prevent them from
    parenting the children.
    16. Need for reunification therapy; Father retained Dr. Stanley
    Clawar to support to support his claim of parental alienation.
    Mother agreed to the use of Dr. Clawar and participated in the
    process. Dr. Clawar produced an extensive written report which
    was admitted at trial. He also testified for nearly a full day at trial.
    In considering the best interests of the children, which clearly
    includes maintaining and, if possible, strengthening the
    relationship between Father and each of the children, it is clear
    that an effort must be made at reunification. This determination
    is not an adoption by the Court of Father's espoused position that
    Mother has intentionally engaged in alienation, but rather is an
    acknowledgement of the reality that M.H. and B.H. are, in fact,
    significantly estranged from Father and likely will remain so
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    without a significant intervention. While A.H. is not yet similarly
    estranged, she is at risk to become so. This reality necessitates
    an attempt, through appropriate reunification therapy, to reunify
    the children and Father. The focus of this effort is not on the past
    but rather on the future. More importantly, it is not to be used as
    a process for fixing blame or accessing guilt or exacting a
    punishment or revenge, but instead to be a process to support the
    needs and interests of the children in restoring their relationship
    with Father. It is emphasized that both parents will be ordered to
    cooperate in the process, including any treatment recommended
    by the provider. Simply repeating or even screaming that
    alienation is at the root of all that is wrong between Father and
    the children will not be acceptable, nor may Mother, despite past
    attempts or failures in the effort, decline to participate. In an effort
    to maximize the potential for success, Father will be responsible
    for the initial selection of a qualified reunification therapist, he
    shall immediately notify Mother and the GAL of his selection.
    Physical safety of the children. Substantial testimony was
    presented regarding concerns about the physical safety of the
    children in Father's care. Father has been accused of engaging in
    physical abuse of Mother and at least one of the children.
    Additional allegations have been made that Father has threated a
    neighbor and strangers in the driveway of the family home, has
    irresponsibly stored firearms with in the home, holds racist and/or
    white supremacist beliefs, has tortured animals, may have
    exposed the children, to pornography and other allegations. While
    the undersigned is well aware that many acts of abuse occur in
    private and are intended to be unobserved, it is of note that in this
    matter, despite the length of time to prepare for trial, the volume
    of material presented at trial and the serious nature of some of
    the allegations, little, other that her own testimony has been
    presented to support most of the allegations. For example, Mother
    has repeated that on at least two occasions, Father threatened
    others with a firearm on the property, including a neighbor, yet
    no one was presented to testify to either event. Further, as
    discussed above, Mother accuses Father of striking B. H. so
    violently that he suffered a separated tailbone yet no medical
    evidence has ever been presented to support the claim, despite
    the child being seen the very next day at Geisinger Hospital for a
    prescheduled appointment. Further, Mother testified to
    photographs she had taken, according to her testimony at the
    direction of Haven, to document the irresponsible storage of
    firearms within the home, however no such photos were
    presented. These allegations can not [sic] be merely disregarded
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    but must be balanced against the fact that Father has been
    repeatedly investigated for alleged abuse against the children and
    that all were determined to be unfounded. Additionally, there have
    been a significant number of supervised periods of custody and
    nothing from them suggests a threat to the physical safety of the
    children. What is clear is that the older two children have said they
    are uncomfortable with unsupervised visits at this time and this
    must also be considered. On consideration, visits will continue to
    be supervised at this time for M.H. and B.H. and they will be
    scheduled for alternating Mondays. A.IH. will have a supervised
    visit each Monday. On Mondays on which the visits are not
    scheduled to include M.H. and B.H., the visits with A.H. shall be in
    a public place within Wellsboro but shall not require supervision.
