Com. v. Gosa, E. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S55007-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    :
    EDWARD GOSA,                           :
    :
    Appellant            :   No. 267 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 5, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0001499-2017
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 22, 2018
    Appellant, Edward Gosa, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    on December 5, 2017. We affirm.
    The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:
    In February [] 2017, Detective Michael Honicker of the
    Delaware County District Attorney’s Investigation Division
    (CID) began investigation of Appellant and his residence
    located at 923 Lamokin Street, Chester, Delaware County,
    Pennsylvania for the distribution of cocaine. During the
    investigation[,] Detective Honicker conducted surveillance
    outside the residence and saw [Appellant] at the residence.
    In addition to the surveillance of the residence, Detective
    Honicker and a confidential informant conducted a controlled
    buy at Appellant’s residence.      During the surveillance,
    Detective Honicker had observed Appellant enter and exit the
    residence. Additionally during the surveillance, Detective
    Honicker became aware that Appellant was also known as
    “Bahir.”
    Based upon the surveillance of the residence, Detective
    Honicker applied for a search warrant of Appellant’s
    residence. On February 23, 2017, Detective Honicker
    J-S55007-18
    executed the search warrant. . . . The search warrant was
    executed with several members of CID; however, no one was
    located at the residence at the time. During the execution of
    the search warrant, in the front upstairs bedroom, the officers
    discovered mail, a Hawaiian Punch box with a security
    envelope inside on a dresser containing seven [] bags of
    cocaine, new and unused packaging material and a straw with
    a scoop. Detective Honicker testified that he immediately
    recognized that it was cocaine in the seven [] bags. The
    police also discovered a small bag of marijuana in this
    bedroom.      There was no other contraband found in
    Appellant’s residence.
    Appellant and the Commonwealth entered into a stipulation
    which was read into the record during the bench trial. The
    stipulation . . . stated that all the bags recovered from the
    residence were appropriately maintained in custody and
    control, that the seven bags contained cocaine containing a
    total of 1.79 grams and that the other bag contained 2.74
    grams of marijuana.
    Detective Honicker testified that the mail that was found was
    addressed to Appellant.        The police discovered mail
    addressed to “Bahir” with an address on Henry Avenue in
    Philadelphia, [Pennsylvania]. There was also mail addressed
    to “Bahir” with the 923 Lamokin Street address. Detective
    Honicker was not aware that Appellant had a son and did not
    know that the son was known as Bahir. Detective Honicker
    testified that he knew Appellant’s street name was “Bahir.”
    This mail was found throughout the residence not just in one
    room or in the bedroom with the cocaine and paraphernalia
    that had been discovered. During the execution of the search
    warrant[,] Appellant’s resume was found in the dining room.
    A review of the resume shows that Appellant listed his
    address as 923 Lamokin Street, Chester, Delaware County,
    Pennsylvania.
    While searching the dining room, the police observed a .22
    caliber rifle in open or plain view by the window. This rifle
    was submitted to ballistics and it was determined the rifle
    was operable.
    Detective Honicker was qualified as an expert in the area of
    narcotics investigations, manufacturing, sales distribution,
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    packaging[,] and deliver[y]. . . . Detective Honicker testified
    that in his [33] years as a narcotics agent[,] he had seen the
    bags that were found in Appellant’s residence before and in
    his experience they were [$20.00] bags. The smaller bags,
    with an apple on them are normally used for packaging
    cocaine. The seven filled or used bags with the apples are
    the same as the unused bags that were discovered.
    Detective Honicker testified that the apple bags were
    normally used for packing cocaine.
    [Detective Honicker testified that, in his] experience[,]
    persons who use cocaine would not buy their cocaine in all of
    the small bags that Appellant had in his possession as it is
    not economical. Detective Honicker explained that it was
    cheaper and easier to buy the almost [two grams] of cocaine
    [that Appellant had] in bulk or in a larger bag. Detective
    Honicker further [testified] that[,] while it is unusual to not
    buy in bulk[,] it is not unheard of. However, Detective
    Honicker was clear that a user of cocaine would definitely not
    have the new and unused [apple] bags . . . unless that person
    was selling [contraband].
