Com. v. Morales, J. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • J-S37021-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JUAN MORALES                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 855 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004004-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JUAN MORALES                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 856 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004444-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 16, 2022
    Juan Morales appeals1 from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after he was convicted by a
    jury of two counts of endangering the welfare of children (EWOC).2 We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1On May 5, 2022, our Court granted Morales’ motion to consolidate the two
    appeals, 855 EDA 2022 and 856 EDA 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).
    J-S37021-22
    Morales was arrested in North Carolina in May 2017 on a Pennsylvania
    warrant issued in connection with the alleged sexual assault of two minor
    female twins (Child 1 and Child 2 — collectively, Children). Children, who
    were seven years old at the time of the alleged assaults, are the daughters of
    Morales’ long-time paramour, N.S.3
    Morales was charged with two counts each4 of rape of a child,
    involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), unlawful contact with a minor,
    aggravated indecent assault of a child, sexual assault, EWOC, corruption of
    minors, indecent exposure, indecent assault of a child less than 13 years of
    age, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), and
    dissemination of explicit sexual materials to a minor.
    The trial court set forth the relevant factual history underlying the
    charges as follows:
    [N.S.] testified that she was in a relationship with [Morales] and
    he lived in the apartment with her and her children. [N.S.]
    testified that she sometimes left her twin seven[-]year[-]old
    daughters home with [Morales] while she went to work. [N.S.]
    testified that on June 29, 2014[,] around 2:30 a.m., she realized
    that [Morales] was not in the bed next to her and walked to the
    living room, where she observed [Morales] on the sofa with his
    “penis out” and “touching himself” while [Child 1] was balled up
    with her arms around her knees at her chest on the other end of
    the couch. [N.S.] explained that she then attacked [Morales]
    using clenched fists, [] which [Morales] did not resist, until he
    pinned her down on their mattress, only allowing her to use the
    bathroom. [N.S.] explained that she did not call the police due to
    ____________________________________________
    3 N.S. and Morales are the parents of a younger daughter who was an infant
    at the time of the alleged assaults on Children.
    4Morales was charged under two separate docket numbers, one for each
    minor victim, CP-51-CR-0004444-2017 and CP-51-CR-0004004-2017.
    -2-
    J-S37021-22
    fear that [Morales] would wake up and hear her on the phone.
    [N.S.] testified that she was able to leave the house with
    [C]hildren, after she told [Morales] she was [] going to take
    the[m] to the flea market. Instead of going to the flea market,
    [N.S.] said that she went to her mother’s house where she first
    called police and then continued on to St. Christopher’s Hospital
    for Children where she was interviewed by a police officer. On the
    following day, she and [Children] went to an appointment at [the]
    Special Victims Unit (SVU) and [] she did not talk to [Children]
    about what happened with [Morales] or what they were allowed
    to talk about. [N.S.] stated that she did not communicate or see
    [Morales] again at that time.
    [N.S.] also described moving with [C]hildren to North Carolina in
    March of 2015, explaining that she lived near and remained in
    contact with [Morales’] older sister[,] but claimed that she did not
    know whether [Morales] was living in North Carolina or
    Philadelphia. [N.S.] described the first time she saw [Morales] in
    2016 at his mother’s North Carolina home and how she was scared
    of him during this encounter.
    On cross-examination, [N.S.] explained that during their
    relationship[,] she and [Morales] would have arguments, around
    [Children], sometimes caused by [Morales’] “w[a]ndering eye for
    women.” [N.S.] testified that before [Children] were interviewed
    at St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children[,] she did not speak to
    them about what occurred with [Morales]. [N.S.] stated that the
    Department of Human Services (DHS) spoke to [Children] at the
    hospital and also visited their house.
    Next, Officer Robert Caban testified that he met with [N.S.] and
    [Children] at St. Christopher[’s] Hospital for Children in response
    to a reported rape in June 2014. Officer Caban recalled that [N.S.]
    told him about what she saw the night before regarding [Morales’]
    “private area out” in front of [Child 1]. Officer Caban could not
    recall if he spoke with [Children] directly. On cross-examination,
    Officer Caban stated several times that he could not recall specific
    details regarding his interview with [N.S.] and [Children].
