In the Interest of: S.D.M. a/k/a S.H. ( 2016 )

J-S50003-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D.M. A/K/A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
S.H., A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: L.V.M.
No. 222 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 4, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Orphans' Court
at No(s): 6 OC 2015
BEFORE: MUNDY, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016
L.V.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered on January 4,
2016, granting the petition filed by the Tioga County Department of Human
Services (“DHS”), seeking to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to
her dependent child, S.D.M., a/k/a S.H. (“Child”), a female born in April of
2003, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).1 We
affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant history in its
opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(1). See Trial Ct. Op.,
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Mother’s decree was translated into Russian. In a separate decree dated
and entered on January 4, 2016, the trial court also terminated the rights of
Child’s father, D.H. (“Father”). Father has not filed an appeal. He is not a
party to this appeal, nor has he filed a brief in this matter.
J-S50003-16
2/26/16, at 1-6 (unpaginated). We adopt the trial court’s recitation for
purposes of this appeal. See id.
As noted above, on January 4, 2016, the trial court entered the decree
terminating Mother’s parental rights. On January 25, 2016, Mother timely
filed a notice of appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).2
In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two questions for this Court’s
review, as follows:
1. The Dependency court sua sponte issued an order that
Mother was precluded from having contact with the child
until the child had therapy and the therapist stated that
contact was okay. DHS failed to tell the therapist that
reunification was a goal and that Mother should become
engaged in therapy when it was appropriate for the child,
therefore, albeit maybe accidental – reunification was
never really being pursued by DHS. Subsequently, Mother
traveled to Ukraine and Russia and due to financial health
constraints was unable to return to the United States in a
timely manner. Did the trial court abuse its discretion
when it determined that [M]other has shown that she
wants to relinquish her parental rights or has failed to
perform her parental duties?
2. The child did not testify at the termination hearing and
no evidence was presented that that [sic] contact with
Mother is a danger to her child’s physical or emotional
well-being. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
determining that the best interest of the child would be
served by terminating Mother’s parental rights?
2
On January 29, 2016, Mother filed an amended notice of appeal correcting
the date of the decree on appeal from January 4, 2015, to January 4, 2016.
-2-
J-S50003-16
Mother’s Brief at 2.3
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of
a petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made
an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614
Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d [567,] 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality
opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion
does not result merely because the reviewing court might
have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also
Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa.
371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v.
Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-55], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate
courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific
determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are
observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
3
We note that, with regard to the issues in Mother’s brief, Mother’s concise
statement preserved only the last sentence of each of these two paragraphs.
See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super.
2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his
or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the
Statement of Questions Involved in his or her brief on appeal). Although
Mother stated those issues somewhat differently in her concise statement,
we nevertheless find that she preserved those issues for our review.
-3-
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presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the
child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge
to second guess the trial court and impose its own
credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions
are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 539 Pa. 161[,
165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony
that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super.
2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Section
2511(a)(1) and (b). See Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (unpaginated). Section
2511(a)(1) and (b) provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights
under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under Section 2511(b), the
focus is on the child. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(en banc). We focus on Section 2511(a)(1).
We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
-5-
J-S50003-16
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a
settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a
refusal or failure to perform parental duties.
* * *
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of
inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of
termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact
must be steady and consistent over a period of time,
contribute to the psychological health of the child, and
must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the
parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship and must
also demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake
the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish his
parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted); see
also In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1006.
Further, regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has
stated as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation
is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.
-6-
J-S50003-16
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the
child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and
association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult
circumstances. A parent must utilize all available
resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must
exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.
Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . her
physical and emotional needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
In her first issue with regard to Section 2511(a)(1), Mother contends
that the trial court improperly terminated her parental rights. Mother
alleges that originally, a trial court order precluded her from contacting
Child. Citing In re M.B., 674 A.2d 702, 705 (Pa. Super. 1996), Mother
asserts that the trial court had no grave threat upon which to deny Mother
any visitation with Child, and improperly placed the burden on Child and
Child’s counselor to initiate visitation. Mother asserts that a lack of
cooperation by DHS impeded her from overcoming that order. Further,
Mother claims that after she traveled to her home country, her own health
and financial constraints impeded her from returning as soon as planned.
