In the Interest of: J.L., Appeal of: L.T. ( 2022 )

J-A15013-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: L.T., MOTHER :
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:
:
: No. 141 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000027-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 142 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000025-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 143 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000026-2021
J-A15013-22
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2022
L.T (“Mother”) appeals from the December 20, 2021 orders involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to two daughters, Ja.L. and Jo.L. 1, and a son,
J.B. We affirm.2
Mother is a Kenyan immigrant and has no family in the United States.
J.B., Ja.L., and Jo.L. were born in the United States in December 2010, June
2013, and October 2014, respectively.3 The Allegheny County Office of
Children, Youth and Families (“OCYF”) has had extensive involvement with the
family since 2016, when the juvenile court issued an emergency protective
custody order removing the children from Mother’s care due to Mother’s
mental health, homelessness, substance abuse, and domestic violence. The
juvenile court initially adjudicated the children dependent on January 11,
2017, but within six months, it closed the dependency cases based upon
Mother’s substantial compliance with the permanency plan and progress
toward alleviating the underlying circumstances which necessitated the
original placement.
____________________________________________
1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of J.E.L., the
individual that Mother identified as the father of Ja.L and Jo.L. Although J.E.L.
participated in the evidentiary hearing, he did not appeal the order terminating
his parental rights.
2 This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte.
3 J.B.’s father, A.B., died on May 19, 2015.
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The orphan’s court succinctly summarized the ensuing history as
follows:
Less than two years after the initial case closed, Mother and
her children again came to the attention of OCYF. The children
were removed from Mother for a second time on February 3, 2019,
via an Emergency Protective Custody Order. OCYF Caseworker,
Tiffany Haten, testified that this removal occurred when Mother
“called 911 several times asking the police to come to her home
to party” during the Super Bowl. [N].T. 11/19/21 at 32-[3]3.
Ms. Haten testified that when the police arrived, “Mother was
highly intoxicated and her responses to the police went from
flirtatious to combative.” Mother refused to allow the police to use
her phone to locate a friend or family to come care for the children,
all of whom were with Mother at the time. Id. Consequently,
Mother was charged with three counts of endangering the welfare
of children. The police transported Mother to Jefferson Hospital,
where she had a physical and verbal encounter with hospital
personnel, and received additional charges of aggravated assault
and harassment. Mother was incarcerated on the charges and the
children were taken into protective custody.
The sisters, Ja.L. and Jo.L., were placed in the same foster
home that all of the children had been in during their previous
time in foster care and J.B. was placed by himself in a separate
home. The children were adjudicated dependent again pursuant
to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) on March 6, 2019. At the time of
adjudication, this Court found that Mother was incarcerated, had
immigration concerns, and “had a drug and alcohol assessment at
the jail that recommended long term in patient treatment.” Order
of Adjudication dated April 6, 2019. This Court further found that
“[J.B.] and [Ja.L.] do not wish to visit mother at this time.” Id.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/8/22, at 4-6 (cleaned up) (some citations to the record
omitted). All three children have remained in the same pre-adoptive foster
home since January 31, 2020.
Mother’s goals under the family service plans (“FSP”) included
addressing her drug and alcohol abuse, mental health problems, and
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parenting deficiencies. In addition, she was required to maintain adequate
housing and satisfy the medical, therapeutic, and developmental needs of the
children. As Mother was concerned that in-patient substance abuse treatment
would impair her employment and consequently place her immigration status
in jeopardy, the juvenile court directed Mother to undergo a drug and alcohol
evaluation to determine an alternative treatment option. The court also
directed Mother to participate in coached supervised visitations with the
children.