    [Child 1] testified that she first met [Morales] when her mom
    started dating him when she was six or seven. [Child 1]
    continued[,] stating that [Morales] started living with them when
    she was seven and sometimes he watched her and [Child 2] while
    their mother was at work. [Child 1] also testified that [Morales]
    touched her more than once, describing how [Morales] showed
    her his phone with “people having sex” on it. [She] described how
    -3-
    J-S37021-22
    [Morales] exposed his private parts to her, touched her private
    parts, made her put his private part in her mouth, and how he
    licked her private part over her underwear over the course of [a]
    few days. [She also] testified that [Morales] put his private part
    on her front private part once while she was laying down while he
    moved in a back and forth motion. [She further described] an
    incident where [Morales] put his private part in her mouth while
    she was alone with him in the living room. [She also] stated that
    she did not tell [N.S.] when these things were going on because
    she was scared and thought something bad might happen if she
    told.
    [Child 1] testified that [N.S.] found out when she came downstairs
    while [Morales’] private part was exposed and she was on the
    couch with him. [She] recalled talking with a lady in a room with
    a camera[,] where she told [the lady] everything that happened
    to her. [She] also recalled talking with a detective. On cross-
    examination, [Child 1] testified that when she moved to Candor,
    North Carolina[,] she lived with just [N.S.] and [her] sisters.
    [She] explained that she never told anyone at school or in her
    family what [Morales] was doing to her.
    [Child 2] testified that she recognized [Morales] as her [baby]
    sister’[s] dad who lived with her when she was about seven years
    old and sometimes watched her when her mom was not home.
    [Child 2] described one day when she was home alone with
    [Morales], waking up in [N.S.]’s bed with [Morales’] hand inside
    her shorts but over her underwear, rubbing on her front private
    part while he forced her hand on to his exposed private part
    moving it in a rubbing motion. [She] stated that on the same day
    and other days[, Morales] showed her videos of men and women
    in various stages of undress doing “inappropriate things.” She
    could not remember if [Morales] said anything to her while
    showing her the videos. [She] further testified that [Morales]
    placed his private part on her back private part and that she saw
    “slimy stuff” come out of [Morales’] private part when they were
    alone in the bedroom. [She] recalled speaking with police officers
    and telling them what happened to her. [She] testified that she
    never told anyone else about what [Morales] was doing because
    he asked her not to and that he never threatened to hurt her or
    her family.
    On cross-examination, [Child 2] recalled[,] after going to the
    hospital[,] speaking to a lady in a room with a table and chair.
    [She] explained that she never told any teacher, principal,
    crossing guard, student, police officer at school, or family member
    -4-
    J-S37021-22
    about [Morales] touching her private part. [She] recalled moving
    to Candor, North Carolina[,] with [N.S.] and [her] sisters and
    being babysat by [Morales’] sister.
    Denise Wilson, Manager of Forensic Services at Philadelphia
    Children’s Alliance (PCA), testified regarding the forensic interview
    process, [the interview] room, and how parents are not in the
    room during the interview. Portions of the PCA interviews were
    intermittently shown to the jury throughout Ms. Wilson’s
    testimony.     Ms. Wilson described both [Children] as being
    reluctant to discuss what happened for fear of making [N.S.] mad
    because they “told their business.” On cross-examination, Ms.
    Wilson detailed her interactions with [Children] and how it was her
    opinion that the[y] wanted to give her more information instead
    of assuming that they were being untruthful.
    Next, Detective Brian Meissler testified that he was the assigned
    investigator on this case and that he met [N.S.] and [Children] at
    St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children, where he spoke to
    [Children] quickly and took a formal statement from [N.S.] While
    reviewing his handwritten statement, Detective Meissler admitted
    that he made a mistake on the form[,] substituting the name Jose
    for [Morales’] name Juan and that there was no mention during
    the interview with [N.S.] of another individual.
    Detective Meissler explained that he typically writes while
    conducting interviews and when the interview is finished he
    “ask[s] them to read it . . . over and sign it, and sign and date the
    last page.” Detective Meissler explained that when he completed
    [his] interview with [N.S.] he followed this procedure with her and
    since there were no initials where changes were made[,] he
    believed “she did not make any corrections.” Detective Meissler
    recalled [Child 1’s] second interview with him at the police station,
    noting how at the end of the interview she wrote “she sail [sic]
    him red hand did [sic]” above her signature. Detective Meissler
    stated his belief that [Child 1] was withholding information during
    the interview.