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Mother likens her situation to that of an incarcerated parent and cites case
law regarding incarcerated parents. Mother claims that her circumstances
precluded her from fulfilling her parental duties from at least April 2014 until
the filing of the termination petition, so her situation is similar to that of a
prisoner who has restrictions on her ability to parent. Mother essentially
argues that DHS did not make reasonable efforts to establish reunification as
a goal and avoid the termination of her parental rights. See Mother’s Brief
at 13.
We find Mother’s argument unavailing. Mother failed to timely
challenge the initial dependency order that denied her contact with Child.
Thus, she may not raise the propriety of that order in this appeal. Mother
was not an incarcerated parent, and therefore, her reliance on the case law
regarding incarcerated parents is inappropriate. Moreover, our Supreme
Court held that the trial court is not required to consider reasonable efforts
in relation to a decision to terminate parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2). In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014). This same
holding is applicable to Section 2511(a)(1) for the reasons expressed by the
Supreme Court. Thus, for the reasons explained by the trial court in its
opinion, which we incorporate herein, we find her argument lacks merit.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 6-8 (unpaginated).
Next, we review Mother’s second issue concerning Section 2511(b).
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
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Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section
2511(b). See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008.
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section
2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super.
2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs
and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53
A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Mother asserts that Child had a very close bond with her and was not
fearful of her. See Mother’s Brief at 14. Mother contends that Child’s
current feelings toward her are relevant to a consideration of Child’s
emotional, physical, and developmental needs. Id. at 15. She argues that
DHS has failed to establish a lack of a bond between Child and Mother
without evidence that Child currently has a lack of feeling toward her. Id. at
14-15. Additionally, Mother claims that the termination of her parental
rights will have a great effect on Child, both physically and emotionally, and
will affect her development in the future, as it will have an impact on Child’s
identity with her Russian heritage. Id. at 15.
-9-
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We find Mother’s argument concerning Child’s need to have her
Russian heritage as a reason for precluding the termination of Mother’s
parental rights lacks merit. For the reasons articulated by the trial court,
which we incorporate herein, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that DHS
sustained its burden under Section 2511(b). See Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/16, at
8-9 (unpaginated). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decree with
regard to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2016
- 10 -
Circulated 06/28/2016 04:16 PM
Received 03/17/2016 Superior Court Mlddle District
I 03/17/2016 Superow~9~1
Fled .
!ME
Rfli~o ~fsi,.ict
j . ~20'16
RrnISm ANO ttCOROER
TIOGA cou.m. PA
IN THE INTEREST OF :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PlEAS Perir1!ylvaril<1
In:~ SIJ!il 20t61Jli3HANS COURT 2015
And now this 4th day of January, 2016, upon consideration of the Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, and after testimony and evidence received, the parental rights of
1.lfg \ ..... M ••.•also known as t*1~, are forever terminated as to
the minor child, S~ Mi.il.,(
•• 11111.I, also known as Stll H. ] £
born April 27, 2003. Further proceedings in this matter shall proceed without further notice to
the aforesaid mother.
The biological parent is advised of his continuing right to place and update personal and
medical history information, whether or not the medical condition is in existence or discoverable
at the time of adopuon, on file with the Court and with the Department of Public Welfare
pursuant to 23 Pa. C. S. A. 2905 (d).
cc: S. Olson, Esq
T. Cummings, Esq.
L. Urbano, Esq.
Slalicn: SCAN3 TIOGA COUNTY, PA
Inst.# 201600341 · Page 1
Received 03/17/2016 Superior Court Mlddle District
FICO ROE!>
Filed 03/17/2016 Supai1lffe©'n'i}~~t~Jct
JA11E ~tm 201 s
noJST~R PJ!O P.ECO~i!Ef.
noGn rnmm. P~
IN THE INTEREST OF ~tt,rt:,Jlvir,i-3
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS !r.sl N,m: 20lu0tr.l:!?