    M.H. and/or B.H. may at their sole discretion attend any of A.H.'s
    visits however their presence will be with the understanding that
    it will not otherwise change the conditions of the visit.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/30/21 at 1-9.1
    ____________________________________________
    1 “The Pennsylvania Child Custody Act (“the Custody Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
    5321–5340, governs all custody proceedings commenced after January 24,
    2011. E.D. v. M.P., 
    33 A.3d 73
    , 77 (Pa.Super. 2011). The Custody Act
    requires a trial court to consider all of the Section 5328(a) best interest factors
    when “ordering any form of custody.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).
    Soon after the current iteration of the Custody Act was enacted in 2011,
    this Court was tasked with interpreting Section 5323(d),“Reasons for award,”
    and held that the trial court must delineate its reasons for its custody award
    prior to the deadline by which a litigant must file notice of the
    appeal. See C.B. v. J.B., 
    65 A.3d 946
    , 954 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
    
    620 Pa. 727
     (Pa. 2013). We reasoned that if the litigant were forced to take
    an appeal without the benefit of the trial court’s rationale, then the litigant
    would be in an untenable position of having “to guess as to which information
    the trial court found pertinent, and how the evidence informed the court's
    analysis of the Act’s sixteen custody factors.” Id. at 955.
    It is noteworthy that the trial court herein did not specifically cite to the
    sixteen, enumerated factors of Section 5328(a) in its December 30, 2021,
    Opinion and Order. Indeed, the court did not reference the Custody Act at all
    therein and instead merely refers to “the various factors set forth in the
    statute.” See Opinion, filed 12/21/30, at 1. However, the trial court’s decision
    to include sixteen (16) individually numbered paragraphs in its Opinion
    suggests an intent to mirror the sixteen subsections of Section 5328(a).
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    Father filed a timely notice of appeal on January 28, 2022. On that
    same date, Father filed a concise statement of matters complained of on
    appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) wherein he presented sixteen (16)
    claims of error. The trial court entered its Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925 on March 3, 2022.
    In his appellate brief, Father raises the following Statement of Questions
    Involved for this Court’s review:
    A. Whether the Trial Court erred or abused its discretion by
    continuing to impose upon Father a restrictive supervised
    visitation schedule in its final order when the Trial Court confirmed
    there was no evidence of record substantiating abuse or an
    ongoing risk of harm to the Minor Children?
    B. Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion by
    issuing a final order based on the unreasonable and tainted
    preference of the Minor Children?
    C. Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion by not
    considering and addressing the uncontroverted evidence of
    alienation on the part of Mother and its impact on the Minor
    Children’s best interests?
    D. Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion by
    issuing a final order based on the testimony of the guardian ad
    litem when the guardian ad litem’s report was not filed and she
    failed to conduct a proper investigation?
    Brief for Father at 4.2
    ____________________________________________
    2 Mother failed to file a timely appellate brief and, therefore, was precluded
    from participating in oral argument. The guardian ad litem was available at
    oral argument and responded to questions posed by the three-judge panel.
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    As Father’s issues are interrelated, we will consider them together. In
    doing so, we begin with our scope and standard of review:
    In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
    type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept
    findings of the trial court that are supported by competent
    evidence of record, as our role does not include making
    independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to
    issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
    the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses
    first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court's
    deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the
    test is whether the trial court's conclusions are unreasonable as
    shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions
    of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
    unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
    With any child custody case, the paramount concern is the
    best interests of the child. This standard requires a case-by-case
    assessment of all the factors that may legitimately affect the
    physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of the child.
    J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 650 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation
    omitted).
    M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    63 A.3d 331
    , 334 (Pa.Super. 2013).
    It is well-settled that in any custody case decided under the Custody
    Act, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 5328 and 5338. Section 5328(a) of the Act sets forth the best interest
    factors that a court must consider in awarding custody. See E.D. v. M.P., 
    33 A.3d 73
    , 79-80 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2011). Specifically, Section 5328(a) provides:
    (a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
    determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
    factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
    affect the safety of the child, including the following:
    (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
    and continuing contact between the child and another party.
