Adoption of: L.U., Appeal of: S.U. ( 2023 )

J-A25014-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.U. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.U. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 428 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 075-2021.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: Z.U. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.U. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 076-2021.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.U. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.U. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 2 WDA 2023
J-A25014-22
Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 077-2021.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023
S.U. (Father), pro se, appeals the orders issued by the Westmoreland
County Orphans’ Court, which dismissed his petition to terminate the parental
rights of C.J. (Mother) regarding three of their Children. Father sought
termination, arguing that Mother was merely a “gestational surrogate,” who
lacked the parental rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The orphans’ court found that Father, a
nonresident, turned to the Pennsylvania judiciary in order to attack the parties’
operating custody order, which had been issued in West Virginia, where
Mother and the Children reside. The orphans’ court concluded it lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination petition under Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5401-5482.
After careful review, we affirm.
We preface our recitation of the factual and procedural history with a
note about the conception of the parties’ Children. The parties’ first child was
conceived through intrauterine insemination (IUI) and is not the subject of
this appeal. The remaining three Children were conceived through in-vitro
fertilization (IVF). Mother carried the embryos and gave birth to them.
Mother was listed as the mother on all three birth certificates, while Father
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was listed as the father. Mother believed Father’s sperm was used to conceive
the Children, until she learned during the West Virginia custody litigation that
this was not the case. See S.U. v. C.J., Not Reported in S.E. Rptr, 2019 WL
5692550 at *1 (W.Va. 2019). “Before the parties met, Father underwent
surgeries to correct unspecified ‘anomalies’ [….]” Id. During the West Virginia
litigation, Mother became aware that the eggs used in the birth of the parties’
Children actually came from Father, who had his own eggs harvested and
stored years prior. Id.1
In the record before this Court, Father has held himself out as “the
father” in this matter. See, e.g., Father’s Brief at 16.2 But Father has also
referred to himself as “the mother” – because his eggs were used to conceive
the Children – to advance his legal position. Id. at 3.
Father’s position is that Mother has no parental rights, because the
Children were conceived using his eggs, not hers, and because he was listed
as the father on the Children’s birth certificate. Thus, Father appears to argue
that he is the mother in fact, and the father by law. Ultimately, Father’s
gender and biology is immaterial to our disposition. We highlight these facts
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1 During the West Virginia litigation, Father had “testified that he was not a
binary male or female at birth, although he has always considered himself to
be male.” See S.U., 2019 WL 5692550 at *1. A court granted Father’s
petition to change the name on his birth certificate to his current name in
2002. Id. at *1, n.3. Although we are careful not to speculate, the record
suggests Father was born with male and female reproductive organs.
2Father’s gender was not addressed during the proceedings below, but based
upon our review of the West Virginia litigation, it appears Father uses the
“he/him” pronouns. Thus, we do the same.
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only insofar as they clarify Father’s legal position and the historical background
of this case, which the orphans’ court set forth in great detail:
Father is a registered nurse and nurse practitioner. It is
unclear where Father currently resides, but Father
previously resided in West Virginia.
Mother resides in West Virginia. The parties, who were
never married, were in a relationship for approximately 12
years, although the exact nature of their relationship is
unclear.
The parties have four children together, all of which were
conceived nontraditionally. Father did not discuss his
gender but testified that Father had his eggs harvested and
stored.
The parties first child, G.U., was born in 2011 and is not
subject to these proceedings. This child was conceived
through intrauterine insemination of Mother, which was
performed by Father. While Mother believed that [Father]
was the sperm donor for this procedure, Father did not
provide sperm and an unidentified sperm donor was used.
The parties’ second child, L.U.[1], was conceived through
IVF at Fertility Center in New York in 2014. The twins, Z.U.
and L.U.[2], born in 2016, were conceived also through IVF.
Mother is listed as the legal mother and Father is listed as
the legal father on all three of the Children’s birth
certificates.
On Father’s Termination Petition, Father alleges that he is
seeking to terminate the parental rights of a “Gestational
Surrogate.”
A hearing on Father’s Termination Petition was scheduled
for August 18, 2021. Mother was represented by [by
counsel],while [Father] appeared pro se.
