Com. v. Thornton, E. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S11043-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    :
    EDWARD CHARLES THORNTON             :
    :
    Appellant         :   No. 1380 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000149-2020
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    :
    EDWARD CHARLES THORNTON             :
    :
    Appellant         :   No. 1381 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000074-2021
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    :
    EDWARD C. THORNTON                  :
    :
    Appellant         :   No. 1382 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000075-2021
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    J-S11043-22
    MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED: AUGUST 9, 2022
    Edward Charles Thornton (“Thornton”) appeals from the judgments of
    sentence imposed after he pled guilty in three separate cases to multiple
    counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fleeing or attempting to elude a
    police officer, driving while operating privileges suspended (“DUS”), one count
    of accident involving damage to attended vehicle, and related offenses.1
    Additionally, Thornton’s counsel has filed briefs pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and petitions to withdraw.            We deny
    counsel’s petitions to withdraw, vacate the judgments of sentence, and
    remand for resentencing.
    The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background of
    Thornton’s convictions as follows:
    On February 23, 2020 at 7:45 p.m., a police officer
    responded to a call about a person inside a vehicle in front of a
    Tractor Supply [store] for four hours. The officer observed that
    [Thornton] was passed out in an awkward position in the vehicle
    while the lights were turned on and the engine was running. After
    [the officer woke up Thornton, he] provided identification, [and]
    the officer determined that he had a previous DUI [conviction].
    After searching [Thornton’s] person and his vehicle, the officer
    found various drug paraphernalia, a bag with a crystal-like
    substance, and a bag with a leafy substance. [Thornton] informed
    the officer that he had ingested marijuana and methamphetamine
    in the previous twenty-four hours. [Thornton] failed the sobriety
    tests but refused to submit to chemical testing. As a result of this
    incident, [Thornton] was charged [at docket 149 of 2020 with,
    ____________________________________________
    1  See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(c), 3802(d)(2), 3733(a), 1543(b)(1)(i),
    1543(b)(1.1)(i), 3743(a). Thornton also pled guilty to several summary traffic
    violations for which the trial court imposed fines.
    -2-
    J-S11043-22
    inter alia, DUI—controlled substance, second offense and DUS
    under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i).]
    On November 18, 2020, an officer in a marked vehicle
    attempted to stop [Thornton] for driving at night without
    headlights. After the officer turned on his lights, [Thornton] fled
    and drove through red lights and blinking red lights in the process.
    [At that time, Thornton] was driving while his license was
    suspended from a previous DUI.         [At docket] 74 of 2021,
    [Thornton] was charged with[, inter alia, fleeing or attempting to
    elude a police officer and DUS under 75 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 1543(b)(1)(i).]
    [O]n March 16, 2021, [while again attempting to flee from
    a police officer, Thornton] collided with another vehicle at the
    intersection of West Main Street and North Main[ S]treet in
    Youngsville. [Thornton] left his vehicle and ran from the scene of
    the accident without assisting the driver of the other vehicle. He
    continued to run after an officer commanded that he stop.
    [Thornton] had a [blood-alcohol content] of 0.17 during this
    incident. He was once again driving while his license was
    suspended due to a previous DUI. [Thornton] was charged [at
    docket 75 of 2021] with[, inter alia, flight to avoid apprehension,
    accident with damage to attended vehicle/property, DUI—highest
    rate, third offense, and DUS under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i).]
    Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/21, at 1-3.
    Thornton entered open guilty pleas in all three cases, and the trial court
    sentenced him to an aggregate term of 69 months plus 270 days to 192
    months plus 270 days of imprisonment, which included consecutive “flat”
    sentences of ninety days of incarceration for the three counts of driving while
    operating privileges suspended.2 Thornton timely filed motions to reconsider
    ____________________________________________
    2  The trial court’s original sentencing order miscalculated the aggregate
    sentence of imprisonment as 69 months plus 180 days to 192 months to 180
    days. After Thornton appealed, the court amended the sentencing order to
    correct the references to 180 days to 270 days for the three consecutive
    sentences for DUS. Because the trial court corrected an obvious mathematical
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    J-S11043-22
    the sentence, which the trial court denied.      Thornton timely appealed, and
    both Thornton and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In this Court,
    Thornton’s counsel filed Anders briefs and petitions to withdraw from
    representation.
    Thornton’s counsel identifies the following issues:
    1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
    sentencing [Thornton] to consecutive sentences instead of
    concurrent sentences?
    2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion at
    sentencing by denying [Thornton] of RRRI eligibility?
    Anders Briefs at 8.
    When presented with Anders briefs, this Court may not review the
    merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
    withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 
    9 A.3d 237
    , 240 (Pa. Super.
    2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and
    wishes to withdraw from representation, he/she must do the following:
    (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
    determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring
    to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which
    does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the
    brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new
    counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems
    worthy of this Court’s attention.
    ____________________________________________
    error, we consider the amended sentencing order as controlling in this appeal.
    See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 
    933 A.2d 57
    , 65 (Pa. 2007) (holding that
    the jurisdictional limitations in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 do not impinge on the
    inherent power of the courts to correct a patent error).