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    (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member
    of the party's household, whether there is a continued risk of harm
    to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide
    adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
    (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating to
    consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective
    services).
    (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the
    child.
    (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's education,
    family life and community life.
    (5) The availability of extended family.
    (6) The child's sibling relationships.
    (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child's
    maturity and judgment.
    (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other
    parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable
    safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.
    (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
    consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for
    the child's emotional needs.
    (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
    emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the
    child.
    (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
    (12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability to make
    appropriate child-care arrangements.
    (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness
    and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party's
    effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not
    evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
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    (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of
    a party's household.
    (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a
    party's household.
    (16) Any other relevant factor.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).
    It is also axiomatic that:
    The record on appeal must clearly demonstrate that the trial
    court     considered all of    the    factors    listed   in section
    5328(a). J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 652 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Section 5323(d) provides that a trial court shall delineate the
    reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a written
    opinion or order. Additionally, section 5323(d) requires the trial
    court to set forth its mandatory assessment of the sixteen section
    5328(a) custody factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant
    must file a notice of appeal. ...
    In expressing the reasons for its decision, there is no
    required amount of detail for the trial court's explanation; all that
    is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that
    the custody decision is based on those considerations. A court's
    explanation of reasons for its decision, which adequately
    addresses the relevant factors, complies with section 5323(d).
    A.V. v. S.T., 
    87 A.3d 818
    , 822-23 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal citations,
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    In addition to being aware of our deference to the trial court's credibility
    and weight of the evidence determinations, we are mindful that it is within the
    trial court's purview as finder of fact to determine which factors are most
    salient and critical in each particular case. See M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    63 A.3d at 339
    . However, we will find error “where the trial court listed the Section
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    5328(a) factors but failed to apply them.” C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 
    136 A.3d 504
    ,
    510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).
    Section 5323 of the Custody Act provides for the following types of
    awards:
    (a) Types of award.—After considering the factors set forth
    in section 5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding
    custody), the court may award any of the following types of
    custody if it in the best interest of the child:
    (1) Shared physical custody.
    (2) Primary physical custody.
    (3) Partial physical custody.
    (4) Sole physical custody.
    (5) Supervised physical custody.
    (6) Shared legal custody.
    (7) Sole legal custody.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a).
    Supervised physical custody is defined as “[c]ustodial time during which
    an agency or an adult designated by the court or agreed upon by the parties
    monitors the interaction between the child and the individual with those
    rights.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322.
    In circumstances where trial courts determine safety restrictions in a
    custody order are warranted:
    [i]t  is   important  for  courts  to   impose    restrictions
    sparingly. See Ferencak v. Moore, 
    300 Pa.Super. 28
    , 445 A.2d
    - 15 -
    J-A14038-22
    1282 (1982). Courts ought not to impose restrictions which
    unnecessarily shield children from the true nature of their parents
    unless it can be shown that some detrimental impact will flow from
    the specific behavior of the parent. The process of children's
    maturation requires that they view and evaluate their parents in
    the bright light of reality. Children who learn their parents'
    weaknesses and strengths may be able better to shape lifelong
    relationships with them.
    Once a court concludes that the imposition of a restriction is
    necessary, it must phrase the restriction in the least intrusive
    language reasonably needed to safeguard the child. Somers v.
    Somers, 
    326 Pa.Super. 556
    , 
    474 A.2d 630
     (1984); Dile v.
    Dile, 
    294 Pa.Super. 459
    , 
    426 A.2d 137
     (1981); Morris v.
    Morris, 
    271 Pa.Super. 19
    , 
    412 A.2d 139
     (1979). Broad or
    nonspecific restrictions will be invalidated in favor of narrowly
    focused, precise restrictions that are directed toward the child's
    welfare. Somers; Dile. This principle underscores the policy that
    it is preferable for parent-child relationships to be defined by and
    developed according to the personalities and character of the child
    and parent, unhampered, to the extent possible, by restrictions
    imposed by the court.