Father indicated that he had initially filed Petitions in
Allegheny County in 2020. The Allegheny Court of Common
Pleas found that Father needed to provide Mother with
notice or obtain her consent. Since Father did neither, the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the
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case without prejudice and the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed. [See In re Adoption of L.U., 256
A.3d 42 (Table), 2021 WL 1998454 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non
precedential decision), allowance for appeal denied, 259
A.3d 890 (Pa. 2021)].
Father testified about the events which led to a custody
order from Mason County, West Virginia. When L.U.[1] was
born, the parties had no issues in their relationship. During
Mother’s pregnancy with the twins, Z.U. and L.U.[2], there
were medical issues which caused her to be placed on
bedrest. During this time, L.U.[1] became ill and had to be
hospitalized for weeks. Father stayed with L.U.[1] while
Mother was recovering.
For various reasons, the parties’ relationship deteriorated
during this time in which Mother was hospitalized. Shortly
before the twins were born, Father filed a Petition for
Declaration of Parentage and Motion to Seal Record in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia attempting
to prevent Mother’s name from being placed on the twins’
birth certificates.
Following a two-day hearing in October 2017, the Family
Court of Mason County, West Virginia entered a Final
Allocation Order on February 6, 2018, detailing the custodial
responsibilities of the parties. Mother was designated as the
primary residential and custodial parent of the Children.
Father was initially ordered to have custody every-other
weekend.
Father has filed a multitude of actions and petitions since
the custody order was entered awarding Mother primary
custody. The Family Court of Mason County entered an
Order prohibiting Father from making further pro se filings
as the court believed Father was continuously attempting to
undermine Mother’s ability to parent the Children.
Father testified that he wished to terminate Mother’s rights
to allow for Father’s Wife (C.U.) (“Stepmother”), to adopt
the Children, as Father has consistently identified Mother as
nothing more than a gestational surrogate who carried the
Children to birth. Father testified that the Petition to
Terminate Mother’s rights is a “collateral attack” on the
orders from West Virginia.
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Father offered few details about his residency but stated
that he had been a resident of Pennsylvania since 2020.
Father indicated that he signed a monthly lease. The court
was provided with a copy of the receipt from Airbnb which
indicated that Father rented the unit from June through
August 2021. Father provided the court with a notice from
PennDOT stating that Father had changed his address on
June 1, 2021. Father provided the court with a receipt
indicated that he had physical therapy sessions for his
shoulder thorough the summer in Pennsylvania.
Counsel for Mother alleges that Father is a vexatious
litigator who attempts to present petitions in front of any
court that will allow it.
Mother’s counsel spoke to the Postmaster of the Post Office
for Smithton, Pennsylvania, which indicated that the office
would reject any mail sent to Father’s address. Mother
doubted the legitimacy of Father’s residency, as the address
Father provided was located above a bar that was listed on
Airbnb as a rental unit which could be rented daily.
The orphans’ court scheduled an additional hearing for
October 8, 2021, to discuss any outstanding issues.
At the time of the second hearing, the court was made
aware of a filing by Father in Ohio regarding this case.
Father stated that he was unaware of this filing, while
Mother argued that the filing was a further attempt by
Father to initiate termination or custody proceedings in
another jurisdiction.
At the time of the second hearing, Father had an appeal
pending in Putnam County, West Virginia, regarding the
custody order.
Father did not provide credible testimony regarding his
residences. Father claimed that he was allowed to have two
residences at once and he exhausted all of his remedies in
West Virginia. Father acknowledged that the pending West
Virginia appeal regarded the same issues complained of in
the termination petition.
Father incredibly testified that the West Virginia Custody
Order was created “out of thin air” without Father’s consent.
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Father did not agree with Mother’s recitation of the West
Virginia Orders and continuously said the orders were void
because they were unconstitutional.
Father said multiple times in the hearing that Mother
“kidnapped” the Children from him. Mother credibly
testified that she was in a relationship with Father and the
couple spent twelve years together. During the relationship,
the two would attend events and family gatherings as a
couple. The West Virginia Courts found Mother’s testimony
regarding the relationship to be credible.
Father argued that West Virginia incorrectly determined
Mother to be credible and that Mother was nothing more
than a “court-created psychological parent.” Father
maintained that the courts of West Virginia relied on an
unconstitutional statute which makes the entire custody
order void.