s .. D. HS GMIIII _ : OF TIOGA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
(AKA:S-~
A MINOR CHILD NO. 6 ORPHANS COURT 2015
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND DECREES ON PETITION FOR
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Findings of Fact
F tvt•••I, also known as - HI e••, was born April 27,
2003. She is the natural child of tttzlllll• ''jJ•i lll•PPM~•l•ll.••1also known as
2. ~was removed from the home of Mr. and Mrs. fiH&••· (Mil&••-•) on April
10, 2013, by Order of !his Court, pursuant to a Petition for Emergency Protective
Custody.
-------~-~------·----------·--
3. ~ has remained in placement with -and CtllillH.-since her removal from
4. S... was adjudicated a dependent child on April 18, 2013.
5. ~s removal was the result, in part, of substantial concerns regarding Mrs.
H I5 's ability to supervise her. particularly in the absence of Mr. H ... who
frequently left the Cornmonwcalth for war k obligations.
Station: Sc;in3. 03115120Hl 12.59:,10 Pl.1 TIOG/1 COUNTY, PA
Josi.# 201600339 - Pago 1 of 14
6. The events leading to the filing of the Petition tor Emergency Custody were initiated by
Mr. I l...._,s call to Children and Youth Servicesin Tioga County regarding his
concernsfor~ safety due to Mrs. H .... s drinking.
7. Mrs. I I di $1as had no contact with se.>1nce her removal from the home.
8. Prior to the filing of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, Mrs. I IS l'1A did
not petition or otherwise request visitation with - through the Court.
9. Following ~s removal from the home, the Tioga County Department of Human
Services, Family ServicesDivision {Family Services),has made available services,
including Intensive Case Management (JCM}.
I 0. Mrs. J Jiii 's participation was initially inconsistent and subsequently ended when
she stopped participating in servicesand ended contact with Family Services.
I I. Prior to the filing of the Petition, Mrs. 1 • M had had no contact wlthFarnllv Services
s•
since at least February 2014.
12. Mrs. 11[ •• has not provided gifts, cards or support in anv way for since her
removal from the homo.
I 3. Mrs. 11 •• I has not participated In s9ils medical or dental care since her removal.
______ f....,..4..:famil_y5erjljcesprovided::seotic~odudiog.¥isitatioi:u.o..Mf......J:W••IL----.:..._----- ... ··-· ··--·--··
15. Mr. I'S ma,n(ained contact with Family Services through July 2014, since that
time his only contact were messageshe left with Mr. Brewer and Ms. Tarbox, in
October 2014, which resulted in criminal charges of harassment being filed.
16. Mr. I$ j's visitation with ~was suspended by court order following a hearing
held May 23, 2014.
Sla1ion: Scan3 · 0311512016 12:59:40 PM TIOGA COUNTY. PA Inst.# 201600339. P~ge 2 ol 14
17. Mr. I' I J has not provided gifts, cards or support in any way for ~since at least
removal.
3.
May 23, 2014.
18. Mr. It has not participated in ~s medical or dental care since prior to her
19. After her removal from the l ... home, ~eceived substantial treatment and
20. S.
counselingto address her anxiety related to the abuse inflicted in the 11 ..
has also been fitted with hearing aids to assist with a previously untreated
hearing loss.
I home.
21. S. is safe and her needs are met in her placement with J ... nd C ...
22. ~
23. The .are
family.
has bonded with the -family
wilting and able to adopt S.
and wants to be a part of it.
and provide her a permanent home and
DISCUSSION
Ms I W I S.was remo.ved from her home on April 10, 2013, pursuant to !!!'. Order of .
. . he J.igga _cow1ty Cour1or Com moo P!.e<'!s gcaol ing a Petitkin foe E mecgeoqu:ust ..,,ad"'iyf-*"~.....