    Fatemi v. Fatemi, 
    489 A.2d 798
    , 801–02 (Pa.Super. 1985).
    Furthermore, this Court has stated:
    Although the express wishes of a child are not controlling in
    custody decisions, such wishes do constitute an important factor
    that must be carefully considered in determining the child's best
    interest. The weight to be attributed to a child's testimony can
    best be determined by the judge before whom the child appears.
    The child's preference must be based upon good reasons and his
    or her maturity and intelligence must also be considered.
    Ketterer v. Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citation
    and quotations omitted).
    In his first two claims, Father avers the trial court erred when it imposed
    supervised visitation upon him in contradiction of its own findings and the
    record evidence. Father stresses the trial court found Father did not commit
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    J-A14038-22
    any acts of abuse upon, nor did he pose any potential risk of harm to, the
    Minor Children.
    Father argues that the trial court’s Custody Order provides Father with
    several hours of physical custody of the Minor Children on Father’s Day and
    other holidays and explicitly states that these custodial periods shall not be
    supervised. The court also excused supervised visitation with M.H. and B.H.
    in those instances when they to choose to attend a custodial session with
    Father and A.H.    See Order, 12/30/21, at ¶ 3-4.
    Father opines that:
    When assuming the false premise that Father is a safety risk,
    there is no apparent or logical reason as to why the presence of
    A.H. or the occurrence of a holiday dissipates the need to protect
    the safety of the two oldest Minor Children. The Order terms show
    there is no rationale for the safety provisions that are related to
    abuse or potential harm to the minor children. It appears from
    the Opinion that the only reason the [t]rial [c]ourt continued
    supervised visitation was because of the Minor Children feeling
    uncomfortable: What is clear is that the older two children have
    said they are uncomfortable with unsupervised visits at this time
    and this must also be considered. On consideration, visits will
    continue to be supervised at this time. . .”
    Brief for Appellant at 22-23.
    Father also posits the trial court failed to consider evidence of Mother’s
    historic alienation of him from the Minor Children and erred in basing its final
    Custody Order on the guardian ad litem’s trial testimony, because she had not
    filed a written report prior to testifying at trial.
    In its Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
    reiterates it “did not find that either party committed acts of physical abuse.”
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    J-A14038-22
    Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, filed 3/2/22, at 1.
    However, the court clarifies its decision to grant father supervised periods of
    physical custody of the Minor Children and its granting M.H. and B.H. the
    discretion to “opt out” of these custodial periods as follows:
    The court also granted the older children, who consistently and
    credibly express a fear of Appellant, great latitude in attending or
    not attending visits with their father. The testimony of these
    children indicates, credibly, that Appellant dismisses or ignores
    their expressed fears and concerns as well as, at least in the case
    of the oldest child, her very presence at some periods of custody.
    As discussed below, attendance at and participation in
    reunification therapy is not optional for the children nor either
    parent. The length, frequency and conditions of Appellant's
    periods of custody would all be subject to modification as progress
    is made in the reunification process.
    Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) at 2 (unnumbered).
    An award of partial custody generally does not contain any
    restrictions. Fatemi v. Fatemi, 
    339 Pa.Super. 590
    , 
    489 A.2d 79
    8, 801 (1985). “A restriction will be imposed if the parties have
    agreed to a restriction or if the party requesting a restriction
    shows that without it, partial custody will have a detrimental
    impact on the child.” Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(e) (“[I]f
    the court finds that there is an ongoing risk of harm to the child
    or an abused party and awards any form of custody to a party who
    committed the abuse or who has a household member who
    committed the abuse, the court shall include in the custody order
    safety conditions designed to protect the child or the abused
    party.”