Mother testified that she lives in constant fear that Father
will find a court that terminates her parental rights. She is
constantly worried that the police will show up at her home
and take the Children from her.
Father indicated that he had at least six appeals pending in
West Virginia in addition to filings in other states.
Stepmother also has appeals pending in West Virginia
regarding adoption of the Children.
Father did not offer further testimony regarding their
employment but stated that Pennsylvania is where their
desired employment was located. Father did not state if he
actually works in Pennsylvania.
In November 2021, the court was made aware that Father
filed a petition for adoptions in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia. The court and the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia had correspondence regarding the
nature of the case. The D.C. Superior Court indicated that
Father fraudulently claimed that the Children had lived with
him since birth and the “gestational surrogate” was not
involved in the Children’s lives. Father provided an address
in Washington, D.C., which was the address of a packing
and shipping company. The D.C. Court was unaware of the
custody proceedings in West Virginia and termination
proceedings in Pennsylvania. The D.C. Court was unaware
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that Mother was granted primary physical custody and that
Father’s custodial rights have been suspended.
A short hearing was held February 11, 2022, to discuss the
proceedings that had occurred in the D.C. Court.
Father indicated that he began living in Washington, D.C.,
approximately one month before filing their D.C. petition.
Father’s D.C. petition was filed on November 2, 2021.
Father indicated that he no longer lives in Westmoreland
County, Pennsylvania at the time of the hearing and was
temporarily living in West Virginia.
See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2-5 (not paginated), Findings ¶¶ 1-32 (cleaned
up).
On March 9, 2022, the orphans’ court dismissed Father's termination
petition after concluding it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. The
court further awarded Mother counsel fees and directed counsel to submit an
itemized bill within 14 days. The court issued three identical orders to
correspond with each Child’s docket.
Father filed a timely appeal, but in circumvention of Pa.R.A.P. 341 and
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018), Father failed to
file separate notices of appeal to correspond with the three orders entered on
each Child’s docket. Instead, Father listed all three dockets on a singular
notice of appeal. Violation of this Rule does not necessarily mean that the
appeal will be dismissed. As our Supreme Court clarified in Commonwealth
v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2021), Pa.R.A.P. 902 affords this Court to take
“such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, remand of the matter to the lower court so that the omitted
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procedural step may be taken.” See Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563,
569-70 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. Young, 280 A.3d
1049 (Pa. Super. 2022). Pursuant to Rule 902, this Court directed Father to
file separate notices of appeal to comply with Rule 341. Father complied, and
thus we may proceed with the merits of his appeals.
Father preserves the following issue for our review:
Did the lower court violate the Fourth Amendment by failing
to rule on the merits and/or terminate a gestational
surrogate’s false presumption of maternity that was created
through a self-operative statute against the wishes of the
biological mother ([i.e., the Father]).
Father’s Brief at 3.
Father dedicates a large portion of his Brief to argue that Mother has no
parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, because she is not a
biological parent.3 Father cites a considerable amount of case law, which is
mostly inapposite to the matter at hand. The matter before us does not
concern Mother’s status as a parent, nor the legal implications of the same.
Those issues were resolved by the West Virginia courts.4 We will not address
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3Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a parent has
a fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of the child.” See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see also D.P. v. G.J.P.,
146 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2016); and see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
4 See S.U., 2019 WL 5692550, at *3.
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them.5 We only address the portion of Father’s argument that involves the
orphans’ court decision to decline jurisdiction.
The orphans’ court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
Father’s termination petition under the UCCJEA.6 In addressing this issue, we
are guided by the following standard of review:
A court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review and will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Under
Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the
court has overridden or misapplied the law, when its
judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when there is
insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s
findings. An abuse of discretion requires clear and
convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law
or failed to follow proper legal procedures.
M.E.V. v. R.D.V., 57 A.3d 126, 129 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
“The purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition,
promote cooperation between the courts, deter the abduction of children,
avoid relitigating custody decisions of other states, and facilitate the
enforcement of custody orders of other states.” A.L.-S. v. B.S., 117 A.3d 352,
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5 “Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,
to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training
will be his undoing.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
6 The orphans’ court also postulated that it lacked jurisdiction under 23
PA.C.S.A. § 2302 (“Venue”), because neither the parties nor the Children lived
in Westmoreland County. Given our disposition, we do not address this
alternative basis.