    Detective Honicker testified that the straw with a scoop . . .
    is a scoop that could be used to fill the small cocaine bags.
    Detective Honicker testified that the scoop spoon was used
    in lieu of a scale and was not used for snorting cocaine.
    Based on his experience, training[,] and the evidence
    collected in this case, Detective Honicker rendered an opinion
    that the cocaine seized from Appellant’s bedroom was not
    possessed for his personal use but rather [was] possessed
    with the intent to distribute. Detective Honicker testified that
    the cocaine could have been used for personal use; however,
    the straw and the new and unused bags led him to the
    conclusion that Appellant was selling the cocaine. . . .
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/18, at 3-6 (internal citations and some internal
    capitalization omitted).
    At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty
    of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (“PWID”) and
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    persons not to possess a firearm.1             On December 5, 2017, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 16 to 32 months in prison
    for his convictions.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and now raises one claim to this
    Court:
    Whether the evidence of record in this case was sufficient to
    prove [Appellant] guilty of [PWID] where the Commonwealth
    failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the seven
    packets found in his bedroom were for sale as opposed to his
    own personal use[?]
    Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some internal capitalization omitted).
    We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim under the
    following standard:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
    in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
    sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
    the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
    our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we
    note that the facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
    resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
    may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
    of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
    trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
    ____________________________________________
    1   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), respectively.
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    J-S55007-18
    and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
    all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    23 A.3d 544
    , 559-560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en
    banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 
    947 A.2d 800
    , 805-806 (Pa.
    Super. 2008).
    Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his PWID
    conviction because the amount of cocaine recovered was consistent with
    personal use. Appellant’s Brief at 11. This claim fails.
    To establish the offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
    substance, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    the defendant both possessed a controlled substance and had the intent to
    deliver it.   Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 
    831 A.2d 607
    , 611 (Pa. Super.
    2003).   In determining whether the defendant had the intent to deliver a
    controlled substance, courts may consider several relevant factors, including
    “the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of
    the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large sums of cash.”
    Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1237-1238 (Pa. 2007).
    Expert opinion testimony may also be admitted to establish “whether the facts
    surrounding the possession of controlled substances are consistent with [the]
    intent to deliver rather than with [the] intent to possess [them] for personal
    use.” 
    Id.
     “The expert testimony of a witness qualified in the field of drug
    distribution, coupled with the presence of drug paraphernalia, is sufficient to
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    establish intent to deliver.” Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 
    955 A.2d 411
    ,
    414 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    In the case at bar, while it is true that the total amount of cocaine was
    consistent with personal use, several other factors demonstrated that
    Appellant possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute. This evidence
    includes, first, Detective Honicker’s testimony that, during his investigation,
    he “did controlled buys of cocaine” from Appellant’s residence.       N.T. Trial,
    10/11/17, at 28. Further, when the police executed the search warrant on
    Appellant’s residence, the police recovered a box that contained: cocaine that
    was divided into seven separate baggies; “new and unused bags for packaging
    cocaine;” and, a straw converted into a scoop. Id. at 31-35. With respect to
    this evidence, Detective Honicker testified that: the seven baggies of cocaine
    were equally divided into “$20 bags;” normally, “if [a person is] going to buy
    cocaine for personal use, [that person is] not going to buy it in” seven separate
    bags because “[y]ou can get all this in one bag for less money than it would
    cost you for each of these bags;” the unused baggies had an “apple on the
    front” and “apple bags” are normally used for packaging cocaine; “you are not
    going to have new unused bags if you are a user;” the presence of the scoop
    indicted that Appellant did not have a scale and was using the scoop to
    “approximat[e] how much to fill a bag” with cocaine; and, the police did not
    recover any paraphernalia that Appellant could have used to ingest the
    cocaine. Id. at 53-58. Finally, Detective Honicker testified that, in his expert
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    opinion after viewing the evidence in its totality, Appellant possessed the
    cocaine with the intent to deliver. Id. at 75-76.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the above
    evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s factual finding that Appellant
    possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at
    1237-1238. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/22/18
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 267 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 10/22/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021