Ihe.I.....io
...fr'~--~-----~
··----~ ~·-·-~--- -•L+~o-o•-~ ~- • 0 ·- ••·--~-·----·- ••,· - • 0 ~---·--•-+••-•••••••-· 0,0 -• ·-· - •• • 0 -••• •-• 0 •- -•--••
County Department of Children and Youth filed the Petition following contact with ~and
Mrs. I on April 9, 2013. Workers from the Department went to the J IJ 6 home after
Mr. H .... phoned as he departed Tioga County for work in the western United States which
would result in his being out of the area for several weeks. Mr. I 9 I 5 advised the
Slolion: Scan3 - 0311512016 12.59:40 PM TIOGA COUNTY, PA Inst# 201600339 • Page 3 of 1,1
.... a.regularly consumed alcohol and that he was concerned tor the
s•
well-being of .-When she did so. A caseworker visited the home on the afternoon of April
9, 2013 and was greeted by ~who reported that her motlier was asleep. had
reported that her mother drinks .i lot and sleepsa lot and says mean things, she also informed
the caseworkerthat her mother had tried to kick her prior to school on the morning of Aprll 8,
2013. At the request of the caseworker, se.attempted several times to wake her mother but
was unable to do so. Following these attempts, S~d the caseworker to the neighboring
S.
home where a Mr. and Mrs. ~
inside. Mrs. '91was
were watching their grandchildren. Mr. and Mrs. L.-.,
and the caseworker returned to the I IQ Q$ home and Mrs. L....
eventually able to awaken Mrs. H~
and ~ent
who then came to the door in
a robe to meet the caseworker. Mrs, 1-11••was reportedly unable to focus on the
conversation and had blood-shot and elassyeyes. Mrs. H1H•I •tuttimalely told the caseworker
she had not been In bed but mt her in the shower, Mrs. M £ initlally admitted the
caseworker to the norne but then kicked her out. sewent to the L.. home and spent the
night.
Following the service of the Order ernnting emergency protective custody, Mrs. HI••
did not appear lor the shelter care hearing. Mrs. I I t P 3 did appear, with court appointed
··· · counsel,Oaniel--Stefanides;
for-the adjudicatory hearing·held·Apri~·rn; ·2013:·Mrs: 11•••
indicated, orally through counsel and in writing, that she did not require the services of an
interpreter at the time of this hearing although one had been provided. During the course of the
hearing.the caseworker, Christa Hilfiger, testified to concerns for S.s safety due to Mrs.
H ... s alcohol abuse, her anger and parenting concerns, Mr. H 1111 $ vas not readily
Sta!ion: ScanJ · 03!!512016 12:59:~0 PM TIOGA COUNTY. PA Inst# 201600339 · Page 4 cl 14
available to protect and parent $.due to his absence from the state for weeks at a time for
S.
work. Following the hearing, the Honorable Robert E. Dalton, Jr., entered an Order of
Adjudication finding
the Court ordered that Mrs. H ..
to be a dependent child. At the same time, apparently suo spcnte,
would have no visitation with ~pending further order
of court. No appeal was taken from the Order of Adjudication. Further, prior to the filing or thP.
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, Mrs.MS f never requested reconsideration or
modification of the order directing that she have no contact with the child. Mr. H •• f!d not
appear for either the shelter care or the adjudicatory hearings. On August 6, 2013 following
continuances granted at the request of the~. the initial permanency review hearing was
held. Mr. and Mrs. H 5 \both appeared for this proceeding and were accompanied by
Attorney Jason Kutulakis, as privately retained counsel. Mrs. 11 •• I did not testlfv but Mr.
H-did. Based upon a review of the records, it appears this is the last substantive
proceeding Mrs. J 1 F I appeared at prior to the termination proceeding.
The next Permanency Review Hearing was conducted September 26, 2013. Neither Mr.
nor Mrs. H ID I appeared but Attorney KL1tulakis appeared as counsel for both. ~. her
theraplst, Ms. Marengo, and foster parent r; .. R. each testified. S .. was questioned by
the guardian ad tltem and explained the abuse inflicted by her mother and the fear resulting
···· -·-··· therefro m:·-spec ificsl ly; when ·questioneu-ab·oorblcrck-rnarks ·ob-se-rved-onrYer ooay; slle ·
explained
[w]hen this happened -when r kind of got the bad grade, my mom, she got
mad at me and she, she, she tried to hit me and she just keeps hitting me and
it, it t)urt me ancl she keep hitting me a lot. .