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356 (Pa. Super. 2015). The UCCJEA was also enacted to conform state law
with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A,
which is a federal law requiring “that states give full faith and credit to another
jurisdiction’s child custody determination made in compliance with the
provisions of the PKPA.” R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 502-03 (Pa. Super. 2011);
see also U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1.
On appeal, Father reasons that the orphans’ court erred when it applied
the UCCJEA to dismiss the case. Father argues that the UCCJEA, by its own
terms, does not apply to adoption proceedings. See Father’s Brief at 26 (citing
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5403 (“Proceedings Governed by Other Law”)). Indeed,
Section 5403 of the UCCJEA states, rather directly: “This chapter does not
govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization
of emergency medical care for a child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5403.
Father’s reliance on Section 5403 is misplaced for two reasons. First,
Father’s argument is predicated upon an incorrect assumption: that there are
custody cases and then are adoption cases, and never the two shall meet.
The Uniform Law Comment to Section 5403 explains that this provision exists
as a housekeeping measure, and that there are times when the UCCJEA will
apply to an adoption proceeding:
Adoption cases are excluded from this Act [(UCCJEA)]
because adoption is a specialized area which is thoroughly
covered by the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) (1994). Most
states either will adopt [the UAA] or will adopt the
jurisdiction provisions of [the UAA]. Therefore the
jurisdictional provisions governing adoption proceedings are
generally found elsewhere.
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However, there are likely to be a number of instances
where it will be necessary to apply this Act in an
adoption proceeding. For example…the UAA requires that
if an adoption is denied or set aside, the court is to
determine the child’s custody. [] Those custody proceedings
would be subject to [the UCCJEA].
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5403 (Uniform Law Comment) (emphasis added).
Thus, even if this matter were “an adoption proceeding,” we do not
agree that the UCCJEA is per se inapplicable. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5402
(Uniform Law Comment) (“Proceedings that affect access to the child are
subject to this Act.”). We need not resolve this issue, however, because
Father’s argument fails for a more definitive reason.
The second reason Father’s argument fails is because this case does not
involve an adoption proceeding at all; rather, this is a termination of parental
rights proceeding.7 A termination proceeding is explicitly covered by the
UCCJEA. The UCCJEA defines a “child custody proceeding” as “a proceeding
for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity,
____________________________________________
7 An adoption proceeding comes after the termination proceeding. Father
understands this point well. For he correctly recognizes that, in order to
advance a cognizable termination petition against Mother, he had to aver that
there was an anticipated adoption by Stepmother C.U. (Father’s spouse). See
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903 (permitting a parent to consent to the adoption by a
spouse (i.e. the stepparent) while keeping intact their own legal relationship
with the child); see also In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1120
(Pa. 2016) (“Because a termination petition filed by one parent against the
other must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption, and because
adoption is a statutory right, we note that the parent seeking termination must
strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for
the adoption to be valid.”).
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termination of parental rights and protection from domestic violence, in
which the issue may appear.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5402 (emphasis added).
It makes sense that the UCCJEA applies to termination proceedings.
Under the rules of statutory construction, we must presume that the
Legislature did not intend to produce “an absurd or unreasonable result.” See,
e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 279 A.3d 620, 630 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)) (further citation omitted). We would reach an “absurd
result” if the UCCJEA barred a Pennsylvania court from modifying a parent’s
out-of-state custody order (see, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5423 (Jurisdiction to
Modify Determination)) but permitted the same Pennsylvania court to forever
terminate that parent’s custody rights. Not only would such a result be
illogical, but it would also create the potential for parental misuse of our
termination procedure.8
We are not dissuaded from our conclusion simply because the statutory
provisions governing the involuntary termination of parental rights fall under
the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511-2514. The UCCJEA clearly
governs the jurisdictional implications of involuntary termination proceedings
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8 See, e.g., M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1129 (“Given that the complete and
irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe
steps a court can take, we must ensure that we do not open the floodgates to
such gamesmanship.”); see also M.R.D., 124 A.3d at 1134 (Wecht, J.,
Concurring) (“[T]o allow custody litigants to invoke [termination] petitions as
a weapon would foster the creation of orphans and provide parents with a
new, and in our view dangerous, tactic in heated custody disputes; indeed,
one can imagine routine cross-petitions for termination as part of custody
battles.”) (further citation and quotation omitted).