    J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 653 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Herein, Father’s expert Dr. Stanley Clawar testified at the custody trial
    that based on his observations and interviews, while Father has work to do
    with professionals to help him “rethink a lot of his dialogue with the children,”
    including active participation in reunification therapy, the continuation of
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    J-A14038-22
    supervised visitation does not allow of Father’s physical contact with the Minor
    Children to “normalize” and should not be a part of any future reunification
    plans. N.T., 11/18/21, at 194, 197, 222-223. Dr. Clawar explained that
    unsupervised visitation is:
    Often done in conjunction, in phases, and bigger blocks of time.
    So I’ve had work here where I’ve done a reunification session and
    then gone to the home with the father or mother, and the children.
    And so, it was a sequence into going out to dinner with or without,
    you know, somebody present and supervising. The question is,
    you know, does this person need supervision? What, to have
    dinner and then take the child home? Supervision to go to the
    arcade? So, I just raise questions about where and if, you know,
    supervision takes place. He’s had three years of supervision, so
    you’re looking for normalizing the relationship as much as you
    can. Will the reports be perfect? Probably not. Will kids come
    home and say: You know, Mom’s annoying as hell or Dad was
    annoying at dinner? But is that abuse? No, it’s not, it’s the
    dialogue between the parent and the child where the kid just
    doesn’t like something that was said. So, the goal here is to get
    rid of the microscope and to normalize it.
    Id. at 223.
    In addition, Attorney Patricia Shipman, the guardian ad litem for the
    Minor Children, testified extensively regarding her custody recommendation.
    N.T., 12/3/21, at 1-70.        Attorney Shipman recommended continued
    supervised physical custody for Father of all three Minor Children, although
    she did not believe A.H.’s custody visits needed to be closely supervised. She
    explained that M.H. and B.H. would “benefit, very much, from having control
    over whether or not they see Father.” Id. at 16. Attorney Shipman explained:
    I think B.F.H., in particular, likes to have the close
    supervision because of comments that Father makes that bother
    him. And I think M.J.H. does as well. Although I think M.J.H.’s
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    J-A14038-22
    more emotionally able to handle those comments than maybe
    B.F.H. is. So, as far as physical, I would recommend that B.F.H.
    and M.J.H. get to choose when they want to go and that time
    continue with A.E.H. with kind of a looser supervision.”
    Id. at 17.
    In making her recommendation, Attorney Shipman highlighted that
    while he is “amazing” and has improved greatly in the time she has known
    him, B.H. had been in a Partial Hospital Program, has gone to trauma therapy,
    receives medication, and sees both a psychiatrist and a psychologist. Id. at
    27-28. She also was aware that B.H. had threatened suicide “at least once.”
    Id. at 28. Attorney Shipman explained:
    He has-he has times with his dad that are very, very good and he
    enjoys them very much. But there are times when his father says
    or does things that just upset him, and he is not able to- I think,
    initially, he wasn’t able to even respond to that, now he has the
    insight to be able to say something to Dad. You know, this is- you
    say this or you do this and it upsets me, but Dad’s response is not
    to accept that, and learn from it, and make changes. And so, he’s
    still in the same place he was three years ago when I met him,
    which is he desperately wants to have a relationship with his
    father, and the relationship with his father is, is rocky- it’s up and
    down- and his father continues to disappoint him.
    Id. at 30.
    With regard to M.H., Attorney Shipman expressed similar concerns of
    mental harm in support of her recommendation for supervised custody while
    at the same time recognizing that she desires to have a positive relationship
    with Father:
    M.J.H. is incredibly depressed and anxious. Her entire body and-
    obviously, I haven’t asked her to strip down-but her legs and her
    arms, like in the summertime when you can see that, are- her
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    J-A14038-22
    entire body is covered in sores that she’s self-inflicted, due to her
    anxiety and she’s picked at them. She’s created them and she’s
    continued to pick at them. I don’t know that she’ll eve not- but
    they’re always going to be visible because they’re scarred so badly
    from that. She has a lot, a lot of dark feelings and hatred towards
    her father. . . . But, I, like, B.F.H., I’ve seen her grow and mature
    a lot. She’s been able to work through a lot of those emotions
    and recognize them, understand them, talk her way through
    them, and control them. . . And, and I would say that despite- I
    think, actually, she wants a relationship with her father more than
    she would let on because even though she has not- she’s had the
    freedom not to go to visits, where in six months she’s chosen to
    go to a couple of them. . . .
