Com. v. Copeland, D. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAVID COPELAND :
:
Appellant : No. 2452 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 16, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006040-2016
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2022
Appellant David Copeland appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(IDSI) and related offenses. Appellant raises claims concerning the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We
affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history
of this matter as follows:
[The victim] testified to two instances of sexual abuse by
Appellant, both of which occurred when she was only five years
old. N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 30. At the time of the alleged
offenses, [the victim’s] mother and Appellant were in a romantic
relationship. Id. at 47, 95-96. [The victim] occasionally spent
the night alone at Appellant’s home. Id. at 32. On other
occasions, [the victim] and her sister, L.W., stayed overnight with
Appellant. Id. at 32, 38-39, 132-33. L.W. testified that their
mother was not present when the girls slept there. Id. at 134.
Appellant’s residence was comprised of one large room, a hallway,
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and a bathroom. Id. at 33-34, 99-100. The main room contained
a television and Appellant’s bed. Id. at 33-34. [The victim]
testified that the first incident of abuse occurred when she and
Appellant were alone in his home. Id. at 32. [The victim] recalled
“sitting” on Appellant’s bed as she played “a fairy princess [video]
game” on the TV. Id. at 35. At some point, Appellant repositioned
[the victim], laid her on her stomach, and pulled her pants down.
Id. at 36. Appellant subsequently engaged in anal intercourse
with her. Id. at 36. [The victim] explained that his penis went
“inside” of her “anal section” multiple times before the abuse
stopped. Id. at 36-37.
A couple of weeks later, Appellant abused [the victim] again in a
nearly identical manner. Appellant picked up [the victim] and
L.W. from their aunt’s house and drove them to his home. N.T.
2/28/18 at 38. [The victim] recalled that Appellant “wanted to
spend time with [them]” and that the girls’ mother was not
present. Id. at 37-39. [The victim] testified that she was laying
on Appellant’s bed and watching TV when, at some point, L.W.
left to use the bathroom. Id. at 41. Appellant, who had been
sitting on the bed, moved closer to [the victim] and “pulled down”
her clothes. Id. at 42. Appellant engaged in anal intercourse with
[the victim] and stopped when L.W. reentered the room. Id. at
44. [The victim] testified that both episodes of abuse “felt weird”
and caused her pain. Id. at 43.
[The victim] first disclosed Appellant’s abuse to her mother when
she was seven or eight years old. N.T. 2/28/18 at 46, 105-07.
However, “nothing happen[ed],” as [the victim’s] mother did not
take her to report the crimes to authorities. Id. at 54-55. A year
or two later, [the victim] also reported the incidents to her sister
and maternal aunt. Id. at 50-51, 55-61. Once again, no one
reported the allegations to authorities. Id. at 61. In 2014, [the
victim] disclosed the underlying offenses to a counselor at her
school, who contacted the police. Id. at 69-70, 112. Appellant
was eventually arrested and charged with the above offenses on
June 1, 2016. Id. at 17.
Based on these facts, following a waiver trial on February 28,
2018, this court found Appellant guilty of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse with a child (IDSI), unlawful contact with a
minor, endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC), corruption of
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minors, and indecent assault of a person less than thirteen.[1]
Sentencing was deferred for the completion of a pre-sentence
investigation [(PSI)] report and mental health evaluation.
On July 16, 2018, this court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
7 1/2 to 15 years’ incarceration, followed by 7 years of
probation.[2] Appellant was also ordered to complete literacy
classes. On July 26, 2018, Appellant filed two post-sentence
motions for reconsideration, arguing that his sentence was
“unnecessarily harsh.” Following a hearing on August 20, 2018,
this court denied the motions.[3]
Trial Ct. Op., 1/13/22, at 1-3.
After the trial court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
tunc on November 24, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in
which he challenged the sufficiency the evidence supporting his IDSI
conviction, the discretionary aspects of his sentence, and the validity of his
convictions in light of the character evidence he presented at trial. The trial
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), and
3126(a)(7), respectively.
2 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to ten years’
incarceration for IDSI and two and a half to five years’ incarceration for
unlawful contact, to be served consecutively. The trial court also sentenced
Appellant to concurrent terms of seven years’ probation for EWOC, indecent
assault, and corruption of minors.
3 At the post-sentence motions hearing, the Commonwealth noted that the
trial court’s original sentencing order included a seven-year probation
sentence for corruption of minors, which exceeded the five-year statutory
maximum for a first-degree misdemeanor. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104. The trial
court explained that the mistake was due to a clerical error and issued a
corrected sentencing order reflecting a five-year probation sentence for
corruption of minors. See Corrected Sentencing Order, 8/20/18. However,
the order did not affect Appellant’s aggregate sentence.