    On cross-examination, Detective Meissler described what a rape
    kit is, the procedures [for] obtaining any evidence to be placed in
    a rape kit, and how no biological evidence of the offender was
    found in [Children’s] rape kits. Detective Meissler explained why
    he continued questioning [Child 2] after she answered “no” to the
    question “Did [Morales] ever touch you with his penis?” testifying
    that it was his belief based on his 15 years of experience that she
    “was withholding information that she didn’t want to talk about[.]”
    -5-
    J-S37021-22
    The Commonwealth made two stipulations before resting [its]
    case-in-chief; the first stipulation concerned the date and time
    [Children] were seen at St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children and
    the second stipulation stated [Morales’] date of birth as October
    13, 1986.
    For the defense, [Morales’] current girlfriend, Samantha Rivera,
    testified that when she met [Morales,] he was living in North
    Carolina with his mother and [N.S.]. Ms. Rivera stated that [N.S.]
    told her that the allegations against [Morales] were not true. On
    cross-examination, Ms. Rivera again explained that when she
    asked [N.S.] if the allegations against [Morales] were true, [N.S.]
    responded “no” and that “she could not talk about it.”
    Lastly, [Morales] testified that, on June 28, 2014, he attended a
    family party with his then-girlfriend, [N.S.], and [C]hildren.
    During the party, he and [N.S.] got into an altercation. [Morales]
    claimed that after arriving home[, N.S.] wanted to continue to
    argue[. I]nstead[, Morales] ignored her until he thought she was
    asleep while he smoked, played x-box, and texted on his phone.
    After leaving the bedroom to get something to drink[, Morales]
    explained that [N.S.] confronted him with his cell phone[,] asking
    him to explain text messages[,] and when she did not like his
    response, swung [at] him and threw the phone at him, hitting him
    in the nose. [Morales] continued describing how he pushed and
    held [N.S.] down until she calmed down and then they both went
    to sleep. The next morning[, N.S.] suggested they go to [the]
    flea market and they all got dress[ed] to go, but [N.S.] drove off
    without [Morales] after he went to retrieve the baby’s sippy cup.
    [Morales] stated that he called [N.S.] a few times[,] but she did
    not answer and later he received a threatening phone call from
    [N.S.]’s brother calling him a pedophile and threatening to kill
    him. [Morales] said that he was scared so he contacted his mother
    to tell her what was going on and then traveled with his mother
    to Charlotte, North Carolina[,] where he stayed until he was
    arrested in 2016. [Morales] also detailed [N.S.]’s move with
    [C]hildren to Candor, North Carolina[,] about five or six months
    after he moved to Charlotte. During this time, he claimed that
    [N.S.] would visit him in his mother’s home and was given a key
    to his mother’s house. Lastly, [Morales] stated that he never
    sexually assaulted [Children].
    On cross-examination, [Morales] explained that[,] through family
    members[,] he heard that authorities were looking for him and
    learned about the nature of the allegations against him. [Morales]
    -6-
    J-S37021-22
    explained that once [N.S.] and [C]hildren moved to North
    Carolina[,] he resumed his romantic relationship with [N.S.] and
    would . . . keep[] his distance from [Children].
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/19, at 2-9 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
    After a four-day jury trial held in August 2018, Morales was acquitted of all
    charges except two counts of EWOC; the jury specifically found that there was
    a “course of conduct” with regard to the EWOC charges based on “diverse
    dates    between     2012     through     2014.”   See   Verdict   Slip,   8/24/18;
    Commonwealth’s Criminal Information, 5/16/17, at 1; see also supra n.3;
    infra n.17.     On November 21, 2018, the court sentenced Morales to two
    consecutive terms of 2½ to 5 years’ imprisonment.             Morales filed post-
    sentence motions; they were deemed denied by operation of law. Morales
    filed timely notices of appeal for each docket number below and complied with
    the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.5          On March 2, 2021, our Court vacated Morales’
    judgment of sentence, affirmed his convictions, and remanded the case to the
    trial court for resentencing on the EWOC charges, to be graded as
    misdemeanors of the first degree where the trial court failed to instruct the
    jury on “course of conduct” and, thus, was not able to support the grading of
    EWOC as a third-degree felony. See Commonwealth v. Morales, Nos. 1111
    & 1112 EDA 2018              (Pa. Super. filed March 1, 2021) (unpublished
    memorandum decision).           On June 17, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a
    ____________________________________________
    5 The trial court opinion inaccurately states that Morales filed a Post-Conviction
    Relief Act (PCRA) petition in December 2018, when, in fact, he never filed such
    a petition. Rather, Morales filed a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence
    following the denial of post-sentence motions.