Mother had seven permanency review hearings throughout the course
of this case which took place from May 22, 2019 through August 4, 2021. The
orphans’ court summarized the sporadic ebb and flow of Mother’s progression
during this period as follows:
Mother accomplished moderate compliance with the permanency
plan, but achieved minimal overall progress. This court found that
Mother’s therapeutic visitation with her son, J.B., had ended in
June because of Mother’s inconsisten[t participation], that she had
attended only five out of 35 drug and alcohol screens and one of
those screens had been positive for THC, that she did not have
independent housing but was staying with a friend, and that while
Mother’s visitation with her daughters, Ja.L. and Jo.L., was fairly
consistent overall [and] visits went okay, there were still concerns
that [M]other gets easily frustrated with the children. There have
been several instances where [M]other is late to visits or she
leaves the visits to go get food for the kids.
Id. at 8-9 (cleaned up) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
On February 1, 2021, OCYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
(b). The orphans’ court appointed separate counsel to represent the distinct
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legal interest of each of the children. During the ensuing evidentiary
proceedings over a video conferencing platform, OCYF presented, inter alia,
the testimony of Neil Rosenblum, PhD, who evaluated the family on four
occasions since 2017, Tiffany Haten, the OCYF caseworker assigned to the
family since 2019, Laura Burlbaugh, the Pressley Ridge caseworker
responsible for scheduling and supervising the visitations, Mary Safran, a
prevention specialist with Family Resources, and K.W., the pre-adoptive foster
mother who has cared for the children for more than two years. Finally, the
agency introduced several exhibits including, inter alia, Dr. Rosenblum’s four
evaluation reports, the most recent dated July 31, 2021, which the orphans’
court admitted without objection.
Mother testified and presented the maternal grandmother, who has
never visited the United States but provides Mother emotional and financial
support from Kenya.
On December 20, 2021, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to the three children. Mother filed notices of appeal from the involuntary
termination orders and simultaneously filed concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 4 The
orphans’ court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 8, 2022.
Mother presents the following questions for our review:
____________________________________________
4 The orphans’ court granted Mother leave to file the appeals nunc pro tunc.
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s brief at 8. J.B.’s counsel filed a brief in support of the termination of
Mother’s parental rights. We note with disapproval that neither counsel for
Jo.L. nor counsel for Ja.L. filed a brief advocating their respective client’s legal
interest in this appeal.
In reviewing Mother’s two issues, we must determine whether the
orders are supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of C.M., 255
A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this standard, appellate courts must
accept the orphans’ court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if
they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123
(Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the
evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of
L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
Simply put, “An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion,” or “the facts could
support an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827
(Pa. 2012). Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion
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“only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference
we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings. Interest of S.K.L.R., supra at 1123–1124.
The involuntary termination of parental rights requires a bifurcated
analysis. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The orphans’ court must initially determine
whether the conduct of the parent warrants termination under § 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for
termination under § 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition
under § 2511(b), which involves a child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the
petitioner must prove grounds under both § 2511(a) and (b) by clear and
convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., supra at 359
(quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa.
1998)).
We need only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), along with
§ 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of
K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted). In
this case, we analyze the orders pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows.
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. . . . .
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under § 2511(a)(2) due
to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct and may also
include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental duties. In re S.C.,
247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). We have long
recognized that a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
At a termination hearing, the orphans’ court may properly reject as untimely
or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow through on necessary services when
the parent failed to cooperate with the agency or take advantage of available
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services during the dependency proceedings. In re S.C., supra at 1105
(citation omitted).
In determining that OCYF presented clear and convincing evidence to
establish the statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the
orphans’ court highlighted that Mother is incapable of providing essential
parental care to the children, as highlighted by her inability to comply with the
FSP goals relating to her mental health problems, substance abuse, parenting,
housing, and visitation, or make significant progress toward reunification. In
sum, the orphans’ court reasoned,
Mother’s failure to comply with the goals set for her by OCYF and
this [c]ourt or to even make significant progress on those goals
constituted “repeated and continued incapacity” to parent her
children and that that incapacity “cannot or will not be remedied”
as required by subsection (a)(2). Further, [noting that] the
children had been out of Mother’s care for approximately 24
consecutive months at the time the petition was filed and 34
months at the time of the termination hearings . . . this [c]ourt
acknowledges [that] Mother began to make some incremental
improvements after the filing of the petition to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Superior Court has been
clear that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent
attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claim of progress and hope for the future.” In the
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Therefore, this [c]ourt concluded that due to Mother’s lack of
progress on her goals that it is, regrettably, not possible that the
conditions which led to the children’s removal will be remedied in
a reasonable period of time.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/8/22, at 22-23.