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court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s sufficiency and
sentencing claims but concluding that Appellant waived his claims concerning
character evidence.
On appeal, Appellant raises several issues, which we have reordered as
follows:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for
unlawful contact with a minor as there was no evidence that
Appellant intentionally contacted/communicated with the
complaining witness for the specific purpose of committing any
crime?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts for
IDSI, unlawful contact with a minor, endangering welfare of
children, corruption of minors and indecent assault, as
Appellant presented substantive evidence of his good character
for being peaceful and law-abiding, which raised a reasonable
doubt and rendered the evidence insufficient on each element
of each crime?
3. Did Appellant’s substantive evidence of his good character for
being peaceful and law-abiding create a reasonable doubt as to
the charges of IDSI, unlawful contact with a minor,
endangering welfare of children, corruption of minors and
indecent assault. This reputation evidence was even more
compelling where the Commonwealth introduced no
corroborating forensic evidence as to assaults that occurred
approximately nine years prior to any investigation taking
place?
4. Was the consecutive-in-nature sentence excessive and more
than necessary to protect the public, vindicate the victim and
rehabilitate an Appellant with no prior criminal record and who
is amendable to complete rehabilitation?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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Sufficiency – Unlawful Contact
In his first claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor. Id. at 25.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that
he intentionally contacted a minor for the purpose of committing a crime. Id.
at 27. Instead, he asserts that “the evidence only established physical
contact” and there was “no actual communication that was done for the
purpose of committing an assault.” Id. Appellant contends that without
evidence of “verbal or non-verbal contact preceding or during the assaults . .
. the evidence was insufficient to prove the ‘contacts’ element of the crime of
unlawful contact.” Id. at 28.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard
of review is as follows:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder.
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Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
Section 6318 of the Crimes Code defines unlawful contact with a minor,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is
intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement officer
acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed the
identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity
prohibited under any of the following, and either the person
initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this
Commonwealth:
(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to
sexual offenses).
* * *
“Contacts.” Direct or indirect contact or communication by any
means, method or device, including contact or communication in
person or through an agent or agency, through any print medium,
the mails, a common carrier or communication common carrier,
any electronic communication system and any
telecommunications, wire, computer or radio communications
device or system.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6318.
Further, it is well settled that “the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as
that testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the
charged crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa.
Super. 2018).
With respect to the “contact” element, this Court has explained:
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[T]he crime of unlawful contact with a minor focuses on
communication, verbal or non-verbal, and does not depend
upon the timing of the communication. Thus, it matters not
whether the communication occurred at the outset of or
contemporaneously with the contact; once the communicative
message is relayed to a minor, the crime of unlawful contact is
complete. Thus, the statute is best understood as “unlawful
communication with a minor,” for by its plain terms, it prohibits
communication with a minor for the purpose of carrying out
certain sex acts.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582, 587 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some
formatting altered, emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Velez, 51 A.3d 260 (Pa. Super. 2012), the
defendant was convicted of unlawful contact with a minor after a woman found
the defendant molesting her daughter, who was “lying on the bed, nude from
the waist down, with her knees up and defendant’s head between her legs.”
Velez, 51 A.3d at 262. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
Commonwealth failed to prove the “contact” element, as there was no
evidence “that he unlawfully communicated with the victim for purposes of
engaging in the prohibited sex acts.” Id. at 266. In rejecting the defendant’s
claim, this Court explained that “[t]he victim would not have had her pants
removed and her legs in that position absent previous contact by [the
defendant], either verbal or physical.” Id. Therefore, the Velez Court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove indecent contact, as it
was “reasonable to infer that [the defendant] directed the victim, either
verbally or nonverbally, to unclothe below the waist and to assume that pose.”
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Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sufficiency claim as follows:
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Appellant verbally
communicated with [the victim] for the purpose of committing a
sexual offense. [The victim] explicitly stated she could not
remember whether Appellant said anything to her during the
underlying incidents. N.T. 2/28/18 at 36, 41. Nonetheless, the
evidence establishes that Appellant physically communicated
with, directed, and/or instructed [the victim] and that he did so
with the specific intent to commit IDSI.
In describing the first incident of abuse, [the victim] testified that
she was sitting on Appellant’s bed as she played a video game.
Id. at 35-36. She explained that Appellant moved her from her
seated position and laid her on her stomach, immediately before
removing her clothes and engaging in anal intercourse with her.