    -7-
    J-S37021-22
    petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that was
    denied on October 20, 2021. See Commonwealth v. Morales, No. 272 EAL
    2021 (Table).
    On remand, the trial court resentenced Morales on January 21, 2022;
    the EWOC charges were graded as a first-degree misdemeanor.             At the
    resentencing hearing, Morales’ attorney noted because the court had imposed
    a standard-range guidelines sentence at the original sentencing hearing and
    because there were no aggravating circumstances or evidence that Morales
    had misbehaved in prison since the time he was originally sentenced, a
    standard-range sentence was appropriate.         N.T. Resentencing Hearing,
    1/21/22, at 5. The Commonwealth, however, requested that the court depart
    from the guidelines and impose the same sentence as it had originally imposed
    upon Morales. Because of the new grading of the EWOC offenses, however,
    the same sentence would be considered an outside-the-guideline-range
    sentence. Id. at 6. To support the guideline departure, the Commonwealth
    offered four reasons: (1) allegations of sexual abuse committed by Morales;
    (2) Morales’ actions when he was discovered by Children’s mother; (3)
    Morales’ lack of remorse at time of original sentencing; and (4) the potential
    impact that Morales’ actions will have on Children. Id. at 6-9.
    Morales exercised his right of allocution at resentencing, noting that he
    had participated in two prison programs since his incarceration—an intense
    community rehabilitative program and a domestic violence program. Id. at
    11-12. Morales testified that the programs “taught [him] how to control [his]
    -8-
    J-S37021-22
    anger and [how to] be a humble person and to . . . look at [him]self in the
    other person’s shoes.” Id. at 12. Finally, Morales told the sentencing judge
    that “he has a job waiting for [him] . . . at a Metro PCS store” when he is
    released from prison, he wants to be able to “help [his] kids’ mother”
    financially, and he has “done a lot of growing up these past 5 years since
    [he’s] been incarcerated.” Id. at 12-13.6
    The court ultimately imposed a term of imprisonment of 2½-5 years on
    CP-51-CR-0004444-2017, and a consecutive sentence of 2½-5 years’
    imprisonment on CP-51-CR-0004004-2017—the same sentence that it had
    originally imposed upon Morales.7 The sentencing judge noted that although
    the facts had not changed since the last sentencing proceeding, and that,
    while she was “happy to learn that [Morales] was not wasting [his] time and
    that [he’s] done a lot of programming [in jail,]” she still believes that “[she]
    was right the first time and [is] going to be right this time.” Id. at 14. The
    court, however, noted on the record that due to the change in grading of the
    charges, the sentence now was outside of the Sentencing Guidelines, but still
    within the statutory maximum. See id. at 18-19; see also 204 Pa.Code §
    ____________________________________________
    6 Morales also told the sentencing judge that he already had been denied
    parole because he was determined “to still [have] high levels of being a risk
    to the community.” Id. at 17-18.
    7 The court also imposed the same conditions as those attached to Morales’
    original sentence, which included mandatory court costs, supervision by
    Sexual Offender’s Unit, credit for time served, and the condition that Morales
    have “NO UNSUPERVISED CONTACT with minor children.”                 Guilty Re-
    Sentencing Order, 1/21/22, at 1 (emphasis in original).
    -9-
    J-S37021-22
    303.16(a)     (Basic     Sentencing      Matrix),   Pennsylvania   Commission   on
    Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines, 7th Ed. Amend. 1;8 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(1)
    (“A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to
    imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall
    be not more than . . . [f]ive years in the case of a misdemeanor of the first
    degree.”).