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Mother contends that the orphans’ court erred in finding that OCYF
presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to remedy the
conditions that led to the children’s removal, which she limits to the
intoxication which led to her arrest. Mother’s brief at 19-20. Mother ignores
the effect of her mental health problems on her struggles with substance
abuse. She continues that the orphans’ court overlooked her progress in
substance abuse treatment in reaching the contrary finding that she cannot
remedy the underlying conditions. Id. at 20-21. The crux of Mother’s
argument is that the court placed too much weight upon Dr. Rosenblum’s
expert assessment that Mother tended to minimize her substance abuse. Id.
at 21-23. Instead, Mother relies upon her own testimony to bolster her claim
that “she has made efforts to remedy the conditions that led to the removal
of the children.” Id at 22. In addition, noting that OCYF permitted J.B. to
dictate his participation in therapeutic visitation, and conveniently ignoring
evidence establishing her parenting deficiencies in relation to the two younger
children, Mother challenges the court’s consideration of her lack of progress
toward reunification. Id. at 23.
The certified record belies Mother’s contentions. First, Mother’s
characterization of the conditions that led to the children’s removal is too
narrow. While Mother’s acute intoxication triggered the emergency protective
custody order, it was not the sole cause of her incapacity. Actually, various
deficiencies concerning mental health, substance abuse, housing, and
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parenting contributed to the removal of the children, and the agency fashioned
goals to address those specific conditions. Furthermore, as the orphans’ court
highlighted in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, Mother failed to make consistent
progress toward these goals and in attending visitations with the children. We
address Mother’s efforts as to these components seriatim.
As to mental health, the orphans’ court reasoned that until immediately
before the filing of the underlying petition to terminate her parental rights,
Mother’s compliance with her mental health treatment regimen was
inconsistent with Dr. Rosenblum, the court-appointed evaluator, describing a
poor prognosis of improvement. Hence, the court determined that “Mother
had not sufficiently met her mental health treatment goal, her lack of
compliance directly impacts her ability to parent her children, and she is
unlikely to remedy this condition in the foreseeable future.” Trial Court
Opinion, 3/8/22, at 17.
We agree with the orphans’ court’s rationale. During the evidentiary
hearings, Dr. Rosenblum confirmed that Mother periodically engaged in
mental health treatment during the dependency proceedings, but failed to
participate in any consistent course of treatment. N.T., 11/19/21, at 84.
Mother has been diagnosed with, inter alia, alcohol use disorder, adjustment
disorder, and personality disorder with antisocial, histrionic, and narcissistic
features. Id. at CYF Exhibit 4. However, when Dr. Rosenblum pressed Mother
about the specific goals of her mental health treatment, she informed him that
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the goals “were largely just to get her children back.” Id. As Dr. Rosenblum
explained, “that is not really a mental health goal.” Id. Indeed, he found that
Mother’s glib response indicates that she is not “using mental health treatment
to understand the concerns about her lifestyle, the concerns about her inability
to function effectively as a parent, [and] the excesses and impulsivity in her
behavior. Th[ese areas of concern were] consistently missed by Mother.” Id.
As Mother could never identify what aspect of her mental health she was
supposed to be treating, Dr. Rosenblum had the impression that Mother was
simply going through the motions of treatment in order to appease her OCYF
caseworker. Id. In sum, he opined, “there has not been an ability to utilize
treatment effectively because there is a very limited ability to recognize and
take ownership of the problems that have lead to her children to now be in
care over an extended period of years.” Id. Phrasing this concept differently,
Dr. Rosenblum observed, “[a]ttending treatment and benefitting from the
treatment are two very different things.” Id. at 85. Hence, the record
supports the orphans’ court’s finding that, despite her improved attendance
at treatment, Mother cannot or will not remedy her mental health problems.