    -so, so her anger- her anger, from what I can tell, stems primarily
    from Father and her relationship with him, and her perception that
    she has been emotionally and verbally abused by him; and also
    probably witnessing him do the same to her mom and her brother,
    and treat her sister completely different.
    Id. at 35-37.
    Attorney Shipmen also noted:
    They’re very sensitive, sweet children, and Father can be
    very sarcastic, and I don’t think they respond well to that. And
    they don’t respond- they’re not happy when they try to tell him
    things that’s- they’re not happy when they try to tell him things
    like, you know, that comment upsets me, and he just, you know,
    basically, laughs at them, or ridicules them, for being upset by
    that.
    Id. at 38.
    At the conclusion of her direct testimony, she stated that “unless and
    until” Father decides “to do the work that Mother and the children have done
    to move forward” she did not “see a lot of change in the physical custody
    schedule.”   Id. at 18.   Attorney Shipman expressed her desire to see the
    - 21 -
    J-A14038-22
    supervised visits transition to less “artificial interactions” going forward.
    Importantly, after noting Mother’s displeasure with Dr. Clawar’s report,
    Attorney Shipman looked favorably upon Dr. Clawar’s recommendations for
    Mother and Father in general and specifically his recommendation for
    reunification therapy. Id. at 19.
    However, Attorney Shipman also explained that eliminating the
    requirement of supervision for Father’s custody visits at this juncture would
    be a “double-edge[d] sword:
    One is, I don’t-I don’t think that A.E.H. is unsafe with Father,
    I just don’t. I think that- I don’t think that the supervision,
    necessarily, provides her safety. But, I also think that A.E.H. feels
    safer with a supervisor, and that-and that if Dad is not doing the
    work that the children are doing and that Mom is doing, that going
    to unsupervised or lesser supervised is kind of going to- I don’t
    know-let him get off without doing that work and not making any
    improvements, other than just having less supervision.
    Id. at 46-47.
    Following Attorney Shipman’s direct and cross-examination, the trial
    court asked her if there were anything she did not believe had been addressed
    by counsel of which the court should be made aware.           Attorney Shipman
    proceeded to give examples of the ways in which Father’s testimony had been
    “full of a lot of lies and inconsistencies.” Id. at 67.
    Attorney Shipman also expressed her belief that the Minor Children want
    “very much to have a relationship with their father that makes them happy,
    that they feel safe with, and they have done everything that they feel like
    they’ve been encouraged to do for that to happen. And he has not.” Id. at
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    J-A14038-22
    69. She cited Father’s refusal to move forward and instead focus on Mother’s
    past alienation or behavior as the primary reason that little has changed in his
    relationship with the Minor Children for three years. Id. at 69-70.
    Attorney Shipman stated the fact the Minor Children have precisely the
    same feelings and positions as they did when she met them three years prior
    proved to her that the children have not been coached or encouraged to say
    certain things due to some outside influence. She concluded by stressing that:
    And, I think, they’ve told you pretty much what they want
    and how they feel- and they’ve been thinking about that for three
    years at this point in time. And I respect their wishes, and I think
    that they should be taken into great consideration.
    Id. at 70.
    Although a trial court is not required to accept the conclusions of an
    expert witness in a child custody case, it must consider them, and, if
    the trial court chooses not to follow the expert's recommendations, its
    independent decision must be supported by competent evidence of record.