Id. at 35-36, 41-43. By repositioning and undressing [the victim],
Appellant physically instructed her to submit to his depraved
sexual desires. It is reasonable to infer that [the victim] would
not have been unclothed, on her stomach without Appellant’s
physical instruction, direction, and/or communication. Moreover,
Appellant’s actions were clearly meant to, and did, facilitate the
illicit sexual activity that followed. Thus, the evidence is sufficient
to prove Appellant unlawfully contacted [the victim] for the
purpose of committing IDSI, and his conviction should be
affirmed.
Trial Ct. Op. at 7.
Following our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find no error in
the trial court’s conclusions. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. As noted by the
trial court, the evidence established that Appellant physically repositioned the
victim and removed her clothes for the purpose of committing IDSI. See N.T.
Trial, 2/28/18, at 35-36, 41-43. Although there was no direct evidence of any
overt verbal communication between Appellant and the victim, it was
reasonable to infer that Appellant communicated with the victim, either
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nonverbally or verbally, to assume the position she was in when she was
assaulted by Appellant. See Velez, 51 A.3d at 262. Therefore, the evidence
was sufficient to prove the “contact” element of IDSI. See id. Accordingly,
Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Effect of Character Evidence
In his next two claims, Appellant argues that all of his convictions were
improper in light of evidence that he had “a reputation in the community for
being peaceful and law-abiding.” Appellant’s Brief at 29.
First, Appellant argues that although the victim’s testimony was
sufficient to prove the charges against him, “there was substantive evidence
of good character, [which] simply diminished the testimony well below the
evidentiary threshold of beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 30. Therefore,
Appellant argues that his good character evidence “render[ed] each element
of each crime insufficient.” Id. Additionally, with respect to waiver, he argues
that he did “not specify any one element of a crime because his argument is
that every element of every charge was rendered insufficient by Appellant’s
substantive character evidence for being peaceful and law abiding.” Id.
Second, Appellant argues that the “character evidence—in itself—is
enough for reasonable doubt.” Id. at 32. In support, he emphasizes that “no
investigation occurred until approximately nine years after the assaults
allegedly took place,” and that “in a case where there was no forensic evidence
to corroborate that an assault took place, [] credibility was of [the] utmost
importance.” Id. Finally, Appellant contends that although the trial court
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treated his claim as “a weight argument in disguise,” he “believes that an
argument based on good character evidence is an argument that should stand
on its own.” Id.
As noted previously, the trial court found that Appellant waived both of
these claims. Specifically, the trial court explained:
Appellant purports to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim for
each of his convictions. In support of his claim, Appellant notes
that he presented “substantive evidence of his good character,”
see Rule 1925(b) Statement at 2, and the Commonwealth did not
present forensic evidence to corroborate the underlying
allegations. However, Appellant’s arguments unwittingly
challenge the weight of the evidence. No relief is due under either
theory, as (a) any claim relating to the sufficiency of the evidence
is waived for want of specificity, and (b) Appellant did not preserve
a weight claim for appeal and, therefore, any claim directed to the
weight of the evidence is waived.
Trial Ct. Op. at 8 (footnote omitted).
The trial court further stated:
In Appellant’s 1925(b) statement, he does not argue that there is
a lack of evidence supporting any of the statutory elements [for
IDSI with a child, EWOC, corruption of minors, or indecent
assault]. Appellant also does not claim there is a lack of evidence
establishing him as the perpetrator of the alleged offenses.
Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is too imprecise to
enable meaningful review. Further, this court is not obligated to
reframe the issues or address Appellant’s unpreserved claim.
Thus, Appellant’s sufficiency claims are waived, as he wholly failed
to satisfy the mandates of Rule 1925(b).
Id. at 11-12.
Following our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusions. In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant did not specify which
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elements of each conviction Appellant sought to challenge on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013) (reiterating
that a Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or
elements that were insufficient, particularly when there are multiple
convictions for crimes that contain more than one element). Therefore,
Appellant’s sufficiency claim is waived. See id.Further, to the extent Appellant argues that the trial court should have
credited his character witnesses instead of the victim, that claim goes to the
weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M.,
Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Super. 2007) (discussing a claim that the trial
court erred in crediting the testimony of one witness over another, and noting
that “such arguments go to the weight, not sufficiency, of the evidence”); see
also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(explaining that, unlike a weight claim, a sufficiency challenge does not include
an assessment of credibility). Because Appellant did not preserve a weight-
of-the-evidence claim before the trial court, that issue is waived. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (stating that a weight claim must be preserved in a post-
sentence motion, a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to
sentencing). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Discretionary Aspects of Sentence
In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that the trial court’s sentence
was “unreasonable because it was manifestly excessive, much too long[,] and
more than necessary to protect the public and vindicate the victim, and failed
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to consider the characteristics of [] Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. In
support, Appellant contends that “[t]he consecutive nature [of his sentence]
was excessive in light of [] Appellant’s good character, lack of a prior criminal
record, potential for complete rehabilitation, and because the sentence was
much more than needed to protect the public.” Id. Further, he asserts that
although the “sentence did consider [] Appellant’s rehabilitation, it did not
sufficiently consider his lack of prior record and great potential for complete
rehabilitation.” Id. at 23. Therefore, he concludes that the trial court abused
its discretion by sentencing him to consecutive terms of incarceration. Id.