    Morales filed a post-sentence motion arguing that the court: did not
    state which facts of the case caused the court to deviate from the suggested
    minimum guideline sentence; failed to acknowledge that the numerous sexual
    assault offenses that [Morales] had originally been charged with were not
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that [Morales] was acquitted of all
    charges except two counts of EWOC; abused its discretion by not stating
    sufficient reasons on the record for deviating from the suggested guideline
    minimum sentence and by imposing consecutive sentences in light of
    mitigating circumstances; and, failed to give proper weight to mitigating
    circumstances.      Post-Sentence Motion, 1/30/22, at 1-2.         On February 17,
    2022, the trial court denied Morales’ motion.
    ____________________________________________
    8 The Sentencing Matrix indicates that for an OGS of 5 and PRS of 5, as in the
    instant case, a standard-range sentence is 12-18 months’ minimum
    confinement, +/- 3 months. Here, Morales’ minimum term of incarceration
    was 30 months. Thus, it falls above the aggravated range and outside of the
    Guidelines.
    - 10 -
    J-S37021-22
    Morales filed timely notices of appeal9 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Morales raises
    the following issues for our consideration:
    (1)    Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion at sentencing where it
    did not state sufficient reasons to deviate from the
    suggested guideline minimum sentence?
    (2)    Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion in sentencing [Morales]
    to consecutive terms of imprisonment where there were
    mitigating circumstances and the imposition of a
    consecutive sentence presents a substantial question that
    the sentence is inappropriate because it is contrary to the
    norms underlying the Sentencing Code?
    (3)    Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion in sentencing [Morales]
    to the maximum sentence permitted for EWOC[,] graded as
    an M[-]1[,] where the imposition of the maximum sentence
    for EWOC [(M-1)] presents a substantial question that the
    sentence is inappropriate because it is excessive, manifestly
    unreasonable[,] and contrary to the norms underlying the
    Sentencing Code[?]
    Appellant’s Brief, at 6.
    Morales’ claims implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “It
    is well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of sentencing,
    there is no automatic right to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 
    66 A.3d 798
    , 807-08 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
    Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four[-]
    ____________________________________________
    9Morales has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018), which requires the filing of “separate appeals from an
    order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket.” 
    Id. at 977
    . See
    also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    2020 PA Super 164
     (Pa. Super. filed July
    9, 2020) (en banc) (revisiting Walker holding) and Commonwealth v.
    Larkin, 
    2020 PA Super 163
     (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2020) (en banc) (same).
    - 11 -
    J-S37021-22
    part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2)
    whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s
    brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
    allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
    sentence [see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise
    statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is
    appropriate under the sentencing code . . . . [I]f the appeal
    satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then proceed to
    decide the substantive merits of the case.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted). After reviewing the record, we find that Morales has
    complied with the first three requirements. In addition, we also find that
    Morales’ Rule 2119(f) concise statement raises a substantial question. See
    Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
     (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)
    (finding claim that imposition of consecutive sentences was unduly excessive,
    together with claim that sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors,
    raised substantial question). Thus, we may review Morales’ sentencing claims.
    Our standard of review when deciding a sentencing claim is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely to be an error in judgment.
    Rather the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
    that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
    its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will,
    or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Shull, 
    148 A.3d 820
    , 831 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
    omitted). Moreover,
    [i]t is well-established that the [Pennsylvania] Sentencing
    Guidelines[, 204 Pa.Code § 303 et seq., ]are purely advisory in
    nature. The Guidelines do not alter the legal rights or duties of
    the defendant, the prosecutor[,] or the sentencing court. The
    Guidelines are merely one factor among many that the court must
    consider in imposing a sentence. []
    - 12 -
    J-S37021-22
    The defendant has no “right” to have other factors take pre-
    eminence or be exclusive; therefore, to have the Guidelines
    considered, whatever they may provide does not change his
    rights. Likewise, the prosecutor has no “right” to have a
    particular sentence imposed. Most important, the court has
    no “duty” to impose a sentence considered appropriate by
    the Pennsylvania Commission of Sentencing.               The
    Guidelines must only be considered and, to ensure that such
    consideration is more than mere fluff, the court must explain
    its reasons for depart[ing] from them.