    Nomland v. Nomland, 
    813 A.2d 850
    , 854 (Pa.Super.2002) (citations
    omitted). Herein, Father’s arguments to the contrary, the trial court accepted
    Dr. Clawar’s recommendation that the family needs to participate in
    reunification therapy and imposed restrictions on Father’s periods of partial
    custody based not only upon the trial testimony of the guardian ad litem, but
    also upon its consideration of the custody factors. Specifically, the trial court
    observed:
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    J-A14038-22
    [Father] assigns various related errors in the grant of
    primary physical custody to [Mother], the weight afforded to the
    preferences of the children and the limits on his periods of
    custody. [Father] asserts the court found none of the custody
    factors to be in [Mother’s] favor. Several of the custody factors,
    including numbers (1), (3), (5) and (11) through (15) favor
    neither party. These factors either reflect equally unfavorably on
    each party, as is the case with factors (1) and (13), are equally
    balanced, as is the case with factors (11) and (12) or are not
    applicable to either party as is the case with factors (14) and (15).
    Other factors, specifically (2) and (2.1) were the subject of
    extensive testimony.
    The court did not find that either party committed acts of
    physical abuse. In doing so the court considered and noted the
    results of the various allegations against [F]ather including the
    summary harassment charge (of which he was acquitted) and the
    Child Protective Services (which were ultimately unfounded).
    Several other factors, for reasons presented in the Opinion, clearly
    favored [Mother] having primary physical custody, these included
    factors (4), (6), (7), (9) and (10). These particular factors were
    also given the greatest weight due to the significance they have
    in supporting both the immediate and long-term best interests of
    the children. Specifically, as to factors (9) and (10) [Father]
    entirely dismisses any possible need for mental health services for
    the children despite the testimony of professionals and the stated
    desire for the same by the older two children. [Father] expressed
    the same disdain and disregard for educational services provided
    for the children, despite his limited involvement in the same
    during the last several years. Perhaps more importantly for his
    immediate relationship and care of the children [Father] totally
    rejects any responsibility for the clearly expressed fear his
    children have of him and instead attributes everything to
    [Mother]. In considering the entirety of the evidence the court
    finds this assertion is simply not credible. [Father] asserts error
    to the weight given to the preference of the children. The
    testimony of each child reflects the clear preference of each to
    reside with their mother. As stated in its opinion, the court gave
    considerable weight, particularly as to the two older children, to
    this preference for the reasons given. The court also granted the
    older children, who consistently and credibly express a fear of
    [Father], great latitude in attending or not attending visits with
    their father. The testimony of these children indicates, credibly,
    that [Father] dismisses or ignores their expressed fears and
    concerns as well as, at least in the case of the oldest child, her
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    J-A14038-22
    very presence at some periods of custody. As discussed below,
    attendance at and participation in reunification therapy is not
    optional for the children nor either parent. The length, frequency
    and conditions of [Father’s] periods of custody would all be subject
    to modification as progress is made in the reunification process.
    [Father] asserts various errors related to the evaluation and
    testimony of Dr. Stanley Clawar. The first of these errors is that
    the court erred in “not properly considering, weighing or adopting
    the uncontroverted evidence or recommendations provided by the
    case’s only expert, Dr. Stanley Clawar.” This broad allegation of
    error does not identify any specific findings or recommendations
    allegedly not considered or adopted. There have been assertions
    presented that Dr. Clawar was a neutral evaluator or witness. The
    record simply does not support this, Dr. Clawar was sought out,
    retained and paid by [Father]. Dr. Clawar testified at length
    regarding his evaluation and the process and carefully
    distinguished that he conducted a forensic evaluation and was not
    a clinical provider to any of children or either party. The court
    did in fact adopt what it determined to be the most
    important recommendation by requiring the parties and
    children engage in immediate reunification therapy. The
    court further directed that [Father] was authorized to
    select a qualified professional and that [Mother] was
    required to cooperate and participate.