Next, as to Mother’s substance abuse problem, the orphans’ court
highlighted Mother’s minimization of her substance abuse, failure to attend all
but five of urine screens scheduled since 2019, and the fact that one of the
few urine samples that she actually submitted tested positive for THC. Thus,
the orphans’ court determined, “Mother does not fully appreciate the impact
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[that] her substance abuse has had on her children and that her lack of
understanding may lead to a relapse and repeated behavior if the children
were returned to her care.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/8/22, at 16. The certified
record sustains the orphans’ court’s concerns.
Tiffany Haten, the OCYF caseworker, testified that based upon mother’s
history of substance abuse and the alcohol-related events that triggered the
agency’s involvement with the family in 2019, Mother was directed to address
her drug and alcohol problems as a qualification of reunification. N.T.,
11/19/21, at 181. Mother initiated treatment in a dual diagnosis treatment
program, but was quickly discharged in February 2019. Id. at 184-85. She
claimed to have engaged in a subsequent dual diagnosis program but
Ms. Haten was never able to verify Mother’s participation. Id. at 185-86.
Mother started individual drug and alcohol therapy on August 6, 2020,
approximately six months before OCYF filed the underlying petition, and
attended approximately fifty-three of sixty-two sessions. Id. at 187.
Notwithstanding Mother’s eventual participation in this aspect of her
treatment, she not only failed to demonstrate any progress but she also
established a pattern of minimizing her problem with drugs and alcohol.
Similar to his description of Mother’s efforts to address her mental health
concerns, Dr. Rosenblum testified that Mother was simply going through the
motions to appease OCYF. Id. at 84. Rather than confront her substance
abuse problems, Mother consistently informed Dr. Rosenblum that she did not
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have a problem and questioned why drug treatment was necessary. Id.
Again, Dr. Rosenblum opined, “to utilize treatment effectively[,] one has to
acknowledge what the problems are that you are working on. I have never
been able to identify that with Mother over a period of years.” Id. at 85.
Mother’s minimization of her substance abuse problem is most clearly
exemplified by her utter disregard for the court-ordered urine screens.
Indeed, Ms. Haten confirmed that Mother attended only five of the forty-two
urine screens schedule since the case was reopened in 2019. Id. at 189-90.
Of the five samples submitted, Mother once tested positive for THC, which she
attributed to her close contact with people who regularly ingested medical
marijuana. Id. at 190; N.T., 12/16/21, at 128. As the certified record
supports the orphans’ court’s determination that Mother failed to appreciate
the impact of her substance abuse upon J.B., Ja.L. and Jo.L., we do not disturb
it.
Mother also neglected her goals relating to housing, parenting, and
visitation. First, as to the housing component, Mother testified that she still
has not secured stable housing for the family. Id. at 87-88. In fact, at the
time of the evidentiary hearing, she was living in temporary housing that was
inappropriate for the children. Id. at 131-32. Although Mother claimed that
her compliance with the housing component was imminent, the orphans’ court
exercised its discretion, as the ultimate arbiter of fact, to reject that assertion.
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In relation to Mother’s parenting and visitation with J.B., Ja.L. and Jo.L.,
Ms. Haten testified that Mother was twice discharged from parenting classes.
N.T., 11/19/21, at 193. While Mother ultimately completed a parenting class
at Family Resources, her instructor, Mary Safran, testified that Mother did not
employ the information properly during the coached supervised visitations
with the children. Id. at 129, 148-49. Ms. Safran described several instances
that highlighted her ultimate position that Mother is immature, elevates her
feelings over the children’s, and is unable to recognize her children’s needs
without guidance and redirection. Id. at 135-37, 146-147, 149. One incident
involved Mother focusing her attention on her own concerns rather than
assisting the children with homework. Id. at 147. Another example
concerned Mother’s inability to be truthful with the children about her housing
situation and providing a false sense of hope by placing the blame on OCYF.