Stalio.'l; Scan3 · 0311512016 12:59.40 PM TIOGA COUNTY. PA Inst 1120160)339. Page 5 of 14
Permanency Review Hearing, September 26, 2013, cp.s-s
S. further testified to receiving a black eye when her mother sot mad and pushed her down.
She also described how she could tell when her mother had beendrinktog excessively, testifying
"she get mean, kind of like crazy, kind of stupid, [slhe acts stupid to me, may get craiy, she being
mean. [s)he Just hit me." Id. at 9.
Mr. It Q ?appeared for a subsequent review hearing on February 25, 2014 with
Attorney Thomas Walrath, appointed counsel, as he was no longer represented by Attorney
Kutalakis. During that hearing, Randy Brewer, s.s caseworker, testified to on-going efforts to
provide services to Mrs. H Q but indicated she often would not answer the door or appear
for scheduled appointments and that she refused to discuss Issues related to the case when she
with him or anyone else at the Department. Mr. Brewer testified that Mr. 11£ 1was visiting
with - when he was in Tioga County and had assisted in efforts to examine placement
through the Interstate Compact. Mr. Brewer continued, however, that Mr. H ... had now
told him he "was not jumping through anymore hoops" clnd not taking part In services anymore.
. ·--·-- ---he had talked to her about
. - -- --------------
it, but it was still there. --··
.. ·----··---- -· -- - - ---- ·-- -·---"-
He- ..added
- ·····---
that he knew
--~ ··--·
getting awful hard to get atong with but that he did not know of her being violent with
did however add that he knew Mrs. ~11 ... lt.\was "emotionally abusive" to
Mrs. H
..... - -----·. --
S-..
S. He
Mr. H ... continued to participate in visitation and phone contact with $.through
May of 2014 .. 4. series of events, including threats by Mr. t-l ... c.against a Department
S!a!iOn: Stan)· 0311512016 12:59 40 Pt.! TIOGA COUNTY. PA Ins!.# 2D 160 0339 . Page 6 of 14
employee, Jed to a request that his visits be suspended. M, . H .... also appeared for that
proceeding with Attorney Thomas Walrath. Mr. H .. 's visits were suspended following a
hearing held before Honorable Joy Reynolds McCoy on May 13, 2014. Mr. H& • neither
requested reconsideration or modification or the order suspending his contact.
On July 1, 20ltl following continuances, the next Permanency Review Hearing occurred in
~ront of Judge McCoy. The order entered following that hearing note d that Mrs. I 1J
••• had
not been participating in hearings, that she had not met with or been in contact with the
caseworker since the last hearing and that she was participating minimally in the lCM program.
Mr. J j I If was present for the hearing and directed to undergo ll psychiatric evaluation.
Judge McCoy specifically addressed the temporarily suspended visits and directed that the
matter be reexamined as soon as it was therapeutlcally recommended. Shortly after this
hearing, Attorney Kutulakis withdrew as counsel for Mrs. I lltnd Attorney Tiff any
Cummings was appointed to represent her.
Neither parent appeared for the October 28, 2014 hearing, also held before Judge
McCoy. Judge McCoy's Order notes that. was doing well in her foster home and that she
feels _part of the family and 1hr11 she states "sometimes she forgets she is in a foster home and
-----~JSbb.1et:ili£.aalfo!l:2iiteeiruc:tflLilildd.~"JMM.ILr.Jl~'& ... l:w..lSJlo.teJi.as...uot..pac.tidpating..in.a,~ewices.aAd-.haG-flG!-------------
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followed through with previously ordered psychiatric evaluation or had contact with the
caseworker. Judge McCoy found "no compliance" with the permanency plan by Mrs. He a
and "no progress" towards alleviating the circumstances leading to placement, her Honor
specifically noted in the Order,
Station· Sc3n3 -03!1512016 12:59.40 PM T!OGA COUNTY. PA !nst.