Com. v. Murray, J. ( 2016 )

J-A14028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JASON PATRICK MURRAY
Appellee No. 1664 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000177-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered August 26, 2015,
in the Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, granting Jason Patrick
Murray’s pre-trial motion to dismiss a charge of driving under the influence
of a controlled substance (hereinafter “DUI (drug offense)”).1 Because we
conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support a
prima facie case that Murray was driving under the influence of a controlled
substance, we reverse the order of the trial court2 and remand for further
proceedings.
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).
2
We note that the order on appeal also denied Murray’s motion to suppress
an out-of-court identification, and, accordingly, a summary parking offense
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The facts underlying Murray’s arrest were summarized by the trial
court as follows:
At approximately 1300 hours on September 23, 2014,
[Emergency Medical Technician, Gill Crossett] was dispatched to
the intersection of Bradford and Spring Streets in the Borough of
Sayre, Pennsylvania, in response to a report of a person passed
out behind the steering wheel of a pickup truck. Upon his arrival
at Bradford and Spring Streets, Crossett found a white male
passed out behind the steering wheel of a 2000 Chevrolet
Silverado truck bearing [a] Pennsylvania registration [number];
the truck’s engine was running. Crossett attempted to gain
entry to the vehicle by opening the driver’s door but found that
the door was locked. Crossett then went to the door on the
passenger’s side of the truck, and the door being unlocked, he
opened it and observed the driver, whom he later identified as
[Murray]; there were no other persons in the truck. When
Crossett first viewed [Murray], he noticed that [Murray’s] arm on
the inside of his elbow was bleeding and he also saw a needle
with fresh blood on it on the floor board of the truck below
[Murray]; Crossett then awakened [Murray] and requested that
he exit the truck; at the time the request to exit was made,
Crossett was … half inside and half outside of the truck.
[Murray] then attempted to put the truck into motion, an act
that caused Crossett to fear for his safety and so he reached
over, shut off the truck’s engine, and removed the ignition key.
At this point, [Murray] reached into or around the truck’s
console, grabbed a metal spoon that appeared to have been
“burnt” and a “small bag” containing an unidentified substance,
exited the truck, and ran into a wooded area; neither the spoon
nor the small bag was ever recovered. Officer [Travis] Snyder
[of the Sayre Borough Police Department] arrived upon the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
is still pending against Murray. See Order, 8/26/2015. Because the order
on appeal did not dispose of the entire case, the Commonwealth properly
certified, in its notice of appeal, that the order on appeal will “terminate or
substantially handicap the prosecution.” Notice of Appeal, 9/25/2015. See
Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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scene at some point after [Murray] had run into the wooded
area, interviewed Crossett, and oversaw the removal of the truck
to the Sayre Borough Police Department. During an inventory
search of the truck at the police station, Officer Snyder found,
and took possession of, a wallet, a cell phone, and one
hypodermic needle which were located on the driver-side floor of
the truck. Examination of the contents of the wallet produced a
driver license issued to Jason P. Murray; the license was later
shown to Crossett and he identified the person whose picture
was on the license as the person he had observed passed out in
the truck. [It was later determined that the truck was owned by
Murray’s father, Francis Murray, who] appeared at the police
station [later that evening to retrieve his truck].
Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8/26/2015, at unnumbered 2-4
(footnote omitted).
Murray was subsequently charged with DUI (drug offense), a summary
parking violation, possession of drug paraphernalia and recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”).3 On April 15, 2015, Murray filed an
omnibus pre-trial motion, requesting that the trial court (1) grant a writ of
habeas corpus, and dismiss the charge of DUI (drug offense), and (2)
suppress Crossett’s out-of-court identification. See Omnibus Motion,
4/15/2015. The trial court conducted a hearing on July 1, 2015. Thereafter,
the Commonwealth dismissed the charges of possession of drug
paraphernalia and REAP. On August 26, 2015, the trial court entered an
order, granting Murray’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissing
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3
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(2) and 3353 (a)(2)(iii) (parking too close to a
crosswalk), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, respectively.
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the charge of DUI (drug offense), but denying Murray’s motion to suppress
his identification. This timely Commonwealth appeal followed.4
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends the trial court erred when it
determined the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a prima facie case of DUI (drug offense).
Our review of a trial court order granting a pretrial writ of habeas
corpus is plenary. Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa.
2005). “Indeed, the trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining
whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the
Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden to make out the
elements of a charged crime.” Id.
We review the court’s ruling “by examining the evidence and
reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Dantzler, ___ A.3d ___, ___ (2016
PA Super 59, *2) (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc). “Notably, the
Commonwealth does not have to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa.
2005). Rather, it must
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4
On September 29, 2015, the trial court ordered Murray to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Murray complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement
that same day.