Id. at 148. The most representative episode required Ms. Safran to terminate
Mother’s visitation with Ja.L. and Jo.L. after Ms. Safran approached Mother
about speaking on the phone in the hallway for nearly ten minutes during the
visitations. Id. at 153. Ms. Safran explained that, having previously advised
Mother she should not utilize her telephone during the supervised visitations,
“I waited over ten minutes and went out in the hallway and I asked her if
there was anything that I could [do to] help and she just [went] ballistic[.]”
Id. In sum, Ms. Safran opined that Mother remains incapable of recognizing
the children’s feelings without redirection and that unsupervised visitation still
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is not recommend. Id. at 148-49. Critically, Ms. Safran’s concerns about
Mother’s parenting aligned with Dr. Rosenblum’s assessment: “I don't doubt
that [M]other loves the children, but her immaturity, her impulsivity and her
poor decision-making . . . prevent[ed the] children from developing a sense
of security and stability and a sense of being centered in their life, which they
do now have.” Id. at 87-88.
Having discussed the nature of Mother’s interactions with the children
as it relates to her parenting, generally, we separately address Mother’s
attendance during the supervised visitations. First, as to J.B., Mother and J.B.
had separate therapeutic visitations, which were scheduled to occur at TRAC
Services for Families at the child’s discretion. Id. at 195. J.B. initially agreed
with the therapeutic visitations; however, TRAC closed services after J.B. grew
frustrated with Mother’s inconsistent attendance and refused to participate.
Id. at 210-11. Throughout the duration of this juvenile court matter, Mother
attended five in-person visits with J.B., five virtual visits, and one therapeutic
visit through TRAC. Id. at 53-54. J.B. has not attended a supervised
visitation with Mother since April 2021—two months after OCYF filed the
petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. N.T., 12/16/21, at 41.
Ms. Haten outlined Mother’s visitation schedule with the two younger
children as follows. Initially, Mother was granted two supervised visitations
per week. N.T., 11/19/21, at 196. During the COVID-19 pandemic, one of
the weekly visitations was virtual. Id. However, the virtual visitations were
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subsequently terminated due to Mother’s lack of attention to Ja.L and Jo.L.
during the sessions. Id. As described by Ms. Haten, “Mother would be nodding
off during the visits . . . talking to others in the background and . . . rush[ing]
the children off the visit because she was planning to go out[.]” Id. at 197.
Thus, while Mother’s attendance at visitations with Ja.L and Jo.L. was
relatively consistent, because of Mother’s behavior and lack of development,
the visits never progressed beyond one supervised visitation per week. Id.
In light of the foregoing evidence, we discern no basis to upset the
orphans’ court’s conclusion that, for three years, Mother failed to achieve her
goals as to mental health, substance abuse, parenting and visitation and that
she is not likely to complete those components within a reasonable time.
Phrased differently, Mother’s persistent incapacity has caused J.B., Ja.L., and
Jo.L. to be without the essential parental control necessary for their physical
and mental well-being. Hence, the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its
discretion in finding that OCYF proved by clear and convincing evidence the
statutory grounds to terminate parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).
Next, having found that the certified record supports the orphans’
court’s determination pursuant to § 2511(a), we review the court’s needs-
and-welfare analysis to determine whether the orphans’ court gave “primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of” J.B., Ja.L., and Jo.L. in terminating Mother’s parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). With respect to § 2511(b), this Court has stated that the orphans’
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court “must . . . discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with
utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.”
In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
Further,
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent.
In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Our Supreme Court has explained, “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In
re T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of
childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed, “[c]hildren
are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to
their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too
often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
Once more, Mother argues that the record is not sufficient to support
the orphans’ court’s determination. Specifically, she asserts that she has
unique relationships with each of the children that is centered on their Kenyan
heritage and culture, which she believes are best served by maintaining her
parental rights. Mother’s brief at 24-25. Again, no relief is due.
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Relying upon Dr. Rosenblum’s expert testimony, the orphans’ court
determined that terminating Mother’s parental rights best served the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of all three children.