“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle
an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,
991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Before reaching the merits of such
claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.
Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised
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for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,
1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal”).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his sentencing claim
by filing a post-sentence motion, a timely notice of appeal, and including the
issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f)
statement in his brief. Therefore, we must consider whether Appellant has
presented a substantial question for review.
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d
1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question
exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the
sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d
793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to
impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being
imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to
the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.”
Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). This Court has also stated that “ordinarily, a claim
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that the sentencing court failed to consider or accord proper weight to a
specific sentencing factor does not raise a substantial question.” Id.(emphasis in original).
However, “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an
assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a
substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70
(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). Further, this Court has held that an appellant’s
“challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive,
together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs
and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial
question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Here, in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that although his
individual sentences were within the recommended guideline range, his
aggregate sentence “was excessive due to its consecutive nature” and in light
of the mitigating factors in this case. Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Therefore,
we conclude that Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review.
See Swope, 123 A.3d at 340. Accordingly, we will review the merits of
Appellant’s sentencing claim.
Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
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judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,
[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and
[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892
A.2d 843, 848 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
“[T]he trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of
the offense and the character of the defendant,” including the defendant’s
“prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (citations omitted). This Court has held that “where the
sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI report], it will be presumed that he
or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s
character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors.” Id. at 1135 (citation omitted). This Court may only disturb a
standard range sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered
the application of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9781(c)(2).
Additionally, it is well settled that “Pennsylvania law affords the
sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
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consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to
sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hoag,
665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that an appellant is not
entitled to a “volume discount” by having sentences run concurrently).
Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s
sentencing claim as follows:
In the case at bar, Appellant argues that the consecutive framing
of his 7 1/2 to 15-year sentence is “excessive.” This court
disagrees. Appellant has a prior record score of zero. IDSI with
a child, the lead charge in this case, has an offense gravity score
of 14. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.15. The offense is subject to a
maximum penalty of forty years’ incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S. §
3123(d)(1). Accordingly, the standard-range sentencing
guidelines recommend a minimum term of incarceration between
six and twenty years for a single IDSI conviction. Appellant’s
entire aggregate sentence falls on the lower end of this standard
range. Thus, Appellant’s sentence is presumptively reasonable.
See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super.
2006).
The consecutive framing of Appellant’s sentence accounts for the
fact that [the victim] was a five-year-old prepubescent child when
he sexually assaulted her, Appellant assaulted her on more than
one occasion, and Appellant abused his role as a caretaker in one
of the most gruesome ways imaginable. Moreover, Appellant’s
actions have had a severe impact on the [victim]. As the
Commonwealth noted at sentencing,
[the victim] has suffered severe, emotional distress as she
was growing up. . . . [I]n some cases such as this there is a
level of shame that a child . . . carries around with them.
What the court does not know is she did suffer from several
suicide attempts. She did try to stab herself [with] a knife.
. . . She also tried to overdose on pills and spoke to medical
staff about having thoughts about taking her mother’s
prescription medication and trying to overdose on those.
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This is a child who will need trauma counseling for the rest
of her life[,] and it took a lot of courage for her to come
forward.
N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/16/18, at 9-10.
Finally, this court reviewed Appellant’s [PSI] report prior to
sentencing and found no significant mitigating factors. When a
sentencing court is informed by a PSI, it is presumed that the
judge was aware of relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and “weighed all relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character against any mitigating
factors.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa.
Super. 2020). Thus, it can be presumed that this court was aware
of and considered all relevant information in sentencing Appellant,
and Appellant’s claim must fail.
Trial Ct. Op. at 16-17 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The trial court had the benefit
of a PSI and considered the appropriate sentencing factors and mitigating
evidence as stated at the sentencing hearing. See Ventura, 975 A.2d at
1135. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that an aggregate sentence of
seven and one-half to fifteen years’ incarceration was necessary in light of the
circumstances of this case and the impact of Appellant’s crimes on the minor
victim. See Trial Ct. Op. at 16-17. Under these circumstances, we have no
basis upon which to conclude that the trial court’s application of the guidelines
was “clearly unreasonable” or that the trial court abused its discretion in
structuring Appellant’s sentences consecutively. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9781(c)(2); Austin, 66 A.3d at 808. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/31/2022
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