    [D]espite the recommendations of the Guidelines, “the trial courts
    retain broad discretion in sentencing matters, and therefore, may
    sentence defendants outside the Guidelines.” The only line that a
    sentence may not cross is the statutory maximum sentence.
    Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 
    923 A.2d 1111
     (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
    Finally, “[i]f a trial court departs from the sentencing recommendations
    contained in the sentencing guidelines, it must provide a contemporaneous
    written     statement    of     the    reason   or   reasons      for   the    deviation.”
    Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 
    812 A.2d 617
    , 621 (Pa. 2002) (citing 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)). See also 
    204 Pa. Code § 303.1
    (d).
    “When a sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the sentencing
    court     for   resentencing,    the    sentencing    judge    should     start   afresh.”
    Commonwealth v. Losch,                 
    535 A.2d 115
       (Pa.   Super       1987).   In
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    640 A.2d 914
     (Pa. Super. 1994), our Court
    stated:
    Reimposing a judgment of sentence should not be a mechanical
    exercise. Given the important nature of the interests involved,
    the judge at the second sentencing hearing should reassess the
    penalty to be imposed on the defendant[—]especially where
    defense counsel comes forward with relevant evidence which was
    not previously available. Thus, [a defendant’s] conduct since the
    prior sentencing hearing is relevant at resentencing.        The
    sentencing judge must take note of this new evidence and
    - 13 -
    J-S37021-22
    reevaluate whether the jail term which [the defendant] received
    is a just and appropriate punishment.
    
    Id. at 919-20
    , citing Losch, 535 A.2d at 122-23.
    Instantly, the sentencing judge did take note of new evidence at
    Morales’ resentencing hearing. Specifically, the judge took into account the
    fact that Morales had completed two rehabilitative programs since being
    incarcerated five years prior.      N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 1/21/22, at 17
    (“However, I am taking into consideration everything that you told me about
    what you’ve been doing while you’ve been incarcerated.”). The judge noted
    Morales’ progress and commended him for having “learned something [by]
    attend[ing] and complet[ing the] programs.” Id. However, even considering
    this new evidence, the sentencing judge highlighted the fact that “the nature
    of [Morales’] case [is] difficult,” id. at 18, and that just because the grading
    of the offenses may have changed, the same sentence was still appropriate
    under the circumstances. Id. at 18-19.
    Additionally, the sentencing judge was aware of the correct guidelines
    “starting   point”   before   she    imposed    Morales’   outside-the-guideline
    resentence. See id. at 4; see also Commonwealth v. Johnakin, 
    502 A.2d 620
     (Pa. Super. 1985) (court must determine correct starting point in
    guidelines before sentencing defendant to sentence outside guidelines). The
    sentencing judge also noted that, in resentencing Morales, she considered the
    young age of the victims, “who had a familial relationship with [Morales],
    [Morales’] reaction[] when he was discovered by the [Children’s] mother; and
    [Morales’] lack of remorse.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/22, at 12.
    - 14 -
    J-S37021-22
    After a review of the record, we conclude that the sentencing court did
    not abuse its discretion when it resentenced Morales.        Shull, supra.   The
    court considered, among other things, the facts of the case, Morales’ character
    and prior criminal record, and any intervening mitigating evidence since he
    had been incarcerated on the instant offenses.       See Commonwealth v.
    Griffin, 
    804 A.2d 1
    , 10 (Pa. Super. 2002) (record as whole must reflect
    sentencing court’s consideration of facts of case and defendant’s character
    and “should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal
    characteristics[,] and his potential for rehabilitation”).   The court likewise
    balanced the factors enumerated in section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code
    and stated, on the record, why it decided to impose an outside-the-guideline
    sentence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 
    657 A.2d 961
     (Pa. Super. 1995)
    (judgment of sentence vacated where sentencing court failed to state, in
    defendant’s presence, permissible range of guideline sentences and did not
    indicate it was sentencing defendant outside of guidelines or provide reasons
    for deviation).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/16/2022
    - 15 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 855 EDA 2022

Judges: Lazarus, J.

Filed Date: 12/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/16/2022