    ***
    [Father] further asserts as error the court “making no
    finding and supplying no remedy or sanction regarding Mother's
    alienation and undermining of Father's relationship with the
    children.” [Father] is correct that the court made no specific
    finding of alienation, however, the court did find that both parents
    had failed to meaningfully support the relation of the other parent.
    The court found and noted that [Father’s] relationship with the
    children had been negatively impacted and that [M]other was, in
    part, responsible for the eroded relationship. [Father] however is
    also, in part, at fault for the present condition of his relationship
    with the children. The court noted and adopted as a remedy a
    requirement that the parties and children immediately begin
    reunification therapy. This remedy was suggested and deemed
    essential by Dr. Clawar. This requirement is foundational to the
    preservation and strengthening of the relationship between
    [Father] and his children. [Father] is further correct that the court
    imposed no sanction upon Mother. A primary focus and purpose
    - 25 -
    J-A14038-22
    in a custody trial is to address the best interests of the children at
    the center of it. A custody trial is not intended to be a mechanism
    by which one parent, through the court, punishes or exacts
    retribution upon the other parent. Should [Mother] refuse to
    participate and cooperate or require the children to participate and
    cooperate in reunification therapy or any other way disregard the
    Order, [Father] may, of course, seek enforcement through means
    including contempt.
    ***
    [Father] presents two allegations of error related to the
    guardian ad litem. Specifically, it is noted that the report of the
    guardian ad litem was not filed. A review of the docket reveals this
    is factually correct, while a report was prepared and circulated it
    was never made part of the record. The guardian ad litem was
    present for the entire trial and testified. The second allegation of
    error asserts “[t]he trial court erred and abused its discretion by
    deferring to, considering or adopting a recommendation or
    position of the guardian ad litem given the evidence of record and
    the failure of the guardian ad litem to conduct a proper
    investigation and interviews.” This allegation identifies no
    recommendation or position nor specific failure by the guardian
    ad litem during her appointment. As noted above, the guardian ad
    litem testified during the custody trial and the court considered
    this along with all other evidence presented in making the
    determinations it did.
    Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, filed 3/2/22, at 1-4
    (unnumbered) (emphasis added).
    Upon our review of the record, aware of and applying the deference this
    Court must give to the credibility determinations of the trial court, we accept
    the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s custody must remain supervised and
    that B.H. and M.H. have the ability to opt out of custodial time with him until
    such time as progress is made in the reunification process. While the record
    does not point to specific acts of physical harm which may result if the custody
    arrangement for B.H. and M.H. is changed prior to the time the family
    - 26 -
    J-A14038-22
    completes reunification therapy, it does suggest that the fragile mental health
    of these children may be adversely affected if they do not continue to have
    periods of supervised physical custody which they may opt out of with Father.
    As mentioned above, the law does not require a certain amount of detail
    for a trial court's explanation to be sufficient, only that the court's decision is
    based on the enumerated custody factors. D.Q. v. K.K., 
    241 A.3d 1112
    ,
    1118 (Pa.Super. 2020). Appellate interference is unwarranted so long as the
    trial court's considerations were careful and thorough. A.V., 
    87 A.3d 818
    ,
    820 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    We are cognizant that the Section 5328(a) analysis should not be
    viewed as a scorecard, for a party does not prevail simply because the trial
    court determines a majority of its factors favors him or her. In theory, any
    single factor be dispositive given the circumstances, so long as the record
    supports such a determination. M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    63 A.3d at 339
    . (“It is
    within the trial court's purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors
    are the most salient and critical in each particular case.”) (citation omitted).
    The weight that a trial court attaches to the factors is critical, and the
    trial court’s delineation of its reasons in support of its Custody Order herein
    evinces the manner in which it weighed those factors to lead it to limit Father
    to supervised physical custody of which B.H. and M.H. may opt out until, as
    per Dr. Clawar’s recommendation, the parties cooperate and participate in
    - 27 -
    J-A14038-22
    reunification therapy. Accordingly, we affirm the Custody Order of the trial
    court.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 07/05/2022
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