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merely put forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of guilt. A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth
produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime
charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief
that the accused committed the offense. Furthermore, the
evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and
accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the
case to be decided by the jury.
Karetny, supra, 880 A.2d at 513-514 (internal citations omitted).
The crime of DUI (drug offense) is defined as follows:
(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, operate
or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
under any of the following circumstances:
...
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case, the
Commonwealth must present evidence that Murray was in physical control of
the movement of the truck, while he was under the influence of a drug,
which impaired his ability to operate the truck safely.
Here, the trial court found the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate Murray was in “actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle under Pennsylvania law.” Trial Court Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 8/26/2015, at unnumbered 5-6.5 However, the court
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5
We agree with this finding by the trial court. When Crossett arrived at the
scene, he observed Murray, “passed out behind the wheel” of a truck. N.T.,
7/1/2015, at 4. Crossett testified the truck was “sittin’ at a stop sign,” with
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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ultimately concluded the Commonwealth lacked “evidence of physical
impairment as a result of [Murray] being under the influence of a drug.” Id.
at 6. The court opined:
Although a needle was seized, which, according to Officer
Snyder’s credible hearing testimony was a hypodermic needle of
the type usually attached to a syringe, there was no evidence to
indicate the presence of a drug. Similarly, the contents of the
bag removed from the truck by [Murray] at the time of his
precipitous exit from the vehicle was never identified. There was
no evidence showing the nature of the spoon taken from the
truck by [Murray]. There was no evidence to show the source or
cause of the flow of blood observed on [Murray’s] arm by
Crossett. Even circumstantially in light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, there is insufficient evidence that sufficiently
establishes both the commission of a crime and that the accused
is probably the perpetrator of that crime.
Id.
The Commonwealth contends, however, that the evidence presented
at the pre-trial hearing was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that
Murray was under the influence of a controlled substance. It emphasizes
Murray was found unresponsive in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle. He
had a spot of blood on his arm, and a hypodermic needle, with an empty
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the engine running, and the gearshift in park. Id. at 3-4. These facts
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to infer Murray was in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle, and that he had, in fact, driven to the
scene. See Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Super.
2010) (evidence sufficient to find defendant was in control of the movement
of a vehicle when he was found “asleep in the driver's seat of the vehicle
with the motor running and the headlights illuminated[;]” there was also an
unopened six-pack of beer in the car and no store nearby that sold alcoholic
beverages), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2011).
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syringe, was recovered on the driver-side floor board. Moreover, Crossett
testified that after Murray awoke, he grabbed a small bag and a spoon with
burnt residue before fleeing the scene. Accordingly, the Commonwealth
asserts Murray’s “physical appearance combined with evidence of the
presence of various items of purported drug paraphernalia in the vicinity of
where [Murray] was seated” was sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.
Upon our review of the certified record, we are constrained to reverse
the order of the trial court. The facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
establish that Crossett found Murray unresponsive in a running motor
vehicle at 1:00 in the afternoon. See Affidavit of Probable Cause,
10/17/2014. Crossett observed a hypodermic needle with a syringe, and a
kitchen spoon with burnt residue, both on top of the middle console, and a
spot of blood on the inside of Murray’s arm. N.T., 7/1/2015, at 5-6. When
Crossett awakened Murray, Murray “tried to put the truck into drive,” but
Crossett was able to confiscate the keys. Id. at 7. Crossett then asked
Murray to unlock the driver’s side door, and Murray “started shoving stuff
into his pocket, got out [the driver’s side] door, ran around my partner and
ran across the street, down towards the railroad tracks.” Id. at 8. Crossett
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saw Murray grab the spoon and small, square plastic “packets of stuff.” 6 Id.
Furthermore, Officer Snyder stated that when he arrived at the scene a short
time later, he found, on the driver-side floorboard, a hypodermic needle with
blood on the tip, attached to an expended syringe. Id. at 18, 23.
We conclude the above-stated testimony was sufficient to establish
probable cause that Murray was under the influence of a controlled
substance, which impaired his ability to drive safely.7 Although there may
be a rational explanation for Murray’s actions, at this stage in the
proceedings, the Commonwealth is not required to “prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Santos, supra, 876 A.2d at 363.
Accordingly, because we find the trial court erred in granting Murray’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus, and dismissing the charge of DUI (drug
offense), we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.
Order reversed.8 Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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6
Crossett stated he “believe[d] the needle fell [on the floorboard] when
[Murray] was shoving stuff in his pocket[.]” N.T., 7/1/2015, at 14.
7
We might have found the trial court’s ruling more persuasive if the police
had not secured possession of the hypodermic needle found on the floor of
the truck. Indeed, the Commonwealth indicated at argument that it intends
to test the contents of the syringe prior to Murray’s trial.
8
Our decision does not affect that portion of the court’s August 26, 2015,
order denying Murray’s motion to suppress an out-of-court identification.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2016
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