Specifically, the court first observed that eleven-year-old J.B. “no longer ha[s]
a primary attachment to Mother,” and since the initiation of the case in 2019,
J.B. has consistently and repeatedly stated his desire to be adopted. Trial
Court Opinion, 3/8/22, at 23. As to the younger children, the court found
that, despite having a rapport with Mother, termination served the needs and
welfare of Ja.L. and Jo.L. because both children are benefiting from their
experiences in the foster home and “any impact on the children if [Mother’s]
right[s] were terminated would be mitigated by the strong support and love
the children received in their foster home.” Id. at 25. The court essentially
adopted Dr. Rosenblum’s conclusion that “after two years[,] it appears that a
goal of adoption is the only . . . outcome that can provide the girls with a
stable and secure family life that they can depend on through the duration of
their childhood and adolescent years.” Id. (quoting OCYF Exhibit 4). As
explained infra, the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s
determination.
In relation to J.B., Dr. Rosenblum testified the termination of Mother's
parental rights would not be detrimental to J.B. N.T., 11/19/21, at 93. He
noted that J.B. “has essentially already severed th[e] emotional bond” with
Mother and he unequivocally endorses adoption. Id. at 124-25. In fact,
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Dr. Rosenblum believed that it would be more detrimental to J.B. if he were
removed from the current pre-adoptive foster home. Id. at 125-26.
Dr. Rosenblum agreed in his “professional opinion to a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty that the benefit to [J.B.] of termination is substantial
and the loss or the detriments to [J.B.] of termination is minimal[.]” Id. at
125. Hence, we discern no error in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that
terminating Mother’s parental rights serves J.B.’s needs and welfare.
Similarly, as to the younger children, Dr. Rosenblum testified in favor of
adoption within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty. Id. at 115,
126. He noted that Mother did not display the characteristics of trust, safety,
security, sound judgment, and supervision. Id. at 91. Generally, he
explained,
[J.B.] and the girls have really benefited from the opposite of what
they experienced with their mother. They have a stable family
life, they go to the same school, they have activities that they
participate in, they have consistent discipline and structure and
their needs are being very well met.
Id. at 87.
Relating to the severance of the parent-child bonds, Dr. Rosenblum
observed, “the girls will miss their mother, but they also have developed very
healthy, strong attachments to the foster parents.” Id. at 92. He continued,
“the girls certainly relied on their foster parents to meet their emotional and
developmental needs to a greater extent -- a far greater extent than they rely
on their mother,” who “has been reduced to a once a week visitor for close to
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three years[.]” Id. In contrast, as a periodic playmate, Mother is not viewed
by the children as someone who will protect them or “guide them in a secure
direction.” Id. In sum, Dr. Rosenblum concluded, “I believe that the girls will
be sad, but I don't believe that it will cause them severe or irreparable harm.”
Critically, he observed that any impairment can be addressed gradually in
therapy. Id.
Dr. Rosenblum’s conclusion is consistent with the testimony of other
witnesses concerning the girls’ desire to be adopted. In this vein, Ms. Safran
testified that Ja.L. and Jo.L. are happy and thriving in their placement and ask
her “when they are [going to be] adopted.” Id. at 199. Ja.L.’s yearning for
adoption is plain. Id. at 216, 219-20. While Jo.L. sometimes equivocates,
she is anxious for the ordeal to end. Id. at 216-17. Likewise, the pre-adoptive
foster mother testified that all three children wish to be adopted, even though
the younger girls prefer to maintain some form of post-adoption contact with
Mother. N.T., 12/16/21, at 39-41. Although the foster mother did not
explicitly assent to continued contact, she agreed that she is best suited to
assess “whether or not [the children should] have ongoing contact with
[M]other” following the adoptions. Id. at 39, 41.
Thus, as demonstrated by the foregoing evidence, the certified record
supports the orphans’ court’s finding that severing the existing parental bonds
would not be detrimental to the children and that the developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare of J.B., Ja.L., and Jo.L. favor terminating
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Mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, based upon our review of the record,
we find the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/22/2022
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