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involving one parent against the other. Courts must “presume that the
General Assembly is familiar with extant law when enacting legislation.”
Raymond, 279 A.3d at 629 (citing White v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 53
A.3d 720, 731 (Pa. 2012) (further citation omitted)).
Having concluded that the UCCJEA governs this proceeding, we now
address whether the orphans’ court properly applied the Act when it declined
jurisdiction. Instantly, the courts in West Virginia have adjudicated the
parties’ custody litigation for years. In our view, the most applicable section
of the UCCJEA is Section 5423 (Jurisdiction to Modify Custody
Determination).9 As noted above, the termination of a parent’s rights is, at
its core and to put it lightly, a modification of parental custody rights.
Section 5423 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in Section 5424 (relating to
temporary emergency jurisdiction) a court of this
Commonwealth may not modify a child custody
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9 We might also conclude that the orphans’ court lacked jurisdiction, because
another forum – West Virginia – has jurisdictional priority under the “first in
time rule.” See M.E.V. v. R.D.V., 57 A.3d 126, 129 (Pa. Super. 2012); see
also 23 Pa.C.S.A.§ 5326 (“Simultaneous proceedings”) (further citations
omitted). But in order to reach this conclusion, we would first have to
conclude that there are simultaneous proceedings in West Virginia. Although
the parties’ case has been the subject of extensive litigation in West Virginia,
the current status of that litigation is unknown.
In any event, it is more prudent to analyze this matter under 5423
(Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Determination). The issue here is not exactly
about which state is better suited to adjudicate the family’s custody claim in
the first instance. The issue is whether Father may turn to Pennsylvania to
modify (or, in Father’s words, “collaterally attack”) the West Virginia custody
order.
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determination made by a court of another state unless a
court of this Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an
initial determination under Section 5421(a)(1) or (2)
(relating to initial child custody jurisdiction) and:
(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer
has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Section
5422 (relating to exclusive, continuing jurisdiction) or
that a court of this Commonwealth would be a more
convenient forum under Section 5427 (relating to
inconvenient forum); or
(2) a court of this Commonwealth or a court of the other
state determines that the child, the child’s parents and
any person acting as a parent do not presently reside
in the other state.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5423.
As applied, we first observe that the exception to Section 5423 – i.e.,
Section 5424 (relating to emergency jurisdiction) – is not applicable; the
Children are not even present in the Commonwealth, let alone in need of
emergency protection. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5424(a). With the exception to
Section 5423 unavailable, we apply the rest of the statute.
For the Westmoreland County Orphans’ Court to have jurisdiction to
resolve the termination petition, the orphans’ court needed jurisdiction to
make “an initial custody determination” under Section 5421(a)(1) or (2). We
conclude that the orphans’ court correctly determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. This is because:
Pennsylvania was never the Children’s home state;10 nor was it that case that
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10 Section 5402 defines “Home state” as: “The state in which a child lived
with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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no other state had jurisdiction (West Virginia plainly had jurisdiction); nor was
it the case that West Virginia declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground
that Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
5421(a)(1), (2).
Our application of Section 5423 may end here. Yet, it bears noting that
even if Father survived the inquiry thus far, he would still have to satisfy either
Section 5423(1) or (2). Father would not survive those inquires either: West
Virginia has not determined that it no longer has exclusive continuing
jurisdiction; West Virginia has not determined that Pennsylvania would be a
more convenient forum; and the Westmoreland County Orphans’ Court has
not determined that the Children and Mother left West Virginia. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 5423(1), (2).
Finally, we note the reason the orphans’ court found most dispositive –
that no one in this family lives in Pennsylvania. Thus, even if orphans’ court
determined that it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, the court still had the
authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that Pennsylvania
was an inconvenient forum. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427(a)-(b).
In short, the orphans’ court did not error or abuse its discretion when it
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to adjudicate Father’s
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immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the
case of a child six months of age or younger, the term means the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period
of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.”
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5402.
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termination petition. The court’s orders dismissing Father’s petitions were
proper.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/6/2023
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