    -4-
    J-S11043-22
    Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    906 A.2d 1225
    , 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (citation omitted).   In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa.
    2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e.,
    the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.        “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]
    requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial
    court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the
    appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”   Edwards, 
    906 A.2d at 1228
     (citation
    omitted).
    Here, Thornton’s counsel avers in his petitions to withdraw that he has
    carefully reviewed the entire record and concluded that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel further avers that he mailed Thornton copies of the petitions and the
    Anders briefs, as well as correspondence explaining Thornton’s right to retain
    private counsel or proceed pro se and raise any additional arguments he
    believes are meritorious. Counsel’s Anders briefs include a summary of the
    facts and procedural history of the cases, a list of issues that could arguably
    -5-
    J-S11043-22
    support Thornton’s appeal, and counsel’s analysis of why the issues lack merit,
    with citations to the record and legal authority.    We conclude counsel has
    substantially complied with the requirements of the Anders procedure.3
    Accordingly, we will conduct an independent review to determine whether this
    appeal is wholly frivolous.
    Counsel identifies challenges to the consecutive sentences and the trial
    court’s conclusion that Thornton was not eligible for a sentence under the
    Recidivism Risk Reduction Act (“RRRI”).4
    Before addressing these challenges, we consider sua sponte the legality
    of the sentence for DUS at docket 149 of 2020. See Commonwealth v.
    Mitchell, 
    986 A.2d 1241
    , 1244 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that this Court
    has the authority to address an illegal sentence sua sponte).             When
    considering the legality of a sentence, this Court’s standard of review is de
    novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 
    205 A.3d 329
    , 345 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    Here, Thornton pled guilty at docket 149 of 2020 to DUS under 75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i), and the trial court sentenced him to pay a fine of
    $1,000 and serve ninety days of imprisonment. In Commonwealth v. Eid,
    ____________________________________________
    3 Counsel did not attach his letters to Thornton to his petitions to withdraw,
    but attached copies of the letters are attached to the Anders briefs. We note,
    however, that Thornton was not included in the certificate of service attached
    to counsel’s briefs. We nevertheless decline to direct counsel to file new
    letters advising Thornton of his appellate rights given our disposition.
    4   61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512.
    -6-
    J-S11043-22
    
    249 A.3d 1030
         (Pa.   2021),    our    Supreme   Court   held   that   section
    1543(b)(1.1)(i), is unconstitutionally vague as currently drafted because it
    fails to specify a maximum term of imprisonment and, therefore, only permits
    a court to lawfully impose a mandatory fine of $1,000. See Eid, 249 A.3d at
    1044. Therefore, we must vacate the sentence of imprisonment for DUS at
    docket 149 of 2020. See id. Because the trial court imposed a consecutive
    sentence on this count, our decision upsets the court’s overall sentencing
    scheme, and we will remand for resentencing.5             See Commonwealth v.
    Tanner, 
    61 A.3d 1043
    , 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    ____________________________________________
    5 In light of our disposition, we decline to consider Thornton’s intended
    challenge to the discretionary aspect of the sentence. As for Thornton’s
    challenge regarding his RRRI eligibility, this raises a question of law. See
    Commonwealth v. Finnecy (“Finnecy II”), 
    249 A.3d 903
    , 912 (Pa. 2021).
    We agree with the trial court’s analysis that Thornton’s three prior resisting
    arrest convictions would render him ineligible for a RRRI sentence. See
    Commonwealth v. Finnecy (“Finnecy I”), 
    135 A.3d 1028
    , 1037 (Pa. Super.
    2016) (holding that a prior conviction for resisting arrest demonstrates violent
    behavior under the RRRI statute); see also Finnecy II, 249 A.3d at 916
    (holding that a history of violent behavior rendering a defendant RRRI
    ineligible requires more than one prior conviction for resisting arrest). The
    certified record, however, contains no supporting evidence of Thornton’s prior
    convictions, such as a presentence report, or a clear statement of the basis
    for Thornton’s prior record at the sentencing hearing.
    The parties shall also consider the effect of Commonwealth v. White, 
    268 A.3d 499
    , 501 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that section 1543(b)(1)(i) specifies
    the range of a defendant’s maximum sentence with sufficient clarity to avoid
    the vagueness issue discussed in Eid), on the legality of flat sentences on the
    remaining two DUS counts under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). We also
    observe that on each of these two counts, the trial court imposed fines of
    $300, although section 1543(b)(1)(i) sets a mandatory fine of $500. See 75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i).
    -7-
    J-S11043-22
    For these reasons, we deny counsel’s petition to withdraw, vacate the
    judgments of sentence, and remand for resentencing consistent with this
    memorandum.
    Judgments of sentence vacated.            Case remanded for resentencing.
    Petition to withdraw denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.6
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/9/2022
    ____________________________________________
    6 Given the procedural posture of this matter, the parties shall have full post-
    sentence and appellate rights following resentencing. See Mitchell, 
    986 A.2d at 1244
    .
    -8-